John J. McGuire

This case involved an Arizona state prison inmate who sought transfer to the state hospital for mental health treatment after prison physicians diagnosed him as mentally ill and dangerous to himself or others. The court held that the specific statutory procedure under A.R.S. § 31-224 must be followed for committing mentally ill prisoners, requiring the prison superintendent to file a petition for commitment rather than allowing a general mental health petition under other statutes. The court reasoned that the statute mandates confinement in the state hospital upon such findings, that the prison physicians' opinions on treatment location were immaterial, and that the trial court should direct commitment accordingly.

criminal lawprocedurehealthcare

The case concerned a contested adoption proceeding in which relatives petitioned to adopt a baby boy after the natural mother consented to their guardianship but explicitly refused adoption consent; the mother was incarcerated for forgery and bad-check offenses, the father had died, and the child had lived with the petitioners for about 18 months. The trial court entered an interlocutory adoption order, finding it served the child's best interests and purporting to sever the mother's parental rights, despite making no finding that she was unfit. On appeal, the court affirmed the adoption order but vacated the portion severing parental rights, holding that the interlocutory decree was provisional, that changed circumstances could be addressed before a final decree, and that Arizona precedents permitted adoption based on the child's welfare even without a dependency finding or parental unfitness.

family law

This case concerns a motion to set aside a default judgment entered against defendants in a personal injury suit brought by a minor plaintiff. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order vacating the default and judgment, holding that the defendants' failure to notify their liability insurer of the lawsuit could be considered by the court under the discretion afforded by Rule 60(c) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. Drawing on the Supreme Court's decision in Sandoval v. Chenoweth, the court reasoned that an insurer need not formally intervene to seek relief and that the liberal policy favoring resolution on the merits supported allowing the motion, even without the insurer appearing in its own name. The decision emphasized that lack of notice to the insurer was one relevant circumstance the trial court could weigh in exercising its discretion.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved plaintiffs suing licensed private process servers for damages after the servers filed a false affidavit of personal service in an earlier lawsuit, leading to a default judgment that was later vacated. The trial court dismissed the amended complaint on contract, strict liability, and fraud theories, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that private process servers, as officers of the court under A.R.S. § 11-445, are subject to common-law liability for false returns akin to sheriffs or constables, with the statute of limitations running from discovery of the falsity rather than the filing. The court rejected the contractual third-party beneficiary claim but found the other counts viable and ruled that an interlocutory dismissal order did not trigger res judicata. The decision remanded for further proceedings on the false-service claims.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved a lawsuit by subdivision lot owners seeking to enjoin construction on another lot that allegedly violated recorded building restrictions limiting dwellings to one story and requiring specific brick materials. The defendants relied on an amendment approved by 51% of lot owners that purported to exempt their lot from those restrictions under a clause allowing changes for the beneficial improvement of the subdivision. The court held the amendment invalid because the power to amend the restrictions extends only to uniform changes applicable to the entire subdivision and does not permit selective exemptions for individual lots. The judgment for the defendants was reversed, and the case was remanded for consideration of the defendants' remaining defenses, such as waiver or abandonment of the restrictions.

property

This case involved plaintiff Adolph Mozes suing defendants Robert Daru, Seymour Lenwood Schorr, and Norman S. Fenton for alleged malicious interference with his business, seeking substantial actual and punitive damages; the defendants denied liability, raised defenses including res judicata and the statute of limitations, and filed counterclaims seeking damages and injunctive relief against further lawsuits or defamatory statements by the plaintiff. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissed the plaintiff's amended complaint with prejudice, and after a bench trial on the counterclaims awarded the defendants compensatory and punitive damages plus injunctive relief. On appeal, the court affirmed the summary judgment dismissal of the complaint but reversed the judgment on the counterclaims, holding that the plaintiff had been denied his constitutional right to a jury trial without a proper waiver under the rules of civil procedure, as his objection to a non-jury trial was overruled and proceeding to trial did not constitute acquiescence. The matter was remanded for a new trial on the counterclaims, with the temporary injunction to remain in effect.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involves a wrongful death claim against Fluor Corporation, Ltd., a general contractor, arising from the death of Donald Sykes, an employee of a subcontractor, while working on premises under Fluor's control. The Arizona Court of Appeals denied Fluor's motion for rehearing and adhered to its prior decision remanding the case for a new trial. The court withdrew a confusing portion of its original opinion addressing Fluor's requested jury instructions 1 and 1A on premises liability and substituted new analysis explaining that the instructions were erroneous because they ignored potential liability under retained control (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414) and improperly mixed standards for licensees rather than invitees.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case was a wrongful death action brought by the administrator of a welder killed in a fire and explosion while working in a confined shaft at a government missile site. Fluor Corporation, the prime contractor, had subcontracted the welding work, and the plaintiff pursued recovery on theories including nondelegable duty for inherently dangerous work, retained control by Fluor, and breach of safety provisions in Fluor's contract with the government. The trial court submitted only the nondelegable duty theory to the jury, which returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial, reasoning that Arizona law does not recognize nondelegable duties as between a prime contractor and employees of an independent subcontractor, following its prior decision in Welker v. Kennecott Copper Co.

torts & liability

This case involved a dispute over title to overlapping portions of an L-shaped lot in a subdivision near Nogales, Arizona, where plaintiffs sought to quiet title and recover damages for trespass, while defendants cross-claimed to quiet title to their claimed areas and asserted a right-of-way. The trial court quieted title in the plaintiffs to most of the disputed parcels based on their record title or adverse possession, and the appellate court affirmed that result but modified the judgment to grant defendants a limited easement for using an existing driveway to access their garage with passenger vehicles. The core reasoning centered on evidence that the parties and their predecessors had long treated the actual boundaries and driveway use as established by possession and practice for over twenty years, supporting adverse possession claims while preserving the historical access that had existed without objection. Record title discrepancies were noted but deemed non-critical due to the adverse possession holdings.

propertyprocedure

This case involved an appeal from a trial court order vacating a default judgment entered against the defendant in a motor vehicle accident lawsuit. The plaintiffs had served process in January 1962, after which the defendant forwarded the papers to his insurer; the parties' attorneys exchanged letters agreeing not to seek default during settlement talks without ten days' prior written notice. Negotiations dragged on with low offers and counter-proposals, culminating in the plaintiffs taking default in February 1963 without further explicit notice. The appellate court affirmed the vacation of the judgment, holding that the October 1962 letter did not clearly terminate the open extension or start the ten-day clock, leaving any neglect by the insurer excusable under the circumstances. A dissent would have reversed, finding the insurer's delay constituted inexcusable neglect.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved a lawsuit by a bowling alley patron against the alley owner for injuries sustained when he fell into a recessed walkway adjacent to one of the lanes. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant, concluding that the defendant owed no duty because the hazard was open and obvious to the plaintiff. On appeal, the court reversed, holding that the obviousness of the condition does not automatically preclude liability, particularly where the plaintiff was engaged in the game and might reasonably fail to protect himself, and that the question of negligence should have been submitted to the jury.

torts & liability

This case arose from post-divorce disputes between former spouses over enforcement of a 1964 decree that awarded the wife child custody (with summer visitation for the husband) and provided for alternate selection or court-ordered division of personal property. After the parties could not agree on the property and the wife allegedly violated custody terms, the trial court issued a July 16, 1965 order finding both in contempt, specifying how to purge the contempt, and disposing of the property, along with later orders addressing show-cause hearings and jurisdiction. The appellate court granted the motion to dismiss the appeal in part, holding that the contempt findings and related enforcement orders were non-appealable because they fell under A.R.S. § 12-864, which incorporates common-law practice barring direct appeals from such contempts, and could instead be challenged collaterally via certiorari or habeas corpus; however, the portion of the July 16 order distributing personal property was appealable as an exercise of the trial court's reserved authority under the original judgment. The court further noted that allowing a supersedeas bond would stay only the property-distribution portion pending appeal.

family lawprocedureproperty