In State v. Hoover, defendant Anthony Leon Hoover filed a motion in the North Carolina Supreme Court seeking a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum. The court denied the motion by order entered after a conference on July 9, 2012. No further explanation or reasoning was given for the denial, and Justice Hudson took no part in the decision.
In State v. Otto, the North Carolina Supreme Court reviewed whether a traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion after Trooper A.B. Smith stopped Megan Sue Otto's vehicle for weaving constantly within its lane for three-quarters of a mile near an equestrian center hosting an event where alcohol might be served; Otto was later charged with driving while impaired and moved to suppress the resulting evidence. The trial court denied the motion to suppress based in part on a finding that the trooper "knew" the center served alcohol, but the Court of Appeals reversed in a divided opinion. The Supreme Court agreed that the trial court's finding was unsupported because the trooper had only heard that alcohol was served there, yet it reversed the Court of Appeals and upheld the denial of suppression. The Court held that the trooper's observation of the vehicle's constant and continuous weaving within its own lane, without leaving the lane, provided the minimal objective justification needed for reasonable suspicion of impaired driving under the Fourth Amendment, independent of any information about alcohol.
In State v. Beckelheimer, the defendant faced charges of indecent liberties with a child and first-degree sexual offense for allegedly performing oral sex on his eleven-year-old male cousin while pretending to be asleep during a video game session in his bedroom. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, which had held the evidence inadmissible and ordered a new trial, and instead upheld the trial court's admission of testimony from the victim's half-brother describing similar prior acts by the defendant. The Court reasoned that the prior acts met Rule 404(b) requirements due to their sufficient similarity in location, method of approach, progression of conduct, and victim age range, even though they occurred ten to twelve years earlier; it further concluded that any remoteness went to evidentiary weight rather than admissibility, and that the trial court had not abused its discretion under Rule 403 after conducting a voir dire hearing and issuing a limiting instruction.
In State v. Hoover, the North Carolina Supreme Court addressed a motion for writ relief filed by defendant Anthony Leon Hoover in a criminal case. The defendant sought the writ on May 14, 2012. On June 13, 2012, the court dismissed the motion by order entered in conference. Justice Hudson was recused from the proceeding. The excerpt provides no further details on the underlying conviction or the specific grounds for the writ request.
This case involves a motion filed by defendant Anthony Leon Hoover in the North Carolina Supreme Court seeking a writ of mandamus related to a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum. The underlying matter stems from State v. Hoover, a criminal case in which Hoover had previously been convicted. On June 13, 2012, the court dismissed the motion in a conference order without further explanation or hearing. Justice Hudson recused herself from participation. The order provides no additional factual background or legal analysis beyond the dismissal itself.
In Variety Wholesalers, Inc. v. Salem Logistics Traffic Services, LLC, a retailer sued its former logistics provider for breach of contract after Salem failed to pay Variety’s carriers with funds Variety had forwarded under their freight agreement, then added Salem’s secured lender Ark Royal Capital as a defendant upon discovering that Variety’s payments had been deposited into a lockbox account Ark controlled under an asset-based loan. The trial court granted summary judgment to Variety on its conversion claim against Ark while denying relief on the constructive-trust claim; the Court of Appeals reversed and entered judgment for Ark on both claims. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the funds were sufficiently identifiable for a conversion action and whether Ark had the knowledge or notice required to support either conversion or a constructive trust. The Court reasoned that evidence of Ark’s weekly account reviews, board representation, and the commingling of client payments raised triable questions about Ark’s awareness that the funds might not belong to Salem, and that UCC Article 4A did not preempt these state-law claims. The case was therefore remanded for further proceedings.