Sharon Keller

In a pending sexual assault prosecution, the trial court ordered the State to provide defense counsel with a copy of a DVD recording of the child complainant's interview at a Child Advocacy Center. The prosecutor petitioned for mandamus relief to rescind the order, arguing it exceeded the authority of Article 39.14(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court of Criminal Appeals denied the petition, holding that the statute expressly permits trial courts to order the State to produce and allow copying of tangible evidence in its possession and to specify the manner of copying, which reasonably includes directing the State to make the copy. The majority reasoned that this approach aligns with the statutory text and avoids the alternative of handing over the original DVD to the defense.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a defendant's convictions for aggravated robbery, based on stealing a handgun on January 21, 2005, and for theft, based on possessing the same handgun on February 19, 2005, while knowing it was stolen, violated double jeopardy protections. The court of appeals upheld both convictions, finding the offenses distinct because of the different dates and the additional knowledge element required for the theft charge. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals declined to grant discretionary review. In dissent, Presiding Judge Keller argued that prior precedent established theft as complete upon the initial unlawful acquisition rather than a continuing offense, so the later possession did not constitute a separate crime from the robbery, and analogous double jeopardy reasoning from Littrell v. State should apply.

criminal lawprocedure

In this criminal case, the trial court revoked the defendant's probation, the court of appeals reversed that revocation, and the State filed a petition for discretionary review. After the court of appeals issued a Rule 50 opinion responding to the petition, the State filed a motion for rehearing (which was overruled) and then a new petition; the court dismissed the new petition as untimely. The majority reasoned that motions for rehearing are not authorized after a Rule 50 opinion under Tex. R. App. P. 50, so the filing deadline ran from the date of that opinion rather than from the overruling of the rehearing motion. The dissenting opinion contends that Rule 50 contains no explicit bar on rehearing motions, that such motions could lead to withdrawal of the opinion without a further opinion, and that the original petition remains pending in any event.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant indicted for aggravated sexual assault who was convicted of the lesser-included offense of aggravated assault by causing bodily injury after the trial court submitted that offense to the jury without any request or objection from the defense. The court of appeals held the submission was error because the offense was not a true lesser-included offense and that the defendant was egregiously harmed. In dissenting from the Court of Criminal Appeals' refusal to grant review, the opinion noted that the indictment's allegations of physical force and violence might distinguish the case from Woodard v. State regarding harm to the constitutional right to a grand-jury indictment. It further suggested review was warranted to decide whether the defendant should be estopped from complaining about the submission due to knowing acquiescence in an instruction that offered potential strategic benefits.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a defendant could use a pretrial habeas corpus application and interlocutory appeal to raise a claim under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) that the prosecution must be dismissed for missing the treaty's 120-day trial deadline after the defendant was transferred to Texas. The trial court denied the habeas application, and the court of appeals initially addressed the IAD claim on the merits before holding that the IAD did not apply. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that a pretrial habeas proceeding is not an appropriate vehicle for such an IAD claim. The court reasoned that IAD speedy-trial violations, like constitutional speedy-trial claims, do not involve a right to avoid trial altogether that would justify pretrial habeas review, and allowing a stay of proceedings would undermine the IAD's purpose; instead, the claim should be raised after conviction if necessary.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a conviction for aggravated assault based on the use of a deadly weapon, specifically whether a knife or sharp object used to stab the victim multiple times qualified as a deadly weapon. The court of appeals had found the evidence insufficient to support the deadly weapon finding due to lack of direct testimony about the object's capabilities and the severity of the wounds. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence was legally sufficient because the nature and location of the injuries, such as puncture wounds near the spine and a through-and-through laceration on the arm, allowed the jury to infer that the object was used in a manner capable of causing serious injury or death.

criminal law

The case involved a defendant convicted of aggravated kidnapping, assault family violence, and aggravated sexual assault against his estranged wife. At trial, the court conducted in camera hearings under Texas Rule of Evidence 412 on the victim's prior sexual history without allowing defense counsel to participate or question witnesses directly, prompting an appeal claiming violations of the rule and the Confrontation Clause. The court of appeals initially reversed but later abated the appeal to remand for a retrospective adversarial hearing with counsel present. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that Rule 412 requires an adversarial hearing and that appellate courts may order retrospective hearings to remedy procedural errors, finding the trial court conducted the new hearing properly and affirming the judgment.

criminal lawprocedure

In Hardy v. State, the chief deputy of the Chambers County Sheriff's Office was convicted of perjury on the theory that he directed another deputy to file a false affidavit charging someone with driving while intoxicated. The court of appeals had found the evidence legally insufficient, relying on Lowry v. State to hold that the State must prove the affiant personally appeared before the notary when executing the oath. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, ruling that Texas Penal Code § 37.07(b) supersedes Lowry by providing that a document containing a recital it was made under oath, the declarant's awareness of the recital, and a signed jurat from an authorized official is sufficient without additional evidence of personal appearance before the notary. The court remanded the case for the court of appeals to address the defendant's remaining points of error.

criminal law

This case concerned whether a Bedford, Texas noise ordinance that bars operating radios or similar devices in a manner that unreasonably disturbs the peace, comfort, and repose of neighboring persons of ordinary sensibilities is unconstitutionally vague. Police stopped and arrested the defendant for driving while intoxicated after hearing loud music from his car during a response to a noise complaint. The trial court suppressed the evidence, ruling the ordinance overbroad and vague for lacking notice and objective standards, but the Court of Appeals reversed. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, concluding that the ordinance's reasonableness standard supplies adequate definiteness for ordinary people and constrains arbitrary enforcement without requiring specific decibel or distance thresholds.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a challenge to a jury charge in a criminal prosecution for causing injury to an elderly person, where the abstract definitions of the culpable mental states were not properly limited. The Court of Appeals found the error harmless and upheld the conviction. This dissenting opinion agrees, arguing that the limitation in the application paragraphs of the charge fully cured any potential harm from the overly broad definitions, consistent with Almanza v. State and precedents such as Patrick v. State and Medina v. State. The dissent contends that courts need not always weigh every Almanza factor when one factor alone demonstrates the error had no effect on the jury's deliberations. It would therefore refuse the petition for review.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a plea bargain in which the defendant signed a written waiver of his right to appeal, along with the trial court's notations confirming the waiver on the judgment and notice of appeal. The Court of Appeals held in a published opinion that the waiver was ineffective because it conflicted with the statutory admonishment under Article 26.13 about limited appeal rights in plea cases. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused to grant the State's petition for review of that holding. In this dissenting opinion, the author argued that the waiver should be upheld because the required admonishment does not rebut it, unlike in prior cases where permission to appeal was evident from the record, and that the issue warrants review due to conflicting published decisions from intermediate courts.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Jose Alfredo Rivera's post-conviction application for DNA testing under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Chapter 64 after his capital murder conviction and death sentence for the 1993 strangulation and sexual assault of a three-year-old child, which he confessed to on video with corroborating details. The trial court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing, finding the confession credible and a recanting statement from a co-defendant not credible or exculpatory. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, holding that negative DNA results on items like fingernail clippings, a rape kit, or anal samples would not establish innocence given the confession and other evidence, and that Chapter 64 does not require a live witness hearing to assess credibility for this type of motion.

criminal lawprocedure

In Garcia v. State, a police officer stopped the defendant's vehicle after an anonymous tip about marijuana possession, citing as justification that a child passenger had looked back at the officer's car several times, which the officer believed indicated a seat belt violation. The defendant was ultimately found with marijuana after the stop, and he moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that the stop lacked reasonable suspicion. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's denial of the motion, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, holding that the child's glances alone did not constitute specific, articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion of a seat belt violation under the Fourth Amendment standards for investigative stops. The court noted that prior cases finding reasonable suspicion for seat belt stops involved direct observations of unbelted passengers or clear views of missing harnesses, which were absent here. As a result, the marijuana evidence was suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful stop.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involves the 1999 capital murder conviction of appellant John William King for the killing of James Byrd Jr., who was beaten, chained to a pickup truck, and dragged to death along a rural road in Jasper, Texas. The appellant raised eight points of error on automatic direct appeal, primarily challenging the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to prove kidnapping or his role as a party to the offense. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals unanimously affirmed the conviction and death sentence, holding that evidence such as DNA from blood and cigarette butts, tire impressions matching the defendant's truck, personal items like a engraved lighter and sandals, witness sightings, and the defendant's documented racial animosity sufficiently supported the jury's findings on the special issues.

criminal law

In this case, a jury convicted the defendant of felony theft, after which the defense requested a presentence investigation report (PSI) under Article 42.12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but the trial court declined and imposed a 60-year sentence. The defendant appealed, arguing the court was required to order the PSI because he was eligible for community supervision. Prior Court of Appeals precedent had treated ordering a PSI as discretionary, but the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that Article 42.12 § 9 mandates a PSI when requested in a felony case unless specific exceptions apply. The core reasoning was that the statute's use of "shall" creates a requirement, and none of the exceptions in subsection (g)—such as jury-assessed punishment or ineligibility for supervision—were met here, distinguishing earlier cases where probation was unavailable.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a post-conviction habeas corpus application by an inmate convicted of securing execution of a document by deception who was denied release to mandatory supervision by a parole panel under the post-1996 Texas statute allowing denial based on rehabilitation and public safety concerns. The court held that while the parole panel's substantive decision is not subject to judicial review, due process requires the Board of Pardons and Paroles to provide eligible inmates with timely prior notice that they are being considered for mandatory supervision so they can submit information in support of release. The court reasoned that the statute creates a protected liberty interest in release for eligible inmates, entitling them to a meaningful opportunity to be heard before the decision, and granted partial relief by ordering reconsideration with proper notice. The court also confirmed that such claims are cognizable under Article 11.07.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Virgil Euristi Martinez's conviction on three counts of capital murder for the October 1996 shooting deaths of Veronica Fuentes and her two young children in Brazoria County, Texas, for which he received a death sentence. On automatic direct appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed nineteen points of error concerning voir dire challenges for cause, suppression of evidence, hearsay admissions, and other evidentiary and procedural matters arising at trial. The court overruled all points, finding that the appellant had not preserved certain errors, failed to show harm from denied challenges, and that the evidence supported the convictions without reversible mistake. The judgment and sentence were affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involves Felix Rocha's conviction for capital murder in the course of a robbery, for which a Texas jury sentenced him to death. On automatic direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals addressed challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for the underlying robbery, the trial court's refusal to allow a retroactive peremptory challenge during voir dire, and claims under the Vienna Convention regarding consular notification for a foreign national. The court held that witness testimony and crime-scene evidence established the corpus delicti of robbery independently of the defendant's confession, that statutory procedures barred the late peremptory challenge, and that any Vienna Convention issue did not require reversal under Texas exclusionary rules. The court overruled all points of error and affirmed the conviction and sentence.

criminal lawprocedure

In Young v. State, the defendant was convicted of possession with intent to deliver and delivery of cocaine, with jury findings that the offenses occurred in a drug-free zone near a school, leading to enhanced punishment ranges. The Court of Appeals reversed the enhancement findings for insufficient evidence that the location was owned, rented, or leased by a school, but the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed that decision. The court held that sufficiency must be measured against the hypothetically correct jury charge derived from the applicable statute, Health and Safety Code § 481.134(c), which enhances punishment for offenses within 1,000 feet of school premises without requiring proof of ownership or leasing by the school. Legislative history confirmed that subsection (c) governs school-related enhancements and that the evidence presented was legally sufficient to support the findings.

criminal law

In McCain v. State, the appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery after kicking in a door, assaulting the complainant, and having a butcher knife with a nine-inch blade partly visible in his pocket during the attack; the complainant later found her car and pager missing. The Court of Appeals reformed the conviction to simple robbery, concluding the evidence was legally insufficient to prove the knife was used or exhibited as a deadly weapon under Texas Penal Code § 29.03(a)(2) because it was not brandished or overtly referenced. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence was legally sufficient for a rational factfinder to find the knife was a deadly weapon due to its intended use and was exhibited by being partially exposed, which facilitated the offense by instilling apprehension and reducing resistance. The court distinguished mere possession from use or exhibition but found the partial visibility and context met the statutory requirements, remanding for proceedings consistent with its opinion.

criminal law