Richard Lance Gabriel

The case concerned whether two groups of plaintiffs were entitled to attorney fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 after prevailing in a lawsuit that challenged a Bachelor Gulch Metropolitan District traffic regulation banning construction traffic from Strawberry Park subdivision roads. The district court had invalidated the regulation on state-law grounds and later dismissed the plaintiffs' added federal constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as moot, but it awarded nearly $1 million in fees based on those federal claims. The appellate court reversed the fee award to Beaver Creek because it had added its substantive due process and equal protection claims only after the court had already ruled in its favor on the core state-law issues. It affirmed the award to Strawberry Park, however, because Strawberry Park's constitutional claims had been present from the outset, were supported by evidence that the regulation was arbitrary or pretextual, and therefore were not "obviously without merit" under the applicable test for substantiality. The matter was remanded solely to determine the amount of reasonable appellate fees due to Strawberry Park.

civil rightsprocedure

This case arose from a dispute over lien priorities on real property in Chaffee County after a series of loans, deeds of trust, and a subordination agreement between Colorado Capital Bank and Bent Tree, LLC. The district court dismissed certain declaratory judgment claims by Tomar Development and the Damyanovichs, holding that Colorado would likely follow the partial subordination approach, under which Bent Tree's foreclosure on the first deed of trust would extinguish the plaintiffs' junior liens. The plaintiffs sought interlocutory appellate review of that ruling and related orders under C.A.R. 4.2. The Colorado Court of Appeals denied the petition, concluding that the record did not demonstrate either that immediate review would promote a more orderly or final disposition of the litigation or that the orders involved controlling questions of law, given the presence of numerous other pending claims, the plaintiffs' ability to amend their pleadings, and the possibility that equitable theories could produce the same outcome.

propertyprocedure

In this workers' compensation case, claimant Jimmy Lassiter sought ongoing post-MMI medical benefits (known as Grover benefits) after a 2009 ALJ order awarded him permanent partial disability benefits based on a DIME physician's rating and recommendation for further treatment, following a 2007 work-related injury. The employer argued that Lassiter had waived those benefits by failing to request them at the PPD hearing, that the claim had closed, and that the ALJ's general reservation clause reserving undecided issues was insufficient to preserve the claim. A second ALJ agreed with the employer and denied the benefits, but the Industrial Claim Appeals Office Panel reversed, holding that the reservation clause preserved the issue. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the Panel, ruling that the clause prevented waiver and allowed remand for a determination on the merits of the Grover benefits request.

labor & employment

This case involved Vulcan Power Company and its directors appealing a Colorado district court's refusal to give preclusive effect to an Oregon court's order compelling arbitration or to compel arbitration of counterclaims in a statutory action to remove corporate directors. The counterclaims, brought by former CEO Stephen Munson and shareholders, sought removal of directors partly on grounds related to Munson's termination. The Colorado Court of Appeals dismissed the portion of the appeal challenging the denial of issue preclusion for lack of jurisdiction under the Uniform Arbitration Act, as that issue did not arise from a motion to compel based on an arbitration agreement. It affirmed the refusal to compel arbitration, holding that the employment contract's arbitration clause applied only to contests of termination itself and did not cover the distinct statutory claims for director removal, which sought equitable relief rather than contract remedies and did not mirror arbitrable disputes.

procedurelabor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case concerns a post-dissolution dispute in which the husband sought to set aside or modify provisions of the 1994 divorce decree that divided marital property, specifically requiring him to pay a portion of his future Social Security benefits to the wife and to make monthly payments for her health insurance or care. The court held that the Social Security provision was void as it violated the anti-assignment clause of the federal Social Security Act and was preempted by the Supremacy Clause, consistent with rulings from other states, and that equitable estoppel did not bar the challenge. The court further determined that the health care payments were properly characterized as part of the property division rather than modifiable maintenance, based on the parties' explicit agreement language and the absence of contrary evidence of intent. The order was therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part, with remand for further proceedings on the marital property division.

family lawpropertyfederal power

In Sanderson v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., the plaintiff sought damages for bad faith breach of an underinsured motorist policy after his insurer offered $30,000 to settle a claim that an arbitration panel later valued at over $850,000 (net of offsets). The district court granted summary judgment to the insurer and denied leave to add an exemplary damages claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the insurer was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the claims were fairly debatable on both factual questions of comparative fault and legal questions regarding PIP offsets, giving the insurer a reasonable basis to contest the amount owed without acting in bad faith. The court further concluded that the insurer's settlement offer and handling of the arbitration did not support a finding of bad faith on the record presented, rendering the exemplary damages amendment moot.

torts & liability

This case involves a dependency and neglect proceeding in Colorado in which the Department of Social Services took custody of a child, E.C., due to reports of domestic violence by the father and concerns about the parents' ability to provide a safe home. The father appealed an order from the dependency and neglect court allocating parental responsibilities for the child to her maternal aunt. The Colorado Court of Appeals remanded the case for further proceedings because the record contained no evidence that the Department had complied with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act, even though the parents had indicated at a shelter hearing that the child might have Apache Indian heritage. The court held that the Department was required to make continuing inquiries and provide notice to any identified tribes or the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and directed the lower court to determine on remand whether such steps had been taken and to document them in the record.

family lawcivil rights

This case involved a dispute among beneficiaries of the McNulty Ranch Trust over the 2000 sale of the trust's ranch property by trustee Sondra Muratori to her son Scott Saunders, followed by Scott's later resale of the land at a substantial profit. Several beneficiaries petitioned to remove Sondra as trustee, sought an accounting and surcharge, and claimed breach of fiduciary duty and related relief against Sondra and Scott. Prior to trial, the parties participated in mediation that produced a settlement stipulation requiring additional payments into the trust and releases among the parties, but one beneficiary, Kevin Saunders, later objected that he had not agreed to the terms and challenged the district court's authority to approve it. The district court approved the modified stipulation after finding it prudent, offered in good faith, fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the parties, considering the costs of continued litigation and expert evidence on damages; the appellate court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion and that Kevin had waived certain objections.

family lawpropertyprocedure

In this unemployment compensation case, claimant Jason G. Mounkes sought review of an order disqualifying him from receiving benefits after a hearing officer found he had intentionally falsified a letter to his employer, Sears Roebuck & Co., reporting his arrest for DUI and marijuana possession. The Industrial Claim Appeals Office affirmed the disqualification under section 8-73-108(5)(e)(VII), which bars benefits for intentional falsification of expense accounts, inventories, or other records or reports. The court determined that the claimant's letter was not a "report" within the statute's meaning, applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis to interpret "other records or reports" as limited to documents relating directly to an employer's assets and liabilities, akin to expense accounts and inventories. Accordingly, the court set aside the Panel's order and remanded the case for an award of benefits to the claimant.

labor & employment

The case arose from a 2002 home purchase by Samuel Barnett from Elite Properties of America, Inc. (Classic Homes), after which the septic system failed, leading to county orders, loss of use, and foreclosure; Barnett sued on multiple claims including breach of warranty and fraud. The district court compelled arbitration on most claims, confirmed the resulting arbitration award (which granted limited damages to Barnett but favored Classic Homes overall), and granted summary judgment to Classic Homes on constructive fraud and civil conspiracy claims based on issue preclusion from the arbitration findings. The Court of Appeals affirmed confirmation of the arbitration award but reversed the summary judgment, holding as a matter of first impression that an arbitral determination is not final for issue preclusion purposes until certiorari review is completed in both the Colorado Supreme Court and U.S. Supreme Court, and remanded the fraud and conspiracy claims for further proceedings after such resolution.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

The case involved the adjudication of a minor, A.D.T., for acts constituting unlawful sexual contact and harassment against another minor at a family crisis center. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the juvenile court's judgment, holding that the court erred by reviewing only one of nine Department of Human Services files of the victim in camera, failing to disclose relevant documents, and not making sufficient findings to support nondisclosure. The court also found that any error regarding the exclusion of a security video was harmless. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether Waste Management's roll-off container services for waste removal and its contracts with hauling companies to transport trailers were subject to sales and use taxes under the City of Commerce City's tax code. The district court granted summary judgment to Waste Management, concluding the transactions were not taxable, and the appellate court affirmed that ruling. The court reasoned that neither service involved the furnishing of tangible personal property, because Waste Management did not sell, lease, rent, or separately charge for the containers, and the hauling agreements were for services in which the transportation companies retained control and paid all costs for their equipment. The opinion interpreted the code to exempt such incidental equipment use in service transactions and resolved any doubt in favor of the taxpayer.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether certain print and television advertisements by Senate Majority Fund and Colorado Leadership Fund during the 2008 election cycle constituted "express advocacy" under Colorado's campaign finance provisions in article XXVIII of the state constitution, which would have required the organizations to register as political committees and comply with contribution limits and reporting rules. Colorado Ethics Watch argued that the ads, which discussed candidates' qualifications and urged voters to contact them, amounted to express advocacy and thus triggered regulation. The court held that the phrase "expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate" is limited to the "magic words" of direct exhortation identified in Buckley v. Valeo and their synonyms or substantial equivalents, and does not extend to the functional equivalent of such advocacy. Because the ads lacked any express call to elect or defeat candidates, the court affirmed the administrative law judge's dismissal of the complaint.

electionsfree speech

In People v. Connors, the defendant was charged with underage drinking and driving (UDD), possession of a controlled substance outside its original container, and possession of marijuana; he pleaded guilty to the UDD charge under a plea agreement, resulting in dismissal of the two possession charges. Four years later, after the court expunged the UDD conviction pursuant to section 42-4-1715, the magistrate also ordered expungement of the dismissed possession charges on the ground that partial expungement of a case was not feasible. The appellate court affirmed the expungement of the UDD conviction but reversed the expungement of the possession charges. It held that the plain language of section 42-4-1715 authorizes expungement only of records concerning a UDD conviction and does not extend to other charges, even those arising from the same case, and that allowing such expungement would produce results inconsistent with the narrower sealing provisions of section 24-72-308.

criminal lawprocedure

In Patterson v. BP America Production Co., royalty owners alleged that BP improperly deducted post-production costs such as compression and transportation from their natural gas royalty payments under uniform lease agreements after federal deregulation, without providing adequate notice of the change to a netback calculation method. The district court certified a class of approximately 4,000 owners, and BP appealed the order on grounds that individualized issues of notice and reliance predominated. The appellate court affirmed the certification, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion because common questions of law and fact arising from identical contractual language and circumstantial evidence of lack of notice predominated over any individual issues.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

The case involved Laura Taylor's appeal of the State Personnel Board's dismissal of her petition for a declaratory judgment. Taylor, who had performed newborn screening follow-up work for the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment since 1985 through various arrangements including as an independent contractor and through a third-party employer, sought a declaration that she had been a classified state employee from 1985 onward and was entitled to associated benefits such as PERA retirement credits. The court affirmed the Board's decision denying relief, reasoning that common-law employment definitions do not apply to the state personnel system, which is limited to classified, exempt, and temporary positions under the Colorado Constitution; that Taylor suffered no cognizable injury given her employment history outside the merit-based system; and that a statute expressly excludes retirement credit for prior non-system service when an employee enters the system.

labor & employmentprocedure

In People v. Daniels, the defendant was convicted of second-degree assault after punching his live-in girlfriend, resulting in a fractured rib and a grade-three splenic laceration. The defendant appealed, claiming the prosecution failed to prove serious bodily injury under section 18-1-901(3)(p) because the rib fracture was not shown to be second- or third-degree. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, interpreting the statute to hold that any break or fracture qualifies as serious bodily injury, with the phrase "of the second or third degree" modifying only burns. The court based this on the statute's grammar, punctuation, and legislative history, and thus did not address whether the spleen injury independently met the definition.

criminal law

In People v. Daniels, the defendant was convicted of second-degree assault after punching his girlfriend, causing her a fractured rib and a grade-three splenic laceration. The defendant argued on appeal that the injuries did not qualify as "serious bodily injury" under Colorado law because the prosecution had not shown the rib fracture was of the second or third degree or that the spleen injury created a substantial risk of death or impairment. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the statutory definition of serious bodily injury treats any break or fracture as sufficient without requiring a specific degree, as the degree qualifier applies only to burns. The court reached this conclusion through statutory interpretation, finding that the plain language and structure of section 18-1-901(3)(p) support applying the "second or third degree" modifier solely to burns.

criminal law

In Lujan v. Life Care Centers of America, the case concerned whether a valid arbitration agreement existed when a son signed admissions paperwork, including an arbitration clause, for his mother upon her readmission to a nursing home, acting as her health care proxy due to her dementia-related incapacity. The plaintiffs, the daughter's estate and family, sued for wrongful death and other claims, and Life Care moved to compel arbitration. The district court denied the motion, and the appellate court affirmed, holding as a matter of first impression that Colorado health care proxy statutes authorize proxies only for medical treatment and benefit decisions, not for arbitration agreements. The court reasoned that proxies differ from agents under powers of attorney, their authority must be construed narrowly, and the strong policy favoring arbitration cannot create authority absent statutory basis.

healthcareprocedure

This case arose from a products liability lawsuit in which plaintiffs obtained a judgment against Goodyear for damages related to defective hoses, including an award of 'other costs and losses' allocated according to the jury's findings of fault, plus prejudgment interest determined on remand. After the parties discussed accrual dates for the interest, Goodyear's counsel sent an email with charts calculating the total amount due; plaintiffs' counsel recognized that the charts erroneously applied 100% liability to Goodyear instead of the jury's 36% and 48% allocations but attempted to accept the figures as a settlement offer. The district court ruled that a valid and enforceable settlement agreement had been formed. The appellate court reversed, holding that the email and charts did not constitute an offer capable of acceptance and that any agreement based on them would be unenforceable due to the obvious mathematical error that plaintiffs sought to exploit. The matter was remanded solely to allow filing of a satisfaction of judgment for amounts already paid.

torts & liabilityprocedure