Charles D. Pierce

In this insurance coverage dispute, plaintiffs sought additional uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits under multiple automobile policies after an accident, arguing that anti-stacking provisions in the policies were inconspicuous, ambiguous, or inapplicable because the policies were issued by two different but affiliated companies. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding the provisions enforceable and limiting total recovery to the highest single-policy limit. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the anti-stacking language was clearly expressed, consistently referenced throughout the policies, and not in conflict with other terms, thereby precluding stacking of benefits across the policies. The court rejected arguments based on reasonable expectations and placement of the provisions, concluding that plaintiffs were fully compensated by payment of the motorcycle policy limit.

business & regulatory

The case involved a defendant convicted of felony menacing after an altercation in a store parking lot where he scratched and pinched the victim, stated he was HIV positive, and attempted to bite the victim while fleeing from a suspected theft. The defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove his statement was a threat, that he possessed a deadly weapon, or that he used one. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to show the defendant's conduct was intended to threaten the victim with imminent serious bodily injury through the use of his HIV status as a deadly weapon. The focus was on the defendant's intent rather than the victim's actual fear, and the actions of scratching and attempting to bite demonstrated the use of a deadly weapon.

criminal law

The case involved a dispute over whether an oral settlement agreement reached during mediation in a tort action for the death of Macy Joseph Price, Jr., in a plane crash could be enforced by the court. The trial court enforced the alleged oral agreement, but the appellate court reversed, holding that Colorado's Dispute Resolution Act requires a signed written agreement for court enforcement of mediated settlements. The court's reasoning centered on the plain language of section 13-22-308(1), which outlines specific steps including reducing the agreement to writing, signing it, presenting it to the court, and obtaining court approval, and the confidentiality provisions that bar using mediation communications to prove an oral agreement.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved a workers' compensation claim by Sherry Mosley for permanent impairment benefits following a 1998 work-related car accident, where the parties disputed the final whole-person impairment rating after multiple medical examinations and two administrative orders. The Industrial Claim Appeals Office affirmed a 31% impairment rating but denied Mosley's request for attorney fees. On review, the court held that the employer had waived its challenge to the non-thoracic portion of the rating by failing to contest it in the first petition for review, that the administrative law judge properly addressed the thoracic spine impairment based on the evidence presented, and that the denial of attorney fees required reconsideration because the employer had raised a new argument in its second petition. The court affirmed the impairment determination, set aside the fee denial, and remanded for further proceedings on fees.

labor & employmentprocedure

In Ainscough v. Owens, union members and organizations challenged the constitutionality of Governor Bill Owens's 2001 executive order and a related payroll deduction policy that ended the practice of state agencies automatically deducting union dues from employees' paychecks and forwarding them to unions. The plaintiffs argued that the policy violated their right to free speech, conflicted with state statutes on payroll deductions, and breached administrative procedures. The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they could not show injury to a legally protected right, as no Colorado constitutional or statutory provision guarantees state-implemented deductions for union dues. The court further noted that the executive order expressed only a policy preference without legal compulsion and caused no direct injury.

labor & employmentfree speech

In People v. Stovall, the trial court denied restitution after a defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and other charges and received a sentence of life without parole plus 896 years, reasoning that ordering restitution would be futile given the defendant's lack of assets and the resources required. The People appealed, arguing the denial violated the restitution statute. The appellate court reversed, holding that under § 18-1.3-603(1), C.R.S.2002, a court may deny restitution only upon a specific finding that no victim suffered pecuniary loss, which was not made here. The court reasoned that the statute's plain language and legislative declarations require restitution whenever a pecuniary loss exists, regardless of the defendant's ability to pay or the costs of collection. The case was remanded for reconsideration consistent with the statute.

criminal law

In Price Mine Service, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, the dispute concerned liability for workers' compensation benefits after a claimant suffered additional injuries in a 1999 car accident while returning from authorized medical treatment for a 1997 work-related injury. The court held that the original insurer, TIG, was liable rather than the employer as an uninsured entity at the time of the second accident. The core reasoning was that injuries occurring during travel for treatment qualify as compensable consequences of the original industrial injury under the quasi-course of employment doctrine, which connects such events to the employment contract and treats them as part of the initial claim instead of a distinct event.

labor & employment

In this case, investors who purchased interests in limited liability partnerships for prepaid cellular services sued promoters, a law firm, and others, alleging violations of the Colorado Securities Act, Consumer Protection Act, Organized Crime Control Act, and related common law claims based on fraudulent promotion and sales. After partial settlements with some defendants, the plaintiffs sought class certification for their remaining claims against the law firm and another defendant, but the trial court denied the motion under C.R.C.P. 23(b)(3), finding that individual issues predominated. The appellate court reversed the denial, holding that common questions of law and fact—such as whether the interests were securities and whether offering documents contained misrepresentations—predominated over individual issues, and that a class action could be superior for adjudication. The court remanded with directions for the trial court to reassess predominance, consider partial certification of issues or claims, and potentially create subclasses to address any remaining individual matters, such as investors' level of participation in the partnerships.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this post-dissolution case, the mother appealed the trial court's order increasing child support from $700 to $989.36 per month after the father won $5 million in the lottery, where the child has cerebral palsy and the mother has sole custody. The appellate court reversed the order and remanded for entry of a new support order. The core reasoning was that the trial court improperly imputed income to the mother based on a 40-hour work week, failing to account for her need to care for the disabled child, and that the new order must consider the father's lottery winnings and both parties' current circumstances under relevant precedents.

family law

In People v. Pineda, defendant Sandra Pineda was convicted by a jury of child abuse resulting in serious bodily injury and appealed both the conviction and her thirty-two-year sentence. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting challenges to the trial court's excusal of a prospective juror with an attention deficit disorder who sought to take notes, denial of defense counsel's motion to withdraw for lack of funds, the constitutionality of the child abuse statute under § 18-6-401(1)(a) against a vagueness claim, unrecorded bench conferences and hearings as harmless error, and the imposition of the maximum aggravated sentence. The court held that the trial court's discretionary rulings were not an abuse of discretion, the statute provided adequate notice and limits when read with ordinary meaning, any recording omissions did not affect the fairness of the trial or ability to review issues on appeal, and sentencing complied with guidelines without improper considerations.

criminal lawprocedure

This case was a negligence action brought by Mary Lee Sheron against Lutheran Medical Center, its subsidiary West Pines, and clinician Janice Vernon after her husband was discharged following an overdose and suicide risk assessment and committed suicide the next day. The jury found each defendant negligent in conducting the mental status examination and risk assessment, awarding damages that the trial court reduced by 30 percent based on the husband's contributory negligence. The appellate court affirmed, holding that a proposed instruction on the emergency room physician's exclusive authority was properly refused because defendants had not designated the physician as a non-party under the comparative fault statute and the instruction would have misled the jury, that the clinician was correctly instructed on the applicable standard of care, and that plaintiff had not made a prima facie showing of willful and wanton conduct to support exemplary damages.

torts & liabilityhealthcare

The case involved a lawsuit by Ajay Sports, Inc. (ASI) as a creditor against Michael Casazza, a director of Pro-Mark, Inc. (PMI), alleging that PMI made an unlawful distribution of assets (including MacGregor stock) to its original investors while insolvent, without paying ASI for marketing and other services rendered to PMI. The jury found Casazza liable on the creditor claim under Delaware law and awarded ASI compensatory and exemplary damages, which the trial court entered as a judgment. The appellate court affirmed, holding that ASI had standing to sue, that sufficient evidence supported the finding of insolvency and the unlawful nature of the distribution, and that exemplary damages could properly be apportioned among multiple defendants according to their individual culpability.

business & regulatory

The case involved defendant Thomas Whatley, who was convicted by a jury of second degree assault on a peace officer after an altercation during his arrest from a vehicle stop, with the jury finding the act occurred upon sudden heat of passion, reducing it to a class 6 felony. Whatley appealed, arguing the trial court erred by refusing a self-defense instruction, allowing prosecution questions about his notice of a potential civil lawsuit against the city for injuries, and denying dismissal on equal protection grounds comparing the charge to third degree assault and resisting arrest. The court affirmed the conviction, reasoning that self-defense was not supported because Whatley denied committing any assault rather than admitting the conduct and seeking justification, that evidence of the civil claim was relevant to show economic interest in the outcome, and that the statutes contain real differences in elements and mental states rationally related to varying penalties.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a developer challenging two town ordinances amending land use rules: one reducing allowable site coverage and another requiring affordable housing mitigation for new developments. The court upheld the site coverage reduction, finding substantial compliance with procedural requirements sufficient to satisfy due process. It invalidated the affordable housing ordinance as violating a state statute banning rent control on private residential property, since the required deed restrictions limited rents and sales prices. The court also reversed the dismissal of declaratory relief claims, determining a justiciable controversy existed regarding conflicts with prior entitlement agreements.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This workers’ compensation case concerned the proper computation of permanent medical impairment benefits for a minor claimant who suffered a compensable injury at age nineteen and reached maximum medical improvement with a nine percent whole person rating. The employer and insurer had admitted liability using the claimant’s actual temporary total disability rate, but the Administrative Law Judge and Industrial Claim Appeals Office ruled that benefits must instead be calculated at the statutory maximum temporary total disability rate. The court affirmed, holding that the minor’s statute (§ 8-42-102(4)) expressly requires permanent disability benefits to be paid at the maximum rate to address minors’ lower earnings and longer working lives, and that this provision can be harmonized with the later-enacted permanent impairment formula in § 8-42-107(8) to give effect to both statutes. The court rejected arguments that the age factor in the impairment formula supplanted the minor’s statute, noting the legislature had not explicitly repealed the special protection for minors.

labor & employment

In Singleton v. Kenya Corp., the widow of a worker who suffered a compensable industrial injury sought death benefits after her husband died from unrelated causes before reaching maximum medical improvement. The Industrial Claim Appeals Office had denied the claim, requiring that the worker reach MMI prior to death for permanent disability benefits to vest. The court set aside the order, holding that under section 8-42-116, C.R.S.1997, dependents may recover death benefits based on posthumous proof that the injury proximately caused permanent total or partial disability, as the statute provides for unaccrued benefits without mandating prior adjudication or MMI.

labor & employment

The case involved two workers' compensation claims by widows of uranium miners who developed lung cancer from occupational radon exposure; diagnosis occurred in 1993 and deaths in 1994. The Industrial Claim Appeals Office held the Subsequent Injury Fund liable for death benefits exceeding $10,000 per case, applying the pre-April 1, 1994 version of Colo. Sess. Laws 1990, ch. 62, § 8-41-304(2), which shifted excess liability to the fund when an employee had prior injurious exposures. The SIF argued that the fund's closure under the 1993 amendments to §§ 8-41-304(2) and 8-46-104 meant no liability for claims vesting after the closure date. The court affirmed, reasoning that the fund remained responsible for consequences of occupational diseases occurring before closure, that legislative history showed intent to close the fund only to new cases while preserving existing liabilities, and that death benefits were not treated as a separate occupational disease under the statute.

labor & employment

In this workers’ compensation case, claimant Leonard Culver sought review of an order allowing his employer, insurer, and the Subsequent Injury Fund an offset against his permanent total disability benefits for social security retirement benefits he had begun receiving before his 1992 industrial injury; he also challenged the constitutionality of the offset statute under equal protection guarantees, while the SIF cross-appealed its share of liability. The court affirmed the Industrial Claim Appeals Panel’s order, permitting the offset and requiring the SIF to pay 40% of benefits based on a prior 1981 farm injury. The core reasoning was that the plain language of § 8-42-103(1)(c)(II) authorizes the offset for retirement benefits without requiring actual prior receipt of disability benefits or proof of double recovery, as the statute coordinates workers’ compensation with social security retirement provisions to prevent duplication of wage-loss benefits; separately, the prior injury qualified as industrial for SIF apportionment purposes because it arose from employment-related activities cognizable under the Act, even without insurance coverage.

labor & employmentcivil rights

In this workers’ compensation case, claimant Raymond Stolworthy challenged a final order allowing his employer, insurer, and the Subsequent Injury Fund to offset his permanent total disability benefits by the amount of social security retirement benefits he and his wife received, and he argued that the authorizing statute, § 8-42-103(1)(c)(II), violated equal protection. The court affirmed the order and upheld the statute’s constitutionality. It held that the retirement offset applies whenever a claimant receives social security retirement benefits, regardless of whether the claimant is entitled to social security disability benefits, because the latter only limits the offset amount and does not affect its applicability. The equal protection claims were rejected on the basis of precedent finding rational distinctions between permanent total and partial disability claimants and between claimants injured before or after age 45.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This workers’ compensation case concerned whether the cost of Medicare coverage should be factored into an injured worker’s average weekly wage for permanent total disability benefits after her COBRA continuation of employer-provided health insurance ended. The court affirmed the Industrial Claim Appeals Office’s ruling that the claimant’s $46.10 monthly Medicare premium must be included, reducing her average weekly wage from $398.53 to $216.71. The decision rested on the plain language of § 8-40-201(19)(b), which requires inclusion of “the employee’s cost of conversion to a similar or lesser insurance plan” once employer-plan continuation terminates, and treats Medicare as qualifying under that provision without regard to the original employer cost or FICA contributions. The court rejected arguments that the statute should instead preserve the pre-injury value of employer-paid benefits.

labor & employmenthealthcare