The case concerns media organizations' request under the Tennessee Public Records Act for police records related to an ongoing aggravated rape prosecution against Vanderbilt football players. The majority of the Tennessee Supreme Court held that Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(2) exempts all such records from public disclosure while the criminal case is pending. In this dissent, Justice Wade contends that the rule's plain language protects only work product and witness statements, not every police record, and that the victim's claims under the Victims' Bill of Rights and state constitutional provisions should be adjudicated by the chancery court. The dissent also notes that protective orders from the criminal court adequately address fair trial concerns and that post-conviction confidentiality statutes would not fully cover the victim's interests.
This case concerns the application of the summary judgment standard in a lawsuit brought by Lea Ann Tatham against Bridgestone Americas Holding, Inc. The majority opinion adopted a federal standard recently established in Rye v. Women’s Care Center of Memphis to resolve the summary judgment issue. Justice Wade, concurring in part and in the judgment, maintains his disagreement with the adoption of the new federal standard, as stated in his dissent in Rye, but agrees that the same outcome would result under the prior Tennessee standard.
This case concerns a medical malpractice lawsuit brought by Michelle Rye and her husband against a women's care center and related defendants in Tennessee state court. The majority of the Tennessee Supreme Court overruled prior precedents establishing the state's summary judgment standard under Byrd v. Hall and Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., adopting instead the federal Celotex standard that shifts the burden differently when a moving party shows the non-moving party cannot prove an essential element at trial. The core reasoning was that the longstanding Tennessee approach was incompatible with the text and history of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and frustrated the purposes of summary judgment. The provided opinion is a dissent arguing that the prior standard should be retained as consistent with state rules and history, that the majority improperly preempted a potential separation-of-powers challenge to a new statute, and that at least some claims should proceed to trial under either standard.
The case involved multiple groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies that sued the State of Tennessee in the Claims Commission seeking refunds of retaliatory taxes they had paid under protest for tax years 2005-2007. The Commissioner and Court of Appeals denied the refunds, finding that certain Pennsylvania workers' compensation assessments created a financial burden on Tennessee insurers doing business in Pennsylvania, thereby justifying Tennessee's retaliatory tax under Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-4-218. The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, holding that the assessments are imposed directly on employer-policyholders (who pay them along with their premiums) rather than on the insurance companies themselves. The Court reasoned that the insurers' administrative role in collecting and remitting the payments does not constitute a qualifying burden or obligation that triggers the retaliatory tax statute.
This case arose when plaintiff Richard Moreno, injured by a tree falling on his car from state property, filed a timely notice of claim against the State under the Claims Commission Act; after the claim transferred to the Claims Commission, the State amended its answer to allege comparative fault by the City of Clarksville, prompting Moreno to sue the City within ninety days under Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119. The majority held that section 20-1-119 did not apply because its text refers to allegations of fault in an answer to an "original complaint," not to a "notice of claim." In dissent, Justice Wade concluded that the notice of claim functions as the functional equivalent of an original complaint for purposes of the statute, so Moreno should have been permitted to add the City as a defendant. The core reasoning was that the statute is remedial, must be given a broad construction to allow claims to be decided on the merits, and that the majority's reading elevates technical form over substance contrary to longstanding Tennessee precedent.
This case arose from a boundary dispute over land in Loudon County, Tennessee, originally acquired in 1918 by a husband and wife; after the husband's death, conveyances occurred under the mistaken belief that the widow held full title, resulting in later descendants claiming interests as tenants in common rather than by the entirety. The Baileys, who had possessed and used the disputed Tract I exclusively for decades without accounting to other heirs, sought to quiet title and later claimed title by prescription after third-party defendants (the Littletons) asserted inheritance rights. The trial court and Court of Appeals denied relief, finding no presumptive ouster due to the Littletons' ignorance of their co-tenancy. The Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed, holding that the Baileys established title by prescription because they had maintained exclusive, uninterrupted possession for over twenty years while claiming the land as their own, with no evidence of disability, permission, or rebuttal by the co-tenants. The case was remanded for further proceedings.