Ann Walsh Bradley

This case involved a contractual dispute between the two equal shareholders of Evald Moulding, Inc., over a 1992 Buy-Sell Agreement that allowed the non-disabled shareholder to purchase the disabled shareholder's shares at book value upon total disability. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed that the agreement was unenforceable under the circumstances because the corporation's incomplete records prevented accurate determination of book value, and Ehlinger was entitled to inspect the books. The court further held that the corporation could not pay Hauser's litigation expenses because he was not entitled to indemnification under Wis. Stat. § 180.0855 and the expenses were not incurred for the corporation's own defense. It rejected Hauser's challenges to the special magistrate process and the scope of GAAP requirements. The decision modified and affirmed the court of appeals, remanding for appointment of a receiver.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a dispute between Kang and the Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System. The matter reached the Supreme Court of Wisconsin under case number 2005AP0507 as a petition for review. On March 14, 2007, the court denied the petition for review, leaving any lower court decision in place. Justice Bradley did not participate in the decision, and no substantive reasoning or details about the underlying claims appear in the provided excerpt.

procedure

This case concerns a petition for review filed in Hottenroth v. Hetsko before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. The court denied the petition for review. Justice Bradley dissented from the denial, while Justice Roggensack did not participate in the decision.

procedure

The case involved disciplinary proceedings against attorney Mark R. Prichard, who faced 77 counts of misconduct across 20 client matters. The allegations included failures to cooperate with grievance investigations, lack of diligence in client representation, inadequate communication with clients, improper handling of client trust funds, failure to protect client interests upon termination of representation, and dishonesty or misrepresentation in two matters. Prichard filed a petition for consensual license revocation under SCR 22.19, acknowledging he could not successfully defend against the charges and waiving his right to a formal hearing. The court granted the petition, revoked his license to practice law, and directed compliance with post-revocation duties under SCR 22.26.

procedure

In State v. Velez, the defendant was charged as an adult with first-degree intentional homicide for a crime committed when he was a juvenile, and he moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the State deliberately delayed charging him to avoid juvenile court jurisdiction and requesting an evidentiary hearing on whether the State manipulated the system. The circuit court denied the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing, concluding that the defendant had not made a sufficient threshold showing of manipulative intent based on the motion papers and the prosecutor's offer of proof regarding police efforts to locate the defendant as a juvenile. The court of appeals affirmed, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not err, as the record showed that police obtained a juvenile arrest warrant shortly after identifying the defendant as a suspect, continued searching for him, and issued a criminal warrant only after he turned 18, without evidence of deliberate delay. The core reasoning was that absent a preliminary showing of improper intent, no evidentiary hearing was required before denying the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved the sentencing of William E. Spaeth for a fifth offense of operating a motor vehicle after revocation (OAR) within five years, which carries enhanced penalties under Wisconsin statutes. The defendant argued that his four prior OAR convictions were not properly admitted or proven by the State. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the record, including the criminal complaint's reference to a Department of Transportation record check, did not sufficiently establish the prior convictions for sentencing purposes. Accordingly, the court reversed the enhanced sentence and commuted it to the maximum authorized without the repeater enhancement. The decision turned on the requirement that prior convictions must be admitted by the defendant or proven by the State, applying standards from repeater sentencing statutes.

criminal lawprocedure

The case arose from a fatal collision during a high-speed police pursuit in Milwaukee, where a fleeing driver ran a red light and struck Donald Cavanaugh's vehicle, leading his estate and father to sue Officer Robert Andrade, the City of Milwaukee, and the driver for negligence. The Wisconsin Supreme Court determined that the City was not immune from liability because it had a ministerial duty to adopt a written high-speed chase policy that accounts for the severity of the offense and that credible evidence supported the jury's finding that the City breached this duty. In contrast, the officer was immune because his decisions to initiate and continue the pursuit were discretionary acts. The court reversed the court of appeals' ruling that had granted the City immunity while upholding liability against the officer.

criminal lawtorts & liability

The case concerned whether the Department of Public Instruction School District Boundary Appeal Board had authority under Wis. Stat. § 117.12(1) to detach non-contiguous "island" parcels from the Stockbridge School District and attach them to the adjoining Chilton and Hilbert districts after residents petitioned for the change. The circuit court and court of appeals upheld the Board's orders granting 46 such parcels, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed. The Court held that the statute permits detachment of island parcels because its plain language requires only that the school districts involved be adjoining, with "adjoining" modifying the districts rather than the territory; it rejected arguments that "attachment" necessarily implies a physical boundary between parcels and the receiving district, and it found supporting legislative history for this interpretation. The Court also rejected Stockbridge's additional jurisdictional challenge based on overlapping petitions under § 117.05(4)(b)1.

propertyprocedure

In Vogel v. Grant-Lafayette Electric Cooperative, dairy farmers sued their electric cooperative for economic losses and annoyance damages after stray voltage from the utility's distribution system harmed their herd, alleging both negligence and private nuisance. A jury found the cooperative negligent and liable for nuisance, awarding $300,000 total, but reduced by one-third for the plaintiffs' contributory negligence. The court of appeals reversed the nuisance portion of the award, holding that private nuisance does not apply to stray voltage claims as a matter of law. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed that holding, concluding that stray voltage can support a private nuisance action because it involves an invasion of the plaintiffs' interest in the use and enjoyment of their land, and that the unintentional nature of the invasion allowed reduction of damages for contributory negligence.

propertytorts & liability

In State v. Bentley, the defendant pled guilty to felony murder and first-degree intentional homicide under a plea agreement and later moved to withdraw the pleas, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney had misinformed him about the minimum parole eligibility date. The circuit court denied the postconviction motion without holding an evidentiary hearing, finding that the record showed Bentley understood the uncertainty and possible range of parole dates. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the motion alleged sufficient facts to require a hearing. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that under the standard from Nelson v. State, the motion failed to allege facts that, if true, would entitle Bentley to relief, and the circuit court's discretionary decision not to hold a hearing was proper because the record conclusively demonstrated no entitlement to relief.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Robert Auchinleck filing actions against the Town of LaGrange and its officials alleging violations of Wisconsin's open meetings and open records laws, including a closed committee meeting and denied requests for records related to the committee's activities. The circuit court dismissed both actions for failure to comply with the notice of claim requirements in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1). On certification from the court of appeals, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the dismissals and remanded the cases. The court held that the open meetings and open records laws are exempt from the notice provisions because their specific enforcement mechanisms for prompt relief would be undermined by the 120-day delay and claim disallowance process required under § 893.80(1).

procedure

This case involved a juvenile delinquency proceeding in which Kywanda F. entered an admission to a concealed weapon charge after a limited colloquy that did not include advice about her statutory right to judicial substitution. The circuit court accepted the admission and later denied her motion to withdraw it, but the court of appeals reversed on the ground that the failure to advise her of the substitution right deprived the court of competency to proceed. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that noncompliance with the statutory duty to inform a juvenile of the right to judicial substitution does not affect the court's competency and requires reversal only upon a showing of actual prejudice. It therefore reversed the court of appeals and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, applying the Bangert framework, to determine whether Kywanda suffered prejudice and whether her admission was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Glenn, the defendant was convicted of intermediate aggravated battery as a party to a crime after members of his group beat the victim at a pier and chased him into the water, where he drowned. The defendant requested a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of simple battery, arguing that the jury could have found he participated only in the initial beating that caused bodily harm rather than the events resulting in great bodily harm. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's refusal to give the instruction, holding that because the only element distinguishing the two offenses is the degree of harm and it was undisputed that the victim suffered great bodily harm, no reasonable view of the evidence supported conviction on the lesser offense. The court reviewed the evidence under the standard for lesser-included offense instructions and concluded the trial court did not err.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a negligence suit by nurse Sheri Gould and her husband against the insurer of Roland Monicken, an Alzheimer's patient institutionalized at a care facility, after Monicken injured Gould while she attempted to redirect him. The trial court instructed the jury under the objective reasonable person standard, disregarding evidence of Monicken's mental condition, and found him liable. The court of appeals reversed, recognizing a mental incapacity defense. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the reversal on narrower grounds, holding that an institutionalized person with a mental disability who lacks capacity to control or appreciate their conduct cannot be held liable for injuries to paid caretakers, and it reversed the remand because the incapacity was undisputed.

torts & liabilityhealthcare

The case concerned a personal injury lawsuit filed by James Gaddis against La Crosse Products, Inc., in which Gaddis served an unsigned summons along with a signed complaint. The circuit court denied the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, but the court of appeals reversed, finding that the unsigned summons created a fundamental defect that deprived the court of personal jurisdiction. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the defect was technical rather than fundamental, as the summons and complaint together provided adequate notice and the defendant suffered no prejudice. The court therefore reversed the court of appeals and concluded that personal jurisdiction attached.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved challenges to the constitutionality of Wisconsin's Sexually Violent Person Commitments statute (Wis. Stat. ch. 980), which allows for the involuntary civil commitment of individuals convicted of sexually violent offenses who are found to have a mental disorder making future acts of sexual violence substantially probable. The respondents argued that the law violated the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the statute creates a civil commitment procedure primarily intended to protect the public and provide treatment, rather than to punish offenders. As a result, the court concluded that the law does not violate the Double Jeopardy or Ex Post Facto Clauses and reversed the trial courts' orders finding the statute unconstitutional on those grounds. The court remanded the cases for further proceedings under the statute.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure