Rita Gruber

In Griffin v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, the Arkansas Court of Appeals reviewed a no-merit appeal from the Pope County Circuit Court’s order terminating Crystal Griffin’s parental rights to her two young children. The children had been removed from Griffin’s custody after being found with serious injuries, and the circuit court had adjudicated them dependent-neglected due to Griffin’s drug use and failure to protect them; over the following months, Griffin completed inpatient treatment but continued to test positive for methamphetamine and amphetamines, failed to maintain stable housing, and attended only about half of her scheduled visits. The circuit court terminated Griffin’s rights on multiple statutory grounds, including twelve-month failure to remedy the conditions causing removal, and found termination was in the children’s best interest based on their adoptability and the risk of harm if returned to her. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the circuit court’s findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence and were not clearly erroneous under de novo review. The court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, noting no meritorious issues existed for appeal.

family law

In this child-custody modification case, Kimberly Grindstaff (formerly Strickland), who had primary custody of the couple’s two minor children after the 2014 divorce, appealed the Benton County Circuit Court’s order transferring custody to Joseph Strickland. The trial court found a material change in circumstances based on the cumulative evidence of Grindstaff’s alienation of the children, failure to communicate about school and activities, violations of the non-cohabitation and joint-decision provisions, and other conduct, and it concluded that an immediate change of custody was in the children’s best interest; it also held Grindstaff in contempt while dismissing her counter-contempt claims. On de novo review, the Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court’s findings were not clearly erroneous, that the noncustodial parent need not show an adverse impact on the children to establish a material change, and that a court is not required to exercise its contempt powers before modifying custody.

family law

In this case, Sherry Rickman appealed a Crittenden County Circuit Court order granting the Arkansas Department of Human Services’ motion to cease reunification services with her child K.R., who had been removed from her custody in 2014 due to the mother’s illegal drug use and adjudicated dependent-neglected. The circuit court found by clear and convincing evidence that aggravated circumstances existed, specifically that there was little likelihood further services would lead to successful reunification, and it was in the child’s best interest to end those efforts. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the evidence supported findings of ongoing instability, including significant ongoing issues with trash and clutter in the home creating unsafe conditions, Rickman’s continued relationship with an abusive partner who had substance issues, repeated positive drug tests for amphetamines despite prior treatment, and mental health concerns, despite over three years of services provided by DHS. The court noted that Rickman had received multiple evaluations, counseling, parenting classes, and drug screens, yet the problems persisted without resolution.

family law

In this probate case, Luetta Dawson, widow of Ray H. Dawson, appealed from a Phillips County Circuit Court order that vacated its earlier rulings reopening her late husband's estate and distributing a newly discovered LLC asset to her. The estate had been opened in 2007, published notices issued, and claims filed, but it was dismissed in 2011 under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for prolonged inactivity with no further action until the 2016 reopening petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed the vacation, holding that the probate court lacked jurisdiction because the estate had been dismissed rather than settled and the personal representative discharged, so the reopening statute (Ark. Code Ann. § 28-53-119) did not apply; the five-year limitations period for probate had also expired without proper service or administration. The court noted that Luetta had not timely appealed or challenged the 2011 dismissal.

family lawpropertyprocedure

David Hanley entered a no-contest plea to five felonies—robbery, aggravated residential burglary, terroristic threatening, theft of property, and possession of firearms by certain persons—in Jefferson County Circuit Court case 35CR-14-119-1, receiving a 180-month prison sentence and 31 days of jail-time credit in an October 2016 sentencing order. He appealed the order and a later denial of his motion for additional credit, arguing he should receive 394 more days for the period from his February 2014 arrest until his March 2015 sentencing on separate charges in other cases. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that Hanley had already been credited with 420 days of jail time on his sentences for the subsequent charges and probation revocations. The court held that Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-404 limits credit to time in custody for the specific conduct resulting in each sentence, and applying the overlapping period to both would constitute impermissible double counting, as established in precedents such as Jones v. State and Humphrey v. State.

criminal law

In this case, Craig Allen Pledger was convicted by a jury in Franklin County Circuit Court of commercial burglary, breaking or entering, and theft of property. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion in limine and ruling that the State could impeach his credibility with his prior felony conviction for failing to register as a sex offender under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2). The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions without addressing the merits of his claim. The court held that the argument was not preserved for appellate review because Pledger did not testify at trial, so the prior conviction was never introduced. Under controlling precedent, a defendant must take the stand to raise and preserve a claim of improper impeachment with a prior conviction.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Tiffany Chandler-Sivage’s appeal of a circuit court order terminating her parental rights to her two children, K.A. and C.C. The Arkansas Department of Human Services had removed the children after Chandler’s arrest on drug charges, following an earlier protective-services case opened due to reports of drug use and mental-health issues. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the termination. The court held that the evidence clearly and convincingly showed termination was in the children’s best interest, based on the risk of potential harm from Chandler’s ongoing substance abuse—demonstrated by repeated treatment failures, recent drug-related arrests, a DWI, and alcohol use—and the fact that the children’s relative placement was only temporary foster care rather than a permanent custody arrangement.

family law

Steven Wheeler pleaded no contest to residential burglary and was placed on probation by a Saline County circuit court. The State later sought to revoke probation, citing new criminal charges, missed reporting requirements, drug use, and unpaid fees. At the revocation hearing, Wheeler admitted violating probation by drinking, and the court revoked his probation and sentenced him to prison as a habitual offender. On appeal, Wheeler argued that revocation was improper because the State never introduced written conditions of probation. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the written-conditions issue is procedural rather than a sufficiency-of-evidence question and that it was waived because it was not raised in the trial court.

criminal lawprocedure

In this unemployment benefits case, Crystal Tyler appealed the Arkansas Board of Review’s denial of her claim after she quit her job as a casting finishing cell operator at Saint Jean Industries. The Board had affirmed earlier rulings that she voluntarily left work without good cause connected to the job, based on her complaint that a supervisor who had harassed her by pulling up her shirt was later reassigned to work only about ten feet away. The Arkansas Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Board’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence. The court found that Tyler had promptly reported the incident to human resources, was assured she would no longer work near the supervisor, attempted further remedies when that assurance was broken, and was discouraged by her new supervisor from pursuing additional complaints, which together established good cause under Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-513(a)(1). The case was remanded for an award of benefits.

labor & employment

OPT, LLC sued the City of Springdale after the city entered its property under local ordinances on unsanitary and unsightly conditions, performed clean-up work on a former salvage yard site known to be environmentally contaminated, and filed liens for the costs. The Washington County Circuit Court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Arkansas Court of Appeals reversed, holding that while direct challenges to the specific lien ordinances were barred by a 45-day statutory deadline, the complaint also challenged the underlying enabling ordinances as void for vagueness and improperly enacted under Ark. Code Ann. § 14-55-202. Because those allegations fell outside the deadline and the complaint had to be construed favorably to the plaintiff on a motion to dismiss, the circuit court had jurisdiction over the enabling-ordinance claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

business & regulatoryenvironmentprocedureproperty

In Haggard v. Haggard, the Arkansas Court of Appeals reviewed post-divorce disputes between Mary Christine Haggard and Brian Edward Haggard over their 2015 decree, which incorporated a mediated agreement for joint custody, child support, alimony of $1,200 per month for 120 months starting February 1, 2015, and equal division of medical expenses. Christy appealed the dismissal of her petition to modify the decree to require equal sharing of additional child expenses such as sports, cell phones, and camps, claiming these terms were part of the parties’ oral agreement but omitted by drafting error. Brian cross-appealed the order requiring alimony payments on the first of each month. The court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the written decree was the parties’ final agreement and could not be altered based on prior oral statements. It also affirmed the alimony ruling, interpreting the decree’s “per month” language according to its plain meaning as requiring payment every 30–31 days.

family law

In this no-merit appeal, Francesca Mercado challenged the Sebastian County Circuit Court’s December 2016 order terminating her parental rights to her infant daughter A.M., who had been removed after medical findings of severe injuries including fractures, head trauma, and a subdural hematoma consistent with physical abuse. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the termination, holding that the circuit court’s findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence on two statutory grounds: that A.M. was adjudicated dependent-neglected due to abuse endangering her life, and that aggravated circumstances existed. The court also upheld the best-interest determination, which weighed the child’s adoptability and the potential harm of returning her to Mercado’s custody. Reviewing the record de novo and deferring to the circuit court’s credibility assessments, the appellate court found no meritorious issues for reversal, including in Mercado’s pro se arguments, and granted counsel’s motion to withdraw.

family law

In Jefferson v. State, Trenton Lamont Jefferson was convicted by a Faulkner County jury of residential burglary, second-degree domestic battering, and a sentence enhancement for committing the battering in the presence of a child, based on a June 2015 incident in which he allegedly entered his former partner’s apartment without permission and struck their five-year-old son multiple times with a belt, leaving visible marks, while their eight-year-old daughter was nearby. He received consecutive sentences totaling 216 months. On appeal, Jefferson challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for all three convictions, the denial of his motion for a new trial, the admission of certain testimony under the excited-utterance hearsay exception, and the trial court’s restriction of his closing argument regarding cultural differences in discipline. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the verdicts when viewed in the light most favorable to the State—including neighbor testimony about hearing the beating and a 911 call, police observations of injuries, and other witness accounts—while the remaining evidentiary and procedural rulings fell within the trial court’s discretion and did not misapply the governing statutes or rules.

criminal lawfamily lawprocedure

This case is a will contest arising from the death of Stephen Michael Herman, whose January 2014 will named Tami Thomas Darr as sole beneficiary and executor. Darr’s half-sister, Francis Jean Billeaudeau, challenged the will in circuit court, claiming Darr procured it, Herman lacked testamentary capacity, and the document resulted from undue influence; the circuit court agreed, set aside the will, removed Darr as executor, and appointed Billeaudeau’s son as personal representative. On appeal, the Arkansas Court of Appeals did not reach the merits. Instead, it ordered rebriefing because Darr’s 22-page argument contained numerous citations to evidence without the page references to the abstract or addendum required by Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-2(a)(7), along with incomplete or incorrect references that frustrated the court’s review. The court directed Darr to file a compliant substituted brief within fifteen days.

family lawpropertyprocedure

The case concerned Erik Canada's appeal of a Benton County Circuit Court order terminating his parental rights to his two young children, who had been removed from their mother's custody in 2015 after police found the family living in a car with drug paraphernalia and methamphetamine residue. The children were adjudicated dependent-neglected, and Canada was ordered to complete services including drug treatment, parenting classes, stable housing and employment, and anger management; DHS later petitioned for termination on grounds that he had failed to remedy the conditions causing removal after twelve months and that aggravated circumstances existed with little likelihood of successful reunification. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the termination, holding that the circuit court's findings on both statutory grounds and the children's best interests were not clearly erroneous. The court noted sufficient evidence supporting the failure-to-remedy ground and credited the caseworker's testimony that the children were reasonably likely to be adopted together, with several suitable homes identified, while also considering potential harm if returned to Canada.

family law

In this dependency-neglect case, Gabrielle Potterton appealed a December 2016 Washington County Circuit Court adjudication and disposition order that found her infant child dependent-neglected due to neglect, physical abuse, and parental unfitness, and that also found by clear and convincing evidence that she had subjected the child to aggravated circumstances based on severe injuries including skull fractures and a subdural hematoma. Potterton did not challenge the dependency-neglect determination itself but argued that the court’s sua sponte aggravated-circumstances finding violated due process because the Department of Human Services had not pleaded the issue in its petition, leaving her without notice to defend against it. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the order, holding that the due-process argument was not preserved for appellate review. The court reasoned that Potterton failed to object when the trial court made the oral finding of aggravated circumstances at the hearing or when asked if she had anything further to add, and that constitutional issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered.

family lawprocedure

This appeal arises from a wrongful-death lawsuit brought by Kimberly Powell, as special administratrix of Christian Hayes’s estate, after Hayes was murdered at his workplace in Park Plaza Mall; a jury found in Powell’s favor against mall owner Park Plaza Mall CMBS, LLC, security provider ERMC, and the two convicted murderers. Park Plaza and ERMC appealed the resulting judgment, but the Arkansas Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal without prejudice. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction because Park Plaza and ERMC’s cross-claims for indemnity and contribution against Sbarro Franchise Co., LLC, and Kahala Franchising, LLC—dismissed without prejudice—remained subject to refiling within the applicable statutes of limitations and savings period, preventing the judgment from being final under Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure–Civil 2 and Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). The circuit court’s Rule 54(b) certificate did not address these specific cross-claims or supply the required factual findings showing no just reason for delay, so it could not confer appellate jurisdiction.

proceduretorts & liability

In 2013, Jesse Emanuel Harris pled guilty to possession of drug paraphernalia and received a suspended imposition of sentence (SIS) with conditions prohibiting new law violations or drug possession. In 2016, the State petitioned to revoke the SIS after Harris was charged with new drug offenses, and the Sebastian County Circuit Court granted the revocation following a hearing. On appeal, the Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the State proved a violation by a preponderance of the evidence through an officer’s testimony that a package of narcotics was found near Harris’s feet and that Harris admitted ownership of it. The court noted that such an admission is sufficient to support revocation and declined to consider Harris’s motion-to-suppress argument, as it had been filed only in his separate criminal case rather than in the revocation proceeding.

criminal lawprocedure

In Bishop v. State, the Arkansas Court of Appeals reviewed the Benton County Circuit Court’s denial of Max Douglas Bishop’s petition for postconviction relief under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1, following his earlier convictions on 30 counts of distributing, possessing, or viewing child pornography. Bishop argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge a search warrant, call certain witnesses, object to evidence or the number of charges under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-27-602, and raise a speedy-trial claim, along with claims that the record was incomplete and that metadata issues prejudiced him. The court affirmed the denial, holding that several arguments were not cognizable in a Rule 37 proceeding because they had not been raised on direct appeal or had been abandoned at the evidentiary hearing. On the ineffective-assistance claims that remained, the court applied the Strickland standard and found that Bishop failed to overcome the presumption of reasonable professional assistance or to show a reasonable probability that the outcome would have differed absent the alleged errors.

criminal lawprocedure

In Hart v. State, the Arkansas Court of Appeals reviewed the Miller County Circuit Court’s revocation of Oliver W. Hart III’s probation in three drug-related cases. Hart had been placed on probation in 2009, transferred supervision to Texas in 2013, and faced revocation petitions after his 2014 Texas arrest for drug offenses and evidence of multiple failed drug screens plus nonpayment of Arkansas court-ordered fines since 2009. The circuit court found he had violated all three alleged conditions and revoked his probation; Hart appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the denial of his motion to dismiss for lack of a timely preliminary hearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the State proved violations by a preponderance of the evidence—particularly inexcusable nonpayment, whose credibility determination favored the State—and that Hart had waived any preliminary-hearing claim by repeatedly requesting continuances rather than objecting or demanding a hearing for over a year, with no shown prejudice from the delay.

criminal lawprocedure