Donald R. Franson jr

In People v. Tapia, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of first-degree murder with special circumstances of robbery and burglary, plus robbery, assault, arson, and vehicle theft, and was sentenced to life without parole plus additional terms. On appeal, he challenged the trial court's denial of his Wheeler motion alleging discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, the admission of evidence about a prior robbery plan, and the rejection of two proposed jury instructions on proximate causation for felony murder and the intent element of robbery. The Court of Appeal held that the Wheeler motion had been improperly denied and reversed the judgment with directions to conduct a new hearing under the Gore procedure, while rejecting the evidentiary and instructional claims as without merit.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In People v. Batt, the defendant pleaded no contest to two counts of residential burglary pursuant to a plea bargain under which remaining charges would be dismissed and the prosecution would not oppose commitment to the California Rehabilitation Center, but he was later sentenced to more than six years in prison, rendering him ineligible for CRC. After the trial court denied his motion to withdraw the plea, the defendant appealed, contending he had been misinformed about the likelihood of CRC commitment, that Penal Code section 859a required the same judge who accepted the plea to hear the withdrawal motion, and that he was entitled to additional presentence custody credits. The Court of Appeal rejected the claims regarding the plea withdrawal and the identity of the judge, holding that section 859a requires only the same court to hear the motion and finding no basis to permit withdrawal, while also determining that the defendant had waived objection to a restitution fine; it remanded solely to award three additional days of custody credits and otherwise affirmed the judgment.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved John Webster, a tenured professor at California State University, Bakersfield, who was denied annual recertification to continue teaching after age 70 under the trustees' regulations, which require standard or above job performance for continued employment. Webster filed a grievance that was initially rejected, obtained a court order for a hearing, and after an unfavorable faculty hearing committee decision, petitioned for administrative mandamus, which the trial court denied on grounds that substantial evidence supported the decision and no due process violation occurred. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the trial court applied the wrong standard of review because the professor's right to post-70 certification-based employment was a vested right requiring the superior court to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence to determine if the administrative decision was supported by the weight of the evidence, with the burden on the university to prove inability to perform. The court also addressed the trustees' policy under Education Code and regulations as preserving a form of tenure subject to annual review rather than abolishing it outright.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved Newhall Land and Farming Company, the current owner of property that had housed a natural gas processing plant, suing former operators Amerada and Mobil for damages from soil and groundwater contamination caused by hazardous discharges during their operations from 1950 to 1970. The trial court sustained the defendants' demurrer without leave to amend to claims for continuing nuisance, continuing trespass, and negligence, ruling that the prior owners could not have created a nuisance or trespass against their own property and owed no duty of care to a future purchaser. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the complaint stated viable causes of action because the pollution created a continuing condition causing new damage daily, consent by prior owners did not bar claims by a subsequent purchaser, and the original operators had a duty to disclose the contamination that extended to foreseeable future owners despite intervening sales and lack of privity.

environmentpropertytorts & liability

In People v. Franco, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of attempted voluntary manslaughter, multiple counts of assault with a firearm on peace officers, resisting executive officers, willful infliction of corporal injury on a spouse, and child endangerment, arising from a 1992 incident in which he shot and injured a police officer and engaged in domestic violence. The trial court imposed a prison sentence and ordered Franco to pay direct restitution of over $13,000 to the City of Woodlake for workers' compensation benefits it had paid to the injured officer. On appeal, the court concluded that the restitution order was unauthorized because the City was not a "victim" entitled to direct restitution under Government Code section 13967(c), distinguishing it from cases involving insurance companies and noting that the City could instead pursue subrogation remedies under Labor Code section 3852. The matter was remanded for further proceedings on restitution, including the possibility of imposing a restitution fine.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the Director of Health Services issuing a class “AA” citation to Hillhaven Convalescent Hospital for violating regulations on nursing services and patient care plans under the Long-Term Care Health, Safety and Security Act, after an 80-year-old resident with swallowing difficulties choked to death when left alone with a meal tray despite his documented need for feeding assistance. The trial court upheld the citation, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that substantial evidence supported the finding that staff failed to implement the care plan’s requirements for feeding, monitoring, and preventing choking. The court further reasoned that the Act’s timelines for issuing notices and citations are directory rather than jurisdictional, so any procedural delay did not invalidate the citation.

healthcarebusiness & regulatory

In People v. Gore, the defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of first-degree murder with a multiple-murder special circumstance, plus residential burglary and firearm enhancements, and was sentenced to life without parole. On appeal, the defendant challenged the trial court's denial of his Wheeler motion alleging that the prosecution had used peremptory challenges to exclude Hispanic jurors, arguing the motion was untimely as to the 12 seated jurors but timely only for the alternates. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred by limiting the Wheeler inquiry to the three alternate jurors due to the unique, expedited jury selection process in this death-penalty case, which prevented earlier objection. The court reversed the convictions and remanded for a new Wheeler hearing that would consider the prosecutor's challenges to all seven Hispanic prospective jurors together, with instructions to grant a new trial if discrimination is found or to reinstate the judgment after resentencing if it is not.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This case arose when Wilson sued the State of California for damages after a diabetic driver, whose license had not been revoked following a prior accident, collided with Wilson's vehicle. The superior court denied the State's motion for summary judgment, finding a triable issue on whether the State had a mandatory duty under Vehicle Code section 12805(c) to revoke the driver's license. The Court of Appeal granted the State's petition for writ relief, holding that no mandatory duty was triggered because the officer's accident report did not constitute a determination that the driver was unable to operate a vehicle safely, and any duty to reexamine remained discretionary. The court reasoned that Government Code section 818.4 therefore preserved the State's immunity from liability for licensing decisions, and it directed entry of judgment for the State.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In People v. Parnell, the defendant was convicted of rape following a plea bargain and sought new counsel under Marsden, leading to a remand for a hearing on that issue after a prior appeal. Upon remand, the defendant moved to dismiss the case under Penal Code section 1382, arguing the Marsden hearing should have occurred within 60 days of the remittitur filing, but the trial court denied the motion for lack of prejudice and affirmed the original judgment. The appellate court held that the statutory speedy trial provisions for retrials did not apply because no right to a new trial had been established, and while a constitutional right to a timely hearing existed, the defendant failed to show any prejudice from the brief delay that would warrant dismissal.

criminal lawprocedure

This case consolidated appeals from trial court orders in multiple conservatorship proceedings that disallowed or reduced bond fees charged by the public guardian under Probate Code section 2942(c) and deposited in the county treasury. The trial court initially found the statute violated equal protection by imposing a tax-like fee on a specific class without rational basis, and alternatively ruled that the public guardian failed to prove any benefit or cost to the individual estates as required by fiduciary duty. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding the statute constitutional because it exempts the poorest individuals receiving Social Security benefits and bears a rational relationship to covering the public guardian's bond costs, and that the flat statutory fee is mandatory with no discretion for the court to adjust or disallow it based on proof of benefit.

civil rightsfamily lawprocedure

The case involved the termination of parental rights of Nicki P. and Benjamin R. over their infant son Edward R. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, after the parents failed to complete a reunification plan involving substance abuse treatment and other requirements following the child's positive drug test at birth. The parents appealed the termination order, contending that section 366.26 violated equal protection guarantees because it did not allow evidence of present circumstances in the same manner as termination proceedings under Civil Code section 232, subdivision (a)(7). The Court of Appeal affirmed the order, holding that section 366.26 affords parents substantially similar protections, including the opportunity to present evidence of changed circumstances at the termination hearing, so that traditional equal protection analysis was unnecessary.

family lawcivil rights

This case involved charges against John Alan Wallace for lewd and lascivious acts on two 15-year-old girls (Penal Code § 288(c)), inducing them to pose for a film involving sexual conduct (§ 311.4(c)), and annoying or molesting children (§ 647.6), arising from him videotaping the girls engaging in suggestive bikini-clad behavior at his home. The Court of Appeal reversed the felony convictions on counts I, II, and III, holding that the jury instructions (CALJIC No. 10.42.5) erroneously defined a lewd or lascivious act as any touching of a minor's body with the required specific intent, rather than requiring the touching itself to be lewd, lascivious, and sexual. The court reasoned that section 288 proscribes only a lewd or lascivious touching (directly or indirectly) involving a sexual act, that the erroneous instructions and prosecutor's arguments were prejudicial because they permitted conviction on innocuous touchings, and that this error also tainted the instructions on count III by failing to properly define the required "sexual conduct." The misdemeanor conviction on count V was affirmed without challenge.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned William Thomas Bryant, who faced multiple felony charges arising from two separate incidents in 1991 involving kidnappings of Kim W. and Tracey H. with intent to commit sexual offenses, plus rape, assaults with a deadly weapon, robbery, and vehicle theft, all with weapon-use enhancements. Bryant pleaded no contest to all counts and was sentenced to a total prison term of 16 years and 4 months under consecutive sentencing rules. On appeal, Bryant contended that the trial court erred by mixing the sentencing provisions of Penal Code section 1170.1 subdivision (b) (specific to multiple kidnappings with separate victims and occasions) with the enhanced penalty range in section 208 subdivision (d), arguing instead for calculation solely under subdivision (a) or the basic kidnapping term in section 208 subdivision (a). The court analyzed the statutory language to determine the proper method for calculating the principal and subordinate terms, including the middle term for subsequent kidnappings and inclusion of one-third of certain enhancements without the five-year limit on subordinate terms.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the conviction of Emery Elroy Grim for a lewd and lascivious act on his minor son under age 14, with jury findings on enhancements making him ineligible for probation due to his position of special trust, substantial sexual conduct, and use of force. Grim was sentenced to a six-year prison term. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the jury instructions and forms on the enhancement allegations were adequate. The core reasoning focused on the definition of oral copulation for purposes of substantial sexual conduct, concluding that existing case law supported the instruction that any contact, however slight, between the mouth and sexual organ suffices, without requiring penetration or substantial contact.

criminal law

The case concerned defendant Lemuel B. Chaney’s convictions for possession for sale of rock cocaine and manufacture of a controlled substance after police executed a search warrant at his apartment and found drug paraphernalia, cash, firearms, and cocaine base. On appeal, Chaney argued that the trial court erred by denying supplemental voir dire of prospective jurors on racial bias under the limits imposed by Proposition 115. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that the defendant failed to show good cause for additional questioning because racial issues were not inextricably bound up with the charges or defense and that the trial court had not abused its discretion in limiting voir dire to the standard questions.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved Mary K.'s appeal from a trial court order appointing a public guardian as conservator of her person and estate under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act after finding her gravely disabled due to bipolar mood disorder and organic personality syndrome. The Court of Appeal affirmed the conservatorship order, holding that the proposed conservatee's attorney could validly waive statutory advisements under Probate Code section 1828 and the right to a jury trial on her behalf, as these rights are statutory rather than constitutional and no contrary evidence showed the attorney lacked authority. The court also found substantial evidence supported the gravely disabled finding based on the appellant's recent erratic behavior, inability to care for basic needs, and lack of insight into her condition. It remanded only for further proceedings on certain imposed disabilities, specifically the voting restriction and the right to refuse nonpsychiatric medical treatment.

civil rightsprocedure

This case involved a dependency proceeding for infant Guadalupe A., who was placed in foster care after her parents were incarcerated on drug charges and she was born addicted to cocaine with significant medical needs. At the 18-month review hearing, the referee sua sponte granted a motion under Welfare and Institutions Code section 350(c) to return the child to her mother without allowing the minor's counsel to present evidence, and denied a motion for mistrial based on the referee's out-of-court contact with the child. The Court of Appeal reversed the return order, holding that the referee prejudicially erred by denying the minor the opportunity to offer evidence as permitted by statute and that the referee's personal interactions with Guadalupe constituted judicial misconduct by introducing extraneous information on contested issues like stranger anxiety. The matter was remanded for further proceedings before a different referee.

family lawprocedure

This case involves a defamation lawsuit brought by Paul S. Mosesian against McClatchy Newspapers and others over articles questioning his qualifications for a horse racing license through his company Calfax. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's summary judgment dismissing the action, holding that Mosesian qualified as a limited-purpose public figure in the controversy over licensing for spring horse racing in Fresno. As a result, he was required to prove actual malice, which a prior ruling had already determined could not be shown by a reasonable jury. The core reasoning was that Mosesian, as president and spokesperson for Calfax, voluntarily injected himself into the public dispute through his bids, protests, and announcements seeking relicensing, thereby remaining a public figure for that limited issue under First Amendment standards.

free speechtorts & liability

This case involved a juvenile dependency proceeding in which Kahlen W., a toddler removed from her parents due to neglect and substance abuse issues, was declared a court dependent and placed in foster-adopt care after reunification efforts failed. At a later hearing, the mother disclosed possible Indian heritage under the Miwok Tribe, raising applicability of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), but the county agency had not provided the required statutory notice to the tribe. The Court of Appeal held that the juvenile court's December 1990 orders—continuing dependency, terminating reunification services, and setting a hearing to terminate parental rights—must be vacated because ICWA's notice provisions were violated. The core reasoning was that federal law mandates specific notice to the tribe or the Secretary when Indian child status is indicated, and failure to comply allows invalidation of the proceedings under 25 U.S.C. section 1914, regardless of resulting delay.

family lawprocedurefederal power

The case involved a homeowners association and a lot owner suing a developer to enjoin construction of a 12-unit planned unit development on lots within the 1945 Figarden Park subdivision in Fresno, on the ground that the project violated recorded CC&Rs limiting each lot to one single-family residence with minimum size and setback requirements. After a bench trial, the court granted a permanent injunction, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. The core reasoning was that the original grant deeds from the 1940s, which conveyed the lots "subject to all reservations, conditions and restrictions of record," sufficiently incorporated by reference the earlier-recorded CC&Rs that expressly created a general plan of mutual equitable servitudes benefiting all lots in the subdivision; those servitudes therefore ran with the land and remained enforceable against later owners despite the absence of contractual privity.

property