Lynn S. Adelman

John Schlueter sued Edward Latek and Latek Capital for restitution of a $758,675 fee paid for brokerage services in selling his company, claiming the defendants lacked required real estate broker licenses under Wisconsin Chapter 452. The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The court assumed for the motion that the defendants acted as unlicensed brokers but held that Chapter 452 bars unlicensed brokers from suing for fees yet provides no private right to recover fees already paid voluntarily. It further reasoned that Wisconsin common law does not allow restitution here because Schlueter benefited from the services, was satisfied, and sought a windfall, and that the complaint failed to plead any plausible breach-of-duty claims showing harm. The court therefore granted the motion and dismissed the case.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this case, Wisconsin state prisoner Terrance Edwards sued prison medical staff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming inadequate treatment for his vitiligo skin condition violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Edwards failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) because his inmate complaint was rejected as untimely under Wisconsin Department of Corrections rules. The court denied the motion, holding that Edwards had properly exhausted his remedies: he had attempted informal resolution with health services staff, his complaint described an ongoing issue, and on appeal he corrected the incident date to reflect a recent denial of treatment on August 2 or 3, 2010, which the reviewing authority improperly ignored without any rule barring such clarification. The core reasoning was that prison grievance procedures do not require strict adherence to the date box alone when other complaint materials and appeals show timely, ongoing events, and no rule prevented correcting the filing on review.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedurehealthcare

This case concerns a dispute over insurance coverage for losses sustained by Right Management, a Manpower subsidiary, after an office building collapse in Paris. Manpower sought additional recovery under a U.S. difference-in-conditions policy issued by ISOP after the local French insurer AIG-Europe limited its payout under a primary policy. The court considered whether Manpower must first litigate against AIG-Europe in France to exhaust the local policy before pursuing the DIC policy. It ruled that Manpower need not sue AIG-Europe or obtain a French judgment, as it can establish a difference in conditions by comparing the two policies in this proceeding. The decision rests on the DIC policy language requiring only a showing that its terms are broader, which presents a legal question for this court without needing the local insurer as a party.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case involves employees of C & D Technologies seeking unpaid wages for short breaks under Wisconsin wage and hour law, even though their collective bargaining agreement with the United Steelworkers permitted those breaks to be unpaid. Plaintiffs originally sued in federal court under a state wage statute but argued for jurisdiction under §301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, claiming their claims required interpreting or were preempted by the CBA. The court had dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and now denies plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, explaining that the employer did not breach the CBA and that the state-law claims are independent and not preempted under federal labor law precedents like Textron and Lingle.

labor & employmentprocedure

In this § 1983 case, plaintiff Richard Betker sued Milwaukee police officers, the police chief, and the city, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated when officers obtained and executed a no-knock search warrant at his home based on an informant's tip about possible illegal firearm possession by his wife, a convicted felon. The court granted summary judgment to defendants on all claims except one against officer Gomez, including claims against the police chief and those involving the right to bear arms or unlawful arrest. The core reasoning was that most claims lacked personal involvement or merit, but the affidavit for the no-knock warrant contained arguably false or misleading statements about recent observations of guns and ongoing criminal activity that were essential to justify dispensing with the knock-and-announce requirement; excising those statements left no basis for the warrant. The court also rejected qualified immunity for Gomez on that claim because it was based on information he knew or should have known was false.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case is a proposed class action alleging securities fraud under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, plus control-person liability under § 20(a), stemming from an officer's embezzlement of over $30 million from Koss Corporation and her use of false accounting entries to conceal it, which rendered the company's SEC filings materially false and caused a stock-price drop upon disclosure. The plaintiff sued the company (on vicarious liability), the CEO (for recklessly certifying the statements), and the former auditor Grant Thornton (for recklessly certifying the statements), without claiming any of them knew of the fraud. The court granted the motions to dismiss the claims against these three defendants, holding that the complaint did not plead facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter or recklessness under the PSLRA because the embezzler had concealed her scheme from management and the auditors, unlike cases where accounting fraud was intended to benefit the company.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involves a lawsuit by Diversey, Inc. against three former employees and a competitor, Swisher Hygiene, Inc., alleging that the employees copied confidential company information before joining the competitor; the complaint included a federal claim under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, which provided grounds for removal from state court. Swisher removed the action to federal court, but Diversey moved to remand on the ground that the other defendants had not joined the removal notice. The court denied the motion to remand. It reasoned that unserved defendants are not required to consent to removal, that Swisher properly amended its notice to explain their absence, and that later-served defendants need not affirmatively join the removal because they retain the separate right to move for remand once served.

procedure

In United States v. Rock, the defendant was charged federally with unlawful transportation and possession of a short-barreled shotgun after police entered a vacant Rockford home without a warrant, observed the firearm, and arrested him. The defendant moved to suppress the gun and his later statements to detectives, arguing the search violated the Fourth Amendment and that the statements were fruit of the illegal arrest or obtained in violation of his Miranda/Edwards rights to counsel. The district court agreed with the magistrate judge that the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the home because he intended to reside there with belongings and permission from the owners, making the warrantless search unlawful and the arrest invalid. It therefore suppressed the firearm and the September 14 and 15 statements as fruits of the unlawful arrest, and also suppressed the September 14 statement independently under Edwards due to the absence of counsel after the initial invocation of rights, while rejecting suppression of the September 15 statement on Fifth Amendment grounds alone.

criminal lawprocedureguns

The case involved plaintiff Christopher Skarzynski challenging the Milwaukee County Department of Child Support Enforcement's deduction of his unemployment benefits to satisfy a child support order and to reimburse the county for guardian ad litem fees, without prior notice or an opportunity for a hearing. Skarzynski sought damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged procedural due process violations and an injunction requiring the Department to provide evidentiary hearings and judicial review for such seizures. The court addressed the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on the injunctive claim and the Chief Judge's motion to dismiss. It granted summary judgment to the county defendants on the due process claims, reasoning that adequate post-deprivation remedies existed under state law, such as common-law certiorari review or tort actions, which satisfied constitutional requirements without the need for additional administrative hearings.

civil rightsfamily lawprocedureproperty

This case is an appeal from a bankruptcy court's ruling in an adversary proceeding concerning whether a debt arising from a fatal fight between two teenagers was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) as resulting from willful and malicious injury. The debtor, a high school student, punched the victim during a confrontation at a party after being pushed, and the victim's estate argued the injury was malicious while the debtor claimed self-defense under Wisconsin law. The bankruptcy court found the conduct willful but not malicious because it fell within the self-defense privilege, and the district court affirmed, holding that the bankruptcy court properly considered retreat and did not err by not addressing provocation where it was not raised. The appeal was denied and the debt ruled dischargeable.

criminal lawproceduretorts & liability

In United States v. McBride, the defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and possessing marijuana with intent to distribute. The court first calculated the advisory sentencing guidelines range at 57-71 months after applying enhancements for a prior crime of violence, a stolen firearm, and connection to another felony, along with a criminal history category of III. It then granted a 5-level downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 for the defendant's substantial assistance to authorities, reducing the range to 33-41 months. Finally, under the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the court imposed a sentence of five years' probation with 180 days of home confinement, citing the defendant's post-offense rehabilitation, low-level drug involvement, and lack of knowledge that the firearm was stolen as reasons why a non-incarceratory sentence sufficed.

criminal lawguns

In United States v. Chao Vang, the defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute MDMA (ecstasy) after assisting a gang leader by storing drugs and relaying messages related to a 30,000-pill shipment, though he did not distribute the drugs or profit from the activity. The court calculated an advisory guidelines range of 70-87 months' imprisonment based on drug quantity, minor role reduction, acceptance of responsibility, and criminal history category II. Applying the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the court imposed a sentence of four years' probation with home confinement and other conditions instead of prison time. The reasoning focused on the defendant's limited involvement and knowledge of the drug quantity, minimal prior record, strong family support including as primary caretaker for his child, employment history, and compliance with pretrial release, concluding that a non-custodial sentence was sufficient but not greater than necessary to achieve the statute's purposes.

criminal law

This case concerns the EEOC's request to hold Flipmeastack, Inc. and Salauddin Janmohammed in civil contempt for failing to post required notices at IHOP restaurants under Flipmeastack's management, as mandated by a 2010 injunction from a prior Title VII sexual harassment lawsuit. The underlying suit alleged that servers at a Racine IHOP were sexually harassed, resulting in a jury verdict against the defendants and an injunction directing Flipmeastack to inform employees of their rights at all seventeen restaurants it managed. Although Flipmeastack and Janmohammed knew of the posting requirement, Janmohammed refused to approve the notices, leading to noncompliance. The court found both parties guilty of civil contempt for violating and aiding the violation of the injunction, ordering immediate posting of the notices, daily fines of $1,000 for further delay, and ongoing monitoring through lists, sworn certifications, photos, and random inspections.

labor & employmentcivil rights

Beverly Stayart sued Google, Inc., alleging that the search engine wrongfully used her name in connection with the erectile dysfunction medication Levitra for advertising or trade purposes in violation of Wisconsin law (Wis. Stat. § 995.50(2)(b)). The court granted Google's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The plaintiff failed to allege facts showing that her name had commercial value or that Google used it for pecuniary benefit, as the search results merely reflected publicly available information from third parties. The court noted that Google was protected in displaying third-party content and that the allegations did not support a plausible claim under the relevant statute or common law.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In this § 1983 case, plaintiff Valeos Bliss alleged that Milwaukee police officers Christopher Chu and Kimberly Foster violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force when they shot him while he was attempting to drive away from the scene of an arrest in an alley. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion as to Officer Foster, finding that a reasonable officer in her position could have believed the car posed an imminent threat of serious harm to nearby individuals when she fired, making her use of force objectively reasonable. The court denied summary judgment as to Officer Chu because material factual disputes remained about whether the vehicle was moving or posed a threat at the time he fired his shot. The City of Milwaukee was also dismissed as a defendant.

civil rightscriminal law

The case involved a defendant who pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and faced a potential enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act due to three prior Wisconsin convictions listed in the pre-sentence report. The court held that the substantial battery conviction qualified as a violent felony under the ACCA but the short-barreled shotgun possession did not, so the defendant did not qualify for the 15-year mandatory minimum. Applying the categorical approach, the court examined the statutory elements of the priors against the ACCA definitions, relying on Seventh Circuit precedent for the battery conviction and distinguishing the shotgun offense from similar guideline provisions because it lacks the required violent and aggressive conduct under the residual clause.

criminal lawguns

The case involved Angie McGee's application for social security disability benefits, which was denied by an administrative law judge who found that she retained the residual functional capacity for certain types of sedentary work despite her impairments including arthritis, obesity, migraines, fibromyalgia, bipolar disorder, and depression. The court decided to remand the matter for further proceedings under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The core reasoning was that the ALJ improperly evaluated the plaintiff's credibility by discrediting her testimony solely based on inconsistency with medical evidence and using criticized boilerplate language, and also failed to properly account for evidence regarding her limitations in determining her RFC.

healthcareprocedure

Kaloti Wholesale, a grocery distributor, sued the United States and federal agents after agents seized about 81,000 cans of infant formula from its warehouse under search warrants; the formula later spoiled, and Kaloti sought damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act for conversion as well as Bivens claims for constitutional violations. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss all FTCA claims except the one against the United States and all Bivens claims except those against the unknown agents, holding that the United States is the only proper FTCA defendant and that Bivens claims may proceed only against individuals. On the remaining FTCA claim, the court denied dismissal, reasoning that although the detention-of-goods exception to the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity would normally bar the suit, the plaintiff had plausibly alleged facts satisfying the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act's re-waiver conditions, including that the property was seized for forfeiture purposes, the claimant's interest was not forfeited or mitigated, and the claimant was not convicted of a crime. The court noted that the Seventh Circuit has not adopted a narrow reading of the re-waiver that would require the seizure to be solely for forfeiture.

procedurefederal powertorts & liabilityproperty

In Daniels v. Equitable Bank, the plaintiff alleged that the bank violated the Truth in Lending Act by failing to clearly disclose his three-business-day right to rescind a $83,000 mortgage loan secured by his home and by having him sign a post-dated certificate at closing stating that he waived rescission. The defendant moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court denied the motion, holding that the allegations stated a plausible TILA claim because the post-dated certificate was false, misleadingly suggested the rescission period had already expired, and amounted to an invalid waiver that did not meet the statute's narrow emergency and handwritten requirements. The court noted that the TILA must be interpreted liberally in favor of borrowers and that similar practices have been found violative by other courts.

business & regulatory

This case involves a diversity action by American Orthodontics Corporation against Epicor Software Corporation for breach of contract, deceptive trade practices under the Wisconsin Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and promissory estoppel, stemming from the purchase of a software system that allegedly failed to meet performance needs. The defendant moved to dismiss the deceptive trade practices and promissory estoppel claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and to strike the demand for costs and attorneys' fees under Rule 12(f). The court denied both motions, reasoning that the contracts' integration clauses were ambiguous regarding disclaimers of DTPA liability, the economic loss doctrine does not bar statutory claims, the DTPA allegations satisfied Rule 9(b) particularity, the promissory estoppel claim plausibly involved promises outside the contract's scope regarding new hardware purchases, and the fees demand was permissible under the DTPA statute.

business & regulatoryprocedure