Sam Bird

Statewide Outdoor Advertising built two billboards after obtaining state highway permits, but the Town of Avoca passed Ordinance No. 69 requiring local business permits for commercial structures and sent letters to state officials and directly to Statewide asserting violations, revoking the state permits, and threatening daily fines until removal. Statewide filed a declaratory-judgment action alleging the ordinance did not apply and seeking to enjoin enforcement, but the trial court dismissed under Rules 12(b)(6) and 8(a), concluding there was no case or controversy because the town had not directly denied a permit or demanded removal. The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that the complaint and exhibits sufficiently alleged that the town's actions affected the plaintiffs' legal rights under the ordinance, satisfying the requirements for declaratory relief.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case involved a dispute between divorced parents over a provision in their 2005 divorce decree that prohibited either party from promoting a non-Protestant religious faith to their sons without the other's consent. The circuit court found the father in contempt after he promoted the LDS faith to the children without the mother's consent and ordered him to cease such conduct. The father appealed the denial of his motions to modify the order to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to clarify the contemptuous conduct, arguing violations of his constitutional rights. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the provision was a valid contractual agreement enforceable by the court and did not result in a miscarriage of justice or require further clarification.

family lawreligious liberty

This case involved a dispute between custodial parent Tami Brock and non-custodial parent Bobby Eubanks over compliance with court-ordered child visitation. The circuit court held Brock in contempt for interfering with visitation and issued a permanent restraining order to enforce compliance. The Court of Appeals affirmed the contempt finding, ruling that affidavits were sufficient evidence under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 43(c) given Brock's failure to appear and that she received adequate notice of the allegations despite the short filing timeline. It reversed the portion of the restraining order that delegated to law-enforcement officers the discretion to arrest and incarcerate Brock upon determining or suspecting a violation, as this improperly transferred judicial contempt authority to the executive branch in violation of separation of powers under the Arkansas Constitution.

family lawprocedure

This case involved claims of medical negligence arising from a stillbirth after an emergency C-section, brought as wrongful-death and survival actions by the parents of the deceased infant. The original complaint was filed by the parents individually without referencing the mother's prior appointment as special personal representative of the estate, and an amended complaint adding that capacity was filed after the two-year statute of limitations had run. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the physician and hospital defendants, ruling that the parents lacked standing to assert the estate claims in the original complaint, that the amended complaint did not relate back, and that minority tolling provisions did not apply. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Arkansas law requires wrongful-death and survival actions to be brought by the personal representative, that the original filing was a nullity as to those claims, and that the tolling statute does not extend the limitations period when only a personal representative may sue.

torts & liabilityprocedurehealthcare

The case concerned whether an Arkansas circuit court retained exclusive continuing jurisdiction over a child-custody matter under the UCCJEA following the parents' 1997 divorce. The mother sought to transfer venue to Texas, arguing the Arkansas court lacked jurisdiction because the child was born in Georgia, had never lived in Arkansas, and had resided outside the state for over a decade. The court held that the Arkansas court had no subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the initial custody determination, rendering that order void and eliminating any basis for continuing jurisdiction. This conclusion followed from applying the UCCJEA's rules for initial jurisdiction, which require either home-state status or a significant connection with substantial evidence available in the state—neither of which existed for Arkansas at the time of the divorce decree, as Georgia was the child's home state.

family lawprocedure

Discover Bank sued Patricia Pommell in circuit court to collect alleged credit-card debt. At trial, the bank sought to introduce an account manager's affidavit and attached business records under Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-46-108, a statutory hearsay exception for records kept in the ordinary course of business. The circuit court sustained Pommell's hearsay objection because no live witness was present, found no other evidence had been offered, and granted a directed verdict dismissing the complaint with prejudice. On appeal, the court held that the statute constitutes a valid exception to the hearsay rule, that the bank had satisfied its filing and notice requirements, and that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the evidence.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In Drake v. State, the defendant appealed the denial of his motion to withdraw a guilty plea to charges of residential burglary, kidnapping, and attempted first-degree murder, after he had agreed to testify against a codefendant but later invoked his right against self-incrimination, leading to the codefendant's acquittal. The circuit court had accepted the plea at a March 2007 hearing and later imposed a forty-year sentence as a habitual offender. The Court of Appeals of Arkansas affirmed, holding under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.1(a) that a defendant has an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea only before it is accepted by the court, and that the plea here was accepted even without explicit words of acceptance on the record. After acceptance but before judgment, withdrawal is discretionary to correct manifest injustice, which the court found was not shown. The court rejected the argument that acceptance requires affirmative on-the-record statements, relying on prior precedent and rules of construction.

criminal lawprocedure

In this medical malpractice case, the estate of a patient who died after a nasogastric feeding tube was misplaced into her lung sued her attending physician, Dr. Martindale, and the on-call radiologist, Dr. Schally, alleging negligence in their response to the misplacement. The trial court granted summary judgment to both doctors, finding insufficient expert evidence of negligence. The appellate court reversed as to Dr. Martindale, holding that expert testimony created genuine issues of material fact regarding whether he was adequately informed of the tube's position and responded appropriately. It affirmed summary judgment for Dr. Schally because undisputed expert testimony established that he met the applicable standard of care by promptly reporting his radiographic findings. Expert testimony was deemed necessary because the standard of care and protocols for such medical situations are not matters of common knowledge.

healthcaretorts & liabilityprocedure

This case concerned whether an Arkansas sentencing court had statutory authority under the Sex Offender Registration Act to require a defendant convicted of misdemeanor public sexual indecency to register as a sex offender. The court of appeals affirmed the registration order. It held that the Act's definition of "sex offense" expressly "includes, but is not limited to" the enumerated crimes, that public sexual indecency is classified as a sexual offense under the criminal code, and that the registration requirement therefore applies to any person adjudicated guilty of that offense on or after August 1, 1997. The court rejected the appellant's argument that registration authority was limited to the listed offenses or to later-enacted crimes, relying on the plain language of Ark. Code Ann. §§ 12-12-903(12)(A) and 12-12-905(a)(1) together with the statute's legislative history.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a workers' compensation claim by Arvel Graham against Owens Planting Company and its insurer after Graham suffered head, neck, and other injuries in a 2001 workplace accident while operating a front-end loader. The Workers’ Compensation Commission awarded additional medical treatment from a specialist and ongoing temporary total disability benefits beyond the initial period, and the employer appealed the sufficiency of the evidence. The court affirmed the decision, finding substantial evidence supported the Commission's determinations that the treatments were reasonable and necessary in connection with the compensable injury and that Graham remained in his healing period without having reached maximum medical improvement. The court emphasized the Commission's role in weighing witness credibility and resolving conflicts in medical evidence, including the testimony linking later-diagnosed conditions like a deviated septum to the original trauma.

labor & employment

In Marmolejo v. State, the appellant was convicted by a jury of being an accomplice to the delivery of methamphetamine and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison plus a fine. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred by admitting testimony about his prior role as a drug supplier under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 404(b), which generally prohibits evidence of prior bad acts to prove character or propensity. The Court of Appeals of Arkansas affirmed the conviction, holding that any error in admitting the evidence was harmless in light of the other evidence presented at trial. The court reasoned that the testimony was introduced with limiting instructions and did not prejudice the outcome given the direct observations of the undercover officers and the sequence of events during the controlled buy.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a former employee, Dave Rycroft, suing McCourt Manufacturing Corporation for unpaid sales commissions under an alleged oral agreement and for a statutory penalty under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-4-405 for nonpayment of wages. A jury awarded Rycroft $12,498.15 in commissions plus a daily penalty, but the Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the commissions award while reversing the penalty. The court held that Rycroft did not strictly comply with the statute's written-demand requirement because the letter was delivered only to an unidentified person at the company who was neither the president nor another responsible employee. The court further held that the trial court did not err in refusing jury instructions on the employer's affirmative defenses of waiver and estoppel, as Rycroft's continued employment after a dispute did not waive his claim to commissions already earned.

labor & employment

The case involved Patricia Brown suing Randolph County Medical Center and several individual healthcare providers for medical malpractice and wrongful death after her husband died while a patient at the facility in February 2002. The circuit court granted summary judgment to all defendants, dismissing the complaint as barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The appellate court reversed as to the medical center, reasoning that Brown had valid authority from her April 2003 appointment order when she filed the initial complaint in June 2003, and that the savings statute permitted refiling after the 2004 nonsuit. It affirmed dismissal of the claims against the individual defendants, however, because Brown's six-month appointment had expired before she added them in early 2004, rendering those complaints nullities, and the 2005 refiling occurred after the limitations period had run.

healthcareproceduretorts & liability

Anne Throneberry was convicted by a jury of manslaughter, kidnapping, and hindering apprehension in connection with her husband's death, though she did not challenge the convictions on appeal. The jury recommended that her sentences run concurrently, but the trial court overrode that recommendation and imposed consecutive sentences, citing information from the separate proceedings involving her codefendants. The appellate court determined that the trial judge abused his discretion by relying on records from those other cases that had not been introduced into evidence at Throneberry's trial or sentencing, as judicial notice of separate case records is not permitted. The court reversed the sentencing decision and remanded for resentencing without consideration of the improper factors.

criminal lawprocedure

In this Arkansas child-support modification case, the father petitioned to decrease his support obligation based on changed circumstances, while the mother sought an increase and filed a contempt motion. The trial court announced a ruling after an in-chambers discussion with counsel but without hearing any testimony or receiving evidence, denying both modification requests, awarding back support and fees, and continuing existing obligations. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court erred by deciding the fact-intensive issues without an evidentiary hearing. The majority reasoned that modification requires proof of changed circumstances and that the parties were entitled to present evidence before a ruling. A dissent argued that the father's counsel had waived any objection by refusing the court's offer to proceed with a hearing.

family lawprocedure

In Floyd v. Koenig, Angela Floyd sued her former physician, Dr. Samuel Koenig III, alleging invasion of privacy, public disclosure of private facts, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty after he released her confidential medical records and identifying information without consent to the adoptive parents of a child she had given up for adoption in 1988. The circuit court dismissed the complaint as barred by the three-year statute of limitations, ruling that Floyd had failed to plead fraud with particularity under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) to support her claim of fraudulent concealment. On appeal, the Arkansas Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that fraudulent concealment need not be pleaded with the particularity required for an independent fraud claim and that the facts alleged in the complaint—particularly the ongoing doctor-patient relationship—were sufficient to raise a question of fact as to whether the statute was tolled until Floyd discovered the disclosure in 2006.

proceduretorts & liabilityhealthcare

Michelle Logan Jones was convicted in a bench trial of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to use in furtherance of a felony. She appealed the denial of her motion to suppress her statements and the physical evidence, contending that the officer's question about anything illegal exceeded the permissible scope of investigating an anonymous loud music complaint under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.2. The court affirmed, ruling that the encounter remained consensual and did not constitute a seizure, as the officer's additional inquiry was a routine question that did not add to the intrusiveness of the initial approach permitted under Rule 2.2(a) to request information in aid of investigating a particular crime.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over title to a 39-acre tract in Benton County, Arkansas, originally part of a 40-acre parcel owned by Paula Weir. After Weir failed to pay taxes post-1989, the property was forfeited to the state, and Robert Oliver acquired a tax deed in 1996; he then paid taxes on the tract for over seven years and sued to quiet title, also seeking damages from J. Michael Enterprises, Inc. (JME), which had obtained quitclaim deeds from the Weirs in 2005. JME counterclaimed that the tax deed's legal description was invalid and challenged the awards of punitive damages and attorney's fees under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-37-226 for clouding title. The circuit court quieted title in Oliver, awarded $2,500 in punitive damages and $5,000 in fees, and the appeals court affirmed, holding that Oliver satisfied the requirements for title by adverse possession under color of title via tax payments, that the deed description was adequate, and that JME's actions met the statutory elements for the damages award based on intent to cloud title and seek payment to clear it.

propertytaxescriminal law

This case concerns a divorced father's motion to terminate his child-support obligation for his adult son, who has mental disabilities and had been living in a group home since 2006. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that the son's relocation from the mother's home did not constitute a material change in circumstances sufficient to end support. The appellate court reversed, holding that the move was a material change and that continued support was unwarranted because the son's housing, utilities, food, transportation, and pharmacy needs were fully covered by his SSI benefits, with additional income from part-time work available for personal expenses. The court reasoned that Arkansas law requires support only when the adult child demonstrably needs it, and no such need was shown on the facts presented. The case was remanded with directions to terminate the obligation.

family law

The case involved a boundary-line dispute between neighbors Donna Turner and Mark and Nanci Brandt in Benton County, Arkansas. The circuit court awarded judgment, costs, and attorney's fees to the Brandts and included a provision threatening Turner with a minimum 180-day jail sentence for any future violations of the order, noting her prior contempt findings. Turner appealed, arguing the lack of a hearing record required setting aside the order, that fees were improper without a record, and that pre-setting contempt punishments was erroneous. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Turner failed to reconstruct the record as required by appellate rules, waived the fees argument by not raising it below, and that the contempt punishment issue was not ripe for review since no violation had occurred.

propertyprocedure