Judith Ann Lanzinger

In State v. Klembus, the defendant was charged with fourth-degree felony OVI under R.C. 4511.19(G)(1)(d) and a repeat-OVI specification under R.C. 2941.1413 after his fifth OVI conviction in 20 years; he moved to dismiss the specification on equal-protection grounds, arguing the statutes imposed different penalties based on identical proof. The trial court denied the motion, convicted the defendant, and imposed consecutive one-year terms for the OVI and specification. The court of appeals reversed, holding the statutes violated equal protection. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the appellate judgment and reinstated the sentence, reasoning that the provisions form part of a logical, graduated penalty system for repeat OVI offenders that is rationally related to public protection and offender punishment.

criminal law

This case concerned whether Ohio's statutory definition of 'employee' under R.C. 4111.14(B)(1), which incorporates federal exemptions including for outside salespersons, conflicts with the broader definition in Article II, Section 34a of the Ohio Constitution for minimum-wage purposes. Sales representatives sued their employers, alleging that reduced draws fell below the constitutional minimum wage and that the statute unconstitutionally narrowed who qualifies as an employee. The trial court upheld the statute, but the appeals court reversed, finding the General Assembly had impermissibly restricted the constitutional term. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed again, holding that the statutory definition is constitutionally valid because it does not clearly conflict with or restrict the meaning under the state constitution. The court therefore applied the statutory exemptions to claims brought under the constitutional provision.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involved Romell Broom, who was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death in 1985; after his appeals were exhausted, an execution attempt on September 15, 2009, failed when medical team members could not successfully insert and maintain IV catheters despite multiple painful attempts over more than an hour. Broom filed a postconviction petition arguing that a second execution attempt would violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments and Double Jeopardy Clauses of the U.S. and Ohio Constitutions. The Ohio Supreme Court held that neither constitutional provision bars the state from carrying out the death sentence after an unsuccessful prior attempt, relying on precedents such as Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber and concluding that the failed procedure did not constitute punishment or place Broom in jeopardy a second time. The court also affirmed that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the petition without further discovery or an evidentiary hearing.

criminal law

The case involved Romell Broom, who was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death in 1985; after his appeals were exhausted, an execution attempt on September 15, 2009, failed when medical team members could not successfully insert and maintain IV catheters despite multiple painful attempts over more than an hour. Broom filed a postconviction petition arguing that a second execution attempt would violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments and Double Jeopardy Clauses of the U.S. and Ohio Constitutions. The Ohio Supreme Court held that neither constitutional provision bars the state from carrying out the death sentence after an unsuccessful prior attempt, relying on precedents such as Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber and concluding that the failed procedure did not constitute punishment or place Broom in jeopardy a second time. The court also affirmed that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the petition without further discovery or an evidentiary hearing.

criminal law

The case concerned disciplinary proceedings by the Ohio Board of Nursing against nurse Beverly Clayton for alleged failures in patient care that contributed to a patient's death, specifically challenging the hearing examiner's decision to limit one of Clayton's subpoena requests for additional evidence. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that hearing examiners appointed by the Board have discretion under R.C. 119.09 to limit or quash subpoenas in such administrative proceedings and that the limitation in this instance did not result in reversible error or invalidate the adjudication order. The core reasoning focused on the statutory language granting hearing examiners authority over evidence and subpoenas, the board's rules implementing that authority, and the absence of prejudice to Clayton from the ruling on her specific subpoena.

procedurehealthcare

The case concerned disciplinary proceedings by the Ohio Board of Nursing against nurse Beverly Clayton for alleged failures in patient care that contributed to a patient's death, specifically challenging the hearing examiner's decision to limit one of Clayton's subpoena requests for additional evidence. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that hearing examiners appointed by the Board have discretion under R.C. 119.09 to limit or quash subpoenas in such administrative proceedings and that the limitation in this instance did not result in reversible error or invalidate the adjudication order. The core reasoning focused on the statutory language granting hearing examiners authority over evidence and subpoenas, the board's rules implementing that authority, and the absence of prejudice to Clayton from the ruling on her specific subpoena.

procedurehealthcare

The case concerned whether a mortgage recorded in Franklin County with an incomplete notary acknowledgment section—making it deficiently executed under R.C. 5301.01—could still provide constructive notice of its existence and contents to third parties. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court certified two questions of state law to the Ohio Supreme Court after the Messers sought to avoid the mortgage in their Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding. The court held that R.C. 1301.401 applies to all recorded mortgages in Ohio and that its recording provides constructive notice of the document and any referenced transactions. The reasoning rested on the statute's plain language stating that recording any document listed in R.C. 317.08, including mortgages, constitutes constructive notice, which is compatible with R.C. 5301.01 and does not conflict with other provisions addressing specific mortgage defects.

property

The case concerned whether a mortgage recorded in Franklin County with an incomplete notary acknowledgment section—making it deficiently executed under R.C. 5301.01—could still provide constructive notice of its existence and contents to third parties. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court certified two questions of state law to the Ohio Supreme Court after the Messers sought to avoid the mortgage in their Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding. The court held that R.C. 1301.401 applies to all recorded mortgages in Ohio and that its recording provides constructive notice of the document and any referenced transactions. The reasoning rested on the statute's plain language stating that recording any document listed in R.C. 317.08, including mortgages, constitutes constructive notice, which is compatible with R.C. 5301.01 and does not conflict with other provisions addressing specific mortgage defects.

property

The case involved Travis Blankenship, who pled guilty to unlawful sexual conduct with a minor after a consensual relationship with a 15-year-old when he was 21, and was sentenced to community control plus designation as a Tier II sex offender requiring in-person registration and address verification every 180 days for 25 years. Blankenship appealed, arguing that these mandatory registration requirements constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment and the Ohio Constitution, citing a psychologist's assessment of his low recidivism risk and lack of sex-offender characteristics. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judgment, holding that the requirements are not so extreme as to be grossly disproportionate to the crime or shocking to a reasonable person and the community's sense of justice. The court addressed both the classification and the associated registration obligations in reaching this conclusion.

criminal law

In State v. Earley, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed whether a trial court could impose separate sentences for both aggravated vehicular assault under R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a) and operating a vehicle under the influence (OVI) under R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), where the OVI conduct served as the predicate for the assault conviction. The defendant had pleaded guilty to these and other charges after an incident involving a vehicle, and the trial court had imposed concurrent sentences including for the assault and OVI offenses. The court of appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court held that cumulative sentences are permissible. The core reasoning was that R.C. 2929.41(B)(3) specifically authorizes separate punishment for these two offenses, creating an exception that applies regardless of whether the general allied-offense merger statute in R.C. 2941.25 would otherwise require merger.

criminal law

In State v. Earley, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed whether a trial court could impose separate sentences for both aggravated vehicular assault under R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a) and operating a vehicle under the influence (OVI) under R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), where the OVI conduct served as the predicate for the assault conviction. The defendant had pleaded guilty to these and other charges after an incident involving a vehicle, and the trial court had imposed concurrent sentences including for the assault and OVI offenses. The court of appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court held that cumulative sentences are permissible. The core reasoning was that R.C. 2929.41(B)(3) specifically authorizes separate punishment for these two offenses, creating an exception that applies regardless of whether the general allied-offense merger statute in R.C. 2941.25 would otherwise require merger.

criminal law

The case involved the estate of Amber Risner suing the Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT) after a fatal 2009 crash at the intersection of State Routes 220 and 32, alleging negligent design, maintenance, and failure to install a full three-light traffic signal instead of flashing red and yellow lights. ODOT had added flashing signals in 2002 and 2005 in response to safety concerns but argued it was immune from claims over its improvement choices. The Ohio Supreme Court held that ODOT is immune from liability for discretionary decisions on which highway portions to improve and what type of improvements to make, following precedents like Winwood v. Dayton and Garland v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., and that improving one section does not create a duty to upgrade surrounding areas. However, once ODOT undertakes an improvement, it must execute the work according to then-current construction standards. The court affirmed partial summary judgment for ODOT on the traffic-signal claim.

torts & liability

In State v. Dean, the defendant was retried and convicted of aggravated murder of Titus Arnold along with multiple counts of attempted murder arising from three separate shooting incidents in April 2005, including an attack at a Mini Mart convenience store and a drive-by shooting on Dibert Avenue. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and death sentence on direct appeal. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's findings, that joinder of the offenses was proper, that the single course-of-conduct aggravating circumstance under R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) outweighed the weak mitigating evidence, and that the death sentence was both appropriate and proportionate to sentences in comparable cases.

criminal law

This case involved a contract dispute between the governing boards of several Ohio community (charter) schools and their private management companies (White Hat), which operated the schools under agreements that paid the companies 95-96% of per-pupil state funding plus grants. The schools sought ownership of personal property such as furniture and equipment purchased by the companies with public funds for school operations, while the companies claimed the contracts entitled them to retain the property unless the schools paid a buy-back amount. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the management companies qualified as statutory "operators" with a fiduciary relationship to the schools, that this relationship was implicated by use of public funds for purchases, and that the contract buy-back clauses were nonetheless enforceable. The court reasoned that the contract language was clear and that any public-policy concerns about the terms should be addressed by the legislature rather than the judiciary, remanding the case for an inventory and disposition of property according to the contracts.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved a dispute over an automobile insurance policy's medical-payments coverage, where the insureds claimed that Grange Indemnity Insurance Company should have paid medical providers at lower rates negotiated by their separate health insurer, Medical Mutual, to reduce the subrogation amount after settling with a third-party tortfeasor. The trial court granted summary judgment to Grange, finding that the policy language requiring payment of "any negotiated reduced rate accepted by a medical provider" referred only to rates negotiated by Grange itself. The court of appeals reversed, but the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the appellate decision and reinstated the trial court's judgment. The Supreme Court reasoned that the unambiguous policy terms obligated Grange to pay only reduced rates it was contractually entitled to through its own agreements with providers or networks, not rates available solely to the insureds' health insurer.

business & regulatoryhealthcare

The case concerned the retrial of Carl Morris on two counts of raping his minor stepdaughter after the Ohio Supreme Court previously remanded the matter for review of the trial court's admission of other-acts evidence under Evid.R. 404(B). The court of appeals had vacated the convictions and ordered a new trial, finding the evidence improper and the error not harmless. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed that judgment, holding that when other-acts evidence is erroneously admitted, an appellate court must evaluate both the effect of the tainted evidence on the verdict and the strength of the remaining evidence once that evidence is excluded. The opinion sets forth the standard for determining whether such an error requires a new trial rather than deeming it harmless.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the conviction of Carl Morris for two counts of raping his minor stepdaughter, challenged on appeal after the trial court admitted other-acts evidence under Evid.R. 404(B), such as incidents involving kicking a dog and propositioning an adult stepdaughter. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment vacating the conviction and ordering a new trial. The core reasoning is that an appellate court reviewing erroneous admission of such evidence must assess both the impact of the improper evidence on the verdict and the strength of the remaining evidence once the tainted evidence is excluded. The court determined that this standard required a new trial in the present case.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Hoffman, the defendant challenged the admission of evidence obtained after his arrest on three misdemeanor warrants, which were later used to connect him to a murder scene and secure his conviction for aggravated murder and robbery. The warrants had been issued by a deputy clerk based solely on complaints that recited statutory elements and brief narratives without facts establishing probable cause. The Ohio Supreme Court agreed that the warrants were invalid under the Fourth Amendment because no neutral and detached magistrate had made a probable-cause determination, but it held that suppression was not required. The court reasoned that the officers had relied in objectively reasonable good faith on binding appellate precedent that had approved the local warrant procedure, triggering the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a mother whose parental rights to her young child were terminated by a juvenile court after child services removed the child due to neglect, instability, and failure to follow a case plan, with the mother later agreeing to the permanent custody order. The mother attempted to file a delayed appeal from the termination judgment, claiming that due process required the same right to such appeals as is available to certain criminal defendants under appellate rules. The Ohio Supreme Court held that due process does not require affording a parent the right to a delayed appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights. The court distinguished the civil nature of parental rights proceedings from criminal cases and affirmed the lower court's denial of the delayed appeal request.

family lawprocedure

The case concerned a mandamus action filed by Norton resident William Paluch against the city mayor, seeking to compel traditional television broadcast of city council meetings via broadcast tower rather than live internet streaming. After voters approved a 2012 charter amendment requiring public airings of meetings to be "televised" live and repeated, the city began streaming proceedings online in 2013 and made recordings available on request. The Ninth District Court of Appeals denied the writ, and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the charter did not specify the method of transmission and that the city acted within its discretion by choosing internet streaming as a form of televising the meetings. The court reviewed the denial for abuse of discretion and found no clear legal right to the requested relief.

procedure