The case concerned whether the Secretary of the Treasury's notice calling for redemption of First and Fourth Liberty Loan bonds on a specific date effectively stopped the accrual of interest on those bonds from the redemption date onward. The Supreme Court held that the notice was effective, terminating interest and rendering subsequent interest coupons void as per the explicit terms in the bond agreements. The reasoning centered on the contractual language of the bonds, which provided that interest ceases from the designated redemption date upon proper notice, and this applied despite the bonds' gold payment clauses, following prior rulings on gold obligations. The Court affirmed the lower courts' judgments in favor of the United States.
In Palko v. Connecticut, the defendant was initially convicted of second-degree murder, but after the state successfully appealed under a Connecticut statute allowing such appeals, he was retried and convicted of first-degree murder, resulting in a death sentence. Palko challenged the retrial as violating the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause by subjecting him to double jeopardy, arguing that the Fifth Amendment's protection against double jeopardy applies to the states. The Supreme Court upheld the statute and affirmed the conviction, reasoning that the Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate all provisions of the Bill of Rights against the states, and that permitting a state appeal leading to retrial in the same case does not offend fundamental principles of liberty or justice. The Court distinguished between rights essential to ordered liberty and others that states may handle differently without violating due process.
In Hale v. State Bd. of Assessment and Review, Iowa residents who owned state and municipal bonds challenged the state's inclusion of interest income from those bonds in assessments under a new personal net income tax, arguing that pre-existing statutory exemptions stating the bonds "shall not be taxed" created contracts that would be impaired by such taxation. The Iowa Supreme Court upheld the assessments, and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. The Court assumed without deciding that the exemptions gave rise to contracts but interpreted them as limited to direct property taxes on the assessed value of the bonds. It reasoned that the statutory language and context, including provisions addressing only ad valorem levies, along with prior state decisions, showed the exemptions were not intended to cover excises on net income.
The case concerned a Washington state tax on the gross receipts of a stevedoring company operating at Puget Sound ports, which the company challenged as an unconstitutional burden on interstate and foreign commerce. The Court held that the tax was invalid insofar as it applied to the company's direct loading and unloading of vessels by its own employees under its control, but valid as applied to the company's separate activity of merely supplying longshoremen to ships without directing the work. The core reasoning was that direct stevedoring services are an essential part of waterborne interstate or foreign transportation and thus immune from state gross-receipts taxation, whereas supplying labor without operational control constitutes a local business subject to state taxation. The decree of the Washington Supreme Court was modified accordingly and remanded.
The case Helvering v. Davis challenged the constitutionality of Titles VIII and II of the Social Security Act of 1935, which imposed an excise tax on employers and a corresponding income tax on employees to fund federal old-age benefits for workers over age 65. A shareholder sued to prevent a corporation from complying with the tax and deduction requirements, arguing the provisions exceeded federal authority. The Supreme Court upheld the taxes and benefit program as valid exercises of congressional power. The core reasoning was that the taxes were not earmarked but paid into general revenue, and Congress could tax and spend for the general welfare in addressing widespread old-age dependency as a national problem supported by extensive evidence of elderly poverty.
The case concerned the constitutionality of Title IX of the Social Security Act of 1935, which imposed an excise tax on employers of eight or more persons measured by a percentage of wages paid, with credits available for contributions to qualifying state unemployment compensation funds. Steward Machine Co., an Alabama employer, paid the tax, sought a refund, and sued the Collector of Internal Revenue, arguing that the federal statute exceeded Congress's powers and invaded state sovereignty. The Supreme Court upheld the tax as a valid exercise of the federal taxing power, reasoning that it was an excise rather than a penalty, that the credit mechanism provided incentives without compulsion, and that the conditions attached to credits ensured genuine state programs without coercing states into adopting them. The Court further concluded that the tax did not improperly delegate legislative authority or violate federalism principles, as states retained freedom to enact or decline their own unemployment laws. The decision affirmed the lower courts' rulings in favor of the government.