Paul E. Pfeifer

The case involved a public records request by a law firm to the Cuyahoga County Board of Health for documentation on homes where minor children had elevated blood lead levels from 2008 to 2011. The board refused to release the approximately 5,000 pages of records, claiming they contained protected health information under R.C. 3701.17, and filed for declaratory judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the board, finding that even redacted records could identify individuals. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the board must review each record, redact protected health information, and release the remainder. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the appeals court decision and remanded the case for the trial court to examine the sample files and responsive records to determine what non-protected information could be disclosed.

procedurehealthcare

The case involved a public records request by a law firm to the Cuyahoga County Board of Health for documentation on homes where minor children had elevated blood lead levels from 2008 to 2011. The board refused to release the approximately 5,000 pages of records, claiming they contained protected health information under R.C. 3701.17, and filed for declaratory judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the board, finding that even redacted records could identify individuals. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the board must review each record, redact protected health information, and release the remainder. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the appeals court decision and remanded the case for the trial court to examine the sample files and responsive records to determine what non-protected information could be disclosed.

procedurehealthcare

The case involved a public records request by a law firm to the Cuyahoga County Board of Health for documentation on homes where minor children had elevated blood lead levels from 2008 to 2011. The board refused to release the approximately 5,000 pages of records, claiming they contained protected health information under R.C. 3701.17, and filed for declaratory judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the board, finding that even redacted records could identify individuals. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the board must review each record, redact protected health information, and release the remainder. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the appeals court decision and remanded the case for the trial court to examine the sample files and responsive records to determine what non-protected information could be disclosed.

procedurehealthcare

The case involved whether the Lockland School District Board of Education violated Ohio's Open Meetings Act by conducting a nonteaching employee's pretermination hearing in executive session rather than publicly. The employee, Adam Stewart, a data coordinator implicated in falsifying student attendance data, objected to the closed session and sought a public hearing under R.C. 121.22(G)(1) before his contract was terminated. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' grant of summary judgment to the board, concluding that the Act permits private sessions for employee dismissal discussions unless the employee is separately entitled by statute to a public hearing. The court reasoned that Stewart's due process rights under Cleveland Bd. of Edn. v. Loudermill provided notice and an opportunity to be heard but did not require the entire hearing to be public, allowing the board to adjourn into executive session for deliberations.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case concerned whether the Northeast Ohio Regional Sewer District had statutory and charter authority under R.C. Chapter 6119 to create a regional stormwater-management program funded by fees charged to landowners based on impervious surfaces. The trial court upheld the program and fees, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that the district's powers were limited to supplying water and handling wastewater containing waste and did not extend to stormwater management. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the appellate decision, concluding that the statutory language authorizing collection, treatment, and disposal of wastewater encompasses stormwater and that the fees qualify as charges for the use or service of a water resource project. The Court also found corresponding authority in the district's charter. The ruling resolved the dispute in favor of the Sewer District without addressing constitutional challenges to the fees.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether an umbrella insurance policy required Auto-Owners to defend landlords Granger and Steigerwald against federal claims of housing discrimination based on race and familial status, where the policy excluded coverage for personal injury expected or intended by the insured. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the insurer had a duty to defend because the policy's coverage for humiliation could extend to alleged emotional-distress damages, and the inferred-intent doctrine did not apply to bar coverage. The court reasoned that emotional distress is not an inherent or intrinsic result of housing discrimination, so the intentional-acts exclusion did not eliminate the possibility of coverage under the policy terms.

civil rightsproperty

In this case, defendant Jordan Beverly was convicted of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity under Ohio's RICO statute, R.C. 2923.32(A)(1), based on a series of burglaries and thefts committed with an accomplice involving stolen vehicles and home invasions. The court of appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the evidence failed to show an ongoing organization with a structure separate from the criminal acts themselves. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the existence of an 'enterprise' under the statute can be proven without evidence of a structure distinct from the pattern of corrupt activity. The decision relied on the statutory definition of enterprise, which includes informal associations, and federal RICO precedents interpreting similar language. The court emphasized that the statute requires only proof of an association in fact through the pattern of activity, not additional structural elements.

criminal law

The case concerned defendant Jordan Beverly's conviction under Ohio's corrupt-activity statute, R.C. 2923.32(A)(1), for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity by committing burglaries and thefts with an accomplice. The trial court found Beverly guilty, but the court of appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the state failed to prove an "enterprise" with a structure separate and distinct from the pattern of criminal acts. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed that decision, ruling that the existence of an enterprise sufficient to sustain a conviction can be established without proving that the enterprise is a structure separate and distinct from the pattern of corrupt activity. The court reasoned that the statute, modeled on federal RICO, requires only proof of an ongoing organization whose associates function as a continuing unit, and that evidence of the pattern of activity itself can satisfy the enterprise element.

criminal law

The case involved defendant Mark Pickens, who was convicted by a jury in Hamilton County of the aggravated murders of Noelle Washington and her two young children, Anthony Jones III and Sha’railyn Wright, after Noelle reported to police that Pickens had raped her. The trial court imposed the death sentence recommended by the jury. On direct appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and death sentence. The court conducted an independent review of the trial evidence, including the prior relationship, the reported rape, the circumstances of the killings, and Pickens’s statements and conduct afterward. It determined that the aggravating circumstances—course of conduct, escaping detection, and murder of children—outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt and that the sentence was proportionate to similar cases.

criminal law

The case involved Willie Herring, who was convicted of multiple counts of aggravated murder and other crimes for his role as the ringleader in a 1996 armed robbery of a bar in which three people were killed. Following his death sentence, Herring filed a petition for postconviction relief claiming that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision granting relief, holding that counsel's performance was deficient under the standards of Strickland v. Washington and that this deficiency created a reasonable probability of a different outcome in the sentencing hearing. The court therefore vacated the death penalty and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing.

criminal law

In State v. Nolan, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of attempted felony murder along with other offenses arising from an incident involving a firearm. The court of appeals reversed the attempted felony murder conviction, holding it was not a viable offense under Ohio law because it is logically impossible, and the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed that ruling. The core reasoning is that an attempt crime under R.C. 2923.02 requires purposeful or knowing conduct with specific intent to cause a result, while felony murder under R.C. 2903.02(B) imposes strict liability as to the death and does not require proof of intent to kill. Therefore, it is impossible to attempt to cause an unintended death, rendering attempted felony murder not a cognizable crime in Ohio. The decision clarifies that prior precedent did not address or authorize such a conviction.

criminal law

In State v. Nolan, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of attempted felony murder along with other offenses. The court of appeals reversed the attempted felony murder conviction on the ground that it is not a viable offense under Ohio law, and the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed that ruling. The Court held that attempted felony murder is not a cognizable crime because R.C. 2923.02 requires that an attempt be committed purposely or knowingly, while R.C. 2903.02(B) felony murder imposes strict liability as to the death and does not require proof of intent to kill. As a result, it is logically impossible to purposely or knowingly attempt to cause an unintended death.

criminal law

The case concerned whether jury instructions on the 'enterprise' element of the offense of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity under R.C. 2923.32 were adequate when they recited the elements of the offense, quoted the statutory definitions of 'enterprise' and 'pattern of corrupt activity,' and required the jury to find both beyond a reasonable doubt. The court held that such instructions were insufficient and that the trial court should have given additional clarifying language drawn from federal case law to explain that an enterprise requires a showing of purpose, relationships among associates, and sufficient longevity. The reasoning emphasized that jury instructions must be relevant and necessary for the jury to understand and apply the law, that the statutory definition alone did not adequately distinguish an enterprise from individuals committing crimes separately, and that the requested instruction was not redundant.

criminal law

This case involved a dispute over insurance coverage under a personal umbrella liability policy issued by Cincinnati Insurance Company to James and Jean Schill. After Robert Schill caused a fatal bicycle accident in Ohio, he sought indemnification from his parents' policy as a 'resident relative,' which required sharing the same 'legal residence of domicile.' The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer, finding no coverage, but the court of appeals reversed. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the appellate decision, holding that James Schill's domicile was in Florida based on his intent to make it his permanent home, as shown by voting there, paying taxes there, and other ties, despite spending time in Ohio for work; his Ohio stays were transient and did not establish domicile. Because Robert's domicile in Ohio did not match either parent's, he was not covered as a resident relative.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case concerned whether a defendant charged with rape, who presented an all-or-nothing defense by denying he was ever in the room with the alleged victim, could block the trial court from instructing the jury on lesser-included offenses such as sexual battery and gross sexual imposition. The trial court gave those instructions over the defendant's objection, and the jury convicted him of a lesser offense. The Ohio Supreme Court held that a defendant has no right to prevent lesser-included-offense instructions when the evidence could reasonably support a guilty verdict on them. The court reasoned that the prosecution must prove every element of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt, but ambiguities in the evidence may allow a jury to acquit on the greater offense while convicting on a lesser one, and the decision to instruct lies in the trial court's discretion.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is the third direct appeal by Donald Ketterer from his capital conviction for aggravated murder and related offenses arising from the death of Lawrence Sanders. After prior remands for resentencing under State v. Foster and to correct postrelease control, Ketterer challenged the latest sentencing entry by a three-judge panel, arguing that discovery was improperly denied, that capital murder, aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary should merge, and that fines and court costs were imposed without a hearing on ability to pay. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the sentence, holding that the limited remand for postrelease control precluded discovery or relitigation of guilt-related issues, that res judicata barred the merger claim and challenges to fines and costs because they had been addressed in prior proceedings, and that the narrow scope of the remand did not permit broader attacks on the original judgment. The court emphasized that subject-matter jurisdiction limits prevented waiver of the remand's restrictions and that repeating prior sentences did not reopen all issues for review.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, mineral-rights owners Ronald Snyder and Steven Neeley sought a declaratory judgment that they could surface-mine coal on a 651-acre tract owned by the Ohio Department of Natural Resources, relying on a deed reservation of 'all mineral rights, including rights of ingress and egress and reasonable surface right privileges.' The trial court granted summary judgment to ODNR, finding that strip mining was not permitted without an express reservation, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed, holding that the contractual language entitles the mineral-rights owners to surface-mine a reasonable portion of the property. The court's reasoning centered on interpreting the deed according to the parties' intent as shown by its plain language, with no indication that the signatories meant to exclude surface mining, while still subjecting any mining to a reasonableness standard.

propertyenvironment

This case involved disciplinary proceedings against Ohio attorney Stephen Leslie Becker for misappropriating funds entrusted to him as guardian of his disabled nephew's estate and as fiduciary of a decedent's estate, primarily to support his gambling addiction, over a period of years. The Ohio Supreme Court reviewed the findings and recommendation of permanent disbarment from the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline. The court decided to permanently disbar Becker, reasoning that the gravity and duration of the fiduciary breaches, harm to vulnerable victims, multiple aggravating factors, and precedents requiring disbarment for knowing conversion of entrusted funds made that sanction necessary to protect the public.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned the timing of a hearing under R.C. 2152.83(B) to determine whether a 14-year-old adjudicated delinquent for rape should be classified as a juvenile-offender registrant. The juvenile court held the classification hearing at disposition and committed the juvenile to a secure facility while also classifying him as a Tier III offender. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute's plain language permits a court to conduct the hearing at disposition even when the juvenile is committed to a secure facility, rather than requiring it to occur only upon release. The decision resolved a conflict among appellate districts by interpreting the statute to give courts discretion over the timing of a single such hearing.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned East Ohio Gas Company (Dominion) appealing an order of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio that reduced the company's proposed monthly customer charge to recover costs of its automated-meter-reading program from $0.54 to $0.42, on the ground that Dominion had not timely completed installation by a December 31, 2011 deadline. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the commission's reduction was substantively unreasonable because the staff calculation used to support it was based on earlier, previously unknown deadlines rather than the actual program deadline, and the 2009 AMR order could not reasonably be read to require earlier completion. The court therefore reversed the commission's order in part, affirmed it in part, and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

business & regulatory