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Eads v. Borman
Oregon Supreme Court · 2012-04-26 · cited 40×
In this case, plaintiff David Eads sued Willamette Spine Center, LLC (a landlord leasing office space to medical providers) along with a surgeon and others after the surgeon negligently performed spinal surgery, causing permanent injuries. Plaintiff sought to hold the LLC vicariously liable on an apparent agency theory, based on the building signage and other representations suggesting the surgeon was part of a group medical entity affiliated with the LLC. The trial court granted summary judgment to the LLC, the Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed as well. The court held that vicarious liability on an apparent agency theory requires the injured party to have reasonably believed, based on the putative principal's own conduct or representations, that the medical professional was the principal's employee or subject to its control in providing the services. The record was insufficient to support such a finding here.
torts & liabilityhealthcare
Rasmussen v. Kroger
Oregon Supreme Court · 2011-10-06 · cited 6×
This case involved petitioners challenging the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 15 (2012), which would phase out Oregon's estate, inheritance, and certain intra-family property transfer taxes. The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed whether the ballot title substantially complied with ORS 250.035(2) requirements for captions and yes/no vote result statements. The court held that the title failed to accurately describe the measure's subject matter and effects, as it did not clearly indicate that current law taxes only estates valued at $1 million or more and that a no vote would retain that threshold. The court referred the ballot title to the Attorney General for modification of the caption and result statements to better reflect the scope of the proposed changes and existing tax scheme, while also noting a need to update the summary due to recent legislation.
taxeselections
State v. Lopez-Minjarez
Oregon Supreme Court · 2011-08-25 · cited 48×
This case involved charges against defendant Petronilo Lopez-Minjarez for crimes including first-degree burglary, second-degree assault, first-degree kidnapping, felony murder, and aggravated murder, arising from the abduction and killing of a teenager whose father was having an affair with the defendant's mother. The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed whether the trial court erred in giving Uniform Criminal Jury Instruction 1052 on aiding and abetting, which states that a defendant can be held liable for any crime that is a natural and probable consequence of a crime the defendant aided. The court held that the instruction misstates Oregon law on accomplice liability and that the error was prejudicial with respect to the assault, felony murder, and aggravated murder convictions because the jury could have convicted based on an incorrect theory that the defendant was responsible for his father's independent actions. However, the error did not prejudice the burglary and kidnapping convictions. Accordingly, the court reversed those three sets of convictions, affirmed the others, and remanded for further proceedings.
criminal lawprocedure
McDowell v. Employment Department
Oregon Supreme Court · 2010-08-05 · cited 29×
In this unemployment compensation case, a probationary teacher was placed on administrative leave after showing a film clip with profanity to his class without required preapproval, then resigned after being advised he would be recommended for discharge and that an appeal to the school board would likely fail. The Employment Department initially denied benefits on misconduct grounds, but the Employment Appeals Board found no misconduct yet determined the separation was a voluntary quit without good cause, denying benefits; the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, concluding the claimant voluntarily left work with good cause because a reasonable person facing imminent discharge and limited practical alternatives, including the union advice and statutory hearing rights that offered little realistic prospect of success, would have resigned rather than await discharge.
labor & employment
State v. Lennon
Oregon Supreme Court · 2010-04-08 · cited 11×
This case involved a defendant convicted by jury of unlawful delivery of methamphetamine, after which the trial court imposed an upward departure sentence of 80 months based on its own findings regarding the defendant's extensive criminal history and the failure of prior sanctions to deter him, rather than submitting those facts to a jury. The Court of Appeals twice held that this was plain error under Blakely and Apprendi and exercised its discretion to remand for resentencing. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding that even assuming plain error occurred, the Court of Appeals should not have corrected it because the record showed no legitimate debate that the departure factors were met, making any new jury proceeding unnecessary. The court affirmed the original sentence, noting that other issues raised were not preserved.
criminal lawprocedure
McCollum v. KMART CORP.
Oregon Supreme Court · 2010-02-19 · cited 9×
This case arose from a personal injury lawsuit in which a jury returned a verdict for defendant Kmart, and the trial court later entered judgment in its favor. Plaintiff moved for a new trial, and the trial court signed an order granting the motion along with a letter opinion, but the order was not entered in the court register until 59 days after judgment. The Court of Appeals initially addressed timeliness and then reversed the new-trial order on the merits, leading to plaintiff's petition for review. The Oregon Supreme Court held that ORCP 64 F(1) requires a motion for new trial to be heard and determined within 55 days of judgment, that the letter opinion did not qualify as an effective order because it was not entered in the register as such, and that the motion was therefore deemed denied by operation of law; accordingly, the court vacated the Court of Appeals decision, vacated the new-trial order, and remanded with instructions to reinstate the judgment for defendant.
proceduretorts & liability
Weems v. Board of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision
Oregon Supreme Court · 2010-02-04 · cited 14×
The case concerned whether the Oregon Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision could impose special sex-offender conditions on post-prison supervision for two individuals convicted of drug crimes, based on their prior arrests and charges involving sexual offenses even though those charges had not resulted in convictions. The board had imposed conditions restricting contact with minors, requiring polygraph testing, and mandating sex-offender treatment, relying on the petitioners' full criminal histories and risk assessments. The court held that the board has authority to consider an offender's complete criminal history and personal background when setting supervision conditions rather than being limited to the facts of the current conviction. It further concluded that the records adequately supported the specific conditions in each case and affirmed the Court of Appeals decisions upholding the board's orders.
criminal lawprocedure
Northwest Natural Gas Co. v. Department of Revenue
Oregon Supreme Court · 2010-01-28 · cited 11×
The case concerned whether Northwest Natural Gas Company, a centrally assessed utility under ORS 308.505 to 308.665, could claim the business inventory exemption from ad valorem property taxation for its stored natural gas reserves and retail appliances under ORS 307.400. The Oregon Tax Court ruled that the exemption applied despite central assessment, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed that decision. The court interpreted the exemption statute as applying broadly to the inventory of all taxpayers, including those subject to central assessment, because its language covers tangible personal property held for sale without exception for centrally assessed companies. Legislative history showed no intent to exclude such entities, and the central assessment provisions in ORS chapter 308 did not override the general exemption in ORS chapter 307.
taxes
Young v. Hill
Oregon Supreme Court · 2009-10-01 · cited 26×
This post-conviction case involves petitioner Young, who pleaded guilty to computer crime and later sought relief claiming the indictment failed to allege a crime because it did not specify 'fake' identification cards, resulting in ineffective assistance of counsel and an invalid plea. The trial court dismissed the petition as meritless under ORS 138.525 for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, holding that subsection (3) of the statute bars appeals from judgments dismissing meritless petitions. The core reasoning was that the statute plainly prohibits appeals of such dismissals when the petition fails to state a claim, regardless of whether the judgment explicitly labels the petition 'meritless,' and legislative history confirms this intent to limit appeals in represented cases.
criminal lawprocedure
Interstate Roofing, Inc. v. Springville Corp.
Oregon Supreme Court · 2009-10-01 · cited 22×
This case concerns the procedural requirements for a limited judgment to be considered final and appealable under Oregon law, specifically whether the judgment document must contain an express finding of 'no just reason for delay' or words of adjudication to conclusively resolve claims. Plaintiff Interstate Roofing brought claims for lien foreclosure, breach of contract, and quantum meruit against defendant Springville, which asserted counterclaims; after a bifurcated trial, the circuit court entered a limited judgment resolving some but not all issues. The Court of Appeals had dismissed part of the appeal as untimely after finding the limited judgment final only as to certain claims, but on review the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that the limited judgment document, when read as a whole, unambiguously disposed of the three claims addressed despite lacking some formal recitals, while other aspects of the appeal could proceed from later judgments.
procedure
State v. Ainsworth
Oregon Supreme Court · 2009-07-23 · cited 22×
This case concerns a mother's attempt to appeal a trial court judgment holding her in contempt for failing to pay child support, after she missed the 30-day appeal deadline due to lack of proper notice of the original judgment's entry. The trial court granted her motion to enter an amended judgment nunc pro tunc to allow a timely appeal based on an attorney's affidavit detailing service irregularities. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, relying on Far West Landscaping v. Modern Merchandising. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court had authority to amend the judgment under ORCP 71 and its inherent powers to correct judgments for oversight or omission, even though legislative changes to the ORCP did not alter the Far West precedent.
procedurefamily law
State v. Parkins
Oregon Supreme Court · 2009-06-25 · cited 123×
In this criminal case, defendant was convicted after a bench trial of first-degree kidnapping and six counts of first-degree sexual abuse, among other charges, based on an incident in which he locked an 11-year-old victim in a bedroom and sexually abused her. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion, but the Oregon Supreme Court allowed review on two issues: whether the evidence supported the kidnapping conviction under ORS 163.225(1)(b) because the victim was not secretly confined in a place where she was not likely to be found, and whether the six sexual abuse convictions should merge. The court held that the kidnapping conviction could not stand because the victim's sister knew her location and rattled the doorknob, and that the sexual abuse convictions merged into three because they reflected different legal theories for the same three acts. The court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with those holdings.
criminal law
State v. Gaines
Oregon Supreme Court · 2009-04-30 · cited 1741×
The case involved a defendant who was convicted of obstructing governmental or judicial administration under ORS 162.235(1) after she orally refused three times to comply with a jail officer's orders to go to the booking area for a frontal photograph, following an initial booking process in which she had resisted fingerprinting and other procedures. The trial court denied her motion for judgment of acquittal, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Oregon Supreme Court reversed the conviction and the lower court's decision. The court held that a person's mere failure to act or oral refusal to comply with a lawful directive, without more, does not constitute a means of physical interference or obstacle within the meaning of the statute, based on the statutory text requiring intimidation, force, or physical or economic interference, as well as the legislative history and context distinguishing passive non-cooperation from active obstruction.
criminal law
State v. Davis
Oregon Supreme Court · 2008-12-31 · cited 82×
This case involved the 2005 conviction and death sentence of Michael Andre Davis for two counts of aggravated murder stemming from 1991 killings at a Portland motel. After a lengthy preindictment delay, the trial court denied motions to dismiss for delay, to allow defense counsel to withdraw, for a mistrial over a prosecutor's reference to an absent witness, and to admit a police report; the jury convicted and the court imposed death. On automatic review, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the preindictment delay did not violate due process, that substitution of counsel was properly denied where the breakdown appeared manufactured, that any improper opening-statement reference was cured by instructions, and that exclusion of the police report was harmless or not error. The court rejected the remaining assignments of error and upheld the convictions and sentence.
criminal lawprocedure
Peeples v. Lampert
Oregon Supreme Court · 2008-08-14 · cited 389×
In this post-conviction case, the petitioner filed a second petition after his first was dismissed without prejudice when he refused to proceed at trial. The post-conviction court dismissed the second petition as a sanction after the petitioner refused to participate in a scheduled deposition, without making the special findings required by Pamplin v. Victoria. The Court of Appeals divided on whether the lack of findings could be raised for the first time on appeal, and the Oregon Supreme Court held that such a challenge is subject to ordinary preservation rules. Because the petitioner did not object to the absence of findings before the judgment was entered, the court affirmed the dismissal. The decision rests on the principle that parties must preserve claims of error when an opportunity to do so exists under the rules governing entry of judgments.
criminal lawprocedure
Yugler v. Myers
Oregon Supreme Court · 2008-05-30 · cited 2×
The case involved a challenge to the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 17 (2010), which would require Oregon judges to instruct juries that they have a right and duty to judge both facts and law and may disregard instructions or the law if following them would produce an unjust verdict. Petitioner argued that the caption and 'yes' vote result statement were inaccurate and misleading because they implied jurors currently possess or would gain such a right, contrary to existing law under which juries have only the power (not a right) to nullify. The court agreed that the caption and result statement failed to substantially comply with ORS 250.035(2) by suggesting the existence of a right that does not currently exist and whose creation by the measure is debatable, while finding the summary adequate. It therefore referred the ballot title to the Attorney General for modification.
electionscriminal law
State v. Evans
Oregon Supreme Court · 2008-03-27 · cited 23×
In this criminal case, defendant was charged with robbery, burglary, unauthorized use of a vehicle, and assault after allegedly encouraging friends to attack a former roommate. During voir dire, a prospective juror disclosed in front of the panel that she had an outstanding stalking order against defendant, leading defense counsel to move for a mistrial on grounds that the remark tainted the remaining prospective jurors and violated defendant's right to an impartial jury under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution. The trial court denied the motion, finding the comment not egregious enough to require a mistrial, and offered a curative instruction that defense counsel declined to request. The Court of Appeals and Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the isolated comment was not inherently prejudicial and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the panel could still decide the case impartially based on the evidence and instructions. The courts emphasized that mere exposure to potentially biasing information does not automatically disqualify jurors absent a showing they cannot set aside preconceptions.
criminal lawprocedure
Farr v. Myers
Oregon Supreme Court · 2007-12-28
The case involves a challenge to the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 1 (2010), a statutory proposal that would impose minimum educational and training requirements for performing 'high velocity, low amplitude' spinal manipulations and adjustments, with violations treated as unlawful chiropractic practice subject to license discipline by health professional boards. The court reviewed the ballot title under ORS 250.085(5) to determine substantial compliance with ORS 250.035(2) and referred the title back to the Attorney General for modification. The core reasoning was that the summary inadequately described current law by generically referencing statutes and rules without explaining that regulatory boards currently set training standards, and it failed to clearly convey the measure's major effect of shifting authority to establish minimum requirements for spinal manipulations across various health professions beyond just chiropractors and athletic trainers.
electionshealthcare
Engweiler v. Board of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision
Oregon Supreme Court · 2007-12-13 · cited 27×
This case involves certified questions from a federal district court in three habeas corpus proceedings brought by individuals convicted as adults of aggravated murder committed when they were juveniles under age 17 and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Oregon Supreme Court addressed the petitioners' statutory eligibility for parole and the applicability of Board of Parole rules, including divisions 30 and 32 of the administrative rules and the effect of statutes such as ORS 163.105 and ORS 161.620 as amended in the 1980s. The court concluded that the board's division 32 rules for aggravated murder apply, requiring a 30-year minimum period of confinement before parole consideration, and that no special exemption or matrix system from division 30 alters that timeline for these offenders. It further held that the board's later-adopted JAM rules are consistent with the governing statutes and that prior inconsistent applications to other juveniles do not bind the board. The reasoning centered on the text and history of the sentencing statutes, the board's rulemaking authority, and the absence of any provision exempting juvenile aggravated murderers from the mandatory minimum framework.
criminal lawprocedurefederal power
Johnson v. Swaim
Oregon Supreme Court · 2007-11-23 · cited 16×
In Johnson v. Swaim, the plaintiff prevailed in a small claims tort action for personal injuries and property damage from a motor vehicle accident and then sought attorney fees under ORS 20.080(1). The Oregon Supreme Court addressed whether the plaintiff had made a timely written demand for payment at least ten days before filing the complaint and whether the defendant had waived that statutory requirement. The court determined that none of the plaintiff's letters or phone contacts satisfied the pre-filing demand rule, as the formal demand letter was sent only one day before the complaint was filed. It further held that the defendant's later settlement offer referencing the statute did not waive compliance with the demand prerequisite. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Court of Appeals and reversed the trial court's attorney fee award.
torts & liabilityprocedure