Virginia C. Kelly

In State v. Burr, the Arizona Court of Appeals reviewed a trial court's dismissal of aggravated driving under the influence charges against Alyssa Marie Burr on double jeopardy grounds. After the jury was empaneled in Burr's first trial, the assigned prosecutor became unavailable due to a death in the family, leading the original judge to declare a mistrial sua sponte on grounds that forcing a substitute attorney would be unfair to the state. A new judge later granted Burr's motion to dismiss, concluding manifest necessity had not existed for the mistrial. The appellate court vacated the dismissal and remanded the case, ruling that the original judge's finding of manifest necessity was reasonable under Arizona and federal double jeopardy standards because a key participant's sudden, unexpected absence can satisfy the required high degree of necessity, and the subsequent judge erred by reviewing that determination de novo instead of accepting it as law of the case.

criminal lawprocedure

In Star Publishing Co. v. Bernini, a newspaper challenged a trial judge’s summary denial of its request under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 122 to photograph a criminal jury trial, arguing the denial was improper because it occurred without a pre-trial hearing, considered the request’s timing, and barred all camera access due to privacy and security concerns. The Arizona Court of Appeals accepted special-action jurisdiction on grounds of public importance concerning media access to proceedings and the practical application of Rule 122, even though the underlying trial had ended and rendered the issues moot. The court held that Rule 122 permits a judge to weigh the timeliness of a request—filed only two working days before trial—as one factor in the decision and requires an on-the-record hearing when objections are raised, so the judge erred by denying the request without first conducting such a hearing. Because the trial was already over, however, the court denied relief.

criminal lawfree speechprocedure

The case involved Anthony Jackson's injury in an accident with an uninsured driver while riding as a passenger in his own vehicle, which was being driven by an employee of a Chevron repair station. After recovering uninsured motorist benefits under Chevron's Business Auto Policy, the Jacksons sued for a declaration that similar coverage must be imputed to the station's separate Businessowner’s Policy because the insurer had not offered it, as allegedly required by Arizona’s Uninsured Motorist Act, A.R.S. § 20-259.01. The trial court granted summary judgment to Nationwide, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The appellate court held that the Businessowner’s Policy, a general commercial liability policy containing only a limited garage operations endorsement for autos, was not a primary motor vehicle liability policy subject to the statutory offer requirement under § 20-259.01(L); therefore, the absence of an offer did not result in imputed coverage.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case concerned a patient's challenge to a trial court's order renewing his involuntary mental health treatment under A.R.S. § 36-543, after the patient was found persistently or acutely disabled. The patient moved to dismiss the petition for continued treatment, arguing that the required annual examination occurred outside the 30-day window mandated by Arizona Administrative Code R9-21-506 and that only one physician examined him instead of the two required by the regulation. The trial court denied the motion, found clear and convincing evidence that the patient remained in need of treatment and unable to accept it voluntarily, and ordered continued inpatient and outpatient care for another year. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that strict compliance with the statute is required but that the regulation's two-physician requirement conflicted with the statute's allowance for one or more examiners and must be disregarded; the timing issue did not warrant dismissal given the evidence presented.

healthcareprocedurecivil rights

The case involved Ricky Gray, convicted after a jury trial of aggravated domestic violence, tampering with a witness, and influencing a witness based on letters sent to his girlfriend urging her to avoid court proceedings and not cooperate in a pending domestic violence case. The appellate court considered whether a conviction for witness tampering under A.R.S. § 13-2804 requires the state to prove that the witness actually withheld testimony or failed to appear as a result of the defendant's conduct. Interpreting the statute's plain language, the court held that the term "induce" requires only that the defendant knowingly attempt to persuade the witness to engage in the prohibited acts, without needing evidence of actual effect, as the legislature had omitted any success element present in prior witness-tampering statutes. The convictions were therefore upheld.

criminal law

This case concerns a former wife's petition to reinstate child support for her adult daughter, who has severe mental disabilities, after the 1988 divorce decree and a 1993 stipulated order had terminated the father's support obligation when the daughter turned twenty-two. The trial court denied the petition on grounds of claim preclusion (res judicata) from the 1993 order and ruled that the daughter was not a party to the proceedings. The appellate court reversed that ruling, holding that claim preclusion did not apply because the daughter's potential lifelong disability preventing self-support was not known or litigable at the time of the 1993 stipulation, and it remanded for further proceedings on the support claim while addressing related issues such as attorney fees and party status.

family lawprocedure

The case involved a planned community association seeking judicial foreclosure on liens for unpaid assessments against nineteen properties, asserting priority over other recorded interests including those held by Flagstar Bank and Freddie Mac. The trial court granted summary judgment to the banks, determining that their recorded first deeds of trust had statutory priority, and imposed Rule 11 sanctions on the association for its litigation positions. On appeal, the court affirmed, concluding that A.R.S. § 33-1807(B)(2) unambiguously provides that recorded first deeds of trust are superior to association assessment liens, the material facts were undisputed, and the association's arguments lacked legal support warranting sanctions and denial of its post-judgment motions.

propertyprocedure

In this special action, the State of Arizona challenged a trial court's order requiring C.M., a victim of molestation by defendant Mark Gannon, to submit to an interview by defense counsel in a separate prosecution involving another victim. The trial court had ruled that C.M. was no longer a victim entitled to refuse an interview under the Arizona Constitution's Victim's Bill of Rights because Gannon's case had been resolved by guilty plea and probation. The Court of Appeals accepted jurisdiction and granted relief, vacating the order. The court reasoned that under A.R.S. §§ 13-4401(10) and 13-4402(A), a victim's rights remain enforceable until final disposition of the charges, which encompasses ongoing probation, as confirmed by related statutes providing for victim notice and participation in probation proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Abdi, the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault after stabbing the victim during a struggle at the victim's apartment, where Abdi claimed self-defense and asserted that the victim had been the initial aggressor. The trial court instructed the jury on self-defense and, at the state's request, added an instruction that a person is presumed to have acted reasonably when acting against someone who unlawfully or forcefully enters their residence. On appeal, Abdi challenged this instruction along with certain evidentiary rulings. The Court of Appeals of Arizona reversed the conviction, holding that the presumption instruction improperly applied the statute (A.R.S. § 13-419) to the victim rather than a defendant raising a justification defense, thereby creating a mandatory presumption that lessened the state's burden of proof on self-defense.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved John Eby, who was convicted in justice court of driving with an alcohol concentration of .08 or greater after a jury trial. Because no transcript of the justice court proceedings was available, the superior court conducted a trial de novo on appeal, denied Eby's motion to suppress, and again found him guilty based on stipulated facts. Eby then sought to appeal that conviction to the Court of Appeals. The court dismissed the appeal, holding that A.R.S. § 22-375 limits its jurisdiction over appeals from superior court judgments in matters originating in justice court to cases involving the validity of a tax, impost, assessment, toll, municipal fine, or statute, none of which were present here, and that a trial de novo does not alter this limitation.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Herrera, Raul Herrera was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of sexual conduct with a minor under fifteen, one count of sexual exploitation of a minor under fifteen, and one count of kidnapping based on acts against his stepdaughter. Herrera appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of uncharged acts as intrinsic to the charged offenses, by precluding evidence of the victim's prior sexual history, and by allowing expert testimony on rates of false accusations and typical perpetrators that he claimed invaded the jury's role. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that the other-acts evidence was properly admitted without need for Rule 404 analysis because it was intrinsic, that any improper aspects of the expert testimony did not result in prejudicial error given the jury instructions and acquittals on two counts, and that the excluded sexual history evidence was irrelevant or barred under applicable evidentiary rules.

criminal lawprocedure

In Mudas Greenhouses, LLC v. Global Horticultural, Inc., the plaintiffs purchased peat moss that they alleged was defective and caused the loss of their seeds and seedlings, leading to claims for breach of contract against the seller and product liability and negligent misrepresentation against both the seller and the producer. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the tort claims, holding that Arizona's economic loss rule barred recovery because the plaintiffs sought only economic damages. The appellate court vacated the judgment, reasoning that the economic loss rule does not apply when a defective product damages other property—in this case, the plaintiffs' seeds and seedlings—which remained distinct property even after being placed in the peat moss. The court further noted that the rule's application turns on whether the claimed loss involves damage to other property rather than solely the product itself or purely economic harm.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

In State v. Rodriguez, the petitioner sought post-conviction relief under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, claiming his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that his 1999 endangerment conviction was too remote to qualify as a historical prior felony conviction under former A.R.S. § 13-604(W)(2)(c) for sentencing enhancement purposes in his 2005 aggravated DUI case. The trial court denied the petition after an evidentiary hearing, finding that the 79 days of presentence incarceration for the 1999 offense counted as excluded time under the statute, so the conviction properly enhanced the sentence and counsel's performance caused no prejudice. On review, the Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the plain language of the statute excludes 'any time spent incarcerated,' which includes presentence custody, and that the petitioner failed to show prejudice from counsel's omission. The court granted review but denied relief, affirming the enhanced ten-year sentences.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved two defendants charged with DUI offenses in justice court whose counsel requested preliminary competency screenings under Rule 11.2(c) due to mental health concerns. The justice court appointed an expert for prescreening, found reasonable grounds for further evaluation based on the resulting reports recommending full examinations, and transferred the cases to superior court. The superior court judge reviewed the reports, disagreed with the incompetency findings, declared both defendants competent to stand trial without appointing additional experts, and returned the cases for trial. The court of appeals held that Rule 11.2(d) requires the superior court to order a full competency examination and related proceedings once any court has found reasonable grounds, without authority to substitute its own determination, based on the rule's plain language establishing exclusive superior court jurisdiction over such hearings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a law firm suing Kieran Curtiss to recover attorney fees his late wife Leela incurred under a fee agreement for dissolution of marriage proceedings, which were dismissed after her death while the couple was still married. The trial court dismissed the claim, ruling the fees were not community debts because they were incurred to end the marriage. The appellate court reversed, holding that debts incurred during marriage are presumed to be community obligations, that exceptions requiring spousal joinder under A.R.S. § 25-214 did not apply here since no dissolution occurred, and that fees for dissolution can qualify as community debts when they benefit the community through orderly asset division or temporary support orders, as recognized in A.R.S. § 25-315(A)(1)(a).

family lawpropertyprocedure

The case involved Christopher Francis, who was convicted after a jury trial of multiple felony charges related to marijuana trafficking, including conspiracy, possession, and transportation of marijuana for sale. The court decided to affirm Francis's convictions and sentences, including enhanced sentences under A.R.S. § 13-3419 for multiple drug offenses committed on separate occasions but consolidated for trial. The core reasoning was that the indictment itself charged multiple such offenses on different days, providing sufficient basis for the enhancement without needing a separate allegation or prior notice, as the statute's application is triggered by the nature of the charges and trial consolidation, distinguishing it from other enhancement notice requirements.

criminal law

This case arose from an inverse condemnation lawsuit where property owners challenged a Pima County ordinance restricting access to and development of their land, resulting in a judgment for the fair market value of the taken property plus litigation expenses. Pima County appealed only the awards for fees, costs, and interest rate, and tendered payment for the undisputed principal amount, but the trial court ordered payment of the remaining sums despite the appeal. The appellate court granted relief in the special action, holding that the automatic stay under Rule 62(g) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure applies to this inverse condemnation judgment against a political subdivision, unlike direct condemnation actions governed by specific statutes that create a substantive right to immediate payment.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned a car accident in which DPS officer Thomas Kimbro, temporarily assigned out of town, struck Brystal McCloud's vehicle while driving to a restaurant for a meal. McCloud sued Kimbro more than a year after the accident, and the trial court granted summary judgment to Kimbro on the ground that the one-year statute of limitations for claims against state employees applied. The appellate court affirmed, holding that an employee on out-of-town travel status remains within the course and scope of employment while traveling to and from meals because such travel is incidental to the assignment, of the kind the employee is hired to perform, and undertaken at least in part to serve the employer. Because the material facts were undisputed, the court could decide the scope-of-employment issue as a matter of law and conclude that the shorter limitations period barred the suit.

torts & liabilityprocedurelabor & employment

This case involved a state appeal from a trial court ruling that barred recovery of certain child-support arrearages owed by Gilbert Munoz, Jr., under former A.R.S. § 25-503(H), which required that unpaid support judgments by operation of law be reduced to a written money judgment within three years after the youngest child's emancipation. The facts showed Munoz had been ordered to pay support in 2001, with some past support reduced to judgment, but additional arrearages accrued and remained unreduced when the children emancipated around 2005. The trial court applied the former three-year limit and concluded enforcement was time-barred by 2008. On appeal, the court reversed, holding that the 2006 statutory amendment removing the three-year limitation applied because the claim was not yet barred at the time of amendment under A.R.S. § 12-505(B), and the prior version of the statute therefore did not prevent collection of the arrearages.

family lawprocedure