Pardon Tillinghast

The case involved members of a beneficial association petitioning for a writ of mandamus to compel their reinstatement after being suspended for refusing to pay an assessment of $14 per week to aid unemployed members. The court overruled the association's demurrer and issued the writ, finding the assessment illegal under the association's rules and bylaws. The core reasoning was that article 7 limited such payments to $10 per week and did not permit the excess amount under the category of necessary expenses, that members could rely on these limits until properly changed, and that petitioners were not required to first seek relief from the board of directors because that body only handled matters referred by districts rather than individual grievances.

labor & employmentprocedure

In Tefft v. Lewis, taxpayers in Hopkinton, Rhode Island, sued to enjoin collection of a tax assessed under a 1903 state law that abolished school districts and transferred their property to towns, requiring an appraisal of that property followed by a town-wide tax to equalize values with remittances to former district taxpayers. The plaintiffs, from a joint school district spanning two towns, argued the appraisal omitted their district's property, making the resulting tax assessment unauthorized and invalid. The court held that the tax was illegally assessed because the statute mandated a complete appraisal of all vested property as a prerequisite, and an incomplete appraisal could not support a valid levy or remission process. It rejected defenses including estoppel, noting the assessors' actions deviated from statutory requirements in a way that unequally burdened certain taxpayers. The court permanently enjoined collection of the tax.

taxespropertyprocedure

This case was a trespass action brought by the plaintiff to recover damages after being bitten by the defendant's dog on a public highway in Pawtucket. The District Court awarded the plaintiff $25 in damages plus costs, but the defendant moved to arrest judgment, arguing a variance between the writ (styled as trespass) and the declaration (which allegedly sounded in trespass on the case by omitting allegations of force and arms). The court overruled the motion, reasoning that any such defect was purely formal and curable under broad statutory amendment powers, that the plaintiff had the statutory option to proceed in either trespass or case for this type of claim, and that the pleadings were consistent enough in form to allow amendment rather than dismissal. The case was remanded to permit the amendment and entry of judgment on the prior decision.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involves a bill for instructions regarding the disposition of trust property held under the will of Harriot O. Baker after the death of her daughter, the life beneficiary. The will directed that the remainder be turned over to the Fourth Baptist Church to be held as a fund, with income used for the benefit of the church and advancing the cause of religion in the Regular Baptist Denomination. The court held that the charitable trust was valid despite questions about the existence and organization of the named church corporation at relevant times. It reasoned that equity will not allow a valid charitable trust to fail for want of a competent trustee and that the respondent corporation, Trustees of the Fourth Baptist Church in Providence, was suitable to serve in that role. The court therefore instructed the trustee to convey the property to that corporation to be held for the purposes specified in the will.

property

The case involved a negligence action brought by the plaintiff against the defendant for fatally injuring the plaintiff's intestate, a railroad worker, when lumber fell from a car the defendant was unloading. The defendant demurred to the declaration, arguing that it failed to allege any specific act of negligence by the defendant in the unloading process. The court sustained the demurrer, holding that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply because the risks were obvious and not hidden, and that the declaration did not sufficiently plead negligence on the part of the defendant in unloading the lumber, as the lack of ties or braces was the responsibility of the shipper, not the defendant.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a dispute between a worker and his employers over the agreed daily wage rate for stone-carving and modeling services under an employment contract, with the plaintiff claiming a higher rate than the defendants paid. The trial court allowed the defendants to withdraw a plea of tender before jury selection, the jury resolved conflicting testimony about the wage terms and awarded damages accordingly, and the plaintiff did not object at trial to the lack of a statutory affidavit of defense. The Supreme Court denied the petition for a new trial, holding that the plea withdrawal caused no prejudice to the plaintiff, the jury properly decided the factual issues, and the plaintiff had waived his rights regarding the affidavit by proceeding without objection.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved a petition for a writ of mandamus by an applicant who twice failed examinations before the State Board of Registration in Dentistry and was denied a license; she sought court-ordered inspection of her exam papers by outside dentists and, if warranted, an order compelling the board to issue her a certificate. The court sustained the board's demurrer and dismissed the petition. It held that the board's duties under the governing statute include discretionary judgment on standards, questions, and evaluations, giving its actions a judicial character, and that the statute provides no appellate or supervisory role for the court over such decisions. Mandamus may compel performance of a ministerial duty that has been refused but cannot be used to review or reverse how the board exercised its discretion.

procedurebusiness & regulatoryhealthcare

The case concerned whether, in a trustee attachment proceeding under Rhode Island statute, a person other than the named trustee could file the required sworn account of any attached personal estate and whether such an affidavit could be filed after the statutory deadline. The court held that both actions were impermissible, ruling that the affidavits filed by the trustee's bookkeeper and later by the trustee himself were nullities and that the lower court's determination to the contrary was erroneous. The opinion interpreted Gen. Laws cap. 254, § 10 as limiting the affidavit to the specific person served as trustee and requiring filing by the entry day or within six days thereafter, with no judicial authority to extend the deadline or substitute another filer. Because the proceeding is purely statutory, the court concluded it could not be enlarged beyond the plain statutory language, and no valid disclosure having been made, the trustee remained subject to the statutory consequences.

procedure

The case involves the construction of the will of William A. Fiske, who died in 1904, leaving his estate to his wife for life with powers to use principal, and upon her death, one-half to her appointees or heirs and one-half to his brothers. Since the wife predeceased the testator, the court was asked whether parts of the estate passed to the wife's heirs or the brothers, or became intestate. The court held that one-half of the estate passed to the wife's heirs at law under the third clause, and the other half to the testator's brothers under the fourth clause. The reasoning was that the testator's clear intent was to divide the estate equally between the two families, the wife's life estate lapsed due to her prior death accelerating the remainders, and the will should be construed to avoid partial intestacy.

propertyfamily law

The case was a negligence action brought by a plaintiff injured when a rotten, unsafe rain-trough projecting over a public sidewalk fell on him along with snow and ice. The building was owned by defendant Anthony, who had leased it to defendant Lederer Realty Corporation before the accident while the trough was already in a dangerous condition; both defendants demurred, with Anthony arguing the lease relieved her of any duty to maintain the premises. The court held that where a public nuisance of continued existence exists on demised premises, the lessor and lessee may both be liable to a person lawfully using the sidewalk who is injured by it, overruled the defendants' demurrers, sustained the plaintiff's demurrer to Anthony's special plea based on the lease, and remanded the case.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

The case involves Amos D. Palmer's petition for release from Butler Hospital for the Insane, where he was committed after being acquitted of murdering his wife by reason of insanity. The court had previously ordered a trial by court rather than jury and now denies the petition after reviewing evidence from a commission of physicians and expert testimonies. The commission concluded that Palmer remains insane with defective moral sense and imperfect self-control, recommending continued restraint for his and the public's safety. Despite conflicting expert opinions and some improvement in his physical health, the court finds the evidence insufficient to establish that Palmer is sane or safe to be released, given his history and the prior unanimous finding of insanity at the time of the crime.

criminal lawhealthcarecivil rights

This case involved a civil lawsuit by plaintiff McDonald against the Rhode Island Company, apparently concerning personal injuries, in which the defendant appealed evidentiary rulings and sought a new trial. During the original trial, the court excluded a hypothetical question posed by the defense to the plaintiff's expert witness because it rested on facts not yet in evidence; the appellate court upheld this exclusion, noting that while discretion exists, the better practice is to require supporting evidence first to avoid prejudice. The court also found newly discovered evidence to be merely cumulative and insufficient to warrant a new trial. However, it concluded that the jury's damages award was excessive and granted a new trial on that issue unless the plaintiff agreed to remit the amount above $5,000 within ten days.

proceduretorts & liability

This case is a divorce petition in which a dispute arose during the taking of a deposition from a physician who had treated the defendant. The physician objected to answering questions about the defendant's medical condition on grounds of privilege, but a single justice of the court ruled that communications to physicians are not privileged in Rhode Island and ordered the witness to testify. The respondent then petitioned the full court for a new trial of that evidentiary issue. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review or reverse the single justice's decision on this incidental matter arising in a divorce case, as the single justice constitutes a quorum for such proceedings and the statute provides no mechanism for further review.

family lawprocedure

This case concerned whether a plaintiff in a negligence action against a railroad could recover statutory counsel fees after recovering a $5,000 verdict. The plaintiff had issued an initial writ before serving the required written notice of claim but never entered that writ in court; after serving notice, he issued a second writ that proceeded to judgment. The court allowed $500 in counsel fees under the statute. The court held that the statute's notice requirement applies to the suit actually prosecuted to judgment, that the unentered first writ was a nullity leaving the parties' rights unaffected, and that the defendant received the statutory opportunity to investigate before incurring any risk of paying counsel fees. The exception to the fee allowance was therefore overruled.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involves a wife's petition to annul her 1882 marriage on the ground that her husband had a prior living wife from whom he was not divorced, with the wife claiming she was unaware of this fact until filing. The court addressed a motion for temporary support, counsel fees, and expenses during the proceeding, despite the respondent's argument that no such relief was available because the marriage was void from the start. The court held that Rhode Island's divorce statutes (Gen. Laws cap. 195, §§ 1 and 14) authorize such allowances in annulment cases, as the law classifies proceedings to declare a marriage void as divorce petitions and makes no distinction based on the ground asserted. It reasoned that a de facto marriage existed, a statutory decree was required to resolve it, and temporary relief stands on the same footing as in other divorce matters, while distinguishing this from permanent alimony or dower rights that require a valid marriage. The motion was granted for further hearing on the amount.

family law

This case involved a trespass and ejectment action by the property owner to recover possession of real estate after the defendant defaulted on an installment purchase agreement. The plaintiff had sent a letter offering to treat the defendant as a month-to-month tenant paying rent, which the defendant accepted by making one payment before ceasing all further payments. The court held that the defendant forfeited rights under the original contract but became a tenant by accepting the new terms, and because rent was in arrears for more than fifteen days, the plaintiff could pursue eviction without additional statutory notice under Gen. Laws R. I. cap. 269, § 7. The jury verdict for the plaintiff was upheld on these grounds, as the defendant had no remaining rights under either agreement.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned a railroad brakeman injured when he fell through a cut-out corner of a platform box car while signaling between cars at night inside a covered bridge, leading to the loss of his leg; he sued the railroad for negligence in using an allegedly dangerous car design. The majority of the court held that the plaintiff could not recover, ruling as a matter of law that he was contributorily negligent for attempting to step between cars without using the running-board. The core reasoning was that the undisputed facts showed a clear failure to exercise ordinary prudence under the circumstances, making the issue one for the court rather than the jury despite two prior jury verdicts favoring the plaintiff and evidence that the car type was not in common use elsewhere.

torts & liabilitylabor & employmentprocedure

This case involved a claim of medical malpractice against a physician for the treatment of a patient's broken thigh bone, which resulted in a slight shortening of the leg. The court determined that the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff could not be sustained. The core reasoning was that the great weight of expert testimony established that the defendant's treatment met the standard of care ordinarily possessed by average physicians in the locality, and that physicians do not guarantee perfect results but must exercise reasonable skill and judgment. Therefore, the verdict was against the evidence, and a new trial was granted.

torts & liabilityhealthcare

The case involved a plaintiff who had sold interests in a saloon business to the defendant Ferdinando in exchange for cash and promissory notes, after which Ferdinando transferred the business to co-defendant Carlo to allegedly avoid payment on the notes. The plaintiff filed a bill in equity seeking to enjoin further transfers of the saloon or its license and to set aside the conveyance as fraudulent. The court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the bill. It reasoned that an adequate remedy existed at law through an action on the notes, including possible attachment or arrest, and that a creditor's bill to challenge a fraudulent conveyance cannot proceed until a judgment at law has been obtained and execution returned unsatisfied.

procedureproperty

This case concerned a passenger injured by stones thrown by a large crowd during a labor strike against the defendant railroad while riding on one of its streetcars in Pawtucket. The majority opinion affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant, ruling that the motorman had no legal duty to anticipate danger from the crowd or to take protective actions such as stopping or warning passengers. In dissent, Justice Tillinghast contended that the evidence of the ongoing strike, the governor's proclamation, and the visible crowd of 700-1000 people raised factual questions about foreseeability that should have been submitted to the jury. The core reasoning was that a common carrier owes passengers the utmost care when circumstances indicate peculiar danger from third parties, and whether those conditions existed here was not a question of law but one for jury determination under precedents like Boss v. Prov & Wor. R. R. Co.

torts & liabilitylabor & employment