Charles K. Wiggins

In State v. Lyons, police executed a search warrant based solely on a confidential source's tip about marijuana being grown indoors on the defendant's property and found evidence leading to charges for manufacturing and possession with intent to deliver. The trial court suppressed the evidence, finding the affidavit insufficient because it stated only when the officer received the tip, not when the informant observed the activity. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the suppression, holding that the warrant failed to establish timely probable cause under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. The court reasoned that the state constitution provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment and requires the affidavit to set forth underlying circumstances, including the timing of the observations, so a magistrate can independently determine the recency and validity of the probable cause.

criminal lawprocedure

In this medical negligence case, plaintiffs sued urologists after a kidney removal surgery resulted in aortic laceration and ongoing leg pain, claiming breaches of the standard of care and lack of informed consent. After plaintiffs' initial expert witnesses became unavailable, they disclosed a replacement expert, but a pretrial judge excluded the witness as a discovery sanction without findings that any violation was willful or substantially prejudicial or that lesser sanctions had been considered. The trial judge later granted a new trial under CR 59(a)(8) on the ground that the exclusion was an error of law. The court affirmed, holding that the new-trial order was within the trial judge's discretion, was supported by the record, and properly enforced the requirement of adequate findings before imposing severe discovery sanctions such as witness exclusion.

proceduretorts & liabilityhealthcare

In Knight v. City of Yelm, a nearby property owner holding senior water rights challenged the city council's decision affirming a hearing examiner's conditional preliminary plat approval for a residential subdivision, contending that the city and developer should have demonstrated adequate water supplies at the preliminary stage rather than deferring to final plat or building permit review. The Washington Supreme Court held that the petitioner had standing to bring the action under the Land Use Petition Act because she showed the decision was likely to prejudice her water rights. The court reasoned that the approval process allowed the city to rely on a reasonable expectancy of future water availability without resolving potential shortfalls earlier, and that the superior court's remand order provided an opportunity for further review to protect those interests.

environmentpropertyprocedure

The case concerned a public school teacher's discharge by the Federal Way School District and the limited avenues for judicial review available to the district. After a hearing officer ruled in favor of teacher David Vinson, rejecting termination, the district petitioned for a statutory writ of certiorari to challenge that decision in superior court. The Washington Supreme Court held that the legislature provided no statutory right of appeal to school districts from adverse hearing officer rulings, unlike the right granted to employees, and that the constitutional writ of certiorari was unavailable because the hearing officer acted within statutory authority without arbitrary or capricious conduct. The court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals, reinstated the hearing officer's decision, and restored attorney fees awarded below.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved the termination of Michael Jenkins' parental rights to his daughter K.N.J. after the child was removed from her mother's care due to severe abuse. The Washington Supreme Court addressed whether a default dependency order entered by a pro tempore judge without Jenkins' consent could satisfy the statutory prerequisites for termination under RCW 13.34.180(1). Although the initial dependency order was void for lack of consent, the Court held that the child's dependency as to Jenkins was proved by evidence presented and findings made by a constitutionally valid judge at the termination trial, where Jenkins was present and represented by counsel. The Court affirmed the termination on this alternative ground, finding that all other required statutory elements were also supported.

family lawprocedurecivil rights

This case involved Jane Roe, who was terminated from her customer service position at TeleTech after a positive drug test for marijuana that she used pursuant to authorization under Washington's Medical Use of Marijuana Act (MUMA) to treat migraines. Roe sued for wrongful termination, alleging that MUMA either created an implied private cause of action against employers or established a clear public policy protecting authorized medical marijuana use from adverse employment actions. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for TeleTech, holding that MUMA provides neither a private right of action nor a clear public policy basis for a wrongful discharge claim. The court reasoned that MUMA's text and purpose are narrowly limited to granting an affirmative defense against state criminal prosecution for qualified patients, physicians, and caregivers, without addressing or protecting against private employment decisions.

labor & employmentcriminal lawhealthcare

The case involved Joshua Harris, who was convicted of two misdemeanors in Seattle Municipal Court and sought credit against his jail sentence for 140 days spent on pretrial electronic home monitoring (EHM), arguing that the denial violated equal protection because Washington's Sentencing Reform Act grants such credit to felons. The superior court granted Harris's habeas petition and ordered credit for the EHM time, but the Court of Appeals reversed, and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed that decision. The court held that rational bases supported treating misdemeanants differently from felons, including the shorter typical sentences for misdemeanors, which could be undermined by mandatory EHM credit; the broader discretion afforded misdemeanor courts to tailor sentences for rehabilitation; and statutory or ordinance provisions distinguishing jail time from EHM as separate forms of confinement. The court rejected claims that EHM was equivalent to custody for credit purposes under equal protection or double jeopardy principles.

criminal lawcivil rights