Rives Kistler

In State v. Keys, the defendant was charged by information with possessing methamphetamine, and his appointed counsel waived the right to a preliminary hearing at arraignment. On appeal, the defendant argued that the waiver was not knowing as required by Article VII (Amended), section 5 of the Oregon Constitution, and that this defect deprived the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction, allowing the issue to be raised for the first time on appeal. The Oregon Supreme Court held that an invalid waiver of a preliminary hearing does not deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction under the state constitution. The court reasoned that the constitutional provision requires a knowing waiver but does not classify such a defect as jurisdictional, distinguishing it from other unique rights that need not be preserved. Accordingly, the court reversed the Court of Appeals decision—which had treated the issue as jurisdictional—and remanded the case for consideration of whether the unpreserved claim could be reached as plain error.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Jarnagin, the Oregon Supreme Court reviewed a pretrial order suppressing evidence in a murder prosecution arising from the death of an infant. The parties did not dispute that officers violated the defendant's state constitutional rights by questioning him at the police station and hospital without Miranda warnings. The court held that statements the defendant made at his home the following day were the product of those violations and must be suppressed, but that statements made before and after a polygraph examination later that day were sufficiently attenuated and admissible. The decision affirmed the trial court's suppression order in part and reversed it in part, focusing on the causal connection between the initial unwarned questioning and the later statements.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves two petitioners challenging the Oregon Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 28, which proposes raising the corporate tax rate on income over $10 million from 7.6% to 10% starting in 2013. The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed whether the ballot title substantially complies with statutory requirements under ORS 250.035(2). The court found that the ballot title's use of the term "income" is misleading because it does not distinguish between different types of corporate income subject to taxation, such as gross income versus taxable income or profits. Accordingly, the court referred the ballot title to the Attorney General for modification to use more precise language.

taxeselections

The case centers on plaintiffs Zidell's petition under ORS 742.061 to recover attorney fees incurred in appellate proceedings in an insurance coverage dispute against defendant insurers London. The court allowed the petition and awarded $40,858.50 in fees for work before the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court. It reasoned that a 2005 amendment to the statute does not apply to actions filed before its effective date, that fees may be recovered for work establishing the insurers' duty to defend as well as preparing the fee petition itself, and that certain billing entries required reduction due to unsuccessful claims for indemnification-related fees.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves the automatic direct review of a death sentence imposed on defendant Brumwell after a jury found him guilty of aggravated murder for killing a fellow inmate while serving a prior life sentence for two other murders committed during a 1994 convenience store robbery. The primary issues on appeal concerned the trial court's admission, during the separate penalty-phase hearing, of evidence about the defendant's prior interest in satanism and death metal music as it related to his earlier crimes. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence of death, holding that the evidence was relevant under the state's evidence rules to the penalty-phase questions of future dangerousness, culpability, and character because it helped explain the motives for the prior violent acts. The court further concluded that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice and that neither the federal First Amendment nor the Oregon Constitution's religion provisions barred its admission in this context.

criminal lawfree speechreligious liberty

This case involves a petition for reconsideration filed by defendants in an insurance coverage dispute, ZRZ Realty Co. v. Beneficial Fire & Casualty Insurance, concerning the allocation of the burden of proof under express fortuity policies for determining whether property damage was expected or intended by the insured. The Oregon Supreme Court had previously found error in the trial court's assignment of that burden and remanded for further proceedings with instructions on whether to supplement the record or rely on existing findings. Defendants raised concerns that the remand language could prevent a successor judge from hearing live testimony after the original trial judge's death. The court rejects two grounds for reconsideration without discussion but modifies its prior opinion to clarify that the trial court retains discretion to take additional live testimony on remand if warranted, while otherwise adhering to the opinion as modified.

procedurebusiness & regulatoryproperty

The case concerned whether a county tax assessor could later add the value of site developments (such as grading, roads, utilities, and foundations) to a taxpayer's land already listed on the assessment roll, treating those developments as omitted property under ORS 311.216. The assessor had inspected the property, used trending to value the land without separately accounting for the developments, and only later sought to increase the land's assessed value by roughly $1 million. The Tax Court ruled for the taxpayer, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because ORS 307.010(1)(a) defines land to include site developments, the failure to value them constituted an undervaluation of property already on the roll rather than the omission of property.

taxesproperty

This case concerns a dispute between Zidell, a ship dismantling company, and its insurers over coverage for environmental property damage caused by pollutants released into the Willamette River and surrounding land during business operations from the 1950s to 1980s. The Court of Appeals had ruled that Zidell bore the burden of proving damages were unexpected and unintended under policies with express fortuity limitations, but that insurers bore the burden under policies with an implied fortuity limitation; it also held that protection and indemnity policies did not cover damage to the riverbed. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the burden-of-proof allocation but reversed on the riverbed coverage issue, holding that the broad language covering damage to "any * * * other fixed or moveable thing whatsoever" included the riverbed. The core reasoning centered on interpreting policy language regarding fortuity requirements and the scope of indemnification promises, leading to a remand for further proceedings on certain claims.

business & regulatoryenvironmentpropertyprocedure

This case involved homeowners Beth and Tim Dewsnup who suffered water damage to their personal property after removing wood shakes from their roof during repairs and covering the plywood sublayer with secured polyethylene plastic sheeting, which was then partially blown away by wind, allowing rain to enter. Their insurance policy excluded water damage except when wind created an opening in a roof, but the insurer denied the claim, arguing the plastic was not a roof and alternatively that faulty workmanship caused the loss. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer on the ground that removing the original roof meant the dwelling was no longer covered, and the Court of Appeals affirmed on the different ground that the plastic sheeting did not qualify as a roof. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ordinary meaning of roof does not require permanency as a matter of law and that whether the plastic sheeting constituted a roof under the policy presented a factual question for the jury that could not be resolved against the homeowners on summary judgment.

property

In State v. Baker-Krofft, the Oregon Supreme Court considered whether parents could be convicted of first- or second-degree criminal mistreatment under ORS 163.205 and ORS 163.200 for maintaining homes with clutter and potential safety hazards, such as fire risks or choking items, even though their children were healthy and well-fed. The trial courts and Court of Appeals had upheld convictions on the ground that failing to address environmental dangers amounted to withholding necessary physical care. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statutory term "physical care" refers to providing services directly needed to maintain a dependent person's bodily health, such as hygiene or repositioning to prevent bedsores, and does not extend to correcting household safety hazards. The court's reasoning rested on the plain meaning of the statutes' wording, which separates "physical care" from duties to provide food or medical attention and does not encompass affirmative obligations to remove potential dangers in the home environment.

criminal law

The case concerned an employment contract dispute in which the employer, after participating in litigation for months, sought to compel arbitration under the agreement's terms but had its petition denied by the trial court on grounds of undue delay and waiver. The employer appealed from the final judgment in favor of the employee rather than filing an immediate appeal, and the Court of Appeals ruled it lacked jurisdiction to review the arbitration order. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, holding that ORS 36.730 makes an interlocutory appeal the exclusive means to challenge an order denying a petition to compel arbitration, so the order could not be reviewed on appeal from the general judgment.

procedure

The case concerned an employee with a debilitating medical condition who obtained an Oregon registry identification card authorizing medical marijuana use to treat symptoms; after disclosing the card and use to his employer, a steel fabricator, he was discharged when he could not pass a drug test for permanent employment, prompting a disability discrimination complaint under ORS 659A.112 for failure to provide reasonable accommodation. The Oregon Supreme Court held that the employer was not required to accommodate the employee's medical marijuana use. The court reasoned that although the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act exempts qualifying cardholders from state criminal liability, the federal Controlled Substances Act prohibits all marijuana possession and use with no medical exception, so state employment discrimination law does not compel employers to accommodate conduct that remains unlawful under federal law.

labor & employmentcriminal lawfederal powerhealthcare

The case concerned whether defendant’s fourth-degree assault on the victim rose to a felony under ORS 163.160(3)(c) because her minor child “directly perceive[d]” the assault, which occurred in a hallway and doorway outside the child’s closed bedroom door. The trial court convicted defendant of the felony after finding the evidence sufficient, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statutory term requires conscious recognition of the assault and that the proof was inadequate. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, interpreting “directly perceive” to mean the child was conscious of and recognized the assaultive conduct; it held that a reasonable trier of fact could infer such perception from the loud sounds of yelling, the headbutt, and the victim’s cry that could be heard through the door despite the television volume. The court therefore reinstated the felony conviction.

criminal lawfamily law

In State v. Southard, the defendant was convicted of sodomy counts after the trial court admitted a physician's medical diagnosis that a child had been sexually abused, based on the child's statements, reported behaviors, and history but without physical evidence of abuse. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, ruling the diagnosis inadmissible as scientific evidence. The court explained that while the diagnosis process followed established protocols, its probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk that jurors would overvalue the expert's ultimate conclusion on the central issue of whether abuse occurred, analogous to the treatment of polygraph results under OEC 403.

criminal lawprocedure

Plaintiffs sued in federal district court under ERISA, alleging defendants fraudulently induced them to enter an employee benefit plan and seeking rescission or a constructive trust; the district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cognizable ERISA claim. Plaintiffs then filed parallel state-law fraud claims in Oregon circuit court arising from the same facts. The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants on claim preclusion and statute-of-limitations grounds, and the Court of Appeals affirmed on claim-preclusion grounds. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding that claim preclusion did not bar the state claims because the federal dismissal did not adjudicate their merits and that ORS 12.220 permitted plaintiffs to refile their action within the statutory window after an involuntary dismissal without prejudice.

procedurelabor & employment

The case concerned whether the Pacific States Marine Fisheries Commission, an entity created by an interstate compact among Oregon, Washington, and California to advise on fishery conservation, qualified for an Oregon property tax exemption on leased office space under ORS 307.090 as a "public * * * corporatio[n] in this state." The Tax Court denied the exemption on the ground that the commission was not a public corporation. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the denial but on different grounds, holding that the commission is a public corporation yet is not "in this state" because the compact establishes it as a multistate body that continues until dissolved by its member states. The court interpreted the statutory phrase "in this state" to limit eligible entities to those formed under or operating within Oregon's jurisdiction.

taxesproperty

The case involved a defendant charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm after his guest placed a gun on the counter in the defendant's trailer. The trial court and Court of Appeals found sufficient evidence of constructive possession based on the defendant's entries into the trailer and attempt to retrieve the gun, leading to a conviction. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence did not establish that the defendant had possession, custody, or control over the guest's gun. The court reasoned that mere ownership of the premises where the gun was temporarily left, without more, does not constitute constructive possession, and the defendant's actions did not transfer control of the specific firearm to him.

criminal lawguns

In State v. Baker, the defendant pleaded guilty to multiple counts of second-degree sexual abuse and incest under a plea agreement and received a 180-month prison sentence. He appealed, arguing that the sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate under Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, holding that ORS 138.050(1) allows appeals from guilty pleas only on grounds that the sentence exceeds the maximum allowable by law or is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual, and that a proportionality claim did not fit either. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, ruling that a claim of unconstitutionally disproportionate sentencing falls within ORS 138.050(1)(b) because both the Eighth Amendment and Article I, section 16, treat proportionality as part of the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The court remanded the case for further proceedings without addressing the merits of the constitutional claim.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a landlord-tenant dispute in which the landlord brought claims for breach of the rental agreement and waste, while the tenants asserted counterclaims for unlawful entry, ouster, unlawful disposition of personal property, and unlawful debt collection practices. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded the landlord $345 on its breach claim and the tenants $1,396 on two of their counterclaims, designated both sides as prevailing parties, and denied attorney fees to either. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Oregon Supreme Court reversed and remanded, ruling that the trial court erred in denying fees entirely based on the parties' conduct and the relative size of their claims, and that it must instead apply the factors in ORS 20.075 when exercising discretion over attorney fees under ORS 90.255 for the fee-generating claims on which each party prevailed.

propertyprocedure

This case involves appeals by defendant Forrest Clayton Norman from two Oregon trial court convictions. The Supreme Court granted a motion to sever the appellate cases, dismissed the petition for review in one (trial court number 031183), and remanded it for resentencing based on the Court of Appeals' prior opinion. In the remaining case (trial court number 031199), the court allowed the petition for review, vacated the Court of Appeals decision, and remanded for reconsideration in light of State v. Ramirez and State v. Fults.

criminal lawprocedure