John F. Taylor

The case concerned whether State Farm could enforce policy clauses limiting uninsured motorist coverage to a single policy when the Gianninis held two separate policies on their vehicles, after Gail Giannini was injured in one accident caused by two different uninsured drivers. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Gianninis, interpreting A.R.S. § 20-259.01(F) as only barring double recovery and allowing claims under both policies. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statute expressly permits an insurer to restrict coverage to one policy per accident and that the presence of multiple tortfeasors did not create more than one accident or override the statutory language. The court reasoned that the statute refers to accidents rather than claims and that the limitation applies regardless of how many negligent parties contributed to the single incident.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

In State v. Womack, the defendant entered an Alford plea to charges including resisting arrest after fleeing police on a motorcycle at high speeds through residential areas, leading to his eventual stop without further incident. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the resisting arrest conviction, finding an insufficient factual basis under A.R.S. § 13-2508(A)(2), which requires intentionally preventing an arrest by using means that create a substantial risk of physical injury to officers or others. The court reasoned that the defendant's actions constituted flight to avoid arrest rather than resistance, as the statute demands proof that the defendant intended to prevent the arrest through the risky conduct, not merely that the flight incidentally created such risks. The opinion distinguishes between avoiding arrest and the specific intent and means elements of resisting arrest.

criminal law

The case involved a dispute between Eastman Kodak Company and A.R. Teeters & Associates, Inc., along with Arlen Teeters, stemming from a 1984 distributorship agreement for microfilm products and services in the Phoenix area. After the original company (A.R. Teeters & Company) faced financial difficulties, ceased operations, and transferred some assets and customers, Kodak sued for unpaid debts, claiming breach of contract by the new entity, successor liability for the predecessor's obligations, and personal liability against Teeters under the trust fund doctrine for certain loan repayments. A jury found in Kodak's favor on all claims, but on appeal the court affirmed the breach of contract verdict against Associates while reversing the successor liability judgment, finding insufficient evidence that Associates was a mere continuation of the predecessor, and reversed the trust fund doctrine judgment against Teeters because the facts showed insolvency but not corporate liquidation at the time of the payments. The court remanded for entry of judgments in favor of Associates and Teeters on the reversed claims.

business & regulatory

This case arose from DUI charges against James Weant under Arizona statutes for driving under the influence and related offenses after a rear-end collision. The Phoenix Municipal Court suppressed blood and breath test results showing a .15 BAC on the ground that Weant might have consumed alcohol while briefly alone with his girlfriend at the hospital, and the superior court affirmed that ruling. The Arizona Court of Appeals accepted special action jurisdiction and reversed, holding that the State presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable person to believe no post-accident drinking occurred, including constant police observation, absence of alcohol in the room, and the amount needed to reach the measured BAC. The court reasoned that any conflicting inferences about the later-detected alcohol odor should be weighed by the jury rather than resolved by pretrial suppression. It directed remand for further proceedings with the tests admissible.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Rivera, the defendant appealed after pleading guilty to two counts of attempted sexual conduct with a minor pursuant to a plea agreement, challenging the factual basis for one count, the imposition of a one-year jail term on the prison sentence count, and the assessment of time payment fees on both counts. The court affirmed the trial court's finding of a sufficient factual basis for the plea on count III, based on the defendant's admissions and police reports in the record showing strong evidence of guilt. It vacated the one-year jail sentence imposed on count I as exceeding the court's authority, since no statute permitted sentencing both to prison and county jail for the same offense in that conditional manner, but upheld the identical jail term as a valid condition of lifetime probation on count III. Finally, the court vacated the $8 time payment fee on count III, interpreting A.R.S. § 12-116 as imposing the fee once per person rather than per conviction, unlike felony assessments.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Barrs, the defendant entered a no-contest plea to attempted burglary and received a two-year prison sentence plus credit for presentence time, but the sentencing judge omitted any mention of restitution in open court and included a $10 restitution order only in the later minute entry. The appellate court held that restitution forms part of the sentence and must be imposed through an oral pronouncement with the defendant present, rather than by subsequent written entry. Because Arizona law imposes a mandatory duty on the trial court to determine and order full victim restitution, the court vacated the restitution portion of the sentence and remanded solely for a new sentencing hearing on that issue while affirming the conviction and remaining sentence terms.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Douglas Borchers, a convicted felon serving a twenty-years-to-life sentence, who challenged the Arizona Board of Pardons and Paroles' actions after his initial 1987 parole grant was vacated due to lack of required victim notice under A.R.S. § 31-411(G) and parole was later denied following a hearing that included testimony from the victim's family. Borchers claimed the board abused its discretion by permitting family participation, failing to provide individualized reasons or timely notice of denial, and denying him the right to cross-examine witnesses. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, interpreting the statute as a notice provision that did not restrict the board's ability to obtain information or allow participation, finding no due process violation from the lack of cross-examination given the nature of parole proceedings, and holding that any notice delay did not require reversal. The core reasoning emphasized the board's broad discretion in parole matters and the plain language of the statute prioritizing notice over limitations on testimony.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a juvenile who pled guilty to unlawful use of means of transportation under a plea agreement that dismissed other charges and capped restitution at $750. The juvenile court ordered the juvenile to pay $500 in restitution to the victims in monthly installments starting over a year later. The juvenile appealed, arguing that the court failed to consider the nature of the offense and his physical and mental condition as required by statute, and that he lacked the means to pay. The appellate court affirmed the order, holding that the record demonstrated the juvenile court had considered the required factors and that the delayed payment schedule reflected consideration of the juvenile's earning capacity and employment history without abusing its discretion.

criminal lawfamily law

The case involved a teacher, Kenneth Hampton, who was dismissed by the Glendale Union High School District due to economic reasons and claimed the district failed to provide him a preferred right of reappointment under Arizona statute when a position opened, despite his temporary employment elsewhere. The court decided that the school district violated A.R.S. § 15-544(C) by not contacting Hampton about the open position and also breached its contract with him, reversing the lower court's summary judgment in favor of the district and remanding the case. The core reasoning was that the statute grants a preferred right of reappointment without exceptions for other employment, and accepting another job does not constitute a waiver or affect qualification for the position, as the legislature did not intend to penalize teachers who seek new employment promptly.

labor & employment

This case involved the appeal of Walter Raymond Jordan, Jr. from his convictions on two counts of kidnapping and two counts of first-degree murder under a felony murder theory, stemming from a bar fight that escalated to the victims being tied up, transported, and killed by stabbing. The court affirmed the convictions after addressing three main issues on appeal. On the Batson challenge regarding the state's peremptory strike of an Asian juror, the court held that the defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of purposeful racial discrimination, so no race-neutral explanation was required from the prosecutor. The court also found no error in admitting autopsy and crime scene photographs of the victims, as they were relevant to prove elements of the offenses despite their graphic nature. Finally, the court modified the sentences to award the defendant 309 days of presentence incarceration credit, which the state conceded was required by statute.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

In State v. Zierden, the defendant was convicted by a jury of one count of forgery involving a specific check and sentenced to ten years in prison as a repeat offender. The trial court also ordered him to pay restitution for an uncharged forgery involving a different check, based on his post-arrest statements to police admitting involvement in both incidents. The Arizona Court of Appeals vacated the restitution order, holding that a trial court may require restitution only for an offense of which the defendant has been convicted, has agreed to pay restitution, or has admitted in court proceedings, and that statements made only to police do not qualify as a sufficient admission due to due process protections. The court emphasized that admissions triggering additional penalties must be made with adequate safeguards, such as in open court or via a signed writing.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a workers' compensation claim by an employee who alleged that chemical exposures at a new work facility caused severe allergic reactions, multiple chemical sensitivity syndrome, and related symptoms, leading to an industrial injury claim against his employer McDonnell Douglas. The Industrial Commission denied the claim after hearings, finding that any exposure was not greater than in the general environment and that the condition was not compensable under occupational disease provisions. The Arizona Court of Appeals set aside the award, holding that the Administrative Law Judge had erred by applying the occupational disease statutes rather than analyzing the claim under accidental injury principles. The court noted that evidence could support a finding of injury by accident due to specific workplace conditions, distinguishing it from typical occupational disease cases like silicosis.

labor & employment

Gateway Potato Sales sued Sunworth Packing, its general partner, and G.B. Investment as limited partner to recover payment for seed potatoes supplied to the partnership, seeking to hold the limited partner liable under A.R.S. § 29-319 for taking part in the business's control. The trial court granted summary judgment to G.B. Investment, finding no evidence that it had participated in control beyond its investment. On appeal, the court reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the limited partner's role. The decision rested on conflicting affidavits: one from G.B. Investment's officer denying day-to-day involvement, and one from the general partner's president describing extensive control by G.B. Investment employees over operations, expenditures, and decisions, which Gateway's owner had been told about before the sales.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved Luis Menendez, who was thrown into the shallow end of an in-ground lap pool at a company party and suffered quadriplegia; he sued the pool's developer, designer, and related parties alleging strict liability in tort and negligence based on the pool's design and construction. The trial court dismissed the strict liability claims and granted summary judgment on the negligence claims. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that an in-ground swimming pool is not a "product" subject to strict liability because it is a structural improvement to real property rather than an item manufactured and placed into the stream of commerce. The court also held that the defendants owed no continuing duty after transferring the property, as there was no evidence of a concealed dangerous condition they had reason to know about or any active concealment.

torts & liabilityproperty

This case arose after Stefan Ferguson suffered severe injuries at a boarding school owned by Wick, leading to an $8.4 million judgment against Wick that exceeded its $500,000 liability policy procured through insurance agent CSC. Ferguson, who had entered a settlement agreement with Wick and its insurer, sued CSC directly alleging negligence and breach of duty in failing to recommend an umbrella policy. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to CSC, and the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that an injured third party may not maintain a direct action against the tortfeasor's insurance agent for negligent failure to advise on higher coverage amounts. The court reasoned that Arizona law imposes no duty on the agent to third parties absent privity or reliance, extending prior precedent that an insurer's obligations run only to its insured.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In Greves v. Ohio State Life Insurance, the beneficiary sued the insurer for breach of a $500,000 life insurance policy after the company denied the claim and rescinded the policy upon learning that the insured had misrepresented his prior treatment for malignant melanoma. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer, ruling that the policy's incontestability clause required the insured to survive two years from issuance, that the misrepresentation justified rescission under A.R.S. § 20-1109(3) because the company would have declined or rated the policy, and that the denial was timely. On appeal, the court affirmed the determinations regarding the incontestability clause and timeliness of the rejection but reversed the summary judgment on rescission, finding genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the insurer would have issued a different policy, and remanded for further proceedings.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this special action, plaintiffs in a medical malpractice case served offers of judgment on the defendant physicians under Rule 68 of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, which by its terms remained effective for 30 days. The defendants moved to extend the response time, and the trial court granted a 90-day enlargement. The Court of Appeals accepted jurisdiction to decide whether a trial court may enlarge the period specified in Rule 68. The court held that Rule 6(b) authorizes such extensions for cause shown, because Rule 68 is not among the rules expressly exempted from enlargement under Rule 6(b), and it affirmed the trial court's order.

proceduretorts & liability

Southwest Gas Corporation filed a complaint with the Arizona Corporation Commission seeking to require El Paso Natural Gas Company to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity and approved rates for its direct sales of natural gas to end-users in Arizona, arguing that El Paso qualified as a public service corporation under Article 15, Section 2 of the Arizona Constitution. The Commission ruled that El Paso was not currently a public service corporation because its sales were limited to existing customers under longstanding contracts and it was not seeking new end-use customers, though it indicated it would assert jurisdiction if El Paso added new customers. The superior court upheld the Commission's decision after reviewing stipulated facts, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that El Paso's limited contractual sales did not constitute a dedication of its property to public use such that all members of the public had an enforceable right to demand service. The court noted that El Paso's interstate transportation and resale activities were subject to FERC jurisdiction, but its direct end-use sales fell outside federal regulation under the Natural Gas Act.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case involved Marvin Swichtenberg suing Jack Brimer for negligence after Swichtenberg fell through a skylight while painting buildings managed by Brimer. The trial court dismissed the action, finding that Brimer was Swichtenberg's employer and thus immune from tort liability under Arizona's workers' compensation exclusivity provision. The appeals court affirmed, holding that equitable estoppel did not prevent Brimer from asserting the immunity defense, that disputed facts about employment status were properly resolved by the court rather than a jury, and that the dual capacity doctrine did not apply to allow the claim because the alleged negligence was connected to Brimer's business activities.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

In Stewart v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance, the Stewarts appealed a summary judgment allowing Mutual of Omaha to rescind three insurance policies on the ground that the applications contained material misrepresentations about Wayne Stewart's mental health history, in violation of A.R.S. § 20-1109. The court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings, holding that disputed facts existed as to whether the applications were fraudulent. The reasoning centered on evidence that Stewart may have disclosed his consultations with physicians to the agents, who did not record the information, and that the recorded answers would not have appeared false to a reasonable insured reviewing the application, which could estop Mutual from claiming fraud.

business & regulatoryprocedure