The case involved plaintiffs suing Fayette County, its officials, the airport authority, and others over alleged zoning enforcement actions, failures to investigate violations on neighboring property, and retaliation, including claims of substantive due process violations and First Amendment retaliation tied to property use and eviction proceedings. The district court granted all defendants' motions to dismiss, adopting the magistrate judge's recommendations. It dismissed the substantive due process claim with prejudice for lack of a protected property interest in freedom from personal anguish or aesthetic preferences regarding adjacent land, and dismissed time-barred portions of the First Amendment claims with prejudice because the continuing violation doctrine did not apply to extend the limitations period beyond conduct before January 18, 2009. The remaining claims were dismissed without prejudice, with leave to file an amended complaint.
This case involved a dispute between the Ambulance Association of Pennsylvania and managed care insurers over whether non-contracting ambulance providers are entitled to direct and timely payment for services under Pennsylvania's Quality Health Care Accountability and Protection Act (Act 68). The plaintiffs sought a declaration that they could submit clean claims and receive payment directly from the defendants within 45 days. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the plain language of Act 68 and its regulations limits the prompt payment requirements to participating providers who furnish services under a managed care plan contract. Non-participating providers like the plaintiffs fall outside this definition and thus have no statutory right to direct payment, as confirmed by principles of statutory construction that give effect to the legislature's chosen terms.
The case involved a federal habeas corpus petition by Michael Alonzo Harris challenging the Bureau of Prisons' calculation of his federal sentence, specifically its refusal to designate his federal sentence to run concurrently with a state sentence and to award prior custody credit. The court denied the petition, adopting the magistrate judge's recommendation. The core reasoning was that the BOP acted within its discretion in denying a nunc pro tunc concurrent designation because the federal sentencing court had explicitly declined to make the sentences concurrent, and any claim regarding prior custody credit was not ripe for review as the federal sentence had not yet been computed and administrative remedies had not been exhausted.
In Shanefelter v. United States Steel Corp., plaintiff Dawn Shanefelter sued her former employer U.S. Steel, her union, and several union officials in state court, asserting state-law claims including breach of contract, intentional misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, intentional interference, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and retaliation arising from her 2004 workplace injury, workers' compensation settlement, and 2008 termination for failure to return to work. Defendants removed the case to federal court, arguing that the claims were completely preempted by § 301 of the LMRA and § 9(a) of the NLRA because they depended on interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement; they also moved to dismiss, while plaintiff moved to remand for lack of jurisdiction. The court granted the motions in part and denied them in part, holding that certain claims were preempted by federal labor law (including the duty of fair representation) and thus removable and time-barred, while others could proceed or required further analysis under the federal standards. The reasoning centered on whether the state claims were founded directly on or substantially dependent upon the collective bargaining agreement, triggering federal question jurisdiction and displacement of state law.
Plaintiffs, pro-life advocates seeking to distribute literature, challenged Pittsburgh Ordinance § 601.62, which prohibits distributing handbills and similar materials on public and private property in ways that cause litter or interfere with pedestrian traffic, and also restricts placement on vehicles without consent. They filed for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, arguing the ordinance unconstitutionally restricts their First Amendment rights. After hearings, the court found a reasonable probability of success on the merits, irreparable harm from restricted speech, no harm to the city from the injunction, and that the public interest favored protecting constitutional rights. The court granted the preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the ordinance against the plaintiffs and others distributing leaflets. The reasoning centered on the ordinance's potential overbreadth in restricting protected speech without sufficient justification.
The case involved a motion to quash subpoenas issued by defendants to third-party employers in a Title VII sexual harassment lawsuit brought by the EEOC and plaintiff-intervenor Moncel Deitz against her former employer, Donohue Cardiology Associates. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, narrowing the subpoenas to specific categories of employment and medical records while quashing requests for broader information about the plaintiff-intervenor's post-separation conduct. The core reasoning was that unlimited subpoenas exceeded the scope of legitimate discovery, and Federal Rule of Evidence 412 prohibits evidence or discovery of an alleged victim's sexual behavior or predisposition in sexual harassment cases unless its probative value substantially outweighs the risk of harm and prejudice, a standard defendants did not meet for unrelated workplace incidents.
