In Rich v. United States, a tank cleaner injured by falling from a ladder while cleaning tanks on a U.S. vessel sued the United States for negligence under the Public Vessels Act after receiving workers' compensation payments from his employer under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. The district court denied the United States' motion to implead the employer as a third party under Admiralty Rule 56, reasoning that no joint liability or liability over was asserted and that the compensation act's exclusivity provision would bar recovery from the employer. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the United States had sufficiently alleged a claim for indemnity based on the employer's independent duty, which could be pursued via impleader even though the compensation act bars direct suits by the employee against the employer.
This case involved claims that corporate officers and related parties misappropriated funds from Automatic to purchase shares of Majestic stock, with the court having previously found liability on that basis rather than stock conversion. On rehearing, the court clarified the method for calculating the profits defendants must disgorge: for 41,500 shares sold by one defendant, profits are measured by the average gain across all her shares rather than isolating the highest-profit sales; for defendants holding unsold shares now worth less than cost, net gains or losses on the overall transaction are considered when a constructive trust is imposed; and no interest is awarded on profits where defendants realized no provable gain. These rules draw on trust and restitution principles governing commingled funds and single breaches, aiming only to strip wrongful benefits without imposing penalties or compensating the corporation beyond the principal already repaid with interest.
This case concerned the proper tax basis for shares of stock that beneficiaries received in lieu of cash proceeds from the sale of real property directed under a will. The will of Laura E. Anderson directed her executors to sell specified real estate, pay small charitable bequests from the proceeds, and divide the balance among four named legatees; the executors instead transferred the property to a corporation in 1928 in exchange for stock that they issued to the legatees, who later received the property in liquidation. The Commissioner assessed capital gains tax using the property's 1921 fair market value at the testatrix's death as the basis, but the Tax Court and the Second Circuit held that the basis was the value of the legatees' claims to sale proceeds in 1928 when they surrendered those claims for the stock. The court reasoned that under New York law the beneficiaries held only equitable interests in the proceeds, not in the realty itself, which remained under the executors' control in trust until disposition, so any appreciation before 1928 affected the estate rather than the individuals; it therefore affirmed the Tax Court's determination of a modest deficiency based on the 1928 valuation minus the charitable amounts.
The case involved David Goldstein's conviction for perjury under 18 U.S.C.A. § 231 after he testified under oath during a Treasury Department tax investigation of several companies and individuals that stock certificates numbered 5 through 8 of Aetna Coated Fabrics, Inc. had been issued in his name on October 2, 1941. The government charged that the certificates were actually issued after March 23, 1945, and presented evidence from the company's stock records and witness testimony showing the later date. Goldstein was convicted by a jury and sentenced to imprisonment and a fine. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the evidence was sufficient to prove perjury as to at least one certificate and that this was adequate to sustain the single-count indictment without needing to prove all assignments. The court also addressed the standard of proof required for perjury and the procedural effect of the defendant's motion to dismiss.
The case Marcus v. Otis concerns a shareholder derivative action in which plaintiffs, through holding companies, sued directors of Automatic Products Corporation for converting 116,500 shares of Majestic Radio & Television Corporation stock that Automatic had acquired from DuMont Laboratories. The lower court held the defendant directors liable both for conversion of the shares and as constructive trustees for withdrawing corporate funds to purchase the shares for their own benefit, applying the same measure of liability on either theory. On appeal, the court reviewed the key transaction of April 26, 1943, in which DuMont transferred its Majestic securities to the defendants for $137,000 after negotiations involving Automatic's officers, and addressed issues including whether the directors converted the shares, the number involved, their status as constructive trustees, and the proper recovery amount. The opinion recounts the factual background, including Automatic's prior holdings in Majestic, the directors' roles, and communications confirming the purchase, while citing precedents on trusts, conversion, and remedies to guide the analysis of the defendants' conduct.
This case is an appeal from a conviction after a fourth trial on charges of violating the White Slave Traffic Act and conspiring to do so. The court reviewed multiple claimed errors regarding the admission of evidence derived from an illegal search, limits on cross-examination, the use of post-conspiracy statements by a co-conspirator, jury instructions on the elements of the offense, and other evidentiary and procedural issues. It held that the trial court properly exercised discretion in admitting evidence based on the prosecutor's assurances of independent origin and that other asserted errors either lacked merit or were not preserved for appeal. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying a post-trial motion for a new trial based on an affidavit later repudiated by the affiant. The judgment of conviction was affirmed.