Paul W. Green

This Texas Supreme Court case arose from a medical malpractice lawsuit brought by Margaret Young against cardiologist Dr. Venkateswarlu Thota and his practice after her husband Ronnie suffered severe complications, including a torn iliac artery, massive bleeding, and eventual death from leukemia, allegedly due to negligence during a coronary catheterization procedure. The jury found no negligence by Dr. Thota, but the court of appeals reversed based on alleged errors in the jury charge, including submission of contributory negligence and a new-and-independent-cause instruction. The Supreme Court held that its presumed-harm analysis from Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel does not apply to broad-form submissions in single-theory-of-liability cases and that any charge errors were harmless under traditional harm review because the evidence supported a finding of no breach of the standard of care. The Court therefore reversed the appellate judgment and remanded for consideration of Young's remaining issues.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved restaurant tenants who signed a lease for a building after the landlord's agent represented it had no problems, but later discovered a severe persistent sewer gas odor from prior tenants that made the space unusable. The tenants sued for rescission and damages based on fraudulent inducement and breach of the implied warranty of suitability, while the landlord contended that merger and disclaimer clauses in the lease barred reliance on any prior statements. The Texas Supreme Court held that the lease language was a standard merger clause that did not disclaim reliance on representations, so it did not negate an element of the fraud claim and could not bar the suit. The court reversed the take-nothing judgment and remanded, while also rendering judgment for the tenants on rescission for breach of the implied warranty.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

This case arose from an oil and gas lessor's attempt to recover unpaid royalties from an investor who had consented to drilling operations under a Working Interest Unit Agreement and Joint Operating Agreement but had not operated the wells. The Texas Supreme Court addressed certified questions from the Fifth Circuit, focusing on whether the lessor could enforce those agreements as a third-party beneficiary or through privity of estate. The court held that the lessor had no such right of enforcement. Its reasoning centered on the absence of clear, assumptive language in the agreements by which the investor would directly assume or become liable for the lessor's royalty obligations, and on the fact that the investor's temporary non-consent interest did not create permanent privity or beneficiary status.

business & regulatoryproperty

In Transcontinental Insurance Co. v. Crump, the case concerned a workers' compensation death benefits claim by the widow of an employee who suffered a knee injury at work and later died from complications, with the insurer disputing whether the injury was a producing cause of death. The Texas Supreme Court held that the treating physician's differential diagnosis constituted reliable expert testimony that was legally sufficient to support the jury verdict on causation, but the trial court's jury instruction defining producing cause was erroneous for omitting the but-for component, and the insurer was entitled to a jury trial on the disputed amount of the claimant's attorney's fees. The court reasoned from precedent that producing cause requires both a substantial factor and but-for causation, that the expert opinion rested on a reliable foundation, and that Labor Code section 408.221(c) mandates jury determination of fees when disputed. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

labor & employmentproceduretorts & liability

In this case, plaintiff Barry Joachim sued his insurer Travelers for underinsured motorist benefits but filed a nonsuit the day before trial; the trial court later entered an erroneous dismissal with prejudice for want of prosecution. Joachim refiled the same claims in a new proceeding, where the second trial court granted summary judgment to Travelers on res judicata grounds. The court of appeals reversed, holding the first dismissal order void because the nonsuit had already deprived the court of jurisdiction. The Texas Supreme Court reversed that holding, concluding that the first court’s order was merely voidable rather than void, constituted a final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction, and therefore barred the second suit under res judicata.

procedure

This case involved business partners Larry Snodgrass and J. Mark Swinnea, who owned equal interests in ERI Consulting Engineers and Malmeba Company. Swinnea fraudulently induced Snodgrass and ERI to buy out his interest in ERI while secretly setting up a competing asbestos abatement business through family members, without disclosure, and later competed in ways that harmed ERI's relationships and profits, leading to findings of statutory fraud, common law fraud, breach of non-compete, and breach of fiduciary duty after a bench trial. The trial court awarded damages including equitable forfeiture of part of the buyout consideration plus lost profits, but the court of appeals reversed, holding forfeiture unavailable. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed in part, holding that consideration received for a business interest sale is subject to equitable forfeiture as a remedy for breach of fiduciary duty by fraudulent inducement of the buyout, in addition to other resulting damages, and remanded for further proceedings.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case concerns an anti-suit injunction issued by a district court to prevent Ann M. Fernandez from pursuing claims in other courts asserting inheritance rights or heirship to the estate of Sarita Kenedy East or related property interests conveyed by East. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' reversal of the injunction after previously reinstating summary judgments that Fernandez take nothing in related bill-of-review proceedings. The core reasoning is that Fernandez's heirship and inheritance claims are barred by the residual four-year statute of limitations, which expired more than fifteen years before she filed suit, and that binding prior judgments foreclose any possibility of her establishing that East died intestate, eliminating any ongoing threat of litigation in other courts.

propertyprocedure

This case involved a dispute over whether Ann M. Fernandez could exhume the body of John G. Kenedy, Jr. for DNA testing to prove she was his non-marital daughter and thus entitled to inherit from his estate and that of his sister. The Texas Supreme Court determined that the probate court abused its discretion in ordering the exhumation and granted mandamus relief to vacate the orders. The court reasoned that prior final judgments barred Fernandez's claims due to the statute of limitations, preventing her from establishing standing as an heir, which meant the probate court lacked jurisdiction over the matter. Consequently, there was no basis for the exhumation under the applicable statute.

family lawpropertyprocedure

The case involved Ann Fernandez's attempts to establish herself as the non-marital child of John G. Kenedy, Jr., who died in 1948, by filing bills of review to reopen his estate along with those of his wife and sister, which had been closed for decades after probate proceedings in the 1940s through 1980s. The district court granted summary judgment against Fernandez on multiple grounds including limitations, but the court of appeals reversed on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the district court should have abated its proceedings in favor of related matters pending in probate court. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals in part, ruling that the district court possessed subject matter jurisdiction over Fernandez's direct attacks on prior judgments and that the Texas Probate Code does not permit probate courts to exercise heirship jurisdiction over long-closed estates where the decedent left a will. The Court further held that the discovery rule does not apply to non-marital children's inheritance or heirship claims or to bills of review seeking to set aside probate judgments, rendering Fernandez's claims time-barred under the applicable statutes of limitations, and it reinstated the district court's judgment while affirming the reversal of an anti-suit injunction.

family lawpropertyprocedure

This case involved Ann M. Fernandez's bill of review proceeding in district court seeking to set aside a 1975 judgment probating the will of Sarita Kenedy East and to assert inheritance rights as the alleged non-marital niece of East, based on claims that she was the non-marital child of East's brother. The Texas Supreme Court held that the district court had exclusive jurisdiction over the direct attack on the prior judgment involving a long-closed estate and that Fernandez's pleadings established standing, but that her claims were barred by the four-year residual statute of limitations because the discovery rule does not apply to such inheritance claims by non-marital children. The court therefore reversed the court of appeals' remand for abatement, reinstated the district court's summary judgment that Fernandez take nothing, and affirmed the reversal of the anti-suit injunction, applying the same analysis as in the related Frost National Bank v. Fernandez decision.

family lawpropertyprocedure

In this healthcare liability suit, plaintiffs Janice and Patrick McDaniel alleged that Janice suffered a pelvic injury during physical therapy and sued defendants Spectrum Healthcare Resources and Michael Sims after an initial federal filing was dismissed without prejudice. The defendants moved to dismiss after the plaintiffs failed to serve the expert medical report required by the Texas Medical Liability Act within 120 days of filing the state-court claim. The plaintiffs contended that an agreed docket control order entered by the parties extended the statutory deadline for all expert reports. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, but the court of appeals reversed, finding the order unambiguously extended the deadline. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the dismissal, holding that any agreement to extend the Act's specific 120-day expert-report deadline must explicitly reference that purpose and that a general discovery deadline in a docket control order does not suffice.

healthcareproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a dispute over whether ADM Investor Services could enforce a forum-selection clause in its 2001 commodities trading agreement with Jetta Prescott, which specified that disputes could be litigated in Illinois courts at ADM's discretion. Prescott sued ADM and Texas Trading in Texas state court alleging fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence after a deficit in her account led to collection actions. The trial court denied ADM's motion to dismiss based on the clause, citing the inconvenience of litigating against two defendants in different states, and the court of appeals denied mandamus on waiver grounds. The Texas Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus, ordering dismissal as to ADM, because ADM had not waived enforcement by its litigation conduct and Prescott failed to show that enforcement would be unreasonable or unjust. The decision rested on the strong presumption against waiver of forum-selection clauses and the lack of evidence of changed circumstances making enforcement unfair.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In this foreclosure dispute, Myrad Properties financed two apartment complexes secured by a single deed of trust, but after default and sale the substitute trustees' deed mistakenly described only one property in its exhibit. LaSalle recorded a correction deed purporting to add the omitted property, prompting Myrad to sue to quiet title to the second parcel. The Texas Supreme Court held that the correction deed was void because correction deeds may not be used to convey an entire omitted property and thus exceeded their narrow permissible scope. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court further held that the original mistaken deed should be rescinded on the ground of mutual mistake to prevent unjust enrichment, rendering judgment for LaSalle without remand.

property

In Vanegas v. American Energy Services, at-will employees sued their former employer claiming breach of an oral promise to pay five percent of the proceeds from any sale or merger of the company to those still employed at that time. The trial court granted summary judgment for the employer on grounds that the promise was illusory and unenforceable, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, ruling that the employees' continued service until the 2001 acquisition constituted acceptance and performance that rendered the unilateral contract enforceable even if the promise could have been avoided earlier.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a premises liability suit against the City of Waco by the family of a college student who died after falling from a natural cliff in a municipal park while watching boat races. The plaintiff alleged that the city was grossly negligent in failing to warn or protect against the danger, which would waive the city's immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act and the recreational use statute. The Texas Supreme Court held that a landowner generally owes no duty to recreational users to warn or protect against naturally occurring conditions such as the cliff, and that the undisputed facts showed the city had not acted with conscious indifference because it had installed a rock wall and warning sign. The court therefore reversed the court of appeals and dismissed the case with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In State v. Lueck, a former Texas Department of Transportation employee sued the state and agency under the Texas Whistleblower Act after being fired following an email to his division director that warned of potential legal noncompliance if a disputed vendor contract was not resolved. The employee claimed the email constituted a good-faith report of a violation of law to an appropriate law enforcement authority, which would waive sovereign immunity under the Act. The Texas Supreme Court held that the pleadings affirmatively showed no waiver occurred because the email addressed only regulatory noncompliance rather than an actual violation of law and because the recipient supervisor was not an appropriate law enforcement authority. As a result, the Court reversed the lower courts and dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case arose from a 2003 motor vehicle collision in Texas in which plaintiff Hawkins sued defendant Ashley for personal injuries. Ashley moved out of state in 2004, and although suit was filed before the two-year limitations period expired, service was not effected until after it had run; Hawkins argued that Ashley's absence tolled the period under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 16.063. The trial court granted summary judgment to Ashley on limitations grounds, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that the tolling statute applied. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 16.063 does not toll limitations when a nonresident defendant remains amenable to service under the state's long-arm statute because the defendant is deemed present in Texas for limitations purposes; the Court overruled its prior decision in Vaughn v. Deitz and reinstated the trial court's judgment.

proceduretorts & liability

The case concerned a suspended DeSoto police officer who elected to appeal his indefinite suspension to an independent hearing examiner under Chapter 143 of the Texas Local Government Code rather than to the civil service commission. The city's suspension letter omitted the required statutory notice that choosing a hearing examiner would severely limit the officer's ability to obtain further review in district court. The officer challenged the examiner's jurisdiction on that basis, leading the trial court and court of appeals to set aside the examiner's decision upholding the suspension. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the notice requirement is not jurisdictional and therefore its omission did not deprive the hearing examiner of authority to decide the appeal.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case concerned whether Nabors Drilling owed a legal duty to third parties injured in a fatal car accident caused by its off-duty employee, who had worked long twelve-hour shifts that could induce fatigue. The trial court ruled that Nabors owed no duty, leading to a take-nothing judgment, but the court of appeals reversed. The Texas Supreme Court held that Nabors had no duty to prevent injury from the fatigue of its off-duty employee or to train employees about fatigue risks. The Court reasoned that employers generally owe no duty for tortious acts of off-duty employees occurring off-site unless the employer exercises control over the specific injury-causing conduct, and the limited exceptions recognized in prior cases involving intoxicated employees do not extend to fatigue from work schedules.

torts & liabilitylabor & employment

The case involved a negligence lawsuit by Charles Rice, an employee of subcontractor Haley Greer, against general contractor HCBeck for injuries sustained on a construction project owned by FMR. HCBeck claimed immunity under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act as a statutory employer because it had arranged for Rice's coverage through an owner-controlled insurance program (OCIP) required by its contract with FMR and incorporated into the subcontract. The Texas Supreme Court held that HCBeck "provided" workers' compensation insurance within the meaning of Labor Code section 406.123(a) by binding itself and its subcontractors to enroll in FMR's OCIP, which actually supplied the coverage and paid benefits to Rice. The Court reasoned that the statutory exclusive-remedy defense applies when a general contractor's written agreements ensure that subcontractors' employees receive the benefits of workers' compensation insurance, fulfilling the Act's purpose of delivering certain coverage without regard to fault. It therefore reversed the court of appeals and rendered judgment for HCBeck.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory