Evelyn Lundberg Stratton

This case concerned whether an indictment for drug trafficking under Ohio law must specify the exact controlled substance involved or if identifying the drug schedule suffices. The defendant was charged with trafficking in a Schedule I or II drug, later identified as BZP, and moved to dismiss arguing the indictment was deficient for not naming the specific substance. The Ohio Supreme Court held that an indictment is sufficient if it names the schedule, as that fulfills the statutory requirements under R.C. 2925.03 and allows the defendant to obtain further details through a bill of particulars. The court reversed the appellate decision that had found the indictment inadequate and reinstated the convictions, noting that the defendant had actual notice of the alleged substance before pleading no contest.

criminal lawprocedure

The case Horvath v. Ish concerned a personal injury lawsuit arising from a collision between a skier and a snowboarder on a ski slope in Ohio, where the injured skier alleged negligence by the other participant. The Ohio Supreme Court held that participants in skiing and similar recreational activities assume the ordinary risks inherent in the sport, such as collisions with others, and thus cannot recover damages unless the other skier's conduct was reckless or intentional rather than merely negligent. The court reasoned that neither Ohio's ski safety statutes nor common law imposes a duty of ordinary care between skiers that would support a negligence claim, but instead applies the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk. It affirmed the appellate court's reversal of summary judgment but on different grounds, remanding the case for further proceedings on whether the defendant's actions met the recklessness standard.

torts & liability

In this case, employee Larry Hewitt sued his employer L.E. Myers Company for a workplace intentional tort after suffering an electric shock injury while working without protective rubber gloves and sleeves on a de-energized power line. Hewitt claimed that the employer's failure to require the gloves created a presumption of intent under R.C. 2745.01(C) by amounting to the deliberate removal of an equipment safety guard. The Ohio Supreme Court held that protective gloves and sleeves are personal items controlled by the employee, not equipment safety guards, which it defined as devices designed to shield the operator from a dangerous aspect of the equipment itself. The court further held that deliberate removal requires a decision to physically eliminate such a guard from the machine. It therefore reversed the judgment for Hewitt and entered judgment as a matter of law for the employer.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

The case involved disciplinary proceedings against Ohio attorney Stanlee E. Culbreath for multiple violations of the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct, including failures to properly maintain his client trust account and document a personal-injury settlement, making false statements to a third party about the settlement amount, and not fully cooperating with the bar association's investigation by delaying responses and document production. The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline found clear and convincing evidence of the violations and recommended permanent disbarment. Culbreath objected, arguing that his lack of cooperation was overstated and that mitigating factors such as personal tragedies and a medical diagnosis had not been adequately considered. The Supreme Court of Ohio imposed an indefinite suspension instead, with conditions for reinstatement including ethics training, a mental-health evaluation, completion of an OLAP contract, and supervised probation, based on precedents involving similar trust-account and cooperation violations while accounting for the mitigating circumstances.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved a challenge to a search warrant used to seize evidence from Lawrence Dibble's home in connection with allegations of inappropriate touching and voyeurism by a former student and another individual. The trial court granted Dibble's motion to suppress the evidence, finding that the police detective knowingly included false statements in the affidavit by referring to the adult woman as a "victim" when the acts were consensual. The court of appeals affirmed, but the Ohio Supreme Court reversed, holding that whether information in a search-warrant affidavit is false must consider the nontechnical language used by nonlawyers, and remanded for a new suppression hearing.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute between former partners Julie Rowell and Julie Smith over custody and visitation of a child born to Smith through artificial insemination. Rowell filed a petition in juvenile court under R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) seeking shared custody and temporary visitation after the relationship ended. The juvenile court issued temporary visitation orders in the child's best interest and held Smith in contempt for noncompliance, but the court of appeals reversed on jurisdictional grounds. The Ohio Supreme Court held that a juvenile court exercising jurisdiction under R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) may issue temporary visitation orders pursuant to Juv.R. 13(B)(1) during pending litigation and reinstated the trial court's orders.

family lawprocedure

The case involved a foreclosure action filed by PHH Mortgage Corporation against Michael Prater, leading to multiple scheduled sheriff's sales of the property that were withdrawn at PHH's request. After the Clermont County Sheriff's Office stopped mailing sale notices and instead directed parties to check a website, the property was sold to Scott Wolf on April 6, 2010, without PHH receiving direct notice. PHH moved to set aside the sale, arguing lack of proper notice, but the trial court and appeals court denied the motion. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed, holding that constructive notice via a sheriff's website does not satisfy due process requirements under the U.S. Supreme Court's precedents in Mullane and Mennonite when the party's address is known or easily ascertainable, as mail notice is a more reliable method reasonably calculated to inform interested parties.

propertyprocedurecivil rights

In State v. Niesen-Pennycuff, the defendant was charged with multiple felonies related to obtaining dangerous drugs and successfully completed a court-ordered intervention in lieu of conviction program, resulting in dismissal of the charges. She then applied to have her record sealed immediately, but the trial court denied the request and required a three-year waiting period under R.C. 2953.32(A)(1), a decision affirmed by the court of appeals. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that R.C. 2951.041(E) gives trial courts discretion to seal the record right away under R.C. 2953.52(A)(1) or to impose the waiting period. The court's reasoning centered on the fact that ILC avoids a conviction, so the statute governing sealing after convictions does not mandatorily control and instead permits judicial flexibility in applying the record-sealing procedures.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Maxwell White, convicted of aggravated murder for killing a state trooper in 1996 and originally sentenced to death. After a federal court vacated the death sentence in 2005, the issue was whether R.C. 2929.06(B), enacted in 1996 to allow a new jury to consider death again on resentencing, could apply retroactively even though the crime predated the statute. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the statute does apply retroactively, ruling that the legislature expressly intended such application and that the provision is remedial rather than substantive, so it does not violate the Ohio Constitution's retroactivity clause. The court further determined that the law permits a new penalty hearing in any capital case where a death sentence is set aside for legal error in the sentencing phase, irrespective of when the offense occurred.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a prior dismissal of a medical malpractice complaint for failure to attach the required expert affidavit of merit under Civ.R. 10(D)(2) barred refiling of the suit. The Troyers had refiled their claims against Dr. Janis after an earlier dismissal that was silent on prejudice, but the trial and appellate courts treated it as a dismissal with prejudice under Civ.R. 41(B)(3) and applied res judicata. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed, holding that the dismissal was an adjudication otherwise than on the merits and without prejudice by operation of law. The court reasoned that the explicit language of Civ.R. 10(D)(2)(d) controls over the general rule and permits refiling within the time allowed by the saving statute, R.C. 2305.19(A).

procedurehealthcaretorts & liability

The case concerned AT&T's application for a municipal income tax refund from Cleveland for tax years 1999 through 2002. After the Board of Income Tax Review partially granted the refund, AT&T appealed only the denial for 1999 to the court of common pleas, while the city tax administrator raised challenges to the refund for 2000-2002 in a brief without filing a separate notice of appeal. The common pleas court addressed all issues, but the court of appeals and ultimately the Ohio Supreme Court held that this was improper. The Supreme Court ruled that under R.C. 2506.01, each party seeking to reverse or modify an administrative decision must file its own notice of appeal to vest the court with jurisdiction over its claims.

taxesprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether police officers violated the Fourth Amendment by stopping a tow truck driver without a warrant after receiving a dispatch report that he was armed, suicidal, and headed to a specific address. The trial court denied the driver's motion to suppress the gun found in his vehicle and his statements, ruling that the stop fell under the community-caretaking/emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement, but the court of appeals reversed and suppressed the evidence. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the appellate decision, holding that the exception permits an officer to stop a person when there is a reasonable belief of an immediate need to protect life or prevent serious injury. The court reasoned that the detailed dispatch provided sufficient grounds for the officers to reasonably conclude that emergency aid was required, making the stop constitutional even without observed traffic violations or additional corroboration at the scene.

criminal lawcivil rights

The case concerned whether Robert Clifton could sue the Village of Blanchester for an alleged regulatory taking after the village annexed and rezoned adjacent land owned by J&M Precision Machining for general industrial use, which Clifton claimed diminished the value and enjoyment of his own nearby agricultural and residential property outside the village limits. Clifton sought to compel the village to initiate appropriation proceedings and pay just compensation. The Ohio Supreme Court held that a property owner lacks standing to bring a regulatory-taking claim against a municipality when the affected property lies outside the municipality’s corporate limits and therefore affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment dismissing the action. The court’s reasoning centered on the principle that a municipality’s zoning powers and corresponding takings liability do not extend to non-residents’ property beyond its boundaries.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In State v. Smith, the defendant pleaded guilty to forgery and was sentenced to community control with an order to pay court costs, but the trial court did not inform him, as required by R.C. 2947.23(A)(1), that failure to pay could result in community service. The court of appeals declined to review the notification issue on the merits, holding it was not ripe until the defendant actually failed to pay or the court imposed community service. The Ohio Supreme Court, addressing a certified conflict, held that the statute's mandatory notification requirement at sentencing makes the failure to notify ripe for immediate appellate review, regardless of whether nonpayment or community service has occurred. The court reasoned that the statutory language requiring notice "at the time the judge imposes sentence" creates a present obligation whose violation can be challenged without waiting for future events. It reversed the portion of the appellate decision and remanded for consideration of the assignment of error.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a workers' compensation claim by Guiseppe Gullotta against Akron Paint & Varnish after he injured his back on the job in 2007. After receiving temporary total disability benefits and returning to light-duty work, Gullotta refused suitable alternative positions offered by his employer and resigned; the Industrial Commission initially denied further TTD benefits on the grounds that his loss of wages resulted from his refusal of light-duty work rather than his injury. When Gullotta's claim was later expanded to include an additional medical condition, the Commission exercised continuing jurisdiction under R.C. 4123.52 and awarded TTD based on new and changed circumstances. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the additional allowance did not constitute sufficient new or changed circumstances to justify continuing jurisdiction, because Gullotta's refusal of suitable employment remained the cause of his wage loss and the Commission had abused its discretion in granting the benefits. The Court therefore affirmed the court of appeals' order vacating the award.

labor & employment

The case involved a law firm filing a mandamus action to compel the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority to release records, including documents on instances of lead poisoning in its dwellings over 15 years, along with insurance policies and meeting minutes. The housing authority produced some insurance records but withheld the lead-poisoning documents, arguing they were not public records or were exempt. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the lower court's judgment, holding that the lead-poisoning records must be produced but with personal identifying information of residents redacted as that information is not a public record under the Public Records Act; it also reversed the award of attorney fees. The core reasoning was that while the underlying documents qualify as records documenting public business, privacy protections require redaction of identifying details, and the request for certain meeting minutes was overbroad as it sought information rather than specific records.

procedure

In State v. Barker, the defendant was charged with unlawful sexual conduct with a minor and entered a no-contest plea after a trial court colloquy that described the constitutional right to compulsory process as the "right to call witnesses to speak on your behalf." The court of appeals held that this phrasing failed to satisfy Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) and reversed the conviction. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the appellate decision and reinstated the plea, ruling that the trial court's explanation complied with the rule's requirements for informing defendants of their rights. The court further held that any alleged ambiguity in the oral plea colloquy could be clarified by reference to other parts of the record, such as the written plea form that explicitly referenced the power of the court to call witnesses.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over whether a commercial general liability insurance policy with a stop-gap endorsement covered an employer's defense against an employee's claim of substantial-certainty intentional tort. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision that the insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify the employer. The court reasoned that the policy's exclusion for bodily injury resulting from an act determined to have been committed with the belief that injury is substantially certain to occur plainly applied to the claims, without needing a prior final determination by a fact-finder. Additionally, the court held that the policy was not illusory because it provided coverage for other employer liability hazards.

business & regulatorylabor & employmenttorts & liability

The case involved a workers' compensation claim by Jamey Baker, who suffered an eye injury at work leading to the surgical removal of his natural lens and replacement with an implant. Baker sought compensation for total loss of vision under R.C. 4123.57(B), but the Industrial Commission denied it, and the court of appeals upheld that denial. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed, holding that entitlement to such an award depends on the percentage of vision actually lost prior to corrective surgery, which in this case was only eight percent and thus below the statutory 25 percent minimum threshold. The court rejected a bright-line rule granting total loss benefits solely based on surgical removal of the lens or cornea.

labor & employment

The case concerned the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio's approval of Columbus Southern Power Company's three-year program portfolio plan to meet statutory energy-efficiency and peak-demand reduction goals under R.C. 4928.66, including a revenue-decoupling mechanism to recover fixed costs. Industrial Energy Users-Ohio challenged the approval on multiple grounds, including the mechanism's duration and cost quantification, the treatment of mercantile-customer exemptions, and compliance methodologies. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the commission's order, holding that IEU failed to demonstrate reversible error in the modifications or approvals and that the commission acted within its discretion on docket-management and rulemaking issues.

business & regulatoryenvironment