This case arose from plaintiff Janet Moore's dental malpractice suit against Dr. Daniel Proper and related defendants, alleging that a routine tooth extraction fractured her jaw and that defendants failed to diagnose or treat the injury properly. The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants, dismissing the claim for failure to comply with Rule 9(j) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure because no reasonable person would expect plaintiff's sole expert, Dr. Joseph Dunn, to qualify under Rule 702. The Court of Appeals reversed, and the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed that reversal. The Court held that Dr. Dunn—a licensed general dentist who performed clinical work including extractions on a fill-in basis during the year before the alleged injury—satisfied Rule 702(b)(2)(a)'s requirement of engaging in active clinical practice of the same or similar specialty, so plaintiff met the Rule 9(j) certification standard.
In State v. Lawrence, the North Carolina Supreme Court reviewed a Court of Appeals decision that had found plain error in a trial court’s jury instructions on the elements of conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon, resulting in a new trial for defendant David Lawrence on that charge. The case arose from Lawrence’s participation in a planned armed robbery of a suspected drug dealer, for which he was convicted along with related offenses. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals had applied inconsistent and incorrect formulations of the plain error standard. It clarified that plain error review requires the defendant to show that the instructional error probably affected the jury’s verdict, adopting the federal standard first set out in State v. Odom, and reversed the grant of a new trial on the conspiracy charge.
In 1994, defendant pled guilty to second-degree murder for a 1993 offense and received a life sentence under North Carolina’s Fair Sentencing Act (FSA), which governed crimes committed before October 1, 1994. In 2011, the Superior Court granted his motion for appropriate relief and retroactively applied the later Structured Sentencing Act (SSA) to reduce the sentence to 157–198 months, making him eligible for immediate release. The North Carolina Supreme Court vacated that order and reinstated the original life sentence. The Court held that sentencing for this offense is controlled exclusively by the FSA, that the legislature alone prescribes criminal penalties, and that a court may not alter a lawful sentence by applying a later statute retroactively.
Sharon Thomas petitioned the North Carolina Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review an order issued by the North Carolina Court of Appeals in her lawsuit against the State of North Carolina, North Carolina Central University, and several university officials. The underlying case involved claims by Thomas against these defendants. On March 8, 2012, the Supreme Court denied the petition after considering it in conference. The order noted that Justice Martin was recused but provided no further explanation for the denial.
In State v. Starr, the defendant was convicted of four counts of assaulting firefighters with a firearm after a jury trial in which firefighters testified that he fired shots at them while they forced entry into his apartment in response to a 911 call. The key issue on appeal was whether the trial court violated N.C.G.S. § 15A-1233(a) by denying the jury’s request during deliberations to review Firefighter Spruill’s testimony without properly exercising its discretion. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the trial court erred because it failed to exercise discretion as the statute requires and instead appeared to deny the request outright. However, the Court concluded that the error was not prejudicial, as Spruill’s testimony was corroborated by three other witnesses, was not confusing or contradictory, and was not the sole evidence linking the defendant to the crimes. The Court therefore modified and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision finding no reversible error.
The case involved a challenge to the constitutionality of an arrest for driving while impaired made by a campus police officer at Davidson College, a private institution with religious affiliations. The defendant argued that the North Carolina Campus Police Act, which authorized the officer's commission, violated the Establishment Clause by delegating government police power to a religious institution. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, but the Court of Appeals reversed, relying on prior precedent. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and upheld the conviction, applying the Lemon test to conclude that the Act has a secular purpose of providing neutral police protection to all higher education institutions, its primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion, and it does not create excessive government entanglement with religious matters, as the arrest involved only secular enforcement of traffic laws.
In this case, Piraino Brothers, LLC petitioned the North Carolina Supreme Court for discretionary review under G.S. 7A-31 of a decision issued by the North Carolina Court of Appeals in a civil dispute involving multiple defendants, including Atlantic Financial Group, Inc., McKee Estates, LLC, and several individuals and law firms. The Supreme Court considered the petition filed on May 24, 2011, and issued an order denying review. The denial was entered following a conference of the Court on November 9, 2011, with Justice Martin recused from participation. No further explanation or substantive analysis of the underlying claims was provided in the order.
This case involved a dispute over whether an outdoor advertising company, Fairway, had timely commenced work under a city sign permit before it expired, after being required to relocate its lawfully erected sign due to a state highway widening project by the DOT. The Bessemer City Board of Adjustment ruled that Fairway's preparatory actions did not qualify as commencing work, so the permit expired and the relocated sign violated a later-enacted ban on outdoor advertising; lower courts affirmed. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that Fairway's negotiations with DOT and the property owner, lease renegotiations, and obtaining a building permit within the six-month period satisfied the ordinance's work requirement. The court reasoned that zoning ordinances must be strictly construed in favor of the free use of property, particularly in this involuntary relocation context mandated by a government project, and that the city's interpretation was overly restrictive and erroneous as a matter of law.
This case involved a dispute over insurance coverage for mold damage to a home allegedly caused by a windstorm. The insured, Sadler, invoked the policy's appraisal process after the insurer, Farm Bureau, initially denied the claim and later offered only a partial payment; the appraisers and umpire awarded $162,500 as the cash value of wind-related damages. Sadler moved for partial summary judgment on his breach-of-contract counterclaim, which the trial court granted, but the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that the appraisal award determined only the amount of loss and did not resolve questions of causation or coverage, and that genuine issues of material fact remained regarding which damages were directly caused by a covered peril, which were limited by the policy's fungi exclusion and coverage cap, and how policy limits applied. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine the covered loss.
This case arose from a dispute involving the law firm Mitchell, Brewer, Richardson, Adams, Burge & Boughman, PLLC and several individuals including Coy E. Brewer, Jr., Ronnie A. Mitchell, and Charles Brittain. The plaintiffs filed a motion to strike the response submitted by Charles Brittain. On April 7, 2011, the Supreme Court of North Carolina granted the motion by order entered in conference. Justices Martin and Timmons-Goodson were recused from the matter.
This case arose from a dispute within a professional limited liability company law firm involving its former and current members. Coy E. Brewer, Jr. petitioned the North Carolina Supreme Court for discretionary review of a decision by the North Carolina Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court denied the petition in a conference order, allowing the Court of Appeals decision to stand without further review. Justices Martin and Timmons-Goodson recused themselves from the matter.
This case involves a disciplinary proceeding by the North Carolina State Bar against attorney Creighton W. Sossomon. The defendant-appellant filed a motion for a temporary stay in the matter. On March 10, 2011, the Supreme Court of North Carolina entered an order dissolving the motion following a conference of the Court. Justices Martin and Jackson recused themselves from the proceeding.
The case involved the North Carolina State Bar proceeding against attorney Creighton W. Sossoman. Sossoman petitioned the Supreme Court for discretionary review of a Court of Appeals decision under G.S. 7A-31 and for a writ of supersedeas staying the judgment. The Supreme Court denied both petitions by orders entered in conference on March 10, 2011. Two justices recused themselves from the matter.
This case arose from a mortgage dispute involving Fifth Third Mortgage Company, borrowers Alan and Phyllis Miller, Branch Banking and Trust Company, and a substitute trustee. The North Carolina Court of Appeals issued a decision in the matter, which Fifth Third Mortgage Company then asked the state Supreme Court to review under G.S. 7A-31. The Supreme Court of North Carolina denied the petition for discretionary review following a conference on November 4, 2010, with one justice recused. No further reasoning or analysis of the underlying claims was provided in the order.
In Johnson v. Schultz, the North Carolina Supreme Court considered a dispute arising from a residential real estate closing in which the buyers' attorney embezzled the sales proceeds after recording the deed but before delivering payment to the sellers. The sellers sued the buyers, the lender, and others seeking to set aside the conveyance or obtain damages, but the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the ground that sellers bore the risk of loss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that in settlement-method closings buyers must bear the risk because they enjoy practical advantages in safeguarding against attorney misconduct. The court's reasoning rested on equitable principles long recognized in North Carolina that allocate loss to the party who first reposed confidence in the wrongdoer, and it declined to apply escrow-closing rules to this transaction.
The case concerns a lawsuit filed by plaintiff Paul Christopher Blow against DSM Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Eastern Omni Constructors, Inc., and The Greenwood Group, Inc. d/b/a Manpower Temporary Services. Following an adverse decision by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, reported at 678 S.E.2d 245, the plaintiff petitioned the Supreme Court of North Carolina for discretionary review under G.S. 7A-31. The Supreme Court denied the petition for review by order entered in conference on March 11, 2010, with Justice Martin recused, thereby leaving the Court of Appeals decision undisturbed.
The case involves a dispute between Southeastern Acoustical Ceilings, Inc. and Elder Construction & Associates, Inc. along with St. Barbara Greek Orthodox Church, arising from a judgment by the North Carolina Court of Appeals. The plaintiff filed a petition with the Supreme Court of North Carolina seeking a writ of supersedeas to address that judgment. The Supreme Court denied the petition by an order issued in conference on January 19, 2010. One justice recused from participation in the decision.
This case involved a dispute between the Beaufort County Board of Education and the Beaufort County Board of Commissioners over the level of county funding required for public school operations in fiscal year 2006-2007, after the school board's initial request and subsequent mediation efforts under state law failed to produce agreement. The trial court, following a jury verdict, ordered the county to appropriate $10.2 million, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of N.C.G.S. § 115C-431(c), which authorizes courts to determine the amount of funding necessary to maintain a system of free public schools and to order the county commissioners to appropriate and levy taxes for that sum. The Court reasoned that the statute does not violate separation of powers because the legislature has comprehensively defined educational standards through statutes and State Board of Education policies, allowing the judiciary to perform a limited fact-finding role within those established parameters rather than exercising core legislative power.
This case involved a juvenile petition filed by Cumberland County DSS alleging that four children, including M.B., were abused, neglected, and dependent, with specific references to multiple statutory definitions of abuse but without initial details of sexual abuse of M.B. by the respondent-father. DSS later moved to amend the petition to add factual allegations of sexual abuse based on M.B.'s disclosures, which the trial court allowed; after a hearing, it adjudicated M.B. as abused under two subdivisions of the abuse statute. The Court of Appeals vacated the abuse finding under the sexual-offense subdivision, holding that the amendment changed the nature of the conditions in violation of N.C.G.S. § 7B-800. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the amendment was permissible because the underlying condition remained abuse as defined in N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(1), and the added allegations did not introduce a new condition such as neglect or dependency.
The case was a lawsuit brought by the executor of Alexandr Raymond Johnson-Christmas's estate against Cabarrus County, its Department of Social Services, and multiple named employees in their official and individual capacities. The defendants had appealed an adverse ruling from the North Carolina Court of Appeals and petitioned the state Supreme Court for discretionary review under G.S. 7A-31. The Supreme Court denied the petition in conference without elaboration, leaving the Court of Appeals decision in place. Justice Martin was recused from the matter.
