This case involved a challenge by incumbent state senator Donna J. Boley to the eligibility of Frank Deem to appear on the Republican primary ballot for West Virginia's Third Senatorial District. Boley argued that Deem, a resident of Wood County, failed to satisfy the residency requirements in Article VI, Section 4 of the West Virginia Constitution and the Senate Redistricting Act of 2011, which bar both senators in a multi-county district from being chosen from the same county. Deem conceded the plain language made him ineligible but contended the provisions violated candidates' and voters' rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and parallel state constitutional provisions on speech, association, equal protection, and political participation. The court held that the residency requirements are constitutional, as they advance a compelling state interest, and issued a writ of mandamus directing the Secretary of State to withdraw Deem's certification.
The case involved Dr. Joe J. White, Jr.'s appeal of the administrative revocation of his driver's license for six months after a police officer at a sobriety checkpoint determined he was driving under the influence based on field sobriety tests, including the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, even though his blood alcohol content measured below the legal limit. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the circuit court's order upholding the revocation by the Division of Motor Vehicles Commissioner and remanded the matter for a new administrative hearing. The court confirmed that evidence from the horizontal gaze nystagmus test is admissible but held that White was entitled to challenge the lawfulness and procedural compliance of the checkpoint itself. The core reasoning centered on the need for proper notice and opportunity to contest the checkpoint's adherence to standardized guidelines under state rules, which had not been adequately addressed in the original hearing.
The case involved a workers' compensation claimant who suffered a back injury at work in 2003 and later sought to add major depressive disorder as a compensable condition, after a social worker and physician assistant diagnosed him with depression linked to the injury. The claims administrator and lower tribunals denied the request, citing lack of prior authorization for the psychiatric consultation, a pre-existing condition, and timing issues. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the Board of Review's order, holding that claimants do not need prior authorization from the claims administrator for an initial psychiatric consultation under the applicable regulations. The court reasoned that the denial improperly prevented a proper psychiatric evaluation and report as required by W.Va.C.S.R. § 85-20-12.4, and remanded for the claimant to receive such an evaluation to determine compensability.
This case concerned a divorce action in which the family court awarded the wife permanent spousal support of $1,000 per month after considering the husband's VA disability benefits for PTSD along with his other income sources. The circuit court set aside that award and instead ordered $500 per month for 18 months, without specifically addressing the disability benefits or finding the family court's factual determinations clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed and remanded, adopting the view that VA disability benefits may be included among a payor spouse's recurring earnings or resources when calculating spousal support under state law and directing the circuit court to address the family court's findings and award with particularity.
The case involved Shenandoah Sales & Services, Inc., a corporation that sought to appeal two Jefferson County real estate tax assessments to the circuit court after the county Board of Review and Equalization upheld the assessor's valuations. The corporation, through its vice-president David C. Tabb, filed the appeals without retaining a licensed attorney, prompting the circuit court to order that it must appear through counsel and to dismiss both appeals when no attorney entered an appearance. The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissals. It held that a corporation is a separate legal entity that may not represent itself in circuit court through a non-lawyer agent, as doing so constitutes the unauthorized practice of law under long-settled authority. The Court rejected arguments that a hearing was required before dismissal or that a prior case allowed pro se corporate appearances.
The case concerned a home builder's attempt to compel arbitration of claims brought by 40 residents alleging injuries from excessive radon gas caused by defective or missing mitigation systems in 11 newly constructed homes. The residents asserted contract, warranty, negligence, fraud, and emotional distress claims, while the builder argued that purchase agreements containing arbitration clauses bound both signatories and non-signatories. The circuit court examined the agreements and concluded the arbitration provisions were ambiguous and unconscionable. The Supreme Court of Appeals denied the builder's petition for a writ of prohibition, holding that the record supported the lower court's findings that the parties had not reached a meeting of the minds on arbitration and that the clauses were unenforceable.