Mary E. Fairhurst

This case involved the joint trial and convictions of Anthony Emery and Aaron Olson for first degree kidnapping, robbery, rape, and accomplice rape based on evidence that they abducted a woman from a Walgreens parking lot, forced her to perform oral sex at gunpoint, and threatened her afterward; DNA evidence and victim identifications linked each defendant to the crimes. On appeal, the defendants raised issues including Olson's denied motions to sever the trials due to allegedly antagonistic defenses, claims of prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments regarding the burden of proof, Emery's motion for mistrial based on Olson's outbursts, and cumulative error. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, reasoning that the defenses were not mutually antagonistic, any improper statements by the prosecutor were not incurable and did not prejudice the verdict given the strong evidence and jury instructions, the outbursts did not warrant a mistrial, and there was no cumulative error requiring reversal.

criminal lawprocedure

This case consolidated appeals from two defendants, Robert Brown and Theodore Kosewicz, who were convicted after separate trials for their roles in the kidnapping, torture, and murder of Sebastian Esquibel in Washington. Brown was convicted of first degree kidnapping and felony murder predicated on that kidnapping, while Kosewicz was convicted of first degree kidnapping and aggravated first degree murder with the kidnapping as the aggravating factor. On appeal, both defendants' kidnapping convictions were reversed due to a charging defect that improperly limited the charged alternative means, but the Court of Appeals upheld Brown's felony murder conviction and Kosewicz's aggravating factor. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed those murder-related results, holding that reversal of the predicate kidnapping convictions did not require reversal of the felony murder conviction or aggravating factor because the underlying elements and notice requirements were satisfied under applicable precedent.

criminal lawprocedure

The case arose when a fire started by defendants' rail grinding operations on their own property spread to plaintiff's adjoining land and destroyed trees, prompting a timber trespass claim for treble damages under former RCW 64.12.030. The U.S. District Court certified the question whether the statute permits recovery when defendants' acts or omissions were not directed at plaintiff's trees, did not occur on plaintiff's land, and involved only indirect damage via fire spread. The Washington Supreme Court answered no, holding that the statute requires a defendant to directly cut down, girdle, injure, or carry off trees on another's land. Its reasoning examined the statutory text and history, which targeted voluntary or negligent direct trespasses rather than indirect harm from negligence, and distinguished the provision from separate statutes addressing fire damage.

propertytorts & liability

The case concerned whether BNSF Railway could be held liable under Washington's former timber trespass statute (RCW 64.12.030) after a negligently started fire on its property spread to the Jongewards' land and destroyed about 4,000 trees. The U.S. District Court certified three questions to the Washington Supreme Court asking whether negligent fire damage constitutes "otherwise injur[ing]" trees under the statute, whether recovery is possible when the defendant was never physically present on the plaintiffs' property, and whether damages must be reasonable in relation to the land's value. The court reviewed the statute's text, 1869 origins, and 1877 reenactment, noting its purposes of punishing voluntary offenders and authorizing treble damages for direct trespasses such as cutting or girdling trees. It interpreted the provision in conjunction with the single-damages exception for casual or involuntary acts and considered whether indirect negligent causation without physical entry falls within the statute's scope.

propertytorts & liability

This case concerned a public records request by Michael Gendler to the Washington State Patrol for location-specific police accident reports involving bicycles on the Montlake Bridge. The WSP refused to release the records without a certification that they would not be used in litigation against the state, citing protection under the federal statute 23 U.S.C. § 409, which shields certain data compiled for federal highway safety programs. Gendler sued under Washington's Public Records Act, and the trial court granted summary judgment ordering production of the reports. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Washington Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that the reports were generated and maintained by the WSP pursuant to its independent state statutory duty under RCW 46.52.060 rather than for federal purposes, so the federal privilege did not apply.

procedurefederal power

In the case In re Carter, the Washington Supreme Court addressed whether the Court of Appeals properly applied the actual innocence doctrine to consider an untimely personal restraint petition filed by Ernest Carter challenging his persistent offender sentence based on a prior out-of-state conviction. The court decided to reverse the Court of Appeals' ruling that vacated Carter's sentence, remanding the case instead. The core reasoning was that the Court of Appeals erred by invoking the actual innocence doctrine before first evaluating Carter's other asserted exceptions to the one-year time bar for personal restraint petitions under RCW 10.73.090 and .100.

criminal lawprocedure

The consolidated cases involved challenges to mechanics' liens filed by contractors Athletic Fields Inc. and Hos Bros. Construction Inc. using the sample claim-of-lien form provided in RCW 60.04.091(2), which lacked a certificate of acknowledgment required under chapter 64.08 RCW. Lower courts in each case ruled the liens invalid for failing to meet the acknowledgment requirement. The Washington Supreme Court held that a claim of lien substantially in the statutory sample form is valid despite the absence of a separate acknowledgment, because the statute expressly states that the sample form shall be sufficient. The court reversed the invalidity rulings, affirmed that one lien was not frivolous, and remanded for further proceedings on lien reinstatement and amendment issues.

propertyprocedure

The case involved whether a Lummi Nation tribal police officer could validly stop and detain a non-tribal driver outside the reservation after observing a traffic infraction and erratic driving on the reservation, which led to a DUI charge against Loretta Lynn Eriksen. The Washington Supreme Court held that the stop and detention were invalid because the tribe's inherent sovereign powers did not authorize extraterritorial action. The court's reasoning relied on the established principle that arrests may not occur outside an officer's territorial jurisdiction, as affirmed in cases like State v. Barker, and determined that tribal sovereignty is limited and does not extend to this off-reservation detention of a nonmember.

criminal lawfederal power

This case involved public records requests for investigative reports compiled by the cities of Puyallup and Mercer Island into allegations of misconduct by Bainbridge Island Police Officer Steven Cain during a traffic stop. The officer and his guild sued to enjoin disclosure under exemptions in the Public Records Act, and lower courts had withheld the full reports to protect the officer's privacy. The Washington Supreme Court remanded the cases with instructions to release the Puyallup criminal investigation report and Mercer Island internal investigation report after redacting only the officer's identity. The court reasoned that the officer's privacy interest in unsubstantiated allegations does not justify withholding the entire investigative records, given the public's interest in the nature and details of the investigations.

criminal lawcivil rightsfree speechprocedure

The case concerned James Barnhart, who was charged with stalking in the Snohomish County portion of Bothell, a city spanning both King and Snohomish Counties. He was tried and convicted in Bothell Municipal Court by a jury that included two residents from King County and four from Snohomish County, selected under RCW 2.36.050. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' reversal of the conviction, holding that the jury composition violated article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution. The court reasoned that this provision guarantees the accused an impartial jury drawn from the county where the offense was committed, rendering the statute unconstitutional as applied to multicounty municipal courts. The court declined to address alternative arguments regarding waiver or harmless error because they were not properly raised below.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a recall petition filed against Pierce County Prosecuting Attorney Mark Lindquist by petitioners Ugás and Fishburn, alleging misfeasance, malfeasance, breach of oath, and obstruction of justice for declining to investigate or prosecute former Assessor-Treasurer Ken Madsen on charges of record falsification and for discouraging other law enforcement agencies from doing so. The trial court dismissed the petition as legally and factually insufficient, rejected an affidavit of prejudice, and awarded Lindquist $50,000 in attorney fees on a finding that the petition was frivolous and filed in bad faith. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed in full, holding that the charges rested on the same claims previously dismissed against Madsen for lack of legal or factual basis, that prosecutors have discretion under RCW 36.27.020 not to pursue such matters, and that petitioners knew of the prior rulings and lack of taxpayer harm when filing. The court also upheld the fee award under applicable standards for bad-faith filings and found no need to address the ballot synopsis because the petition was insufficient.

electionscriminal lawprocedure

The case involved Cliff Alan Jones, who was convicted of first-degree child molestation and initially sentenced to 130 months in prison plus 36 months of community custody; after a successful challenge to his offender score, he was resentenced to 51 months incarceration plus the same community custody term, but had already served 81 months by that point. Jones sought credit for the 30 excess months of incarceration toward his community custody sentence, claiming it should begin after completion of his amended incarceration term or that equitable principles required it. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of credit, ruling that under the Sentencing Reform Act, community custody is defined as time served in the community and is tolled during any period of confinement, providing no statutory authority to apply excess prison time to the community custody term. The court also declined to extend equitable credit doctrines because they would contradict the relevant statutes and public policy favoring supervision of offenders upon release into the community, and it disavowed a contrary appellate decision.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Samuel Donaghe, who was convicted of second-degree rape and sentenced to incarceration plus one year of community placement. After his release from prison, he was civilly committed as a sexually violent predator, and he later sought a certificate of discharge from the trial court, arguing that his community placement term had ended and that he was entitled to restoration of his voting rights. The trial court and Court of Appeals denied the certificate, holding that the community placement period had tolled during his civil commitment because it could not begin until he was released to community supervision. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that Donaghe had not completed all requirements of his sentence under the Sentencing Reform Act and that the tolling did not unconstitutionally disenfranchise him.

criminal lawelectionscivil rights

Stephen K. Eugster sued the State of Washington and Court of Appeals judges, seeking a declaratory judgment that the statutory system for electing Court of Appeals judges from geographic districts of unequal population and assigning cases to three-judge panels violates article I, section 19 of the Washington Constitution, which requires that all elections be free and equal. The trial court dismissed the complaint under CR 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim and denied Eugster's motion for partial summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the one-person, one-vote principle does not apply to judicial elections under either the federal Equal Protection Clause or the state constitution's free-and-equal-elections provision. It relied on U.S. Supreme Court precedent summarily affirming that the principle is inapplicable to judges and on the presumption that statutes are constitutional. The court also noted that the case assignment process is designed to distribute workload equitably without favoring particular litigants.

electionscivil rights

Washington consumers who participated in debt settlement programs filed a class action against Global Client Solutions (GCS), which managed special purpose accounts for the programs, and Rocky Mountain Bank and Trust (RMBT), which held the accounts, alleging violations of Washington's debt adjusting statute, chapter 18.28 RCW. The U.S. District Court certified four questions to the Washington Supreme Court concerning the statute's application to account administrators and banks. The court determined that the statute's plain language is unambiguous and covers entities like GCS that initiate transfers and collect fees in connection with debt adjustment, while certain banks are exempt from the statute's primary requirements under RCW 18.28.010(2) but may still face liability for aiding and abetting violations.

business & regulatory

The case involved Gale West, who was found by a jury to be a sexually violent predator under chapter 71.09 RCW based on his criminal history and refusal of treatment, resulting in a civil commitment order. West appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by allowing limited testimony from a treatment facility superintendent about the program's structure and his participation, and by denying his request for discovery of the expert witness's evaluations of 37 other individuals. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the commitment, holding that the evidentiary rulings did not prejudice West because the testimony was brief, the State did not emphasize it, and the jury received no further details, while the discovery request sought protected work product from unrelated cases that was not essential to challenging the expert's methodology or bias in West's proceeding.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Valentin Sandoval, a noncitizen permanent resident charged with second-degree rape, who accepted a plea deal reducing the charge to third-degree rape after his attorney advised that the plea would not result in immediate deportation and that immigration consequences could be addressed later with separate counsel. Sandoval later faced deportation proceedings and claimed his plea was invalid due to ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Applying the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, the Washington Supreme Court held that the attorney's advice was constitutionally deficient because the immigration consequences of the plea were clear and unambiguous under federal law. The court further found prejudice because Sandoval demonstrated he would not have pleaded guilty had he received accurate advice, leading to reversal of his conviction and permission to withdraw the plea.

criminal lawimmigration

In State v. Russell, the defendant was convicted of first degree rape of a child (domestic violence) based on alleged abuse occurring in Washington, with the trial court admitting evidence of prior and subsequent acts of sexual misconduct against the victim in other states under ER 404(b) to show lustful disposition. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to sua sponte provide a limiting instruction on the proper use of that evidence. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the conviction, reasoning that ER 105 requires a limiting instruction only upon request by a party and that RAP 2.5(a) did not bar review but the trial court had no affirmative duty to issue such an instruction absent a request. The court noted this conclusion aligns with over 40 years of precedent disavowing any requirement for sua sponte limiting instructions in this context.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Vincent Adolph's personal restraint petition challenging a two-year sentence enhancement for vehicular homicide based on a prior 1992 DUI conviction from Lincoln County, arguing insufficient evidence supported that conviction. The Washington Supreme Court held that the petition was not procedurally barred as it was timely filed and raised a valid claim of unlawful restraint. The court denied the petition, finding that the certified Department of Licensing driving record abstract and DISCIS defendant case history provided sufficient evidence to prove the prior conviction by a preponderance of the evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

In Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Foundation, Inc., a property owner leased part of her horse farm to a nonprofit that cares for abused horses under covenants requiring maintenance and return of the property in good condition. The lessee allowed widespread deterioration including manure buildup, drainage failures, broken fencing, and other damage, leading the lessor to sue the organization, its manager, and two directors for breach of lease, waste, and negligence. The trial court awarded damages including tort remedies and found individual liability due to gross negligence, but the Court of Appeals applied the economic loss rule to restrict recovery to contract claims only. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the tort duty to refrain from waste arises independently of lease covenants, so tort remedies remain available alongside contract claims and individuals can be held liable.

propertytorts & liability