In People v. Miller, a jury convicted defendant Edward Lorenzo Miller, Jr. of sexual penetration of a minor based on evidence including a child's testimony and DNA analysis linking sperm on the victim to the defendant. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for a new trial, finding that a DNA report prepared by an absent criminalist had been improperly admitted as a business record in violation of the Confrontation Clause under Crawford v. Washington, and that this error was prejudicial given the case's reliance on credibility. The People appealed the order. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the trial court erred in two respects when granting the new trial motion.
The case involved a U.S. Postal Service employee cited for two Vehicle Code infractions while driving her personal vehicle on duty; after her requests for continuances were granted once and denied once, and after a notice of removal was filed in federal court but later remanded as untimely, the traffic court held trial in her absence and convicted her. On appeal, the appellate division affirmed the convictions, and after transfer, the Court of Appeal agreed with the result but not the reasoning. The court held that the traffic court erred by proceeding to trial after receiving notice of removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), but concluded the error was harmless under state law because the removal was untimely, the defendant had no federal constitutional right to counsel in an infraction case, and she suffered no prejudice from the absence of a defense. The court further explained that Penal Code provisions treating infractions like misdemeanors for most procedural purposes did not require reversal here.
In People v. Bloom, the defendant made over 40 harassing and profane calls to 911 operators in one evening, prompting a dispatcher to complete citizen’s arrest forms and request officers take him into custody. Officers located the defendant, informed him of the citizen’s arrest, and attempted to handcuff him, but he resisted and caused minor injuries to three officers. He was charged with battery on a peace officer, resisting an executive officer, and making harassing 911 calls; after the felonies were reduced to misdemeanors, he pled guilty and later appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence, arguing the citizen’s arrest was invalid because the misdemeanor was not committed in the officers’ presence and the dispatcher did not physically participate. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s ruling, holding that a private citizen may lawfully delegate the physical act of arrest to officers by executing the required forms and requesting their assistance under Penal Code sections 837, 839, and 847, and that the dispatcher’s observation of the calls satisfied the presence requirement.
In Espinosa v. Kirkwood, plaintiffs participated in a burglary with defendant Kirkwood and were injured when his car collided with other vehicles during a police chase immediately after the crime. They sued Kirkwood for negligence-based personal injury damages, but the trial court granted summary judgment dismissing the case under Civil Code section 3333.3. That statute bars recovery of damages where a plaintiff's injuries were proximately caused by the plaintiff's own commission of a felony or immediate flight from it, and both plaintiffs had been convicted of the underlying burglary or attempted burglary. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the statute applied because the plaintiffs voluntarily fled with Kirkwood as passengers, making an accident a foreseeable result of their joint flight and establishing proximate cause under the initiative's terms. The court rejected arguments that passenger status or the driver's role created a triable issue of fact.
In People v. Casas, a car salesman was convicted of embezzlement after taking a customer's trade-in vehicle and downpayment to collect funds but instead driving the vehicle nearly 400 miles over two days to purchase drugs with the cash. The trial court excluded evidence of the defendant's lack of intent to permanently deprive the owner and instructed the jury that intent to temporarily deprive was sufficient. On appeal, the court affirmed the conviction, holding that embezzlement requires only that the defendant's use of entrusted property significantly interferes with the owner's enjoyment or use, even if temporary, and that the trial court's rulings on evidence and jury instructions were not error. The judgment was affirmed.
The case involved defendant Charles Patrick Williams, who as general manager of Valley of Enchantment Mutual Water Company embezzled over $50,000 and failed to pay the company's payroll taxes from 1999 to 2006, causing the company to incur IRS penalties and interest along with investigation costs. After Williams pleaded guilty to grand theft by embezzlement, the trial court ordered restitution but excluded the IRS penalties from the award. The People appealed, and the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that under Penal Code section 1202.4 the penalties constituted an economic loss directly resulting from the defendant's criminal conduct and thus must be included in restitution to fully compensate the victim company. The court distinguished prior precedent and remanded for a new restitution hearing to determine the precise amount.