David Furman

In this post-dissolution proceeding, Lucey V. Walker appealed the denial of her C.R.C.P. 59 post-trial motion in a maintenance dispute with her former husband, after her related appeals were consolidated. The Colorado Court of Appeals dismissed all appeals, ruling that the two consolidated appeals were moot and that the primary appeal in 09CA0510 was untimely under C.A.R. 4(a). The court reasoned that Walker's C.R.C.P. 59 motion, filed nearly four years after she obtained an extension to secure a hearing transcript, was itself untimely because she failed to diligently prosecute it by updating the trial court on her efforts or filing promptly after learning no transcript was available, and therefore did not toll the 45-day appeal deadline. The court found her supporting affidavits conclusory and insufficient to show diligence, noting she provided no explanation for the additional four-month delay after the transcript issue was resolved.

family lawprocedure

This case involved a claimant fired from a beef packing plant after testing positive for marijuana at work under the employer's zero-tolerance policy, who then sought unemployment benefits. A hearing officer awarded benefits on a no-fault basis, finding the employer failed to prove the confirming lab was licensed or certified as required by statute, but the Industrial Claim Appeals Office Panel reversed and imposed disqualification. The court set aside the Panel's order and remanded to reinstate the hearing officer's decision, holding that the statute expressly requires proof of a licensed or certified testing facility to support disqualification and that the record supported the hearing officer's finding of no such proof. The court did not reach issues about medical marijuana use or impairment.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case concerned whether a 37-acre parcel of vacant land in Denver, previously classified as agricultural, should retain that status for property tax years 2007 and 2008 after construction work for road widening disrupted its use. The Denver County Board of Equalization reclassified the property as commercial vacant land, but the Board of Assessment Appeals reversed that decision and ordered the agricultural classification restored based on the land's inclusion in a larger farm unit enrolled in a federal conservation program. The Court of Appeals reversed the BAA, holding that the property did not qualify as agricultural land under C.R.S. § 39-1-102(1.6)(a)(I) because it had not been placed in the conservation program until 2007 and was not being restored through conservation practices or an approved plan during the relevant prior years. The court reasoned that the statutory requirements for agricultural classification must be strictly met and that the BAA's interpretation lacked a reasonable basis in law.

taxesproperty

The case involves the termination of parental rights of A.L.L. and D.Z. to their child C.Z. in a dependency and neglect proceeding, where the child is an Indian child subject to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The trial court terminated the rights after finding beyond a reasonable doubt that continued custody would likely cause serious emotional or physical damage to the child and that the county department had made active efforts to provide remedial services. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the termination judgment, clarified procedures for withdrawal and substitution of court-appointed appellate counsel in such cases under C.A.R. 3.4, and held that the department's services satisfied the ICWA active efforts requirement despite references to reasonable efforts in earlier orders. The court rejected arguments that the treatment plans and prior findings undermined the termination order.

family lawcivil rightsprocedurefederal power

The case involved a University of Colorado police officer who was suspended without pay immediately after his arrest for alleged felonies involving sexual offenses against a child. An administrative law judge and the Colorado State Personnel Board determined that the university violated personnel rules by imposing the suspension without first holding a predisciplinary meeting, since formal charges had not yet been filed. The court affirmed that Board Rule 6-12(A) permits suspension without pay and without a meeting only after an employee is formally charged via complaint, indictment, or information, but reversed the board's finding on the timing, holding that charges were filed on October 7, 2008. It remanded for an order requiring back pay and administrative leave for the period from the September 25 suspension until that filing date. The core reasoning was the plain-language distinction between arrest and formal charging under the personnel board rules, along with the availability of other options like paid administrative leave to address workplace concerns.

labor & employmentcriminal lawprocedure

In People v. Sanchez, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of first-degree murder after deliberation, two counts of attempted first-degree murder, and first- and second-degree assault arising from stabbings at a campground party following an accusation of theft. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed all convictions. It held that the evidence of deliberation was sufficient because the defendant unfolded his knife before the attack, targeted vulnerable body areas, and made statements indicating readiness to act. The court further concluded that any inconsistency between the attempted-murder verdicts and the heat-of-passion assault findings did not require reversal and that the trial court properly gave a flight instruction based on the defendant's post-crime conduct.

criminal lawprocedure

In People v. Alvarado-Juarez, the defendant was convicted of extreme indifference murder and related charges after a shooting during a group fight that killed one person and injured another; witnesses identified him as the shooter. He appealed, arguing that his conviction violated equal protection because reckless manslaughter prohibits identical conduct but carries a lesser penalty, and that Colorado's pattern jury instruction on reasonable doubt failed to convey the required degree of certainty. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that extreme indifference murder requires proof of circumstances showing universal malice and extreme indifference to human life generally—an element absent from reckless manslaughter—providing a reasonable basis for different penalties. It also ruled that the jury instruction accurately described reasonable doubt, consistent with precedent, and therefore did not need to address any potential structural error.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This dependency and neglect case arose after the Arapahoe County Department of Human Services became involved with a separated family due to one child's need for mental health treatment, with the children remaining in the father's custody. The department later sought to allocate parental responsibilities jointly to both parents and to be dismissed from the case, citing cooperative parents, adequate services, and no ongoing protective concerns; the guardian ad litem objected, arguing unresolved issues with the children's special needs. The trial court allocated parental responsibilities, dismissed the department, and ordered the case to remain open under the guardian ad litem's supervision. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the department's dismissal, holding that evidence supported it under C.R.C.P. 21 and that the department's role was not statutorily required once protective issues ended, but reversed the order keeping the case open, concluding the guardian ad litem lacks authority to provide protective supervision and that continued jurisdiction would unduly intrude on parental rights. The court remanded with directions to close the case and terminate jurisdiction.

family lawcivil rightsprocedure

In this case, plaintiff Stacy Mullen sued Allstate Insurance Company on behalf of a class, alleging claims including fraudulent concealment, negligent misrepresentation, bad faith, violation of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, and seeking declaratory judgment. The suit claimed that Allstate's two-tier premium structure for uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) coverage on multi-vehicle policies was misleading and illusory because, under Colorado law, such coverage follows class one insureds regardless of the vehicle, and Allstate failed to disclose that separate single-vehicle policies from competitors could provide equivalent coverage without extra premiums. The district court granted summary judgment to Allstate, finding no duty to advise about competitors' options, that the policy accurately described the coverage benefits for class one and class two insureds in all vehicles, and that the additional premiums were not illusory. The appellate court affirmed, holding that Allstate's disclosures complied with Colorado insurance law, the coverage provided real benefits, and no genuine issues of material fact existed.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involved charges against Grover Edward Boston for sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust, based on alleged incidents between 1987 and 1992 that were reported to police in 2007. The district court dismissed the charge, concluding that the statute of limitations had run under the effective date clause of a 2002 legislative amendment. The appellate court reversed that dismissal. It held that the amendment extended the limitations period to ten years after the victim's eighteenth birthday for offenses alleged to have occurred on or after July 1, 1992. The court reasoned that the effective date clause was intended only to establish when the act took effect and to invoke a safety clause protecting it from referendum, and thus created no conflict with the substantive extension of the limitations period.

criminal lawprocedure

In Copper Mountain, Inc. v. Industrial Systems, Inc., the plaintiff owner sued the general contractor and subcontractor for damages from a fire during renovation work at a ski resort lodge, alleging negligence and breach of contract. The defendants moved for summary judgment based on waiver of subrogation clauses in the standard AIA construction contracts, which required the owner to obtain property insurance covering the work and waived claims for damages to the extent covered by such insurance. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, ruling that the waiver applied to all damages covered by the owner's existing insurance policy that was used to satisfy the contract's insurance requirements, regardless of whether the damaged property was part of the defined "work" or adjacent areas.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

This case concerned a dispute over ownership of subsurface mineral rights, including oil and gas, beneath a parcel of land in Garfield County, Colorado, that the Colorado Department of Highways condemned in 1975 for a highway right-of-way. Gypsum Ranch, which acquired the original owner's remaining interest, sued CDOT and others seeking to quiet title to the minerals, while CDOT claimed it had acquired fee simple absolute including the minerals through the condemnation proceedings. The trial court granted summary judgment to CDOT, but the appellate court reversed, holding that CDOT acquired only the interest necessary for highway purposes and did not obtain the mineral estate. The court reasoned that Colorado eminent domain statutes expressly limit the state's authority to acquire mineral interests other than those needed for subsurface support, that the 1987 Rule and Order did not mention or convey minerals, and that payment for gravel value did not indicate intent to transfer unrelated mineral rights.

property

In this workers' compensation case, claimant Thomas Kelly sought benefits for injuries from a 2004 car accident in Nevada, claiming he was traveling to an authorized preoperative appointment related to a prior 2008 industrial knee injury. The ALJ denied the claim, finding that Kelly had substantially deviated from any route to the appointment by taking a longer path from his vacation in Reno that would pass his home in Gypsum and arrive hours early, and that the appointment had not been authorized before the accident. The Industrial Claim Appeals Office affirmed based on the deviation finding alone. The court upheld the denial, holding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's determination that Kelly was not en route to the appointment and thus not within the quasi-course of employment under Colorado precedent extending benefits to travel for authorized treatment.

labor & employment

This workers' compensation case involved claimant Marie Kilwein, who sought authorization and payment for 2005 treatments by an osteopath after her primary treating physician, Dr. Rook, lost his status following a 2001 medical utilization review order that changed her physician; Dr. Rook had referred her to the osteopath for acupuncture in 2003 while appealing the order, which was ultimately affirmed by the court in 2005. The ALJ denied the request for authorization of the later treatments, and the Industrial Claim Appeals Office upheld that decision. The court affirmed, holding that Dr. Rook's authorization to treat and refer ended with the 2001 order, the 2003 referral was limited in scope and had concluded by early 2004, and the 2005 care fell outside the normal progression of authorized treatment under the Workers' Compensation Act. The court also rejected arguments that the rules permitting continued care during appeal extended the physician's referral authority or that the ALJ showed bias.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involves a premises liability claim under the pre-2006 version of Colorado's Premises Liability Act where plaintiff Clark DeWitt sued defendant Tara Woods Limited Partnership after slipping and falling on ice at an apartment complex owned by Woods, injuring his neck, back, and knee. At trial the court, relying on Vigil v. Franklin, barred Woods from raising the statutory affirmative defense of comparative negligence. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Act does not abrogate the comparative negligence defense because it is a creature of statute rather than a common-law defense, the legislative purpose of protecting landowners from certain liabilities supports its application, and the statutes do not expressly exclude each other. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

torts & liabilityproperty

In 1984, plaintiff Edgar Kaiser sold his majority interest in the partnership owning the Denver Broncos to defendant Patrick Bowlen under a contract with provisions on transfers, rights of first refusal, and warranties that expired after one year. More than fourteen years later, Kaiser sued Bowlen and related entities in state court alleging breach of contract and related claims arising from post-sale transfers of ownership interests among Bowlen family entities. After Kaiser lost all claims in parallel federal litigation, the state district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on grounds of issue preclusion and denied Kaiser's motion to amend his complaint to add a fraud claim. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the federal judgment barred relitigation of the issues and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the late amendment due to undue delay.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this workers' compensation case, claimant Joanne T. Benuishis challenged the impairment rating issued by Dr. Franklin Shih, the physician selected to perform a division-sponsored independent medical examination (DIME) after she was injured at work. The administrative law judge and the Industrial Claim Appeals Office Panel determined that Dr. Shih had no actual or apparent conflict of interest despite his contracts with the employer's insurer, Pinnacol Assurance, as a preferred provider and physician advisor, and awarded benefits based on his 40% whole-person impairment rating. The court affirmed the Panel's order, holding that neither the governing statute nor Division Rule 11-2(H) disqualifies a DIME physician solely because of such contracts, absent any direct or substantial financial relationship with the claimant's treating physician or any personal interest in the case. The court found substantial evidence supported the lower findings that Dr. Shih had no discussion of the claim with Pinnacol and followed standard practices with other insurers.

labor & employment

The case involved Cynthia Zelenoy's challenge to the suspension of her driver's license by the Colorado Department of Revenue after her son caused two alcohol-related accidents while driving her vehicle. The Department required proof of financial responsibility for the future, specifically an SR-22 insurance form in her name, which Zelenoy did not provide, submitting instead standard liability policies and an SR-22 in her son's name. The court affirmed the suspension, holding that under Colorado statutes, only an SR-22 provides the necessary guarantee of continuous coverage for three years and must be filed by the vehicle owner. The court also rejected claims that the relevant statutes and notice were unconstitutionally vague, finding that the requirements were clear from the statutory definitions and the notice provided.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved Patrick Ward, a Wildlife Technician III at the Rifle Falls Fish Hatchery employed by the Colorado Department of Natural Resources (DNR), who suffered a work-related back injury leading to permanent restrictions and requested reassignment or accommodation under the ADA and Colorado’s Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA). After the DNR failed to conduct a search for suitable vacant positions, engage in the interactive process, or restructure his role despite his qualifications, it terminated him upon exhaustion of leave; an ALJ found violations of both statutes, ordered reinstatement with back and front pay, and awarded attorney fees for bad faith conduct, which the State Personnel Board upheld. The court affirmed, holding that the DNR’s inaction and misleading communications violated its duties to accommodate and that the bad faith findings were supported by evidence of a pattern including ignoring restrictions and omitting key rule language in termination notices. Core reasoning focused on the DNR’s policy obligations to search for positions within the employee’s restrictions and the evidentiary support for the ALJ’s conclusions on liability and fees.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involved the Denver Department of Human Services seeking to terminate a mother's parental rights to her two young daughters after allegations of sexual abuse by her boyfriend and her crack cocaine use, followed by her failure to comply with a treatment plan and her abandonment of the children by moving out of state. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the termination judgment. The mother argued on appeal that the termination hearing occurred more than 120 days after the motion was filed without the required good cause findings, in violation of statutes governing expedited hearings for young children. The court held that the statutory timeline is not jurisdictional, so exceeding it does not require reversal, and the record showed valid reasons for the delays due to paternity testing for possible fathers along with the mother's lack of objection to the postponements.

family lawprocedure