Judith Dobson McConnell

The case concerned a community coalition's petition challenging the City of San Diego's approval of a development project involving 484 condominium units and retail space, which included certifying an environmental impact report, rezoning, and granting a vesting tentative map. The trial court dismissed the petition on two procedural grounds: failure to serve a summons within 90 days of the project's approval under Government Code section 66499.37 of the Subdivision Map Act, and failure to file a written request for a hearing within 90 days of filing the petition under Public Resources Code section 21167.4, subdivision (a) for the CEQA claims. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the 90-day periods were not tolled by impossibility or other doctrines, that an oral request did not satisfy the written requirement, and that the coalition had not shown sufficient diligence in pursuing the hearing date.

environmentpropertyprocedure

This case involved enforcement of a 1998 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) and related consent decree between major tobacco companies, including R.J. Reynolds, and California (along with other states), which prohibited the use of cartoons in cigarette advertising and promotion. The People of California sought sanctions and injunctive relief after Reynolds ran its 2006-2007 Camel Farm campaign, which featured photomontage images such as jet-powered flying tractors, radios with helicopter rotors, and televisions growing on plant stems in Rolling Stone magazine and on a website. The trial court found that several of these images qualified as cartoons under the MSA's definition because they depicted comically exaggerated features or unnatural abilities, but it declined to issue injunctions since Reynolds had already suspended the campaign. On appeal, the court affirmed that the images met the MSA cartoon criteria and held that it need not address sanctions authority because none were actually imposed. The core reasoning focused on matching the specific ad elements to the three prongs of the MSA's cartoon definition without attributing responsibility for adjacent editorial content created by the magazine.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved the Center for Biological Diversity challenging San Bernardino County's approval of an open-air composting facility for human waste under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The trial court found the final environmental impact report inadequate for failing to sufficiently analyze an enclosed composting facility as an alternative and for not addressing water supply requirements under Water Code section 10910, leading to decertification of the report and an award of attorney fees. On appeal, the court affirmed these rulings, holding that the project triggered water supply assessment obligations and that the attorney fees were properly awarded under the private attorney general statute for enforcing public interests.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

In this dependency case, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (a), alleging that infant Giovanni was at substantial risk of serious physical harm due to repeated domestic violence between his parents, including a severe incident where the father assaulted the mother in the child's presence. The juvenile court found the allegations true, granted de facto parent status to the maternal grandmother, placed the child with relatives, and denied the father's requests for a Marsden hearing and continuance. On appeal, the father challenged the jurisdictional finding as unsupported by substantial evidence under subdivision (a) rather than (b) and the denial of his other requests. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that exposure to parental domestic violence can support jurisdiction under section 300(a) when it creates a substantial risk of nonaccidental serious physical harm, that substantial evidence supported the finding based on the father's history of violence, and that the juvenile court acted within its discretion on the remaining issues.

family lawcriminal lawprocedure

This case involved a mother's appeal from a juvenile court order denying her petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388, in which she sought to reopen prior dependency proceedings concerning her two young children who had been removed due to severe physical abuse of one child. The mother claimed her privately retained counsel had provided ineffective assistance at the jurisdiction and disposition hearings, where the court had denied her reunification services. The Court of Appeal held that a parent may knowingly waive the right to appointed counsel meeting juvenile dependency qualifications and is then barred from challenging counsel's qualifications, and that a section 388 petition is an allowable but not preferred vehicle for raising ineffective assistance claims. Even assuming the claims were properly presented, the court found the mother failed to make a prima facie showing of prejudice or entitlement to an evidentiary hearing, as her own lack of credibility and refusal to acknowledge the abuse explained the outcome rather than any counsel deficiencies. The order denying the petition was affirmed.

family lawcriminal lawprocedure

Christopher Arthur appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of mandate seeking to overturn the DMV's suspension of his driver's license after his arrest for driving with a blood-alcohol content of 0.08 percent or higher at a sobriety checkpoint. The case centered on whether the checkpoint substantially complied with the factors outlined in Ingersoll v. Palmer for constitutional validity under the Fourth Amendment. The court held that the checkpoint was constitutional despite a discrepancy between the announced location and the actual site, as well as limited information on its operational details, because official duties are presumed regularly performed under Evidence Code section 664 and Arthur failed to rebut that presumption with sufficient evidence. The judgment upholding the suspension was affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

This case was a putative class action by an uninsured patient, Daniel Durell, against Sharp Healthcare alleging that the hospital engaged in unfair and deceptive practices by charging him its full Chargemaster rates for emergency services while substantially discounting those rates for Medicare and privately insured patients. Durell brought claims under the unfair competition law (UCL), Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment. The trial court sustained Sharp's demurrer to the second amended complaint without leave to amend, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the resulting judgment of dismissal. The court held that Durell lacked standing because the complaint did not allege actual reliance on any alleged misrepresentations, applying the standard from In re Tobacco II Cases to both the fraud and unlawful prongs of the UCL, and that the remaining claims failed for lack of sufficient allegations regarding performance, reasonable value, or other required elements.

business & regulatoryhealthcare

This case is a putative class action brought by an uninsured patient, Dagmar Hale, against Sharp Healthcare and Sharp Grossmont Hospital alleging that the hospital deceptively charged uninsured patients substantially higher rates for medical services than it accepted from Medicare or insured patients, in violation of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), and related contract claims. The trial court sustained Sharp's demurrer to the second amended complaint without leave to amend on all causes of action. The Court of Appeal reversed as to the UCL and CLRA claims, holding that the complaint sufficiently alleged the plaintiff's standing to pursue those claims, but affirmed the dismissal of the breach of contract and implied covenant claims, finding them insufficiently pled, and upheld the denial of leave to amend those claims.

business & regulatoryhealthcareprocedure

The case involved beneficiaries of a family trust who petitioned the probate court to compel the trustee to distribute remaining trust assets after the trustee's account showed cash on hand with no liabilities, but the trustee refused distribution due to a separate dispute over jewelry that was not a trust asset. The probate court denied the beneficiaries' request for attorney fees under Probate Code section 17211(b), ruling that their petition did not qualify as a contest of the trustee's account. The Court of Appeal reversed that denial, holding that the statute applies because the beneficiaries successfully challenged the trustee's opposition to distribution based on the account, and it remanded the matter for the probate court to determine whether the trustee acted without reasonable cause and in bad faith.

propertyprocedurefamily law

The case concerned William Arterberry's action against the County of San Diego for delaying inspection and issuance of a certificate of occupancy for a solar energy system on his farm, which he attributed to unrelated code violations. Arterberry sought damages and attorney fees under Civil Code section 714, which bars public entities from willfully delaying solar system approvals. The trial court denied attorney fees, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, ruling that subdivision (f) of section 714 expressly immunizes public entities from private damage actions, so Arterberry could not qualify as a prevailing party under subdivision (g). The court relied on the statute's plain language to conclude no private right of action for damages exists, rejecting arguments that other statutes like Government Code section 815.6 could override this immunity or that policy goals justified allowing damages.

business & regulatoryenvironment

In In re S.A., the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency petitioned under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300(d) to declare S.A. a dependent of the juvenile court after she alleged that her adoptive father, Kent B., had sexually molested her over several years. The juvenile court sustained the petition following a contested hearing, finding by clear and convincing evidence that the molestation occurred, removed S.A. from Kent's custody, and ordered no visitation. On appeal, Kent challenged the order on grounds of ineffective assistance of S.A.'s counsel, the court's exclusion of the therapist's statements and testimony due to the psychotherapist-patient privilege, and insufficient evidence to support the molestation finding. The Court of Appeal held that Kent lacked standing to raise the ineffective-assistance claim, that the privilege was properly invoked and applied, and that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's credibility determination in favor of S.A.'s testimony.

family lawcriminal lawprocedure

In Bardales v. Duarte, the parents disputed custody of their four children after Duarte took them to Mexico and Bardales later brought them to California; Duarte filed a state-court petition under the Hague Convention seeking their return, while Bardales sought custody under state law. The trial court dismissed Duarte's Convention petition for lack of prosecution after repeated continuances and her failure to appear, then awarded Bardales joint legal and sole physical custody, child support, and sanctions. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that a trial court has authority to dismiss an unprosecuted Convention petition and to resolve remaining state-law custody and related issues once no treaty petition remains pending. The reasoning centered on the court's inherent power to manage its docket and the fact that dismissal without prejudice allowed refiling but cleared the way for state proceedings.

family lawprocedure

The case concerned a law librarian at the San Diego County Public Law Library who was discharged after sending a lengthy email to his supervisors and coworkers criticizing management decisions, including schedule changes, committee assignments, and an internal inquiry into his invitation to speak at a conference; the email also accused superiors of autocratic behavior, possible false claims under the California False Claims Act, and creating a hostile work environment. The librarian filed a wrongful termination lawsuit asserting state law claims, and the employer moved for summary adjudication. The trial court granted the motion, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that summary adjudication was proper because the librarian’s at-will employment allowed discharge and his claims, including any potential Brown Act or retaliation issues, lacked merit on the undisputed facts.

labor & employmentfree speechprocedure

This case involved a juvenile dependency proceeding in which the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency petitioned to remove one-year-old Damian C. from his mother D.C. due to her drug abuse, leading to jurisdictional findings, removal, and foster care placement. The mother appealed, arguing that the court erred in concluding the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did not apply and in failing to ensure adequate inquiry and notice to tribes regarding possible Native American ancestry through the maternal grandfather, including Pasqua Yaqui or Navajo heritage. The Court of Appeal affirmed the jurisdictional and dispositional orders, finding sufficient evidence to support the dependency determination and removal. However, it remanded the matter for the limited purpose of directing the Agency to complete proper ICWA inquiry and notice requirements under federal and state law, as the information provided created reason to know of potential Indian child status. The court noted that if a tribe later determines the child is Indian, parties may seek to invalidate actions violating ICWA provisions.

family lawfederal power

This case involves a paternity action in which M.S. sought to establish O.S. as the father of her twins and obtain child support from him. The trial court ordered O.S. to pay monthly child support, including in his income both biannual bonuses from his Indian tribe and attorney fees paid by the tribe. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the attorney fees should not be included in O.S.'s gross income because they do not constitute money he actually receives, but the bonuses may be included as they are recurring actual income. The court reversed the support order and remanded the matter for recalculation of support without including the attorney fees.

family law

In Ali v. U.S.A. Cab Ltd., former taxi lessees sued the company and its principals in a putative class action, alleging that standardized lease agreements wrongfully classified them as independent contractors instead of employees and thereby violated Labor Code provisions and wage orders by denying workers' compensation coverage, minimum wages, meal and rest breaks, and by imposing unlawful fees. The complaint sought class treatment for over 100 current and former drivers based on common lease terms and company policies. The trial court denied the motion for class certification. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that common questions did not predominate over individual ones and that class treatment was not superior, after examining the leases, training materials, and declarations showing variations in driver control and experiences.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved SASCO Electric's appeal from a judgment denying its petition for writ of administrative mandate, which challenged a Fair Employment and Housing Commission ruling that the company violated the California Fair Employment and Housing Act by discriminating against employee Zibute Scherl on the basis of pregnancy. The Commission found that SASCO had terminated Scherl, a yacht deckhand and second captain, because of her pregnancy rather than legitimate performance or business reasons, and it awarded her damages including punitive damages. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment after applying the substantial evidence standard of review to the Commission's findings, determining that the record supported the conclusions that Scherl was qualified for her position, that her pregnancy was a motivating factor in the termination, and that SASCO acted with malice or oppression.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involves the termination of parental rights of Willie S. over his son Jason J. in a juvenile dependency proceeding initiated after allegations of abuse and neglect in the mother's home. The juvenile court terminated Willie's parental rights and selected adoption as the permanent plan for Jason. Willie appealed, arguing he qualified as a presumed father under Kelsey S. standards requiring a finding of unfitness before termination, or that such a finding was otherwise necessary, and that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception applied. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Willie did not meet the criteria for Kelsey S. status due to insufficient commitment to parenting, no unfitness finding was required at the termination hearing for a biological father, and substantial evidence supported the inapplicability of the exception.

family law

The case concerns a dispute over ownership of real property held in the name of St. Luke’s Parish after its vestry and majority of members voted to disaffiliate from the Episcopal Church and affiliate with another denomination. Following the California Supreme Court’s decision in the Episcopal Church Cases, which resolved substantively identical facts against local parishes, the court held that title remains with the general church and its diocese. The court also applied its prior ruling in New v. Kroeger to conclude that the disaffiliating vestry lost authority to amend the parish’s governing documents or control the corporation, rendering those actions ultra vires. Because no material factual disputes required trial, the court affirmed summary judgment for the Episcopal Church and the Diocese of Los Angeles.

propertyreligious liberty

The case involved two individuals convicted of child sex offenses in the 1980s who had successfully completed probation and received exclusions from California's Megan's Law public website in 2005 under then-existing law allowing such relief for certain intra-familial offenders. After 2005 and 2006 amendments narrowed the exclusion criteria and made them retroactive—limiting eligibility to parents, stepparents, siblings, or grandparents and excluding crimes involving oral copulation or penetration—the Department of Justice notified them that their information would be posted. They petitioned for relief, claiming equitable estoppel based on detrimental reliance and arguing that the retroactive change violated ex post facto, due process, and other constitutional protections. The court affirmed denial of the petition, holding that the offenders did not meet the revised statutory requirements, equitable estoppel did not apply against the Department, and the amendments were not punitive so did not implicate ex post facto or related constitutional bars.

criminal lawcivil rights