Margaret H. Downie

The case involved Baseline Financial Services suing Ruth Madison for breach of an installment contract after she stopped payments on a financed vehicle in 2006; the contract included an optional acceleration clause allowing the creditor to declare the full debt due upon default. The superior court granted Madison summary judgment, ruling that the four-year statute of limitations began running when the bank internally charged off the debt as uncollectible in August 2006. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the claim accrued instead upon the bank's repossession of the vehicle in December 2007, which constituted the affirmative act exercising the acceleration option. The court reasoned that, under precedent such as Navy Federal Credit Union v. Jones, an internal write-off is merely an accounting measure that does not trigger the limitations period for future installments, whereas repossession provides the required overt notice of acceleration. The matter was remanded for further proceedings.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this case, Sylvia Assyia sued State Farm for breach of contract after the insurer paid only $2,000 of her $50,000 uninsured motorist policy limits following a 2008 accident caused by an uninsured driver, despite her documented losses exceeding $52,000. State Farm appealed the superior court’s award of attorneys’ fees and costs to Assyia under A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A), arguing that her claim sounded in tort because the insurer was merely stepping into the shoes of the uninsured motorist. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the fee and cost award, holding that the action arose out of contract. The court reasoned that the duty allegedly breached was created by the insurance policy itself and would not exist but for that contractual relationship, making fee-shifting under the statute appropriate. Assyia was also awarded taxable costs as the successful party in the contested proceeding.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case was a judicial foreclosure action brought by Helvetica Servicing against Michael Pasquan after default on a $3.4 million loan secured by his Paradise Valley residence, with the central dispute being whether Arizona’s anti-deficiency statute (A.R.S. § 33-729(A)) barred a deficiency judgment. The Court of Appeals vacated the $1.9 million deficiency judgment and remanded for further proceedings, ruling that the superior court had not correctly applied the statute’s standards to the sequence of loans. The court held that refinancing does not eliminate purchase-money protection to the extent new loan proceeds are used to pay off an earlier purchase-money obligation, and that loan funds used to construct a qualifying residence can also qualify for protection; however, amounts disbursed for non-purchase-money purposes may be traced and recovered through a deficiency action.

property

In this post-divorce case, Audrey Ann Lally and Noel Thomas Lally had been litigating child support, spousal maintenance, and other issues since their 2000 divorce; in 2007, the mother petitioned for contempt over alleged unpaid amounts, and after a hearing the family court entered an August 2007 judgment against the father for over $80,000 in arrearages. The father did not appeal that judgment but instead filed motions to amend it and to amend his own counter-petition, both of which the court denied in a September 5, 2007 order; he then appealed only from the denial order. The Arizona Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the September order was not an appealable special order made after judgment under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A) because the father's arguments in his motions were identical to those already raised and rejected in the underlying August judgment and therefore did not present new issues.

family lawprocedure

In Cook v. Losnegard, an unmarried couple with one child litigated a petition by the father, who had moved to Washington, to modify custody and child support; the family court upheld the mother's sole custody but adjusted parenting time and ordered the parents to share the child's travel expenses for visits equally, while also recalculating incomes and reducing the father's monthly support obligation from $860 to $270. On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the travel-expense allocation, finding no abuse of discretion because the father's relocation was reasonable and the allocation was equitable under the circumstances, and it upheld the income figures used for support calculations. However, the court vacated the modified support order and remanded, holding that the mother was denied due process because the family court had previously indicated it would not address child support at the custody trial and would instead refer the issue to a IV-D commissioner, leaving her without notice or an opportunity to present relevant evidence such as daycare costs.

family lawprocedure

The case arose from a dispute between Arizona Physicians IPA (APIPA) and Western Arizona Regional Medical Center (WARMC) over whether WARMC’s grievances alleging underpayment for hospital services to AHCCCS enrollees were timely filed under state law. AHCCCS ruled that most of the claims were timely received and ordered APIPA to decide them on the merits, labeling its order a “Final Decision” subject to judicial review. APIPA sought judicial review in superior court, which dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that under the Administrative Procedures Act only final agency decisions terminating the administrative proceeding are reviewable, and AHCCCS’s interlocutory timeliness ruling did not end the case because the merits of the reimbursement disputes remained unresolved.

healthcareprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In this case, remainder beneficiaries of the Esther Caplan Trust challenged the corporate trustee's (Citigroup) decisions to distribute principal to lifetime beneficiary Arlene Sova under a provision granting the trustee "sole discretion" to invade corpus based on her "need to encroach," arguing that the trustee failed to properly investigate her finances, consult the remaindermen, or apply adequate standards. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court's approval of past distributions totaling over $73,000, which were made after the trustee reviewed Sova's budget and tax returns, but modified the order to require future discretionary decisions to consider specific factors from the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, such as the beneficiary's other resources, standard of living, and the trust's purposes. The court upheld an in camera review process for Sova's personal financial information to protect privacy while allowing the trustee to fulfill its duties, denied the remaindermen's request for direct access to that data, and ordered the trustee to provide them with statements of all income and principal disbursements.

property

The case involved a criminal prosecution for first-degree murder and child abuse of an infant, where the State sought to call treating physicians as witnesses at trial. The physicians' employer requested that the doctors be compensated as expert witnesses for their testimony, and the superior court ordered such compensation for several doctors. The appellate court accepted special action jurisdiction and granted relief to the State, holding that the physicians could testify as fact witnesses about their treatment of the child without expert compensation, as the State limited their testimony to observations and actions during treatment rather than additional expert opinions.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned an employer's challenge to a workers' compensation award of permanent partial disability benefits to employee Carl Truelock, who lost his teeth after hitting his face during a workplace accident while employed as a mechanic. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the award of scheduled benefits under A.R.S. § 23-1044(B)(22) for up to eighteen months. The court interpreted the statute's reference to permanent disfigurement about the head or face, which expressly includes injury to or loss of teeth, as permitting compensation for tooth loss without a separate showing of disfigurement. It reached this conclusion after examining the statutory text, legislative history, the remedial purpose of the workers' compensation act, and the longstanding policy of the Industrial Commission, to which it deferred given the provision's ambiguity.

labor & employment

In State v. Kemper, the defendant appealed his conviction for sexual assault under Arizona Revised Statutes section 13-1406 after a jury found him guilty. The Court of Appeals of Arizona held that the trial court's jury instruction was erroneous because it omitted the required mens rea element—that the defendant must have intentionally or knowingly engaged in the act without the victim's consent—despite following the recommended Arizona jury instruction. This omission improperly relieved the prosecution of proving every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, violating the defendant's constitutional rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The court determined that the error was fundamental and, based on a companion memorandum decision finding prejudice, vacated the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.

criminal law

In Haag v. Steinle, an Arizona resident charged with sexual exploitation of a minor sought pretrial release to his home in Buffalo, New York, but the superior court required him to remain in Maricopa County under electronic monitoring pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-3967(E)(1). The Court of Appeals accepted special action jurisdiction and held that the statute grants trial courts discretion to release defendants to locations where electronic monitoring is unavailable, interpreting "where available" as referring to the place of release rather than the charging jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the statute's language, context, and legislative history do not mandate in-state residence, that other provisions of the same law explicitly contemplate out-of-state defendants, and that a contrary reading could raise constitutional concerns. On remand, the superior court must exercise its discretion to determine whether release to Buffalo is appropriate, considering the lack of monitoring as one factor among others.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Barker, the defendant was convicted of resisting arrest after physically struggling with officers who tried to handcuff him during a disorderly conduct encounter. Barker appealed on the ground that no officer had formally announced he was under arrest, so the officers could not have been "effecting an arrest" within the meaning of Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-2508. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, ruling that a formal announcement of arrest is not required and that "effecting an arrest" is an ongoing process that begins when officers use physical force or restraint to take a person into custody. The court held that the evidence of officers grabbing, pushing, wrestling, and using a Taser on Barker while attempting to handcuff him was sufficient to support the jury's verdict.

criminal law

In Miller v. Arizona Corp. Commission, customers of Arizona Public Service Company challenged the Arizona Corporation Commission's 2006 Renewable Energy Standard and Tariff rules and an associated customer surcharge, claiming the Commission exceeded its authority in adopting them through a collateral attack after not participating in the underlying proceedings. The court held that the Commission acted within its plenary ratemaking authority under the Arizona Constitution. The core reasoning was that the REST rules, which require utilities to obtain increasing percentages of electricity from renewable sources including distributed energy systems and authorize surcharges, constitute reasonably necessary steps in the ratemaking process. The court noted the extensive administrative process used to develop the rules and limited the scope of review for this collateral attack.

business & regulatoryenvironment

This case involved a dispute over the property tax classification of improvements, including a large resort hotel, convention facilities, and golf courses, built on state trust land in Arizona under long-term ground leases. The tax court granted summary judgment to Maricopa County, upholding its classification of the improvements as class one property subject to a higher assessment ratio. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the improvements qualify for the lower-tax class nine status. The court reasoned that the statutory requirements were met because the improvements are owned by the lessees, located on state land, used primarily for convention and recreational purposes, and will become state property upon lease termination given the reversionary interest created by the lease terms and governing law.

taxesproperty

The case involved Jennifer Bither seeking uninsured motorist benefits from Country Mutual Insurance after her daughter was killed in a car accident with an uninsured driver. Bither was a statutory beneficiary under Arizona's wrongful death statute but not an insured under the policy. The court held that under A.R.S. § 20-259.03, recovery of UM benefits for wrongful death is limited to those who are both qualified to bring a wrongful death action and surviving insureds under the policy, so Bither could not recover. The superior court's contrary ruling was reversed based on the statute's plain language requiring both qualifications.

torts & liability

The case involved Arizona Real Estate Inv., Inc. suing Edward Schrader for forcible detainer after purchasing a Scottsdale home at a trustee's sale and giving notice to vacate, which Schrader did not do. The superior court found Schrader guilty of forcible detainer, awarded possession and fees to the plaintiff, and rejected his challenge to service of process. On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals vacated the judgment, ruling that the lower court had wrongly applied post-and-mail service rules from special detainer actions rather than the personal service requirements of Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 4.1 for forcible detainer cases, and that the record did not support alternative service due to lack of evidence of impracticability.

propertyprocedure

The case involved the Estate of Mary Winn suing a nursing facility under Arizona's Adult Protective Services Act for alleged abuse of the vulnerable adult after her death, seeking damages including for the inherent value of her life. The court ruled that the estate could not recover damages for the inherent or intrinsic value of Mary Winn's life as "actual damages" under the APSA statute. The reasoning centered on the statutory language allowing actual and consequential damages, which the court interpreted as not including loss of life itself, distinguishing it from pre-death pain and suffering or separate wrongful death claims, and noting the legislature did not explicitly provide for such recovery.

torts & liabilityhealthcare

In Preston v. Kindred Hospitals West, L.L.C., the sisters of a deceased patient, acting as personal representatives of his estate, sued the hospital and related defendants for wrongful death, negligence, and elder abuse under Arizona's Adult Protective Services Act. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the bankruptcy trustee was the real party in interest because the claims belonged to the bankruptcy estate. The superior court granted the motion, holding that the plaintiffs could not join or substitute the trustee without showing that identifying the proper party was difficult or that they had made an understandable mistake. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the plain language of Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) allows a reasonable time to join or substitute the real party in interest after an objection without any additional showing of mistake or difficulty, and it remanded for further proceedings.

procedure

This case involved a medical malpractice and wrongful death lawsuit brought by the family of a patient who died from blood clots in her lungs after treatment by Dr. Yonan. The trial court declared a mistrial and imposed sanctions of $125,000 in attorneys' fees and costs on the defendants for failing to properly disclose expert opinion testimony by Dr. Yonan regarding the standard of care. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a defendant physician testifying as a standard of care expert must comply with expert disclosure requirements and that monetary sanctions under A.R.S. section 12-349(A)(3) may be assessed against a party causing a mistrial.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved Paula Ann Roberson challenging the denial of her motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of her home, where officers entered without knocking and announcing despite a valid search warrant. The court affirmed the superior court's decision, holding that a violation of the knock-and-announce rule does not require suppression of evidence under either the federal or Arizona constitutions. The reasoning relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Hudson v. Michigan, which determined that such a violation is too attenuated from the seizure of evidence to justify suppression, and found no broader protection under the state constitution in this context. The court also noted statutory amendments aligning suppression rules with constitutional requirements.

criminal lawprocedure