John F. Molloy

This case was a second appeal in a wrongful death action brought against the City of Tucson after a man drowned when his car became stranded in floodwaters on a public street during a heavy rain in 1961. The trial court entered a substantial judgment for the plaintiff, and the appellate court affirmed. The court held that a sudden emergency jury instruction was proper given the evidence of a developing crisis, that an erroneous instruction on the presumption of due care was harmless, and that the statute permitted the jury to consider the surviving widow's mental suffering in awarding damages. It also found no error in other evidentiary and instructional rulings, including withdrawal of the assumption of risk defense.

torts & liability

This case concerns a contract dispute over the sale of real estate between Sam Levitz Furniture Company (seller) and Safeway Stores (buyer), where the agreement included a condition that Safeway's purchase of Levitz's property was contingent on Safeway purchasing adjacent properties. The core issue was the meaning of the term 'purchase' in that condition—specifically, whether it required Safeway to enter a binding contract for the adjacent land or to actually acquire title to it. Following its prior decision in a related appeal, the court held that the contract language, interpreted by its plain meaning as selected by the buyer, referred to entering a contract rather than completing title acquisition. The court affirmed judgment for the escrow agent but reversed the judgment in favor of Safeway, remanding with instructions to enter a decree of specific performance requiring Safeway to complete the purchase from Levitz, as the condition had been satisfied and no surrounding circumstances altered the contract's meaning.

property

This case involved a certiorari review of a city court's dismissal of a criminal complaint charging a bar owner with violating Tucson Code § 11-18, which made it unlawful for bar or tavern operators to allow members of the general public to loiter on the premises after 1:00 a.m. on weekdays or after 1:00 a.m. on Sundays. The lower court had dismissed the complaint on grounds that the ordinance conflicted with state statutes vesting liquor control in the Department of Liquor Licenses and Control (A.R.S. § 4-111 et seq.) and was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the ordinance did not interfere with state-regulated liquor sales or licensing decisions and instead addressed separate concerns of public order and morality after legal closing hours. The court reasoned that the municipal ordinance could validly parallel state law and regulations without conflict, and that it fell within the city's charter-based police powers to preserve public peace and morals, without exceeding constitutional limits on loitering restrictions.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

The case involved Robert Thompson, who was charged with burglary and grand theft after the looting of a Tucson bar; he was arrested while intoxicated near the scene with incriminating items in a car. The central issue was the admissibility of a signed confession he gave later that day while hung over, after requesting and receiving a small amount of liquor mixed in coffee from the interrogating detective. The trial court held a voluntariness hearing and admitted the confession, finding it was made freely and voluntarily based on the officer's account that Thompson was rational and coherent, with no threats or improper inducements. On appeal, the court upheld the confession's admissibility but modified the burglary conviction from first to second degree, concluding the evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the entry occurred at night. The concurrent sentences were affirmed without change.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved two consolidated actions by Pioneer Plumbing Supply Co. against the Hackins and related entities: one to foreclose a mortgage and another seeking compensatory and punitive damages arising from disputes over a May 9 agreement concerning plumbing work and payments. The trial court ruled in Pioneer's favor in both, finding that Hackin had breached the agreement, that there was no duress or fraud, and that the Hackins' counterclaims lacked support. On appeal, the court addressed procedural issues including waiver of jury trial through a stipulation and untimely demands under Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure 38 and 39, as well as the merits of the contract claims. It affirmed the judgment in the mortgage foreclosure action but reversed and remanded the damages action for further proceedings. The core reasoning centered on the enforceability of the parties' stipulation waiving jury trial, the trial court's findings on the contract terms being supported by substantial evidence, and the absence of wrongful conduct by Pioneer after Hackin's breach.

procedurepropertybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned three cousins jointly tried and convicted of first-degree burglary after police found them inside a closed pizza parlor with tools and signs of forced entry into machines. Edward Olivas moved for a separate trial, arguing that post-arrest incriminating statements by his codefendants George Leeth and Frank Olivas prejudiced him, invoking Bruton v. United States. The trial court denied severance both before and during trial, and the appellate court addressed whether this violated Bruton. The core reasoning centered on the statements not naming Edward Olivas, combined with repeated limiting instructions directing the jury to consider each statement only against the speaker, which the court found sufficient to avoid prejudice requiring separate trials.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a surviving parent's attempt to obtain a default judgment in a separate wrongful death action against the same defendant after the trial court denied her motion to intervene in an earlier suit filed by the surviving spouse. The trial court dismissed the parent's action on its own motion, concluding she had no independent cause of action under A.R.S. § 12-612 and was bound by the prior intervention ruling. The appellate court reversed, holding that the statute's preference for a single action does not render a subsequent beneficiary's suit a nullity; instead, consolidation under Rule 42(a) is the appropriate remedy, and the properly entered default entitled the parent to a determination of damages. The decision rested on statutory construction of Arizona's Wrongful Death Act, recognition that a surviving parent is a beneficiary, and principles allowing flexibility in handling multiple related actions without nullifying defaults.

proceduretorts & liability

This case arose from a rear-end collision in which the plaintiffs were injured when the defendants' 1964 Buick station wagon suffered a sudden brake failure due to a ruptured hydraulic line, after being driven about 10,000 miles. The plaintiffs sued the car's owners (the Marianis), the selling dealer (Young Buick), and the manufacturer (General Motors) on theories including negligence and strict liability under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A. The trial court directed verdicts for all defendants, but the Court of Appeals affirmed as to the Marianis and Young Buick because the record showed no evidence of negligence in maintenance or inspection, while reversing and remanding as to General Motors on the ground that Arizona law extends strict product liability to foreseeable bystanders injured by a defective product. The court noted evidence that the brake line had worn through from rubbing in an inaccessible location, creating a jury question on defectiveness.

torts & liability

The case involved an osteopathic physician who was expelled from the Arizona Osteopathic Medical Association and removed from the staff of Phoenix General Hospital after the Association's Ethics Committee received complaints about overcharging and unnecessary treatment. The trial court issued writs of mandamus ordering his reinstatement, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the expulsion violated the Association's bylaws because the physician did not receive adequate notice or an opportunity to be heard before the Board of Trustees voted on September 22, 1965. The court reasoned that the registered-mail notice was returned undelivered, the physician's known office practices and refusal to accept such mail were ignored, and the acting Ethics Committee chair—who had a personal conflict with the physician—made no additional efforts to inform him of the hearing despite their meeting that same day. The decision emphasized that the bylaws' procedural requirements for notice and a hearing must be followed to ensure fundamental fairness before revoking membership that was a prerequisite for hospital privileges.

procedurehealthcare

The case involved Roger and Agnes Jones, recipients of Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled (APTD) benefits under a state program conforming to federal Social Security Act requirements, who challenged the State Department of Public Welfare's reduction of their benefits by treating their 19-year-old son's net earnings (minus a $40 allowance) as available to the household. The superior court denied relief, but the court of appeals reversed. The core reasoning was that applicable federal law limits benefit calculations to income and resources actually available to the individual recipients rather than income merely assumed to be accessible from unemancipated minors, and that the department exceeded its jurisdiction by improperly importing AFDC regulations into the APTD program.

federal powerhealthcare

This case concerns juvenile court proceedings in Pima County involving a minor initially declared a neglected dependent child in 1962, later returned to his mother's custody, and then facing a 1968 delinquency petition for serious acts. The juvenile court held hearings on the minor's mental condition, ultimately suspending criminal prosecution, finding him mentally defective and disordered under A.R.S. § 8-235, and committing him to the Arizona State Hospital rather than transferring the matter to adult court. The Pima County Juvenile Probation Department later sought a rehearing under Rule 60(c) on the transfer issue, prompting the minor to challenge the court's jurisdiction on grounds including double jeopardy. The court held that the initial suspension order lacked finality as it was unaccompanied by a delinquency adjudication and involved ongoing mental evaluation, and that the juvenile court retained inherent and statutory authority under its continuing jurisdiction (A.R.S. § 8-236) to modify or rehear orders while the matter remained pending. Accordingly, the writ challenging the rehearing was quashed, allowing the juvenile court to proceed with reconsideration of the transfer.

criminal lawfamily lawprocedure

This case concerned whether a 15-year-old unlicensed driver, Ruth Toben, was covered as an insured under her father's automobile liability policy for an accident involving a Jeep she drove without the title owner's permission. The policy provided coverage for relatives driving non-owned vehicles but excluded those used without the owner's permission. The trial court ruled in favor of coverage, finding that the son who had permission to use the Jeep was its "owner" for purposes of the clause and had granted permission. The appellate court reversed, holding that the son was not the owner and that the actual owner had not permitted Ruth to drive, so the exclusion applied and the insurer was not liable for the remaining judgment balance.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case involves a wrongful death action filed by a surviving widow on behalf of herself and two minor children, where the trial court denied a motion to amend the complaint to add the deceased's parents as additional beneficiaries. The court reviewed the Arizona Wrongful Death Act, particularly A.R.S. § 12-612(A), which lists surviving spouses, children, or parents as potential beneficiaries, and addressed conflicts between provisions on damage distribution based on injury to survivors versus intestate succession rules. It interpreted the statute's use of 'or' in the beneficiary list as inclusive rather than exclusive, allowing parents to qualify even when a spouse or children survive. The appellate court reversed the denial of the motion to amend, holding that excluding the parents would be an abuse of discretion and could lead to inefficient proceedings.

torts & liabilityfamily lawprocedure

This inverse eminent domain case involved a dispute over a strip of land along Speedway Boulevard in Tucson that Pima County purportedly took in 1949 administrative proceedings to widen the road but did not physically use until 1965. The landowner sued after the taking, claiming lack of proper notice under the applicable statute, and prevailed at trial. The court held that valid service of notice on the owner was a prerequisite to any taking under the statute, and the evidence—including the owner's testimony denying receipt or signing the acknowledgment—failed to establish that notice was given. The court rejected arguments that the two-year limitations period or doctrines like waiver, estoppel, or laches barred the claim, because no physical entry occurred until 1965 and the record showed no participation by the owner. Judgment for the landowner was affirmed.

propertyprocedure

In State v. Tages, the defendant was convicted under A.R.S. § 13-541 of obstructing public officers who were attempting to execute a felony arrest warrant for her husband at a Tucson bar. Evidence at trial conflicted regarding whether the defendant physically interfered with the officers or merely made verbal statements questioning their identity and demanding to see the warrant. The trial court refused the defendant's requested jury instruction that merely remonstrating with or criticizing an officer does not amount to obstruction. The appellate court reversed the conviction, concluding that the instructions given were inadequate because they failed to inform the jury that words alone were insufficient for conviction and that officers must disclose their official status when it may not be known to the defendant.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a personal injury lawsuit stemming from a two-car collision at a rural intersection allegedly made dangerous by earthen dikes built on adjacent farmland that blocked drivers' views. The plaintiffs sued the property owners for negligence and public nuisance and the county for related highway responsibilities. The court affirmed summary judgment for both defendants, holding that landowners have no duty to avoid obstructing views across their private property for highway users when the structures serve a legitimate purpose and are not on the public right-of-way. It distinguished this from liability for conditions causing physical contact or obstructions placed directly on public roads. The decision also addressed the county's lack of duty or liability under the facts presented.

torts & liabilitypropertyprocedure

This case involved extraordinary writ proceedings in which defendants challenged a superior court's jurisdiction to reinstate a personal injury lawsuit after it had been dismissed without prejudice for lack of prosecution under the inactive calendar rules. The court held that the July 1965 order vacating the dismissal and restoring the case to the active calendar was a nullity because plaintiffs' motion to set aside the dismissal was never served on opposing counsel, violating Rule 5(a) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule IV(a) of the Uniform Rules of Practice. As a result, the original dismissal order remained conclusive, and all subsequent orders attempting to revive the action were reversed and vacated. The core reasoning emphasized that reasonable notice to parties with an interest in opposing relief is a prerequisite to the lawful exercise of judicial power.

procedure

This case arose from a 1964 accident in which four-and-a-half-year-old Greg Nagle was struck and injured by a garbage-collection truck driven by defendant Robert Conger for the City of Scottsdale; the child's parents sued both for medical expenses and on the child's behalf. A jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and the plaintiffs appealed, claiming that references to the child's location away from home, the absence of a contributory-negligence instruction, the verdict forms, and other trial events cumulatively deprived them of a fair trial. The court affirmed, holding that any mention of parental supervision was invited or harmless, that contributory negligence was not an issue because a child of that age cannot be contributorily negligent as a matter of law and parental negligence is not imputed, and that the plaintiffs had waived objections to the verdict forms and other matters by failing to raise them at trial; the court further noted that the jury had viewed the scene and that the record did not show the verdict resulted from legal misunderstanding.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a dispute over whether an automobile insurance policy could allow the insurer to reduce payments under bodily injury liability coverage by amounts already paid under the voluntary medical expense coverage. The insured had obtained a judgment against the policyholder for injuries, and the insurer sought to credit the $706.20 in medical payments already made toward the liability limit. The court upheld the policy provision, reasoning that unlike mandatory coverages such as uninsured motorist insurance, medical expense coverage is optional, allowing the parties to contract freely regarding offsets, and the policy language clearly provided for such crediting without violating public policy or the Safety Responsibility Act.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case involved a high school student, Mike Quimby, who sought to enjoin a school district and the Arizona Interscholastic Association from enforcing eligibility rules that barred him from interscholastic sports after he moved to live with guardians following a court order, rather than with his parents. The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the appeals court affirmed. The court held that the school district's membership in the voluntary association did not constitute an illegal delegation of authority because the district could withdraw at any time and effectively adopted the rules by participating. It further reasoned that the eligibility regulation, which required students to live with parents or meet narrow guardianship criteria, had a reasonable relation to preventing improper recruiting and school shopping and did not violate the student's protected interests, even when the move was judicially compelled.

civil rightsprocedure