Sharon L. Kennedy

This case involved a minor child who suffered a dog bite at a playground in a manufactured-home community, leading to a lawsuit against the community's owner, Sun Secured Financing, under Ohio's dog-bite statute, R.C. 955.28(B). The plaintiff claimed Sun was a 'harborer' of the dog and thus strictly liable for the injuries, while Sun argued it was not. The trial court granted summary judgment to Sun, but the court of appeals reversed, finding Sun qualified as a harborer. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the appellate judgment and reinstated the trial court's ruling, reasoning that harboring requires sheltering, protecting, or exercising control over the dog, which Sun did not do as the animal remained under its resident owner's control despite Sun's general policies permitting leashed dogs in common areas.

torts & liabilityproperty

This case involved disciplinary proceedings against Ohio attorney Nathan Todd Harvey, who was appointed as fiduciary for a probate estate in 2020 and stole more than $225,000 from it by using estate funds for personal expenses shortly after opening an account for the estate. Harvey was convicted of felony theft by deception, leading to an interim suspension, and the disciplinary board found violations of multiple Rules of Professional Conduct based on his misappropriation, false statements, and other misconduct. The Supreme Court of Ohio rejected the board's recommendation of indefinite suspension with mental-health conditions and instead imposed permanent disbarment, citing the attorney's dishonest motive, pattern of multiple offenses, failure to make restitution, lack of acknowledgment of wrongdoing, and insufficient mitigating evidence. The court emphasized that permanent disbarment is the appropriate sanction for such misappropriation of client or estate funds under its precedents.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a capital defendant could collaterally attack a prior trial court judgment denying his petition for postconviction relief by filing a motion under Civ.R. 60(B). The Supreme Court of Ohio held that such motions are not allowed, ruling that R.C. 2953.21 supplies the exclusive statutory mechanism for bringing collateral challenges to the validity of a conviction or sentence in a criminal case. The court explained that the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to these special statutory proceedings when the rules are clearly inapplicable, and the legislature had designated postconviction relief as the sole remedy. As a result, the court reversed the Eleventh District Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings on the defendant's remaining assignment of error.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. McAlpin, the defendant, who had been convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death, filed an untimely motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence without first obtaining leave of court under Crim.R. 33(B). The trial court denied the motion, and the Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the denial on different grounds, ruling that the failure to obtain leave to file the untimely motion provided a sufficient reason to deny it regardless of the merits. The court remanded the case to the trial court to address the defendant's separate pending motion for leave to file a new-trial motion.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved disciplinary proceedings against Leslie Ann Celebrezze, a former judge on the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Domestic Relations Division, for misconduct including improperly assigning high-stakes divorce cases to herself in violation of random assignment rules, pressuring colleagues to transfer cases to her, and repeatedly appointing or recommending her personal friend and romantic partner as a receiver or mediator without disclosing the relationship. The Board of Professional Conduct found violations of multiple provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Rules of Professional Conduct related to impartiality, ex parte communications, conflicts of interest, and dishonesty. The Supreme Court of Ohio adopted the board's findings and imposed a two-year suspension from the practice of law with one year conditionally stayed on the condition of no further misconduct. The court reasoned that the combination of case-assignment manipulation and undisclosed conflicts undermined public confidence in the judiciary's fairness and impartiality, warranting the sanction to address the harm caused.

procedurefamily law

In State v. Gowdy, the defendant was charged with two counts of felonious assault after an altercation captured on video, and he requested a self-defense jury instruction before trial. The trial court made statements questioning whether the evidence would support self-defense and noted the burden on the defendant, after which Gowdy entered a guilty plea to a reduced charge following a Crim.R. 11 colloquy. Gowdy appealed, arguing that the court's misstatements of Ohio's self-defense law under R.C. 2901.05(B) and its pretrial comment on the instruction rendered his plea unknowing, unintelligent, or involuntary. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) validates the plea even if the court's ancillary legal comments or premature ruling were erroneous, as they did not affect the voluntariness or understanding of the plea process.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Roberts, the defendant Elijah Blaine Roberts was convicted after trial of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and related offenses stemming from the July 2019 strangulation death of his mother, Tracey Epperson, in her Cincinnati apartment and the taking of her wallet, car, and other property. The First District Court of Appeals reversed the aggravated murder and aggravated robbery convictions, finding that the trial court had erred by admitting certain custodial statements recorded after Roberts was in custody and other-acts testimony from his aunt, and that those errors were not harmless. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the convictions, holding under Crim.R. 52(A) that any errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the remaining evidence—including the circumstances of Roberts’s arrest with the victim’s property, forensic evidence, and other testimony—overwhelmingly established his guilt. The court further determined that the evidence was sufficient and that a manifest-weight challenge would be unavailing.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved One Power Company's appeal of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio's approval of Ohio Power Company's (AEP Ohio) fifth electric-security plan under R.C. 4928.143. One Power challenged the commission's denial of a proposed protective agreement that would have allowed broader access to confidential discovery materials by its in-house employees, as well as the decision to continue the basic-transmission-cost rider as nonbypassable rather than allowing certain customers to avoid the charge by shopping with competitive providers. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the commission's orders, holding that the protective agreement denial followed proper procedures and that the nonbypassable rider design complied with R.C. 4928.05, Adm.Code 4901:1-36-04(B), the state's electric policy under R.C. 4928.02, and the commission's prior practice of treating the rider as nonbypassable since 2015.

business & regulatory

This case involved consolidated proceedings before the Ohio Public Utilities Commission concerning Dayton Power and Light Company's electric security plan, including applications to apply the significantly excessive earnings test (SEET) under R.C. 4928.143(F) for 2018 and 2019, as well as a quadrennial review under R.C. 4928.143(E). The commission determined that the plan produced significantly excessive earnings in those years but permitted the utility to retain them by committing to future capital investments rather than issuing refunds to customers; it also upheld other aspects of the plan such as a rate-stabilization charge. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the commission's SEET ruling, holding that the statute does not authorize allowing a utility to keep significantly excessive earnings based on prospective investments, and remanded for a new analysis that properly accounts for capital requirements in the comparative review. The court rejected challenges to the rate-stabilization charge and alternative grounds offered to affirm the commission's orders.

business & regulatory

The case involved a dispute over whether Huntington National Bank had a duty to disclose facts that materially increased the risk to Raymond Schneider, a 50% owner of certain companies, when he signed a personal guaranty for $77 million in loans to refinance a business portfolio. Schneider argued that the bank should have informed him of issues like prior loan defaults and the borrower's declining finances before he executed the guaranty and a later reaffirmation. The Ohio Supreme Court held that Ohio law does not impose such a disclosure duty on creditors in arm's-length transactions absent a special relationship of trust or confidence between the parties, and this rule applies even when one party is a surety or guarantor. The court reversed the First District Court of Appeals' decision and reinstated the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the bank.

business & regulatory

The case involved the prosecution of Kenneth Brown in Henry County, Ohio, for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity under R.C. 2923.32 as a member of the Tecumseh Street Gang's drug-selling enterprise, which operated primarily in Lucas County. Brown challenged venue in Henry County on the grounds that he personally had not conducted any enterprise activity there. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment upholding the conviction, holding that venue was proper because another member of the enterprise, Alexandria Armijo, had sold cocaine in Henry County as part of the enterprise's affairs. The court's reasoning focused on the statute's text allowing venue in any county where a member of the enterprise participated in its activities, regardless of the defendant's own direct involvement in that county.

criminal law

The case involved Kostantinos Pamboukis filing a fourth successive affidavit of disqualification under R.C. 2101.39 and 2701.03 to remove Judge Elinore Marsh Stormer from a Summit County Probate Division adoption case. The court dismissed the affidavit without reaching the merits of any bias claims. It reasoned that the statute requires a pending proceeding before the judge for the chief justice to consider disqualification, and Pamboukis failed to show any matter remained pending after a final judgment and denial of his Civ.R. 60(B) motions. Prior affidavits had already been denied or dismissed on similar grounds, including lack of a pending case.

procedure

In State v. Diaw, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed whether law enforcement violated the Fourth Amendment by obtaining a single historical location data point from the Letgo online marketplace app via subpoena without a warrant, where the data had been voluntarily shared by the defendant during a transaction that led to robbery and assault charges. The trial court had suppressed the evidence, but the Tenth District reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed that ruling. The court held that individuals lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily conveyed to third parties under the third-party doctrine, distinguishing the single data point here from the prolonged tracking at issue in Carpenter v. United States. It reasoned that the location revealed a public meeting spot rather than protected private movements or the home, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned whether R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) requires a trial court to impose a mandatory prison term on the underlying felony offense when a defendant is convicted of a corresponding firearm specification. Jadyn Logan pleaded guilty to attempting to have weapons while under a disability along with a one-year firearm specification; the trial court sentenced her to community control on the felony and prison only on the specification. The Supreme Court of Ohio answered yes to the certified question and reversed the Eighth District Court of Appeals, holding that the statute mandates prison for the underlying felony because a firearm specification is a sentencing enhancement rather than a separate offense. The court reasoned that the statutory language directing prison for “any [felony] offense … with respect to a portion of the sentence imposed pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a)” can apply only to the felony itself, and that the broader felony-sentencing scheme confirms this interpretation. The matter was remanded to the trial court for resentencing.

criminal lawguns

This case concerns an affidavit of disqualification filed under R.C. 2701.03 by attorney Richard Porotsky, representing plaintiff Medical Protective Company in a declaratory judgment action against Dr. Abubakar Atiq Durrani and his practice, seeking to void medical malpractice insurance policies based on alleged misrepresentations. The Ohio Supreme Court struck an affidavit submitted by non-party Eric Deters and denied the request to disqualify retired Judge Guy L. Reece II from presiding over the case and related Durrani malpractice matters. The court held that the judge's comments during hearings, handling of motions, denial of a gag order, and other conduct did not create an appearance of bias against the plaintiff or its counsel, and that claims regarding ex parte communications, tolerance of unauthorized practice of law, or unprofessional remarks by opposing counsel lacked merit under the applicable standards.

procedurehealthcare

This case involves a third affidavit of disqualification filed by attorney Robert Croskery against Judge Alan C. Triggs in a Hamilton County Common Pleas Court civil lawsuit between Cintrifuse Landlord, L.L.C. and Panino, L.L.C., a restaurant tenant, concerning breach of a lease agreement over failure to build a patio and resulting rent disputes. The Ohio Supreme Court granted the affidavit, disqualifying Judge Triggs from further presiding over the case and ordering reassignment to another judge. The core reasoning was that the judge's off-the-record comments, including stating he did not like the attorney, prior adverse rulings that were reversed on appeal (including a sanctions award), and indications of prejudging the claims created concerns about the appearance of impartiality, warranting disqualification to assure the parties and public of the judge's neutrality under R.C. 2701.03.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involves an affidavit of disqualification filed by defense counsel Dustin M. Blake under R.C. 2701.03, seeking to remove Judge Jeffrey L. Reed from presiding over the resentencing of defendant James Benvenuto in an Allen County criminal case involving multiple counts of drug possession, trafficking, and engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity. The Ohio Supreme Court denied the affidavit, holding that allegations related to the 2017 sentencing were forfeited and that the affiant failed to present evidence establishing any statutory basis for disqualification. The court reasoned that Judge Reed had followed prior federal and state appellate orders on merging counts and resentencing, had not expressed any unwillingness to comply with further remand, and that adverse rulings or legal disagreements alone do not demonstrate bias or prejudice. A reasonable observer with full knowledge of the facts would not question the judge's impartiality.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves an affidavit of disqualification filed by defense counsel Dustin M. Blake under R.C. 2701.03, seeking to remove Judge Jeffrey L. Reed from presiding over the resentencing of defendant James Benvenuto in an Allen County criminal case involving multiple counts of drug possession, trafficking, and engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity. The Ohio Supreme Court denied the affidavit, holding that allegations related to the 2017 sentencing were forfeited and that the affiant failed to present evidence establishing any statutory basis for disqualification. The court reasoned that Judge Reed had followed prior federal and state appellate orders on merging counts and resentencing, had not expressed any unwillingness to comply with further remand, and that adverse rulings or legal disagreements alone do not demonstrate bias or prejudice. A reasonable observer with full knowledge of the facts would not question the judge's impartiality.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves an affidavit of disqualification filed by defendant Cody Henderson in his criminal menacing case in Washington Court House Municipal Court, seeking to remove Judge Susan R. Wollscheid and Acting Judge Steven P. Beathard from presiding. The court dismissed the request as to Judge Beathard because he had not been assigned to the case. It granted the request as to Judge Wollscheid, finding that although the evidence did not establish actual bias, her handling of the arraignment— including interrupting the defendant's procedural objections, denying media access requests tied to his claimed status as a citizen journalist, and failing to promptly address his motion for return of seized property—would cause a reasonable observer to doubt the fairness of the trial. The decision emphasized the need to ensure unquestioned neutrality and protect the defendant's constitutional rights to a fair proceeding open to public and press scrutiny under Sup.R. 12 and First Amendment principles.

criminal lawfree speechprocedurecivil rights

This case involves an affidavit of disqualification filed by defendant Cody Henderson in his criminal menacing case in Washington Court House Municipal Court, seeking to remove Judge Susan R. Wollscheid and Acting Judge Steven P. Beathard from presiding. The court dismissed the request as to Judge Beathard because he had not been assigned to the case. It granted the request as to Judge Wollscheid, finding that although the evidence did not establish actual bias, her handling of the arraignment— including interrupting the defendant's procedural objections, denying media access requests tied to his claimed status as a citizen journalist, and failing to promptly address his motion for return of seized property—would cause a reasonable observer to doubt the fairness of the trial. The decision emphasized the need to ensure unquestioned neutrality and protect the defendant's constitutional rights to a fair proceeding open to public and press scrutiny under Sup.R. 12 and First Amendment principles.

criminal lawfree speechprocedurecivil rights