Peter Eckerstrom

The case involved James Johnson, who was convicted after a bench trial of second-degree murder of his former wife and initially sentenced to an aggravated twenty-two-year prison term. After remand for a jury determination of aggravating factors, the jury found that the murder was committed in an especially cruel, heinous, or depraved manner along with other aggravators, leading the trial court to reimpose the aggravated sentence. Johnson appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the cruel/heinous/depraved finding and the exclusion of expert testimony on his mental state. The appellate court concluded that sufficient evidence existed to support the aggravating factors but determined that the trial court abused its discretion by precluding relevant expert evidence that could rebut the state's proof of Johnson's mental state. Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and the jury's findings on the especially cruel, heinous, or depraved circumstance and remanded for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

Gary Hackworth, a warehouseman whose job involved prolonged standing and heavy lifting, filed a workers' compensation claim alleging that his Morton's neuroma foot injury was caused or aggravated by his employment. An administrative law judge denied the claim after finding a conflict in medical testimony and accepting the independent examiner's view that the condition could have idiopathic causes and could not be stated to a medical probability as work-related, even though the treating physician opined it was more than 50 percent likely due to the job and medical literature linked such neuromas to repetitive trauma. The court set aside the award, concluding that the examiner's testimony about possible unknown causes, without specific facts or evidence ruling out employment as a cause, did not create a sufficient dispute to deny compensability.

labor & employment

This case involved the state's appeal of a trial court's dismissal of an indictment against Jaime Espinoza for failing to register as a sex offender. The dismissal stemmed from a 2004 superior court order imposing registration as a probation condition for an adult criminal damage conviction, which was based on an erroneous assumption that Espinoza had a prior juvenile duty to register from a 1997 delinquency adjudication for attempted child molestation. The court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the 2004 order was void because the superior court lacked jurisdiction to impose registration requirements tied to a juvenile matter that the juvenile court had explicitly declined to order, and the adult offense did not independently authorize such a condition. The core reasoning centered on statutory limits on court jurisdiction over juvenile delinquency subject matter and the principle that a void order cannot create an enforceable registration duty.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Yonkman, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of sexual abuse and sexual conduct with a minor based on acts against his stepdaughter, with the state also introducing other-act evidence from two additional alleged victims. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the convictions and sentences and remanded the case, holding that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress Yonkman's confession. The court reasoned that after Yonkman invoked his right to counsel during an initial police encounter, the detective's subsequent contact through the victim's mother to arrange a polygraph and interview constituted police-initiated interrogation in violation of Edwards v. Arizona, rendering the later Miranda waiver invalid. The opinion also addressed but did not resolve several other evidentiary issues that could arise on remand.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Nuckols, the state appealed the trial court's denial of its request for restitution to Pima County after the defendant was convicted of multiple felonies stemming from fleeing and shooting at a deputy sheriff. Pursuant to a plea agreement capping restitution at $10,000, the trial court had ordered that restitution issues remain open for 30 days after sentencing, but the state filed its claim form over two months late seeking $540.56 for vehicle repairs. The trial court denied the request as untimely after a hearing, and the appellate court affirmed. The court held that while victims have constitutional and statutory rights to restitution, trial courts may set reasonable deadlines for asserting those claims, and missing such a deadline waives the right absent any excuse or authority to disregard the deadline.

criminal lawprocedure

In this probate action concerning the estate and trust of Frances B. Lewis, appellant Simon Lewis objected to informal probate of the will and filed a complaint against the personal representative, Mark Lewis. The trial court sanctioned Simon by dismissing his complaint, entering default judgment, and overruling his objection, based on his failure to personally appear at a pretrial conference and his attorney's failure to file a timely reply to counterclaims. The Court of Appeals reversed the sanctions and remanded, reasoning that the personal appearance order was not clearly communicated to the represented party, the record did not support a finding of willful noncompliance, and sanctions could not be imposed for attorney negligence without a proper evidentiary hearing under Rule 16(f).

procedureproperty

This case involves a claim by Tod Santee against Mesa Airlines and America West Airlines for damage to his specialized wheelchair during unloading from an airplane. After the trial court dismissed the complaint under Rules 12(b)(6) and (c), Santee filed a notice of appeal before the entry of final judgment and while a Rule 68(g) motion for expert fees and costs was pending. The Arizona Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, holding that it lacked jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was premature and ineffective under the rules requiring a timely notice after final judgment, and the filing did not qualify for the limited Barassi exception since substantive issues remained unresolved. The court reasoned that allowing such premature appeals would disrupt trial proceedings and lead to piecemeal litigation, and that the Rule 68(g) motion involved non-ministerial decisions requiring court discretion.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved a teacher, Richard Anderson, who was suspended without pay by the Valley Union High School District following a disciplinary decision by the district's governing board. Anderson appealed the board's decision to the superior court, which affirmed it, and then sought further review in the court of appeals. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that no statute authorizes an appeal beyond the superior court in such matters. The core reasoning was that A.R.S. § 15-543 limits review of governing board disciplinary decisions to the superior court, and appeals to the court of appeals require an explicit statutory basis that was absent here, with prior case law not establishing jurisdiction where the issue was not addressed.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved a dispute over a mechanic's lien filed by Delmastro & Eells against property owned by Taco Bell after Delmastro performed construction work for a prior owner. Delmastro sought to foreclose on the lien covering multiple parcels, including Taco Bell's Block 3, but Taco Bell counterclaimed under A.R.S. § 33-420 alleging the lien and lis pendens were wrongfully recorded. The trial court granted Taco Bell's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the foreclosure claim and awarding relief on the counterclaim, and the appellate court affirmed. The core reasoning was that mechanic's liens require strict statutory compliance, which Delmastro failed to meet by not serving Taco Bell with required preliminary twenty-day notices under A.R.S. § 33-992.01, providing inadequate descriptions in those notices, omitting Taco Bell as owner in the lien filing under § 33-993, and not apportioning the lien value per § 33-991.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved Kyle Smith's convictions following a jury trial on two counts of aggravated driving under the influence arising from the same incident. The trial court suspended sentence and placed Smith on probation despite his 1999 felony conviction for endangerment, which the state challenged on appeal as rendering him ineligible for probation; Smith cross-appealed the denial of a challenge to a juror with hearing issues and one jury instruction. The appellate court affirmed the convictions, holding that Smith waived any juror challenge by failing to exercise a peremptory strike and that the record supported retaining the juror, while also finding the challenged instruction proper. On the sentencing issue, the court reversed, concluding that the plain language of A.R.S. § 13-703(A) precluded probation eligibility based on the prior felony conviction regardless of its status as a non-historical prior, and remanded for resentencing.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Goddard, the petitioner sought post-conviction relief under Arizona Rule 32 after pleading guilty to two counts of attempted sexual conduct with a minor under fifteen, challenging the trial court's designation of his offenses as dangerous crimes against children following resentencing. The trial court had originally imposed sentences under the dangerous crimes against children statute but later resentenced him under the general sentencing provisions per State v. Gonzalez, while still applying the dangerous crimes designation. Goddard argued that the definition of dangerous crimes against children applied only to offenses subject to that statute's enhanced sentencing scheme and could not attach once he was resentenced under a different provision. The court denied relief, holding that the statute separately defines the category of offenses qualifying as dangerous crimes against children, independent of its sentencing enhancements, and that the designation properly triggered additional statutory consequences such as lifetime probation monitoring and treatment as a historical prior. The appellate court granted review but affirmed the trial court's ruling based on the plain language and structure of the relevant statutes.

criminal lawprocedure

In Rasmussen v. Munger, the petitioner challenged an order denying his release from jail after serving one year as a condition of probation for two arson convictions. The trial court had imposed consecutive seven-year probation terms, each with a one-year jail term to be served consecutively. Rasmussen argued that Arizona statutes did not permit consecutive jail terms exceeding one year total or that the second jail term could not begin until after the first probation period. The court accepted special action jurisdiction and granted relief, holding that under A.R.S. § 13-901(F), when consecutive probation terms are imposed, each jail term must be served within its respective probation period. Because Rasmussen had completed the jail term tied to the first probation period, the court ordered his release from the second jail term and remanded for modification of the probation conditions.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Vermuele, the defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder after stabbing her adult son during an argument and was sentenced to natural life in prison without parole. On appeal, she argued that the sentence was excessive and that the trial court had failed to properly consider mitigating evidence such as her mental disorder, remorse, difficult childhood, and substance abuse. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding that the trial court had understood its discretion to consider a broad range of mitigating factors, had in fact weighed the evidence presented (including non-enumerated factors like remorse), and had simply determined it did not warrant a lesser sentence. The court also rejected the state's forfeiture argument, concluding that claims arising from the sentencing pronouncement itself were preserved for review without the need for an immediate objection.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned a dispute in which Beesley built a driveway and culvert over a drainage easement shown on a subdivision plat, prompting neighboring lot owner Smith to sue for trespass, nuisance, and unlawful alteration of a watercourse under A.R.S. § 48-3613. Following a bench trial, the court ruled for Beesley on the trespass and statutory claims (awarding only nominal damages on nuisance) and denied injunctive relief or attorney fees to Smith. On appeal, the court held that the trial judge should have ordered removal of the driveway under the statute because the easement was dedicated solely to drainage and Beesley had not obtained required flood-control authorization, requiring remand to reconsider fees; the remainder of the judgment was affirmed.

propertytorts & liabilityenvironment

In State v. Davis, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of one count of misdemeanor public sexual indecency based on evidence that he masturbated in a vehicle in the presence of a minor. He appealed the trial court's denial of his motions for a new trial, which argued that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and that he received insufficient time for closing argument, as well as the requirement that he register as a sex offender for life. The appellate court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding that the state presented sufficient evidence to support the verdict, that the eight-minute closing argument limit did not prevent counsel from covering necessary points, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering registration given the facts of the offense.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Mohajerin, the defendant sought to clear his official records of an arrest and charges for sexual assault and threatening or intimidating, which had been dismissed without prejudice after his wife recanted her initial allegations that were supported by physical evidence at the time. The trial court denied the petition under A.R.S. § 13-4051, applying a standard that required proof the arrest or charges had been unlawful or illegal when made. On appeal, the court clarified that the statute allows relief if the arrest or charge was wrongful and justice requires a notation of clearance, one method being to show the underlying allegations were false, but it affirmed the denial because the record did not entitle Mohajerin to relief under any reasonable view of the facts, including the corroborating evidence and the wife's later statements. The decision emphasized that dismissal or recantation alone does not automatically warrant clearance.

criminal lawprocedure

In Cortez v. Avalon Care Center Tucson, L.L.C., the plaintiff Juanita Cortez sued the defendant nursing home operators for negligence, abuse of a vulnerable adult, and wrongful death after her mother died while residing at La Colina Care Center. The defendants moved to compel arbitration pursuant to an agreement signed upon admission, but the trial court initially granted the motion after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the defendants had waived their right to arbitration by failing to assert it until more than a year after the lawsuit was filed and after substantial litigation had occurred. The court reasoned that such delay was inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate and undermined the policy favoring arbitration as an expeditious and inexpensive dispute resolution method.

proceduretorts & liabilityhealthcare

In State v. Eddington, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder following a jury trial in Arizona after an investigation by the Pima County Sheriff's Department. On appeal, Eddington argued that the trial court should have struck a potential juror for cause because the juror was a deputy sheriff employed by the same agency, knew several prosecution witnesses, and was aware the defendant was in custody. The Court of Appeals held that a peace officer currently employed by the investigating agency has an indirect interest in the case under A.R.S. § 21-211(2) and must be stricken for cause, rejecting the trial court's reliance on the juror's assurances of impartiality, but concluded the error caused no prejudice because the deputy was removed by peremptory strike and affirmed the conviction. The court also rejected challenges to the jury instructions on second-degree murder and lesser offenses.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Eddington, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder following a jury trial in which the court denied his motion to strike a Pima County sheriff's deputy from the jury panel for cause. The deputy had been employed by the same agency that investigated the case, knew some of the state's witnesses, and was aware the defendant was in custody. The Arizona Court of Appeals held that under A.R.S. § 21-211(2), a peace officer employed by the investigating agency has an indirect interest in the matter and must be stricken for cause, even if the officer claims impartiality. The court found the trial judge erred by refusing to strike the juror but affirmed the conviction because the defendant had removed the deputy with a peremptory strike and showed no prejudice. The opinion also rejected challenges to the jury instructions on lesser offenses.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Ahumada, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of possessing cocaine and drug paraphernalia. The court upheld the denial of his motion to suppress the drugs found in his pocket during a pat-down at a casino. The core reasoning was that the officer developed probable cause to believe the item was contraband based on the tactile feel of bindles during the pat-down, the surrounding circumstances of a suspected drug transaction, and the officer's experience, making the seizure lawful under the plain-feel doctrine.

criminal lawprocedure