John F. Reif

This case involved a medical malpractice lawsuit brought by the family of a deceased child against several doctors and a hospital, resulting in jury verdicts for the defendants. After the trial, the plaintiffs learned that one juror had concealed racial bias against African Americans (the plaintiffs' race), misrepresented his views on the burden of proof during voir dire, and provided incomplete information about his criminal history on the juror questionnaire. The Oklahoma Supreme Court reviewed the denial of a new trial de novo and held that the juror's participation violated the plaintiffs' constitutional right to an impartial jury under Article 2, Section 19 of the Oklahoma Constitution, warranting a new trial against the two defendant doctors. The court emphasized that juror bias claims of this nature raise issues of constitutional dimension requiring independent review rather than deferential standards.

civil rightsproceduretorts & liability

This case involved medical malpractice claims by a plaintiff against providers who performed a prostate biopsy, diagnosed cancer, conducted surgery to remove the prostate, and provided post-surgical treatment. The trial court granted judgments for the defendants, including a jury verdict for the pathologist and summary judgments for others based on expert evidence of compliance with medical standards. On certiorari review, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the judgments except for the claim against the surgeon, holding that summary judgment was improper on the theory of failure to obtain informed consent for continued post-surgical treatment after the pathology showed no cancer in the removed prostate. The court reasoned that physicians have an affirmative duty to disclose material facts necessary for patients to make informed decisions about treatment, and the evidentiary materials did not rule out liability on this ground under established precedents like Scott v. Bradford.

healthcaretorts & liability

This case concerns an unclassified state employee who sued the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner for unpaid wages allegedly owed for on-call time under the Protection of Labor Act, seeking liquidated damages, costs, and attorney fees pursuant to 40 O.S. section 165.9. The federal district court certified the question of whether such an employee has a private right of action against the State under that section. The Oklahoma Supreme Court answered that the State is not included in the statutory definition of "employer" applicable to sections 165.1 through 165.11, precluding reliance on section 165.9 for the requested relief. The core reasoning relied on the plain statutory language, the Commissioner's administrative exclusion of state wage claims, and the distinction between administrative processes and actions at law.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case was a lawyer disciplinary proceeding brought by the Oklahoma Bar Association against attorney Gray Moore Strickland after he pleaded guilty in federal court to the misdemeanor of willfully failing to file his 2008 individual income tax return, for which he received five years of supervised probation and was ordered to pay $64,729.36 in restitution. The complaint alleged violations of Rule 1.3 of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings and Rule 8.4(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Following a hearing before the Professional Responsibility Tribunal that included evidence of mitigating factors, the Oklahoma Supreme Court conducted a de novo review and imposed public censure, finding that the attorney's broader pattern of unpaid taxes—including employment taxes from 2001-2007—amounted to serious misconduct that undermined public respect for the law and the legal profession, consistent with prior precedent, while noting that suspension was not warranted given his competence and need to meet restitution obligations.

criminal lawtaxes

This case involves a former McDonald's employee suing the company for intentional infliction of emotional distress after his manager allegedly denied three requests to take anti-seizure medication and called him a slur, causing the minor employee to fear a seizure and leave work in distress. The trial court granted summary judgment to McDonald's based on issue preclusion from a prior federal court ruling that dismissed the employee's ADA claims, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings, reasoning that the federal court had only determined the employee was not disabled—which ended its jurisdiction—and had not actually adjudicated whether the manager's conduct was extreme and outrageous under state tort law, an issue that reasonable people could find meets the threshold for the claim.

torts & liabilitylabor & employment

This case concerned the amount of support alimony awarded to the wife in a divorce after a 22-year marriage during which she had primarily cared for the children and had limited earning capacity as a birth certificate clerk. The trial court awarded the wife a total of $9,000 in support alimony, but on review the court held that this amount was insufficient and constituted an abuse of discretion. The appellate court found that the trial court had failed to properly weigh the relevant Oklahoma factors, including the length of the marriage, the significant disparity in the parties' earning capacities, the wife's demonstrated need for additional income to cover living expenses and pursue further education, and the husband's ability to pay given his higher income and assets. Based on those considerations, the court recalculated and increased the award to $54,000, payable at $1,500 per month for 36 months.

family law

The case concerned whether an Oklahoma statute, 68 O.S.Supp.2010 § 2817(L), that required personal property used in oil, gas, and mineral exploration (including drilling rigs) to be assessed annually at values from a specific industry bulletin violated the state constitution's mandate to assess all personal property at fair cash value. The county assessor obtained a declaratory judgment from the district court declaring the statute unconstitutional under Article 10, § 8(A)(1), and the oil rig owner appealed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute was invalid because it made the bulletin the sole and conclusive valuation factor, potentially divorcing assessments from actual fair market value. The court reasoned that while the legislature may classify property and prescribe valuation methods, those methods cannot exclude relevant market data such as recent arms-length sales, as established in precedents like Liddell v. Heavner and Bliss Hotel Co. v. Thompson.

taxesproperty

The case involved a plaintiff suing defendants for bad faith and negligence after they allegedly failed to pay the full deficiency on an auto loan following a total loss, contrary to the terms of a gap protection contract (deemed insurance in a prior appeal). The trial court granted summary judgment eliminating both theories, finding no bad faith because defendants did not believe the contract was insurance and no independent negligence duty existed apart from the contract. The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the elimination of negligence as a theory because any such duty is subsumed in the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but reversed on bad faith, holding that the contract created a special relationship (due to unequal bargaining power and risk elimination) that supports tort liability for breaching the implied duty, creating a jury question. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the bad faith claim.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerned Jami Lynn Stewart's application for reinstatement to the Oklahoma Bar after her 2002 suspension for failing to pay tax liabilities. The Oklahoma Bar Association and Professional Responsibility Tribunal had recommended denial, and an initial opinion had rejected reinstatement on the ground that the unpaid taxes reflected a continuing moral obligation despite their discharge in bankruptcy in 2006. On rehearing, the Oklahoma Supreme Court granted reinstatement, holding that 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) and the Supreme Court's decision in Perez v. Campbell prohibit any state licensing decision from considering a debt discharged in bankruptcy. The court found that Stewart had otherwise satisfied all reinstatement criteria, including remorse, compliance with suspension conditions, and legal competence, and that federal supremacy barred further inquiry into the discharged tax debt.

taxesfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

This case involved a challenge to the constitutionality of H.B. 2437, a bill enacted by the Oklahoma legislature concerning health insurance. The Oklahoma Supreme Court assumed original jurisdiction and ruled that the bill violated provisions of the state constitution (Okla. Const., Art. 5, Sections 33 B and D) governing the enactment of certain revenue measures. As a result, the court held that the bill could not be enforced. The decision was reached by a majority of the justices, with some concurring in part and others dissenting on grounds that the measure was a permissible fee rather than a tax requiring special legislative procedures.

healthcaretaxesbusiness & regulatory

This case involved a developer suing lot owners in small claims court for unpaid maintenance assessments under restrictive covenants, after which the owners filed counterclaims exceeding the small claims limit for breach of contract, fraud, and related issues concerning property improvements like a lake and gate. The case was transferred to the district court docket, where the developer prevailed on its claim and the counterclaims, leading the trial court to award attorney fees. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that attorney fees under 12 O.S.2001 § 1757(C) apply only to discretionary transfers under § 1757, not mandatory transfers required by § 1759 due to oversized counterclaims, and found no evidentiary basis for fees as sanctions under the bad faith exception to the American Rule or § 2011.1. Accordingly, the court reversed the fee award to the developer.

procedureproperty

This case involves a dispute between former spouses over whether the support alimony and child support provisions in their 2007 divorce decree could be modified. Husband Steven Parham sought modification based on changed circumstances under Oklahoma statutes, while Wife Patricia Parham argued that the decree was a consent decree that could only be altered by mutual agreement and that its language limited changes to specified termination events. The trial court granted summary judgment to the wife, treating the decree as non-modifiable without consent. On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed, holding that modification and termination are distinct concepts, that the decree did not expressly preclude statutory modification, and that the parties' agreement merged into a judgment subject to modification under the law, consistent with precedents like Dickason v. Dickason.

family law

This case was a disciplinary proceeding against Oklahoma attorney Rhett Henry Wilburn under Rule 7 of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct, triggered by his felony conviction for unlawful possession of Oxycodone and misdemeanor convictions for entering a building with intent to commit assault and battery and two counts of assault and battery on children. The Oklahoma Supreme Court conducted a de novo review of the record, which included evidence of prior discipline, the lawyer's substance abuse and mental health issues, misrepresentations to the Professional Responsibility Tribunal about hearing continuances, and his ongoing failure to seek treatment. The court held that the convictions and related conduct constituted clear and convincing evidence of unfitness to practice law and suspended the respondent from practice for two years and one day while ordering payment of costs. Reinstatement would require proof of continued sobriety. The ruling rested on the court's exclusive constitutional authority over attorney licensure and discipline.

criminal law

The case concerned whether weapons and related items found in a gun safe in the living room of a home could be forfeited after the owner was convicted of possessing marijuana with intent to distribute, where the marijuana itself was located in the master bedroom and kitchen. The State sought forfeiture under 63 O.S. § 2-503(A)(9), which allows seizure of weapons available to facilitate a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Act. The trial court ordered forfeiture of the safe and its contents, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed as to the weapons. The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State failed to show the required nexus between the weapons and the drug offense; the weapons were stored separately from the drugs, and their mere presence in the residence was insufficient to establish they facilitated the crime under the statute's facilitation requirement.

criminal lawgunsproperty

The case involved a dispute between the President Pro Tempore of the Oklahoma Senate, the Speaker of the Oklahoma House, and the Governor over the scope of the Governor's line-item veto authority under Okla. Const. Art. 6, § 12. Legislative leaders challenged the Governor's use of the veto on provisions in two general bills (S.B. 1323 and H.B. 2286) that added conditions or restrictions to previously appropriated funds, arguing it applied only to bills dealing exclusively with appropriations. The Oklahoma Supreme Court assumed original jurisdiction and issued a declaratory judgment holding that the Governor could exercise line-item veto power on any bill making appropriations that embrace distinct items, including those adding conditions to prior appropriations. The court reasoned that the constitutional text applies to "every bill... making appropriations... embracing distinct items," that the added restrictions materially affected the authorization for expenditure of state funds under Art. 5, § 55, and that the framers intended the Governor to have a role at every stage of the appropriations process with the Legislature's override as a check.

procedure

This case involved the estate of Eva June Crowell, who died from an asthma attack while incarcerated in the Cleveland County Jail, suing the county board of commissioners, the sheriff, and jail employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly delaying access to her inhaler in violation of her civil rights. The defendants sought summary judgment, arguing the delay did not amount to deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. The trial court and Court of Civil Appeals granted summary judgment to all defendants, finding no disputed facts on deliberate indifference. On certiorari, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed as to the sheriff and jail personnel, holding that evidentiary materials created material fact questions about the length of the delay and response circumstances that precluded summary judgment on the deliberate indifference issue, but affirmed summary judgment for the Board of County Commissioners because the record showed no legal basis for a claim against it.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved the estate of Eva June Crowell, who died from an asthma attack while incarcerated in the Cleveland County Jail, alleging that jail personnel unnecessarily delayed providing her inhaler after being notified of her distress, in violation of her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the delay did not constitute deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, supported by evidence that an employee arrived with the inhaler about four minutes after the emergency call. The trial court granted summary judgment, finding no triable issue on deliberate indifference despite possible negligence, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. On certiorari, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed as to the sheriff and jail personnel, holding that evidentiary materials raised disputed questions of fact regarding the timing and circumstances of the response that precluded summary judgment on deliberate indifference, but affirmed summary judgment for the Board of County Commissioners because no legal basis existed for a claim against it.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether Gregory Wilhoit could pursue a claim for wrongful conviction and imprisonment under Oklahoma's Governmental Tort Claims Act without first obtaining a formal determination of actual innocence via pardon or judicial relief. Wilhoit had been convicted of first-degree murder in 1987 based on bite-mark evidence, but the conviction was reversed on appeal in 1991 and the charges were dismissed in 1993 after the trial court sustained his demurrer to the evidence. The trial court and Court of Civil Appeals dismissed the suit because Wilhoit lacked a prior actual-innocence finding required by 51 O.S. Supp. 2003 §§ 154(B) and 156(H). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that claims arising before the statutes' May 23, 2003 effective date may proceed without such a prior determination if filed within the one-year window, provided the claimant presents evidence of innocence during the claims process and any subsequent litigation. The Court remanded for further proceedings, noting that Wilhoit's petition identified supporting forensic evidence and was timely filed.

criminal lawtorts & liabilityprocedure

Jerry Smith sued Pioneer Masonry for wrongful termination, alleging he was constructively discharged after complaining about racial harassment at work, including racial slurs and jokes. The trial court dismissed the Burk tort claim because Pioneer had fewer than fifteen employees, following the precedent in Brown v. Ford that tied the public policy of the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act to the Act's employee threshold. The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Act's public policy against racial discrimination can support a wrongful termination claim regardless of the number of employees. The Court reasoned that Brown was inconsistent with Tate v. Browning-Ferris, which recognized the Burk tort as a cumulative remedy for racially motivated discharges, and with later decisions that abandoned the adequacy-of-remedies test for status-based discrimination claims.

labor & employmentcivil rightstorts & liability

This case involved a class action lawsuit by working interest owners under joint operating agreements against an oil and gas operator and its marketing affiliate, alleging improper billing for well costs and failure to properly account for the market value of production due to marketing fees charged by the affiliate. The trial court certified a class of over 5,000 owners and approved a mediated settlement allocating $4.5 million to the well cost claims and $2 million to the marketing fee claims, which covered the price differential component but provided no separate recovery for fixed-percentage marketing fees. Two objectors appealed, arguing that the class was not cohesive because some members had not signed marketing election letters and that the settlement inadequately represented those with fixed-fee claims. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed under a strict scrutiny standard, but on certiorari review the court held that the proper standard is abuse of discretion and concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class or approving the settlement after a fairness hearing where no contrary evidence was presented.

business & regulatoryprocedure