Lori S. Wilbur

In Dillon v. Weber, a habeas corpus petitioner challenged his convictions for first-degree rape and criminal pedophilia on the ground that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The South Dakota Supreme Court reversed the habeas court's denial of relief, holding that counsel's performance was deficient under the first prong of Strickland v. Washington and that the deficiencies prejudiced the outcome under the second prong. The court found multiple errors by counsel, including failures to object to inadmissible evidence and improper arguments, that collectively undermined the fairness of the trial. It remanded with instructions for the state to retry the petitioner or discharge him.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is James E. Smith's appeal from the denial of his second habeas corpus petition after his 1990 South Dakota convictions for first-degree murder, first-degree robbery, and committing a felony while armed, arising from a bank robbery in which he shot and killed a teller. The court affirmed the denial of relief on claims that the trial court omitted a required accomplice-corroboration jury instruction and that trial and habeas counsel were ineffective for failing to raise or request it. The core reasoning was that any error was harmless because overwhelming independent evidence established Smith's guilt, the cautionary instruction given was adequate, and ineffective-assistance claims in successive habeas proceedings require a showing of prejudice in the original trial, which was not made.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Ronald Rowland, a patron at the Log Cabin bar in Sioux Falls, who was bitten in the face by a large Akita dog brought into the bar by another customer. Rowland sued the bar for negligence, claiming it breached its duty of care as a business owner to a business invitee by allowing the unknown dog to remain on the premises amid intoxicated patrons. The trial court granted summary judgment to the bar, finding no breach as a matter of law under a prior similar acts test for foreseeability. The appeals court reversed, holding that summary judgment was improper because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the bar should have foreseen the risk under the totality of the circumstances, including the dog's size, the bartender's lack of familiarity with it, and the setting with drunk customers, and that such negligence questions are typically for a jury.

torts & liability

This case involved a negligence claim by Julie and Erica Boomsma against Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern Railroad after their northbound car struck a flatbed railcar stopped on a service track at a Wolsey, South Dakota crossing, resulting in serious injuries. A jury awarded over $1 million in damages, and the railroad appealed on multiple grounds including federal preemption of state-law claims, jury instructions, expert testimony, and evidentiary rulings. The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the verdict, holding that federal funding and warning devices installed on the main and switching lines did not preempt common-law duties regarding the separate service line crossing, where inadequate signage and lack of active warnings contributed to the accident. The court also upheld the trial court's handling of other issues, finding no reversible error and sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings on negligence and damages.

torts & liabilityfederal power

The case concerned a contract for the sale of an equipment dealership, where the buyer alleged that the seller breached express warranties by inaccurately representing the usage hours on five combines listed in an exhibit to the purchase agreement. The trial court found no actionable express warranty, whether oral or written, but the appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part. It upheld the finding of no oral warranties but held that the written descriptions of the equipment's condition and hours in the contract exhibit constituted an express warranty under the UCC that could not be disclaimed by an "as is" clause, that the seller breached it, and remanded for a determination of damages.

business & regulatory

The case involved Prairie Home Cemetery Association, a nonprofit cemetery, which received a large gift of personal property from the estate of Fred Zoss in 1996. The South Dakota Department of Revenue assessed inheritance tax on the transfer, which the association paid under protest before seeking a refund on the grounds that it qualified for a statutory exemption as a benevolent organization. The circuit court denied the exemption, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that under SDCL 10-4-9.2, the association had to be both a recognized cemetery association and hold one of the specified federal tax-exempt statuses under IRC sections 501(c)(3), (7), (8), (10), or (19) as of the date of the decedent's death; however, the association was not formally re-created until 1998 and did not obtain any qualifying IRS recognition until 1999, so it failed to meet the statutory criteria at the relevant time.

taxesproperty

This case concerned a dispute over whether Lawrence County officials must place a referendum on the ballot challenging the county commission's approval of zoning changes, a conditional use permit, and a planned unit development for Frawley Ranches. After the commission approved the measures, opponents gathered signatures on a petition to reject them, but the commission refused to schedule a vote, asserting the petition was improperly formatted by combining multiple ordinances. Petitioners obtained a writ of mandamus from the circuit court ordering the vote, and the court denied Frawley's motion to intervene as a matter of right or permissively, though it allowed Frawley to participate as amicus curiae. The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the petition met statutory requirements for form and signatures, that mandamus was appropriate to compel the election, and that any error in denying intervention caused no prejudice because Frawley was heard on the merits.

electionspropertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved Juanita Enger, who was determined to be permanently and totally disabled due to work-related injuries sustained while employed at FMC, a defense contractor. After prior rulings established her disability status, Enger petitioned for a total lump sum payment of her worker's compensation benefits, a partial lump sum to cover attorney fees, and an adjustment to unpaid benefits owed. The Department of Labor denied all requests, the circuit court affirmed the denials of total lump sum and unpaid benefits but reversed on the partial lump sum for fees, and the South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed that outcome. The court reasoned that a total lump sum was not in Enger's best interests under the applicable 1983 version of SDCL 62-7-6 because it would replace the reliable periodic income stream intended by the worker's compensation system, whereas a partial lump sum for attorney fees was justified to enable payment of legal representation given her financial circumstances.

labor & employment