Maureen McKenna Goldberg

This case involves a putative class-action lawsuit by plaintiffs Nicholas T. Long and Julianne Ricci against Dell, Inc. and related entities, alleging that Dell improperly collected Rhode Island sales tax on optional service contracts and shipping/handling charges for computers purchased in 2000, in violation of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act and common-law negligence. The defendants sought review via certiorari of the Superior Court's denial of their motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that tax disputes must proceed through administrative channels or the District Court with prepayment requirements. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the motion, holding that the Superior Court has jurisdiction because the claims are framed as DTPA and negligence actions rather than direct tax refund claims, and remanded the case for trial.

taxesbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerns a same-sex couple, married in Massachusetts, who sought a divorce in Rhode Island Family Court after meeting the state's residency requirements. The Family Court certified a question to the Rhode Island Supreme Court asking whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction under state law to grant divorces in such cases. The Supreme Court declined to answer the certified question at that time, instead remanding the matter to the Family Court to compile a factual record addressing issues such as where the marriage license was obtained, where the parties were domiciled, whether solemnization occurred, and whether domicile and residence requirements were met. The court also directed the Family Court to determine in the first instance whether an actual case or controversy exists, whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause applies, and whether the federal Defense of Marriage Act is relevant, while requiring the certified question to be reworded for clarity.

family lawprocedure

In State v. Casas, the defendant was convicted of possessing between one ounce and one kilogram of cocaine and possessing it with intent to deliver after police stopped his truck based on tips from informants linking him to drug storage at a Providence address. The Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed the conviction and vacated the judgment, ruling that the initial stop lacked adequate reasonable suspicion, the defendant was immediately placed in custody without Miranda warnings, and his consent to search the vehicle was not voluntary due to coercive circumstances including being boxed in by police cars and prolonged detention. The court concluded that these constitutional violations required suppression of the evidence, including cash found on the defendant.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case concerned an action to quiet title to streets and roadways located on a historic wharf in Newport harbor, including North Commercial Wharf, Scott's Wharf, and a connecting way. Plaintiff Newport Realty, Inc., the record owner of abutting land, argued that the roads were private rights-of-way created for the benefit of lot owners and that it therefore held fee title to them. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed extensive historical evidence of conveyances dating to the eighteenth century, original plats, and decades of public use and municipal actions such as abandonments. The court concluded that the roads had been dedicated to public use through incipient dedication, as the plats and deeds showed no intent to create private ways and the public had accepted the offer by continuous use for over eighty years.

propertyprocedure

In State v. Davis, the defendant appealed his convictions for assault with a dangerous weapon with intent to rob and breaking and entering a dwelling, arguing that the trial justice erred by denying a motion for new trial on grounds that the jury was not required to unanimously agree whether he acted as a principal or an aider and abettor. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of conviction. The court held that when a jury is properly instructed on alternative theories of criminal participation and unanimously finds guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it need not also unanimously specify the manner of participation. The court distinguished this case from prior decisions involving duplicitous indictments or unclear verdicts, noting that the jury here returned clear guilty verdicts on two distinct counts of the indictment and acquitted on the others.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a retired Warwick police officer challenging the city's decision to end supplementary payments covering medical expenses for on-the-job injuries after disability retirement, despite prior assurances from city officials. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief under the state Injured on Duty statute, as well as a promissory estoppel claim based on a 1979 letter and other representations promising continued coverage. The trial court rejected the statutory claims because the city's adopted pension plan controlled and did not require the extra benefits, but it granted individual relief on promissory estoppel after finding detrimental reliance. The Supreme Court reviewed the parties' cross-appeals but confined its analysis to the named plaintiff alone.

labor & employmenthealthcare

This case concerned a dispute over possession of a house purchased by parents for their son and daughter-in-law, along with claims for compensation related to renovations made during the marriage. After the couple separated, the parents sought to evict the former daughter-in-law, who counterclaimed for title or equitable relief under theories including promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, and constructive trust. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the judgment granting possession to the parents and upheld most aspects of the award for litigation costs and attorney's fees, while reversing and adjusting the calculation of compensation for the value of improvements. The court's reasoning emphasized that no gift or ownership promise was made to the daughter-in-law, that the occupancy was a rent-free tenancy terminable at will, and that equitable recovery for improvements was limited by the owners' consent and the absence of any deduction for use and occupation.

propertyfamily law

The case involved plaintiff Mary Seide, who was seriously injured when her car was struck by a stolen flatbed truck that was fleeing a high-speed police pursuit involving multiple departments across Rhode Island highways. Seide sued the State of Rhode Island, various police departments, and individual officers, alleging negligence in deciding to initiate and continue the chase and in failing to follow reasonable pursuit policies. The trial court granted judgment as a matter of law for the defendants, but the Rhode Island Supreme Court sustained Seide's appeal and vacated that judgment. The court reasoned that state law imposes a duty on emergency vehicle drivers to avoid reckless disregard for others' safety, the public duty doctrine does not bar liability here, and the evidence of the prolonged wrong-way chase created a jury question on recklessness that precluded judgment as a matter of law.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved Edward Plunkett, a state employee terminated in 2001, who first sued the State of Rhode Island for wrongful termination and lost after the Superior Court and Supreme Court ruled he served at the pleasure of the Chief Justice. While that appeal was pending, Plunkett filed a second Superior Court action alleging age and disability discrimination under the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act. The State moved for summary judgment on res judicata grounds, arguing the discrimination claim could and should have been raised in the first suit based on identical facts. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, held that res judicata barred the second action because Plunkett had multiple opportunities to preserve or add the claim but failed to do so, and directed entry of judgment for the State.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involved a dispute between the Rhode Island Department of Corrections and the Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers over whether a correctional officer from one bargaining unit could grieve the state's hiring of a non-union applicant for an adult counselor position covered by a different unit's collective bargaining agreement. The union sought to confirm an arbitration award that found the grievance arbitrable under the master agreement as adopted for the professional unit via a memorandum of agreement, while the state moved to vacate the award. The Superior Court confirmed the award, but the Supreme Court reversed and vacated it, holding that the dispute was not arbitrable. The court reasoned that the grievant was not covered by the applicable agreement for the position, the arbitrator had misquoted key contract language regarding vacancy-filling rights from other units represented by Council 94, and an arbitration award must be grounded in the contract between the parties.

labor & employment

This case concerned a landlord's suit against a corporate tenant for unpaid rent, utilities, and related costs under a month-to-month lease for commercial property. At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the trial justice sua sponte added three new defendants—an unincorporated business and two individuals doing business as that entity—and allowed the case to proceed against them. The Supreme Court vacated the resulting judgment, concluding that the addition of parties violated the rules governing amendments to pleadings and joinder, as the new defendants had not been named in the original or amended complaints and there was no express or implied consent to try claims against them.

procedure

This case concerned a dispute over the calculation of a suspension period for weekly workers' compensation benefits under R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-35-58 after an injured employee recovered damages from a third-party tortfeasor. The employee had received a jury award from Stop & Shop for a workplace injury, paid attorney's fees, costs, and a workers' compensation lien from the gross recovery, and sought to have the suspension period based on the net amount rather than the gross. The trial court and Appellate Division ruled that the statute required using the gross recovery to determine the length of the suspension. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, reviewed the statutory language de novo, and quashed the Appellate Division's decree, concluding that the term 'excess damages' in the statute refers to the net recovery after deducting fees and costs.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a challenge to a will executed by James Pollard shortly before his death, in which he left his estate to his nephew and the nephew's wife. The plaintiff, the decedent's brother, appealed from probate court approval of the will, claiming the decedent lacked testamentary capacity due to cognitive issues following a stroke. A jury agreed with the plaintiff and invalidated the will, but the Superior Court granted the defendants a new trial, finding the verdict against the weight of the evidence from witnesses, medical professionals, and nursing home staff who described the decedent as alert and communicative around the time of execution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice properly weighed the testimony showing no delusions or incapacity affecting the will and that the decedent's hearing issues did not prevent effective communication or understanding.

family lawproperty

In State v. Martini, the defendant was charged with disorderly conduct as a domestic violence offense under Rhode Island's Domestic Violence Prevention Act, with the state seeking enhanced felony penalties based on his two prior domestic violence convictions. The defendant moved to dismiss the information, arguing that disorderly conduct is classified as a petty misdemeanor under G.L. 1956 § 11-1-2 and thus exempt from the misdemeanor-based sentencing enhancements in § 12-29-5(c). The Superior Court granted the motion to dismiss, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, holding that penal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the defendant and that the plain language of the enhancement provision applies only to offenses punishable as misdemeanors, not petty misdemeanors. The court rejected the state's arguments based on the DVPA's definitional provisions and legislative intent, emphasizing that the statute's text controls over broader policy considerations.

criminal law

This case concerned whether insurance policies issued to the Town of Cumberland required the insurers to indemnify the town for a $1.6 million settlement of an underlying federal civil rights lawsuit brought by developers whose subdivision applications were denied after the town changed its zoning ordinances. The trial court granted summary judgment to the town on its claims for declaratory relief and breach of contract, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court held that the policies were ambiguous because their definitions of covered "personal injury" included intentional torts while their definitions of "occurrence" appeared to require unintentional acts, and under settled rules of construction the ambiguity was resolved in favor of coverage. It further reasoned that the settlement compensated only for compensatory damages arising from due process violations and tortious interference, not punitive damages or inverse condemnation, so no policy exclusions applied.

civil rightspropertyproceduretorts & liability

This case involved post-divorce proceedings to enforce a property settlement agreement between former spouses Paul and Georgia Andrukiewicz regarding division of the husband's municipal pension benefits. The Family Court ruled that the wife was entitled to receive the first $583 per month of the husband's pension starting from his 'normal retirement date,' defined as the date he became eligible to retire after twenty years of service, and ordered both retroactive and prospective payments. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the agreement's language was unambiguous and that 'normal retirement date' referred to the eligibility date prescribed by the pension plan rather than the date the husband elected to actually retire and begin collecting benefits. The court relied on the plan documents, testimony from town officials, and the fact that the agreement incorporated but did not merge into the divorce decree, preserving its contractual terms under Rhode Island law. The husband's arguments regarding ambiguity, inequity, and laches were rejected.

family lawproperty

This case involved a class action by purchasers of Lincoln Benefit Life Company's Saver’s Index Annuity against the insurer, alleging breach of contract over the setting and notification of the annual Index Participation Rate and cap applied to the annuity's value. The contract required Lincoln to 'declare' the rate and cap each year and to send annuitants an annual report within 30 days showing the new figures; Lincoln set the 1998 figures via internal email but initially mailed an erroneous annual report listing higher numbers before sending a corrected report without highlighting the changes. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to Lincoln, but the Supreme Court held that an internal email did not constitute a 'declaration' to policyholders and that the corrected report failed to provide proper notice, entitling plaintiffs to judgment on their declaratory judgment and breach of contract claims. The Court affirmed class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) but reversed certification under Rule 23(b)(3).

business & regulatoryprocedure

In State v. Jaiman, the defendant appealed his Superior Court convictions for murder, conspiracy to murder, and felony assault arising from a 1993 drive-by shooting in Central Falls in which his cousin was the actual shooter. The appeal centered on the second trial, where the cousin, testifying under a plea agreement, claimed memory loss and failed to repeat his prior statements implicating the defendant, leading the trial court to admit portions of the cousin's earlier police statement as a prior inconsistent statement under Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A). The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, reasoning that the witness remained subject to cross-examination within the meaning of the rule despite his claimed memory failure, as he was sworn, testified, and was extensively questioned about the events, his prior testimony, and his plea deal, consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Owens.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the Rhode Island Attorney General's attempt to enforce a civil investigative demand (CID) under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) against an attorney who purchased and sold residential properties at tax auctions, based on a complaint that he failed to disclose lead paint contamination as required by the Lead Poisoning Prevention Act. The Superior Court dismissed the CID, ruling that the DTPA did not apply due to a statutory exemption for activities regulated by other state agencies. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the exemption in G.L. 1956 § 6-13.1-4 covers conduct subject to monitoring by the Department of Health under the Lead Poisoning Prevention Act, similar to prior precedents involving regulated insurance sales and asbestos abatement. The court rejected arguments that a savings clause in the lead paint statute preserved DTPA remedies, as the CID was specifically tied to violations of the regulated lead disclosure requirements.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case involved the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (DEM) assessing a $20,070 administrative penalty against the Nickerson respondents for regulatory violations related to the improper maintenance of underground gasoline storage tanks on property they owned from 1994 to 1997. The respondents appealed the penalty to Superior Court under the Administrative Procedures Act, arguing they should not be liable because their brother solely operated the property. The Superior Court consolidated the appeal with a separate civil enforcement action, heard new testimony about post-hearing cleanup efforts, and vacated the penalty despite finding no errors in the agency's decision. The Rhode Island Supreme Court quashed the Superior Court judgment, holding that the APA confines judicial review to the certified administrative record and prohibits consideration of new evidence or equitable grounds to override a valid agency decision supported by competent evidence.

environmentprocedureproperty