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Staveland and Fisher
Oregon Supreme Court · 2019-12-27 · cited 7×
This case concerns the dissolution of a nonmarital domestic partnership between Staveland and Fisher, focusing on whether Staveland was entitled to half the appreciated value of the house they shared. The trial court awarded Staveland 50 percent of the appreciation based on the parties' intent to share it as a couple, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Oregon Supreme Court clarified that a trial court's finding of the parties' express or implicit intent regarding property in domestic partnership dissolutions is reviewed as a question of fact, and held that the record contained evidence supporting the trial court's intent determination. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals on other grounds but reversed the general judgment and remanded for recalculation of the property division while vacating the supplemental judgment.
family lawproperty
Department of Human Services v. J. R. F.
Oregon Supreme Court · 2012-02-16 · cited 15×
This case concerns a juvenile court order in a dependency proceeding requiring a father not to interfere with visits between his daughter D, a ward of the court removed due to alleged abuse, and her half-siblings living in his home. The Court of Appeals upheld the order under ORS 419B.337(3) as part of broader statutory authority to promote the child's best interests and family reunification. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding that the record from the review hearing—showing limited details on family dynamics, no current contact wishes between D and father, and only general reports of D's desire to see siblings—was inadequate to support such an order. The court emphasized that any statutory authority must be construed in light of parents' due process rights to direct their children's upbringing, as recognized in ORS 419B.090(4), and vacated the order for further proceedings.
family lawcivil rightsprocedure
Carson v. Kroger
Oregon Supreme Court · 2012-01-12
This case involves challenges by petitioners to the ballot title certified by the Oregon Attorney General for Initiative Petition 22 (2012), a proposed constitutional amendment that would establish a 'right to life' for all human beings from fertilization onward, with limited exceptions, and thereby prohibit abortion, certain contraceptives, embryonic stem cell research, and some fertility treatments. The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed whether the ballot title's caption, 'yes' and 'no' vote result statements, and summary substantially complied with the requirements of ORS 250.035(2). The court determined that the title was deficient, particularly in its use of vague or loaded phrasing like 'right to life' and 'full legal rights of a person,' its failure to adequately describe retained rights or the measure's full effects if approved or rejected, and its incomplete summary of impacts on current law. As a result, the court referred the ballot title to the Attorney General for modification to address these issues.
abortionelections
State v. GLUSHKO
Oregon Supreme Court · 2011-11-10 · cited 38×
The case concerned two consolidated criminal prosecutions in which defendants Glushko and Little moved to dismiss charges under ORS 135.747 after delays of more than eight years between the filing of charges and trial. The statute requires dismissal if a defendant is not brought to trial within a reasonable time unless the delay resulted from the defendant's application or consent. The Oregon Supreme Court held that a defendant's mere failure to appear at a scheduled hearing does not constitute consent to delay within the meaning of the statute. It nevertheless concluded that the delays were reasonable because each defendant had been notified of the hearing, knew that nonappearance would trigger suspension of proceedings and issuance of a warrant, and remained in control of when the cases would resume. The court therefore affirmed the denial of the motions to dismiss.
criminal lawprocedure
BALBOA APARTMENTS v. Patrick
Oregon Supreme Court · 2011-10-06 · cited 13×
This case involved a landlord-tenant dispute in which Balboa Apartments filed a forcible entry and detainer (FED) action against tenant Lisa Patrick for nonpayment of rent. After an error in the initial service of the summons and complaint, the landlord filed an amended complaint and served it on the correct unit more than seven days before the scheduled first appearance, but not within one judicial day of paying the filing fee as specified in ORS 105.135(3). The tenant moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction due to the timing of service, but the trial court denied the motion, awarded possession to the landlord, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Oregon Supreme Court held that the statute's one-day service requirement did not mandate dismissal where the tenant received the required notice well before the hearing date, as the provision's purpose is to ensure adequate opportunity to respond rather than to create a jurisdictional bar for minor timing deviations.
propertyprocedure
State v. Cloutier
Oregon Supreme Court · 2011-09-22 · cited 233×
In this criminal case, defendant pleaded no contest to misdemeanor driving under the influence, entered a diversion program, and later received a $1,100 fine after failing to complete the program; he appealed, arguing that the trial court unconstitutionally increased the fine because he exercised his right to plead no contest, violating due process. The Court of Appeals initially considered the appeal under ORS 138.050(1)(a), which permits review of sentences that exceed the maximum allowable by law. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute confers no appellate jurisdiction here because the fine was well below the statutory maximum of $6,250, and claims of unconstitutional sentencing procedures do not qualify as exceeding the maximum allowable by law. The court reasoned that the phrase refers only to sentences beyond legislatively set limits, not constitutional challenges, which must instead be pursued through post-conviction relief, and that a broader reading would conflict with the statute's text, context, and history.
criminal lawprocedure