LeRoy F. Millette jr

In Livingston v. Virginia Dept. of Transp., homeowners in Fairfax County's Huntington subdivision sued the County and VDOT for inverse condemnation under Article I, Section 11 of the Virginia Constitution after their homes flooded during a 2006 storm. The plaintiffs alleged that VDOT's 1960s relocation and narrowing of Cameron Run, construction of the Capital Beltway as a berm blocking northern flow, and subsequent failure to dredge accumulated sediment caused or worsened the flooding that damaged their properties. The circuit court dismissed the suit on demurrer, ruling that a single flooding event could not support an inverse condemnation claim. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that the complaint sufficiently alleged that the damage resulted from the exercise of eminent domain powers for public use, which can support such a constitutional claim even from one occurrence.

property

The case involved Robert Charles Gleason, Jr., who pled guilty to two counts of capital murder for killing fellow inmates Harvey Watson and Aaron Cooper while incarcerated in Virginia prisons. Gleason received death sentences in both cases after the circuit court found the aggravating factors of vileness and future dangerousness, and he waived his right to appeal. Although the defendant waived his appeals, Virginia law required the Supreme Court to review the sentences for whether they were imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, and whether they were excessive or disproportionate to penalties in similar cases. The Court found no evidence of improper influence in the proceedings and, after comparing the crimes and defendant to prior capital cases involving inmate murders, multiple killings within three years, and ligature strangulation, concluded that the death sentences were neither excessive nor disproportionate.

criminal law

This case arose from a personal injury lawsuit filed by a Gloucester High School student injured in a fight on school grounds after an assistant principal received but did not act on a report warning of the impending fight. The plaintiff sued the other student, a third student who encouraged the fight, and the assistant principal for simple and gross negligence as well as assault and battery; a jury awarded $5 million in damages, but the trial court declined to impose joint and several liability. The Supreme Court of Virginia granted appeals to address whether the assistant principal owed a duty, whether sovereign immunity applied, the sufficiency of evidence for a gross negligence instruction, the admissibility of deposition testimony, and joint and several liability between intentional and negligent tortfeasors. The court reversed in part and remanded for a new trial, holding that the assistant principal owed a duty but was protected by sovereign immunity from the simple negligence claim while allowing the gross negligence claim to proceed to retrial.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case arose from a federal district court action in which biological father John Wyatt sued various parties, including an attorney and adoption agency, for their alleged role in facilitating the unauthorized adoption of his infant daughter E.Z. without his knowledge or consent, despite his plans to raise the child with the mother. The district court certified questions to the Virginia Supreme Court asking whether Virginia recognizes a tort of intentional interference with parental rights and, if so, what elements define the claim. The court held that Virginia does recognize such a cause of action, drawing on common-law principles protecting parental rights, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and the approaches of other jurisdictions, while identifying the elements as knowledge of the parental relationship, intentional interference without justification, and resulting harm to the parent's custodial rights. The majority reasoned that recognizing the tort advances important public policies favoring the stability of family relationships and the rights of parents, leaving the precise contours of liability to future case development rather than legislative action.

family lawtorts & liability

This case involved a dispute between the two attorney shareholders of a professional corporation law firm, where the minority shareholder sued individually for judicial dissolution, inspection of records, and breach of contract, and derivatively for conversion and breach of fiduciary duty after the majority shareholder allegedly misused corporate funds and denied access to records. The circuit court overruled challenges to the minority shareholder's standing to pursue derivative claims under Code § 13.1-672.1, appointed a receiver for an accounting, and entered judgment awarding damages on the derivative conversion claim plus attorneys' fees. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the minority shareholder had standing because she could fairly and adequately represent the corporation's interests despite also seeking dissolution, and affirmed the award of attorneys' fees and costs related to the successful derivative claim and the records inspection request. The core reasoning focused on the statutory requirements for derivative standing and fee awards under the Virginia Stock Corporation Act, concluding that simultaneous pursuit of dissolution did not automatically disqualify the plaintiff and that the litigation produced a substantial benefit to the corporation.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved George Christian's requests to the Virginia State Corporation Commission for certain employee and payment records under the Virginia Freedom of Information Act. The SCC responded that the VFOIA did not apply to it but provided limited responsive information after Christian filed a petition. The SCC dismissed the petition, finding no live controversy after the production of documents. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the VFOIA is inapplicable to the SCC because its enforcement provisions are unconstitutional as applied to the Commission under prior precedent, and the legislature has not amended the statute to provide an enforceable mechanism against the SCC.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In this case, Fox Rest Associates, L.P. sued George B. Little, Anne B. Little, and George B. Little and Associates to void transfers of sale proceeds, wages, and office equipment into a joint bank account as fraudulent conveyances under Code § 55-80 or voluntary conveyances under Code § 55-81, following an uncollected judgment against Mr. Little from a prior derivative action. The circuit court granted the defendants' motion to strike at the close of Fox Rest's case in chief. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that Fox Rest presented sufficient evidence for a prima facie case on most claims because expert testimony indicated Mr. Little was insolvent during the relevant period and the transfers lacked valuable consideration. The court reasoned that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Fox Rest, did not establish solvency as a matter of law and that the voluntary conveyance claim did not require proof of fraudulent intent.

propertyprocedure

This case arose from Pauline Dabney's personal injury claim after she was injured by pit bulls in 2002; she sought a declaratory judgment that Augusta Mutual Insurance Company had a duty to defend and indemnify the estate of the dogs' owner's deceased landlord under a homeowners policy that required notice of an occurrence "as soon as is practical." The circuit court barred the jury from considering whether Augusta learned of the underlying suit in early 2005 because the amended complaint alleged only 2004 discovery, and it ruled as a matter of law that the insured's 2004 notice was untimely. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the first ruling because it was limited to the pleadings but reversed the second, holding that whether notice substantially complied with the policy was a factual question given circumstances such as the delayed identification of the owner and policy, the policy cancellation, and an incorrect address; it remanded for a jury determination on that issue.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned Robert Bennett's breach of contract claim against his former employer, Sage Payment Solutions, seeking severance pay under an executive employment agreement after Bennett demanded higher compensation or a transition plan and was later terminated. Sage defended on the ground that Bennett had repudiated the agreement through his email and conduct, and the trial court permitted Sage to amend its pleadings mid-trial to assert that defense before submitting the issue to the jury, which returned a verdict for Sage. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that a party's repudiation of future contractual obligations can constitute a valid defense to a breach claim even after performance has begun, and finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court's rulings on amendment of the pleadings or jury instructions.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned Riverside Owner's challenge to the City of Richmond's Tax Abatement for Rehabilitated Real Estate Program, under which the city assessor applied the Chandler policy to determine a rehabilitated property's initial assessed value as of the program application date rather than the rehabilitation completion date, resulting in a lower partial tax exemption. Riverside Owner, after purchasing the rehabilitated property, contested the resulting tax assessment and sought additional relief including attorney's fees under a prior development agreement with the city. The circuit court upheld the city's valuation method as consistent with the applicable city code and state enabling statute and denied fees. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, ruling that the Chandler policy complied with the statutory requirements and that the action was brought and decided solely as an erroneous tax assessment case under Code § 58.1-3984, precluding recovery of contractual attorney's fees.

taxespropertybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether Enterprise, a self-insured rental car company, could enforce an indemnification clause in its lease against renter Baasanjav after paying damages to a third party injured by Baasanjav’s negligence, and whether Baasanjav’s insurer Farmers was obligated to reimburse Enterprise under its policy. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Enterprise, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. The Court held that the lease’s indemnification provision was enforceable because Enterprise was not an insurer and thus not subject to anti-subrogation rules. It further ruled that Enterprise’s self-insurance did not qualify as “collectible insurance” under the Farmers policy’s “other insurance” clause, making Farmers’ coverage primary rather than excess, so Farmers had to reimburse Enterprise for the $5,000+ paid to the third party.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

In Ruby v. Cashnet, Inc., the plaintiff sued a payday lender alleging that its practice of immediately issuing a new loan after full repayment of a prior loan violated Virginia's Payday Loan Act prohibition on refinancing, renewing, or extending payday loans under former Code § 6.1-459(6)(i), now codified at Code § 6.2-1816(6)(i). The circuit court ruled for the lender, viewing 2008 statutory amendments as evidence that the practice had not previously been prohibited. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that each transaction was a refinancing because it substituted one debt for another with the same creditor and a renewal because it re-established the debtor-creditor relationship on similar terms; the court further reasoned that the amendments both clarified the existing prohibition and added further restrictions on lending practices.

business & regulatory

In this case, the Commonwealth appealed after the Court of Appeals reversed a conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, which had been based on evidence from a pat-down search of a passenger during a traffic stop for a broken brake light. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the frisk was lawful under the Fourth Amendment because it was supported by reasonable suspicion. The court reasoned that officers could properly rely on an alert from the police PISTOL database indicating the passenger was probably armed and a narcotics seller/user, which was based on information from his prior arrests and convictions entered by other officers. This information, the majority concluded, was sufficient to justify the protective pat-down for officer safety during the stop, even without additional contemporaneous observations of present dangerousness.

criminal lawcivil rights

The case concerned whether the evidence supported Winston Tyrone Burton's conviction for abduction under Virginia Code § 18.2-47(A), after he approached a woman in a mall parking lot, deceived her into lying across the front seats of her car under the pretense of checking a brake issue, and was later seen with his hand in his unzipped pants. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment affirming the conviction and vacated the conviction. The court held that the evidence failed to prove Burton intended to deprive the victim of her personal liberty, as his actions were consistent with seeking sexual gratification and he stepped aside without further detention when she stated she needed to leave. The statute requires proof of such intent beyond a reasonable doubt, separate from the deceptive act itself, and the brief positioning did not establish the necessary element.

criminal law

The case involved whether, under Virginia's Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA), a circuit court could conditionally release a person found to be a sexually violent predator (SVP) to live and be supervised outside the Commonwealth, here to Washington, D.C., via the Interstate Compact. After finding Amerson to be an SVP by agreement and holding a hearing on commitment versus release, the circuit court ordered conditional release to a D.C. agency under a plan with out-of-state residence and supervision. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that the SVPA does not authorize conditional release of an SVP outside Virginia because its provisions on supervision, violations, and emergency custody orders only address release and enforcement within the Commonwealth, and the Interstate Compact does not apply to this civil proceeding. The court remanded for the circuit court to decide between civil commitment and in-state conditional release under the Virginia plan.

criminal lawprocedure

In Johnson v. Woodard, forty Gloucester citizens petitioned the circuit court under Virginia Code §§ 24.2-233 and 24.2-235 to remove four county supervisors from office, alleging neglect of duty, misuse of office, or incompetence based on criminal indictments. The circuit court issued rules to show cause, appointed a special prosecutor who later obtained a nonsuit, and then imposed sanctions on the petitioners along with attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the circuit court retained jurisdiction after the nonsuit order to address sanctions, but reversed the sanctions award because the petitioners were not parties to the removal action. The court reasoned that Code § 8.01-271.1 authorizes sanctions only against attorneys or parties who sign filings, and the petitioners' limited role in submitting the initial petitions did not make them parties subject to such penalties.

electionsprocedure

Alan Nogiec, a former county parks and recreation director, sued Isle of Wight County for breach of a severance agreement containing a nondisparagement clause and sued assistant county administrator Patrick Small for defamation based on statements Small made at a televised board meeting about Nogiec allegedly suppressing information on flood risks to a county museum. A jury found for Nogiec on both claims and awarded damages. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed the breach of contract judgment because Nogiec presented no evidence of damages resulting from any breach and affirmed the defamation judgment because the board meeting was not a legislative proceeding entitling the statements to absolute privilege, though a qualified privilege applied and the question of malice was properly left to the jury.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

This product liability case arose from a 2003 apartment fire that spread after exterior sidewall sprinkler heads, manufactured by Tyco and installed by SimplexGrinnell before 1997, failed to activate due to corrosion. Insurers Royal Indemnity, as subrogees, sued for negligence (including design and post-sale duties) and breach of warranty, seeking over $10 million in damages. The circuit court dismissed the negligence claims under the statute of repose (Code § 8.01-250) by classifying the heads as ordinary building materials and dismissed the warranty claims as time-barred. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed in part, holding that the sprinkler heads qualify as "equipment" under the statute of repose (allowing the negligence claims against Tyco to proceed) but affirmed dismissal of the warranty claims because a manufacturer's functional description does not create an express warranty of future performance and the limitations period had expired; the judgment against Simplex was affirmed on separate grounds. A concurrence agreed with the outcome on repose but criticized the ongoing "ordinary building materials" analysis.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned a challenge by out-of-town residents and homeowners' associations to a Town of Leesburg ordinance imposing a 100% surcharge on water and sewer consumption rates for customers outside town limits, which the complainants alleged violated state statutes requiring rates to be fair, reasonable, practicable, equitable, and uniform. The circuit court ruled in favor of the complainants after finding the town's evidence insufficient even under the fairly debatable standard. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that the town met its burden because its expert's testimony, based on a cost-of-service study recommending the surcharge to fund reserves and cover costs, was sufficient to make the ordinance's validity fairly debatable. The core reasoning was that the fairly debatable standard is a low threshold requiring only some supporting evidence, which the town's policy-guided rate study and expert opinion provided, regardless of contrary evidence from the complainants.

business & regulatoryproperty

Guy Anthony Banks was convicted of possessing a firearm after a felony conviction under Code § 18.2-308.2 following the seizure of a gun from a jacket in his bedroom after his arrest on unrelated warrants. The circuit court denied his motion to suppress the evidence, ruling that exigent circumstances justified the officers' actions due to cold weather. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial on an alternative ground—that Banks had consented to the seizure by requesting a jacket—without that issue having been argued below or decided by the circuit court. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that the Court of Appeals could not apply the "right result for the wrong reason" doctrine because the record showed conflicting evidence on consent that the circuit court had not resolved.

criminal lawprocedure