Sarah E. Parker

In State v. Moore, the defendant was convicted of misdemeanor sexual battery against a 16-year-old victim after a jury trial in superior court, based on evidence that he entered her bedroom, straddled her on the bed, and touched her body over her clothes. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ ruling that admission of a police officer’s testimony—stating that the defendant, after arrest and Miranda warnings, refused to speak about the case—was not plain error warranting a new trial. The court reasoned that although the testimony improperly referenced the defendant’s post-Miranda exercise of his right to remain silent, the prosecutor did not emphasize or elicit it, did not cross-examine the defendant about his silence, and the overall evidence of guilt was substantial and corroborated by multiple witnesses; the defendant’s failure to object triggered plain-error review, which he did not satisfy. The court also held that related testimony about the defendant’s pre-arrest conversation with police did not imply any refusal to speak and thus was not error.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Williams, the defendant was a passenger in an SUV stopped for a window-tint violation on Interstate 77; after the officer questioned the driver and passenger separately and noted conflicting accounts about their relationship, travel route, and vehicle ownership, he extended the stop for a canine sniff that led to the discovery of 65 pounds of marijuana. The defendant was charged with trafficking, moved to suppress the evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, and after the trial court denied the motion, she pleaded guilty while preserving her right to appeal. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision upholding the denial of suppression. The Court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, the inconsistencies and other indicators gave the officer reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop beyond the time needed to address the tint violation, justifying the canine search.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns a dispute over a district court administrative order in North Carolina, pitting District Attorney Jonathan M. David against District Court Judge Jerry A. Jolly. The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed a motion to dismiss filed by the appellee (Judge Jolly) on August 29, 2011. On January 26, 2012, the court denied the motion in a conference order, allowing the underlying matter to proceed. Chief Justice Parker and Justices Martin and Timmons-Goodson recused themselves from consideration. No substantive reasoning or further details appear in the order.

procedure

In State v. Nabors, the defendant was convicted of possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine and sale of cocaine after an undercover purchase arranged by a police informant at a gas station. The Court of Appeals had reversed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss, but the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed that decision and upheld the convictions. The core issue was whether the State presented sufficient evidence that the substance was cocaine, given challenges to the lay testimony of the informant and an officer. The Court held that the defendant's own witness, who testified that he (not the defendant) sold the drugs and described them as cocaine while recanting a prior statement, supplied independent evidence of the substance's identity sufficient to defeat the motion to dismiss. The Court also found no merit in an unaddressed claim regarding the trial judge's questioning of a witness.

criminal lawprocedure

In Boyce & Isley, PLLC v. Cooper, the North Carolina Supreme Court considered a motion filed by the defendants to strike materials in the case. On November 9, 2011, the court denied the motion by order entered in conference. The brief order provides no further explanation of the court's reasoning. Chief Justice Parker and Justices Timmons-Goodson and Hudson were recused.

procedure

This case concerns a petition by defendants Roy A. Cooper III, his campaign committee, and associated individuals seeking discretionary review by the North Carolina Supreme Court of a North Carolina Court of Appeals ruling in a lawsuit filed by the law firm Boyce & Isley, PLLC and its attorneys. The underlying litigation involved claims arising from statements made during Cooper's political activities. On November 9, 2011, the Supreme Court denied the petition for discretionary review in a conference order, leaving the Court of Appeals decision intact. No reasons for the denial were stated in the order. Chief Justice Parker and Justices Timmons-Goodson and Hudson recused themselves from consideration of the petition.

electionsfree speechtorts & liabilityprocedure

This case, Boyce & Isley, PLLC v. Cooper, came before the North Carolina Supreme Court as an appeal or proceeding involving the named law firm plaintiffs and the Cooper defendants. The sole matter addressed in the order was a motion by the North Carolina Press Foundation, Inc., seeking leave to file an amicus curiae brief. The court dismissed the motion as moot following consideration in conference on November 9, 2011. Chief Justice Parker and Justices Timmons-Goodson and Hudson recused themselves from participation.

procedurefree speech

This excerpt from Boyce & Isley, PLLC v. Cooper concerns a procedural motion in litigation between a law firm and multiple defendants, with various attorneys appearing for each side. On November 9, 2011, the North Carolina Supreme Court denied the defendants' July 12, 2011 motion to seal, issuing the denial by conference order without further elaboration. Chief Justice Parker and Justices Timmons-Goodson and Hudson were recused from participating in the decision. The order addresses only the sealing request and does not resolve the underlying claims.

procedure

The excerpt concerns a procedural motion in the long-running North Carolina case Boyce & Isley, PLLC v. Cooper. Defendants filed a motion for sanctions on July 12, 2011. On November 9, 2011, the North Carolina Supreme Court denied the motion by order entered in conference. The order notes that Chief Justice Parker and Justices Timmons-Goodson and Hudson were recused and provides no further explanation of the court's reasoning.

procedure

In State v. Biber, the defendant was indicted for felonious possession of cocaine after Asheville police officers entered a motel room rented by another person and discovered drug paraphernalia and a bag of white powder believed to be a controlled substance. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him and had entered without consent or a warrant, but the trial court denied the motion, and the defendant pleaded guilty while preserving his right to appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling, but the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding that the officers had probable cause based on their observations of drug-related items in plain view, the defendant's movements and claim to the room, and the circumstances matching the reported drug activity. The core reasoning was that the facts provided reasonable grounds for belief of guilt, which is sufficient for probable cause even if not enough to support a conviction, and the trial court's findings supported the denial of the suppression motion.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned whether North Carolina law requires the non-attorney Guardian ad Litem (GAL) volunteer to be physically present in court during a termination of parental rights (TPR) hearing involving two children alleged to be neglected and dependent. The trial court terminated the father's parental rights after finding grounds under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111 and that termination served the children's best interests. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the children's representation was incomplete without the GAL volunteer's presence. The Supreme Court reversed that decision, ruling that N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-601, 7B-1108, and 7B-1200 are satisfied when the GAL program as a whole fulfills its statutory duties through investigation, reports, and advocacy by the attorney advocate, even if the volunteer GAL is absent from the hearing. The Court found the program had met those obligations here via filed reports, witness examination, and evidence submission throughout the proceedings.

family lawprocedure

This case concerns petitions filed by the State of North Carolina challenging actions related to a district court administrative order issued by Judge Jerry A. Jolly in Brunswick County. The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed requests for a writ of supersedeas to stay the Court of Appeals' judgment, a writ of certiorari to review that order, and a writ of mandamus directed to the Superior Court. Following a conference, the Court allowed the supersedeas and certiorari petitions but denied the mandamus petition. Chief Justice Parker and Justice Martin recused themselves from consideration. The orders were certified on June 15, 2011, without further substantive discussion in the excerpt.

procedurecriminal law

This case involved a dispute over payment for the construction of a house, where plaintiffs Ron Medlin Construction (a licensed partnership) and George Ronald Medlin sought recovery from defendants Raymond and Sarah Harris under claims including quantum meruit, after the partnership performed work on the project but defendants refused full payment. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendants on the quantum meruit claim, which a divided Court of Appeals affirmed. The North Carolina Supreme Court modified and affirmed that decision, holding that Medlin executed the cost-plus construction contract as a partner on behalf of the partnership, creating an express contractual relationship that precluded recovery in quantum meruit as a matter of law. The court reasoned that where a special contract exists, no contract can be implied by law, and the undisputed facts showed the partnership had performed under the agreement without any showing that Medlin lacked authority to bind it. The case was remanded for further proceedings on remaining issues such as defendants' counterclaims.

business & regulatory

This case arose from a dispute among heirs over the distribution of assets under a holographic will that lacked a residuary clause, with plaintiffs claiming certain property had adeemed by extinction and passed by intestacy. After the trial court issued interlocutory orders dismissing some defendants and granting partial summary judgment, and later entered a final consent judgment, plaintiffs appealed; the trial court and Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely for failure to appeal the 2007 interlocutory dismissal order within thirty days. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the appeal was timely because N.C.G.S. § 1-277 permits but does not require immediate appeal of most interlocutory orders affecting substantial rights, such as those involving title to land, and that the mandatory-immediate-appeal rule applies only in condemnation cases. The Court therefore vacated the dismissal orders and remanded for merits review of the appeal.

procedureproperty

The case involved Maria Meza, a non-qualified alien, who sought Medicaid coverage for two periods of inpatient psychiatric treatment in 2004 and 2005, which the county DSS denied except for the admission dates on grounds that her condition did not qualify as an emergency medical condition under 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(3). After a DHHS hearing officer awarded coverage for only part of the first hospitalization and none beyond the first day of the second, Meza sought judicial review under N.C.G.S. § 108A-79(k); the superior court reviewed the entire matter de novo on the administrative record and made its own findings favoring broader coverage, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that when a superior court reviews a DHHS Medicaid decision solely on the administrative record, it must apply the whole-record test to factual issues and de novo review to legal issues. Because the superior court had improperly conducted de novo review of the facts, the Court reversed and remanded for proper application of the whole-record standard, under which the hearing officer's findings were supported by substantial evidence.

healthcareimmigrationprocedure

The case involved a former Dillard's employee who sued the company for malicious prosecution after being arrested, indicted, tried, and acquitted on embezzlement charges arising from a 1997 incident in which two customers left the store without paying for shoes due to a voided transaction. The jury found the employer liable for malicious prosecution and awarded punitive damages, but the trial court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the punitive damages. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in setting aside the punitive damages award. The core reasoning was that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, was insufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find by clear and convincing evidence that the employer's actions demonstrated malice or reckless and wanton disregard of the plaintiff's rights, as required for punitive damages.

torts & liabilitylabor & employmentcriminal law

This case concerns a petition for discretionary review filed by plaintiff Eugene Boyce in Boyce & Isley, PLLC v. Roy A. Cooper, III and others, seeking Supreme Court review of a North Carolina Court of Appeals decision under G.S. 7A-31. The Supreme Court of North Carolina denied the petition by order entered after conference on November 5, 2009. Certain justices, including the Chief Justice and two others, recused themselves from consideration of the petition. The denial was certified to the lower court without elaboration on the underlying claims.

procedure

The case involved whether an employee who accepted a voluntary early retirement package (VERP) offered by Carolina Power & Light Company during a company-wide downsizing was eligible for unemployment insurance benefits under North Carolina law. The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the lower courts and held that the employee was ineligible for benefits. The court reasoned that the employee's departure did not constitute leaving work for good cause attributable to the employer, as the employer had not announced any involuntary layoffs, the employee still had a job available, and acceptance of the VERP was based on the employee's own speculation rather than employer actions that would reasonably compel resignation. The decision emphasized that the burden is on the claimant to show good cause attributable to the employer, and none of the employer's actions—downsizing, offering the package, or not answering questions—met that standard.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

In State v. Byrd, defendant Billy Ray Byrd was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury on his wife after an incident in which he shot her at her workplace, along with related charges including violation of a protective order. The trial court enhanced his sentence under N.C.G.S. § 50B-4.1(d) based on his knowing violation of a temporary restraining order (TRO) issued under Rule 65(b) that prohibited contact and assault. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the TRO was not a valid domestic violence protective order under Chapter 50B because it was not issued pursuant to that chapter's specific procedures, making the sentence enhancement erroneous, but concluded the error was not prejudicial given the facts of the case. The decision turned on the distinction between a general civil TRO and the specialized ex parte protective orders authorized by Chapter 50B.

criminal lawfamily lawprocedure

This case involved a juvenile delinquency proceeding in which W.R., a fourteen-year-old student, was adjudicated delinquent for possessing a weapon on school property based on statements he made during questioning by school administrators and a school resource officer. The Court of Appeals vacated the adjudication, concluding that W.R. was in custody and that admission of his incriminating statements without Miranda warnings or findings under N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101 constituted plain error. The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed, holding that the constitutional and statutory issues were not preserved for review because no motion to suppress or objection was made at trial, and the limited record did not establish that the questioning amounted to custodial interrogation. The Court further reasoned that statements to school officials are admissible absent evidence they were acting as agents of law enforcement, and the trial court did not err in admitting the statements without objection.

criminal lawprocedure