Thomas A. Balmer

This case concerned whether statements made by defendant to a fellow inmate, Layman, while both were in custody should have been suppressed because Layman acted as a state agent in violation of defendant's right to counsel under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution. Defendant was convicted of aggravated murder and other crimes based in part on Layman's testimony, but the trial court had denied a motion to suppress after finding insufficient evidence of state agency. The Court of Appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed that decision, holding that by the end of Layman's second proffer meeting with prosecutors the state's offer of benefits in exchange for information, combined with its implicit guidance on topics of interest, provided enough encouragement and direction to render Layman a state agent. As a result, defendant's admissions to Layman after that date were obtained in violation of his right to counsel and should have been excluded, leading to reversal of four convictions and remand for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a petitioner seeking post-conviction relief from three of her seven criminal convictions on the ground that they were obtained through nonunanimous jury verdicts in violation of the Sixth Amendment rule announced in Ramos v. Louisiana. The post-conviction court denied relief on that claim, but the Supreme Court reversed that denial as to the three challenged convictions and remanded for further proceedings, while affirming the denial of other claims or deeming them moot. The court reasoned that, under its decision in Watkins v. Ackley, a conviction based on a nonunanimous verdict constitutes a substantial denial of a constitutional right that renders the conviction void under ORS 138.530(1)(a), even if the conviction became final before Ramos was decided, unless a procedural defense applies.

criminal lawprocedure

In Huggett v. Kelly, the petitioner sought post-conviction relief from two convictions obtained by nonunanimous jury verdicts, asserting claims of inadequate assistance of counsel and a violation of the Sixth Amendment jury unanimity requirement established in Ramos v. Louisiana. The post-conviction court denied relief, ruling that Ramos did not apply retroactively to convictions that were already final. On appeal, certified to the Oregon Supreme Court, the court reversed that denial and remanded the case, holding that under its decision in the companion case Watkins v. Ackley, a conviction based on a nonunanimous verdict constitutes a substantial denial of a constitutional right that renders the conviction void and entitles the petitioner to relief under ORS 138.530(1)(a), absent any procedural defenses. The petitioner's remaining claims were deemed moot in light of the resolution of the Ramos-based claim.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a petition for post-conviction relief from four felony convictions that had been obtained through nonunanimous jury verdicts. Petitioner argued that those convictions violated the Sixth Amendment rule announced in Ramos v. Louisiana, which requires unanimous verdicts for criminal convictions, and sought retroactive application of that rule even though the convictions were already final. The post-conviction court denied relief, but the Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding that a Ramos violation constitutes a substantial denial of a constitutional right that renders the conviction void under ORS 138.530(1)(a). The court reasoned that the statutory post-conviction framework requires relief for such constitutional violations unless a procedural defense is raised and sustained, regardless of whether the conviction was final before Ramos was decided. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In this case, taxpayers appealed an Oregon Department of Revenue income tax assessment to the Tax Court but sought to avoid the statutory prepayment requirement under ORS 305.419 by claiming that payment would cause undue hardship. The Tax Court found their financial affidavit insufficient, ordered additional documentation, and dismissed the appeal when taxpayers neither provided the documents nor paid the tax. On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the Tax Court properly found the taxpayers had failed to establish undue hardship and that the statute limits "undue hardship" to financial hardship resulting from payment of the assessed tax. The court rejected the taxpayers' argument for a broader interpretation of the term that would include non-financial grievances such as alleged unfair treatment by the department.

taxesprocedure

The case arose from a Family Abuse Prevention Act proceeding in which the relator sought a restraining order against her husband and introduced video evidence from a dash camera showing her communications with a certified advocate. The trial court granted the respondent's motion to compel production of the entire memory card containing those videos as well as all other advocate-victim communications, relying on an asserted exception to the certified advocate-victim privilege and the rule of completeness. The relator petitioned for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the privilege under OEC 507-1 protected the communications and that the discovery request was overbroad under ORCP 36. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had misapplied the privilege exception and that no legal basis supported compelling production of the unaltered memory card, rendering the order an abuse of discretion. The court therefore issued a peremptory writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate the discovery order.

family lawprocedure

In State v. Thompson, the defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery and other crimes after police seized his cell phone without a warrant at a hospital following a robbery and shooting, retained it for five days, obtained a search warrant, and used data from the phone during questioning that produced statements admitted at trial. The Oregon Supreme Court held that the five-day warrantless retention of the phone was unreasonable and violated Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. The court also determined that the defendant had adequately preserved his objections to derivative evidence. However, the court affirmed the conviction, concluding that admission of the evidence was harmless error because the statements were not prejudicial in light of other unchallenged evidence and arguments at trial.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a challenge to final orders by the Department of Human Services finding reports of child abuse by petitioner against his two children to be 'founded,' based on a 'reasonable cause to believe' standard under agency rules. The circuit court applied a probable cause standard after developing a record through trial and sustained only two of four determinations, while the Court of Appeals applied a different standard and sustained three. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding that three of the founded determinations were supported by substantial evidence because the record permitted a reasonable person to find a reasonable basis for believing the abuse had occurred. The court reasoned that evidence questioning the reliability of DHS's information must be considered but that the circuit court's statements about flaws in the investigation process were not relevant to the substantial evidence review.

family lawprocedure

The case involved a request under Oregon's public records law for four documents prepared over 25 years ago by the Portland City Attorney for city officials, which the city claimed were exempt as attorney-client privileged communications. The trial court ruled the records exempt from disclosure, but the Court of Appeals reversed, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed that decision. The court held that ORS 192.390 requires disclosure of public records more than 25 years old without exception for the attorney-client privilege under OEC 503, as the statute's text provides that such records shall be available for inspection. It further concluded that this interpretation does not violate the city's home-rule authority under the Oregon Constitution. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

procedure

This case arose after defendant Billy Lee Oatney Jr. received use and derivative use immunity during the initial investigation of an aggravated murder, but the state shared part of his immunized statement with associate Johnston, who then provided information, pleaded guilty, and testified against Oatney in his first trial. Following post-conviction relief that found trial counsel ineffective for not moving to suppress Johnston’s testimony as derived from the immunity agreement, the case was remanded for retrial. The trial court issued a pretrial order barring the state from calling Johnston to testify in violation of the immunity agreement if defense counsel, within the bounds of law and evidence, argues in opening or closing that Johnston or another person committed the crime or that the state failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Oregon Supreme Court held that ORS 138.045 authorized the state’s direct appeal of the order as one suppressing evidence in a murder case, and affirmed the order because such defense arguments do not open the door to the prohibited testimony.

criminal lawprocedure

In Eklof v. Persson, a petitioner convicted of aggravated murder sought to amend her second post-conviction relief petition a third time to add claims that the state had withheld exculpatory evidence regarding certain witnesses at her trial. The post-conviction court denied leave to amend after considering judicially noticeable facts showing some claims were barred by ORS 138.550(3) as successive petitions that reasonably could have been raised earlier, then granted summary judgment to the state; the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding that under ORCP 23 A the key factor for allowing amendments is prejudice to the opposing party, though futile amendments may be denied, and that courts may rely on judicially noticeable facts to assess futility. It determined that claims related to two witnesses were not futile while one was, and that the state had shown no meaningful prejudice, so denying leave to amend was an abuse of discretion. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned an initiative petition submitted to the Oregon Secretary of State that failed to qualify for the ballot after signatures from voters with inactive registrations were excluded. Plaintiffs challenged the exclusion, arguing that such voters remained qualified under Article IV, section 1 of the Oregon Constitution. The trial court granted summary judgment for the secretary, the Court of Appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals while affirming the circuit court judgment. The court held that only voters presently eligible to vote qualify to sign initiative petitions, and state statutes properly deem inactive registrants ineligible until their registration is updated. It concluded that the legislature's registration rules fall within constitutional authority and that the secretary correctly excluded the signatures.

electionscivil rights

The case concerned whether a hydroelectric water right associated with a dam unused for power generation since 1995, but periodically leased to the state for in-stream use, was subject to mandatory conversion to a permanent in-stream water right under ORS 543A.305(3). The Oregon Supreme Court held that the right must be converted because the five-year period of non-use for hydroelectric purposes had elapsed, and the leases did not prevent conversion. The court reasoned that the conversion statute requires actual use of water under the hydroelectric right itself, which means use for hydroelectric purposes, while leasing under the separate in-stream leasing statute (ORS 537.348) creates a different right and does not count as use under the original hydroelectric right. It therefore reversed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the trial court.

environmentproperty

The case concerned a challenge by Portland landlords to a city ordinance requiring relocation assistance payments to tenants displaced by certain rent increases or no-cause evictions, along with a private right of action for tenants to enforce violations. Plaintiffs argued the ordinance was preempted by ORS 91.225, which bars local governments from enacting measures that control rents, and exceeded the city's home-rule authority under the state constitution. The Oregon Supreme Court held that the ordinance did not control rents within the meaning of the statute because it imposed a conditional payment obligation rather than setting or limiting rent amounts directly, and that creating a cause of action was a valid exercise of home-rule power. Accordingly, the court concluded the ordinance was not preempted and affirmed the Court of Appeals decision upholding it, while vacating the trial court's judgment and remanding for further proceedings.

business & regulatoryproperty

Shareholders Joseph LaChapelle and James Field brought a derivative action on behalf of Deep Photonics Corporation against three of its directors, alleging breaches of fiduciary duty including the duty of care. After a jury trial resulted in a verdict and damages award for the plaintiffs, the defendants appealed, challenging the submission of the claims to a jury rather than the court and the trial court's denial of their midtrial motion to assert an exculpation defense based on a provision in the company's certificate of incorporation. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and the limited judgment, holding that Article I, section 17, of the Oregon Constitution entitled the plaintiffs to a jury trial on their claims for money damages. The court further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the late amendment because it would have prejudiced the plaintiffs by affecting their trial preparation and strategy after extensive proceedings.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerns an insurance company's civil action seeking equitable and statutory contribution from other insurers for claims payments and defense costs incurred on behalf of an insured trucking company. On petitions for reconsideration, the Oregon Supreme Court denied Con-Way's petition but granted those of Allianz and London, modifying its prior opinion to correct erroneous references to 'Freightliner' instead of 'Con-Way' as the party that entered side indemnification agreements with the insurers. The court clarified that while Con-Way separately agreed to indemnify the insurers, the underlying insurance policies themselves created duties to defend and indemnify for covered claims, leaving the insurers liable unless and until Con-Way performed. The opinion is adhered to as modified.

business & regulatory

This case arose after a resident and city councilor of Damascus, Oregon, challenged the validity of a 2016 voter measure, referred by the legislature via HB 3085, that sought to disincorporate the city using a simple majority rather than the absolute majority required by existing statutes. The Court of Appeals ruled the measure invalid on statutory grounds in an earlier decision, and the plaintiff then sought attorney fees. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' award of fees to the plaintiff under the equitable "substantial benefit" theory. The court reasoned that the plaintiff had acted in a representative capacity on behalf of the city's residents and all state residents by obtaining a ruling that clarified the legislature's authority to refer questions of local government structure to voters, thereby conferring a sufficiently substantial benefit to justify shifting fees. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings on the fee amount.

electionsprocedure

This case involved an insurance contribution dispute where Allianz, after paying damages and defense costs for its insured Daimler related to environmental liabilities from Freightliner (a company Daimler acquired), sought reimbursement from Freightliner's historical insurers under common law and Oregon's Environmental Cleanup Assistance Act. The trial court had dismissed some claims based on indemnification agreements and pollution exclusions in the policies, while denying a directed verdict on whether Daimler assumed Freightliner's liabilities. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that evidence supported the jury's finding that Daimler assumed the liabilities, that the insurers' duties to defend or indemnify must be determined solely from the insurance policy terms without regard to side agreements, and that the ambiguous pollution exclusion phrase "sudden, unintended[,] and unexpected" required the trial court to provide a legal interpretation to the jury rather than leaving it unresolved. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these rulings.

business & regulatoryenvironmentproceduretorts & liability

This case concerns a petition for attorney fees and costs following an earlier administrative rules challenge in which environmental organizations successfully invalidated rules adopted by the Energy Facility Siting Council regarding the review of requests for amendment to site certificates. Petitioners had raised five challenges (three procedural and two substantive) and prevailed on one procedural ground (failure to substantially comply with a statutory notice requirement) and one substantive ground (improper limitation on judicial review), leading to invalidation of the rules. The court awarded petitioners $31,633 in attorney fees under ORS 183.497 plus $541 in costs, holding that mandatory fees were required only for work on the substantive challenge because the council had acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law, while denying both mandatory and discretionary fees for the successful procedural challenge due to the council's reasonable arguments and good-faith efforts; fees were further limited to the discrete fee-generating claim and calculated at prevailing market rates.

environmentprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In State v. Morales, the defendant was convicted of sex offenses after a trial with court-appointed counsel, and the trial court ordered him to pay $5,000 in attorney fees drawn from $20,000 in pretrial security funds deposited by his mother, despite expressly finding that the defendant himself lacked the ability to pay. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and circuit court judgments, holding that funds deposited by a third party cannot, by themselves, satisfy the statutory requirement under ORS 161.665(4) that a defendant have the ability to pay such costs. The court reasoned that the security deposit remained the property of the third party and did not count as part of the defendant's financial resources absent evidence of donative intent or other circumstances making the funds fairly attributable to the defendant; therefore, once the trial court found no ability to pay, imposition of fees was error. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure