Susan Phillips Read

The case involved whether the evidence was legally sufficient to convict defendant Christian Bueno of second-degree assault under Penal Law § 120.05(3) for attacking an on-duty EMT with intent to prevent him from performing a lawful duty. After EMT William Spinelli and his partner treated an injured woman at a Brooklyn apartment and were returning to their marked ambulance, Bueno struck Spinelli from behind, threw him to the ground, and repeatedly punched him in the face and head. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the prosecution presented a prima facie case by showing that Bueno attacked someone he had reason to know was an EMT performing duties at the time, based on the uniform, ambulance markings, and the circumstances of the assault immediately after the EMTs left the scene. The majority reasoned that a jury could infer the required intent from the natural and probable consequences of the attack in that context, without needing direct proof of Bueno's subjective motive.

criminal law

This case involved defendant Reynaldo Concepcion's appeal from convictions for weapon possession, drug possession, and assault after a jury trial. The trial court denied his motion to suppress cocaine found in his minivan, ruling that the inevitable discovery doctrine applied even though consent was not proven. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of suppression by instead finding that defendant had consented to the search, a ground the trial court had rejected. The Court of Appeals held that this violated CPL 470.15(1) and its prior decision in People v. LaFontaine, which bars the Appellate Division from affirming on a ground not decided adversely to the defendant below. The court therefore reversed the Appellate Division's order as to the suppression ruling, remitted the matter for further proceedings on the motion, and left the non-drug convictions undisturbed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant Dean Pacquette, who was indicted for second-degree murder, assault, and weapon possession after a 2007 shooting in Brooklyn. He sought to suppress statements made to police, arguing they violated his right to counsel because an attorney assigned to represent him on an unrelated Manhattan drug charge had advised him not to speak to police about the homicide. At a Huntley hearing, testimony conflicted over whether the attorney clearly indicated representation extended to the Brooklyn case or invoked the right to counsel for it; the detectives understood the representation as limited to the drug matter. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of suppression and the conviction, holding that the attorney's statements did not trigger an indelible right to counsel in the homicide investigation under the circumstances of the unrelated arraignment.

criminal lawprocedure

In People v. McKnight, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and attempted murder after he and an accomplice fired multiple shots at Maurice Lingard during a street confrontation, resulting in the death of William Smith due to transferred intent. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences totaling 45 years to life, which the Appellate Division upheld, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court reasoned that under Penal Law § 70.25(2), the offenses did not arise from a single act or an act that was a material element of both, as the shots causing Smith's death and those directed at Lingard constituted separate acts, consistent with precedents like People v. Bonilla.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involves two consolidated appeals in which trustees and shareholders of Refco and AIG sued the companies' outside auditors for allegedly failing to detect or assisting management in committing financial fraud that harmed creditors and investors. The New York Court of Appeals held that the claims were barred under existing precedents on in pari delicto, imputation of agent misconduct to the corporation, and the adverse interest exception. The court reasoned that altering these doctrines to expand liability for professional advisers would require a departure from longstanding common-law principles allocating responsibility between a corporation and its agents, and it declined to do so. The decisions preserved the traditional limits on third-party recovery in cases of corporate fraud.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involved a worker injured when a trench wall collapsed during an emergency repair of a water main beneath a state highway, where his employer had not obtained the required work permit from the Department of Transportation. The worker and his wife sued the State of New York, asserting common-law negligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240, and 241(6) based on inadequate excavation protections required by the Industrial Code. The Court of Appeals held that the State was not subject to liability under Labor Law § 241(6) as an owner because the unauthorized work created no sufficient nexus to impose the statute's nondelegable duty, reversing the lower courts' finding of liability after a trial on the § 241(6) claim. The court reasoned that the permit requirement under Highway Law § 52 meant the State had no ownership relationship triggering the duty in this context, while dismissing negligence claims for lack of notice or control.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

The case consolidated appeals from two defendants who pleaded guilty to sex offenses involving minors and later challenged their convictions on the ground that the trial court failed to advise them during the plea colloquy of the requirement to register as a sex offender under SORA or of potential conditions of probation. The Court of Appeals held that SORA registration and probation conditions are collateral rather than direct consequences of a guilty plea. As a result, a trial court's omission of these topics from the plea hearing does not render the plea unknowing, involuntary, or unintelligent. The court affirmed the convictions, reasoning that only direct consequences must be addressed to ensure a valid plea, while collateral consequences need not be.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute between Janice R., the biological mother of a child conceived through artificial insemination, and Debra H., her former partner in a Vermont civil union formed shortly before the child's birth, over custody, visitation, and parental rights after their separation. Debra H. sought joint legal and physical custody along with restored access, arguing standing based on the civil union and equitable estoppel principles from prior cases. The New York Court of Appeals considered precedents such as Matter of Alison D. v. Virginia M., which limited standing to biological or adoptive parents, and Matter of Shondel J. v. Mark D., along with the legal effects of the Vermont civil union. The court held that the civil union conferred parental status on Debra H. under Vermont law, granting her standing to seek custody and visitation, while rejecting a broader functional or de facto parentage doctrine for New York.

family lawcivil rights

In People v. Tolentino, the defendant was pulled over for playing music too loudly, after which police obtained his name, checked DMV records revealing multiple license suspensions, and arrested him for aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle. He moved to suppress the DMV records as the fruit of an allegedly unlawful stop, but the trial court denied a Mapp hearing on the ground that DMV files are not subject to suppression, and he pleaded guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that under INS v. Lopez-Mendoza a defendant's identity is never suppressible as the fruit of an illegal seizure, so preexisting government records accessed through that identity are likewise not suppressible, and the records were compiled independently by the DMV. The court noted that identity-related evidence remains subject to standard Fourth Amendment attenuation, independent-source, or inevitable-discovery analysis in other circumstances.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a dispute between the City of New York and several police unions over the NYPD's plan to expand the use of hair analysis (RIAH) for drug screening of uniformed officers, replacing urine testing for random, promotional, and specialized-unit testing while keeping the same triggers and consequences. The unions argued that the change was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining under the Taylor Law and local equivalents. The Court of Appeals held that the decision was not subject to bargaining. The core reasoning was that the Police Commissioner's statutory authority over discipline of the department, including the choice of scientific testing methodology and testing triggers, vested him with unilateral discretion to implement the policy.

labor & employmentcriminal law

The case involved defendant George Konstantinides, convicted after a high-speed chase and shootout with police on charges including attempted murder and criminal possession of a weapon. On appeal, he claimed he was denied conflict-free counsel because one of his trial attorneys allegedly attempted to influence witnesses to shift blame for the gun, and that the sentencing court erred by not holding a hearing on the constitutionality of one of his prior felony convictions. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence in full. It reasoned that the defendant failed to show any conflict operated on the defense, and that the record supported the validity of the prior conviction without need for further inquiry.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case concerned whether homelessness qualifies as an inappropriate living situation under risk factor 15 of the risk assessment instrument used to classify defendants under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). The court held that a hearing court may assess 10 points under this factor with clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is undomiciled and lacks any history of shelter living or community ties, and that such evidence was present here from the CJA report and presentence report showing the defendant had been homeless for two years with no address or contacts. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly classified defendant as a level two sex offender, as those points raised his total above the level one threshold. The court rejected a per se rule requiring points for all homeless offenders and noted that future arrangements are assessed prospectively under the guidelines.

criminal law

The case involved a buyer of a luxury condominium unit suing the building's sponsor and related parties for common-law fraud, claiming that construction and design defects were concealed through omissions in the offering plan amendments required under the Martin Act. The court decided that such a fraud claim could not proceed when based solely on those alleged material omissions from the mandated disclosures. The reasoning was that allowing the claim would improperly create a private right of action to enforce Martin Act requirements, as the alleged fraud did not involve independent misrepresentations but rather nondisclosures tied directly to the regulatory filings.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

The case involved a worker injured by an industrial machine purchased used by his employer from Weyerhaeuser 16 years earlier; the worker sued Weyerhaeuser in strict products liability, claiming the machine was defective due to its open architecture without modern safety devices. The New York Court of Appeals, answering a certified question from the Second Circuit, held that Weyerhaeuser could not be held strictly liable. The court reasoned that under precedents like Sukljian, strict liability applies only to regular sellers with continuing ties to manufacturers and a public expectation that they stand behind the goods, neither of which applied to Weyerhaeuser's occasional surplus sales of used equipment on an as-is basis.

torts & liability

In this case, defendant Felix Guerrero pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced to 19 years to life, but the sentencing judge did not orally pronounce the mandatory $150 surcharge and $2 crime victim assistance fee required by Penal Law § 60.35(1), though they appeared on the commitment sheet and worksheet. Guerrero appealed, arguing that CPL 380.20 and 380.40 required these assessments to be pronounced in open court in his presence, as with other sentencing components. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding that the surcharge and fee are not part of a defendant's "sentence" under those CPL provisions because § 60.35(1) explicitly describes them as levied "in addition to any sentence required or permitted by law." The court distinguished these assessments from post-release supervision (which must be pronounced) by examining statutory language, legislative history focused on revenue-raising rather than punishment, and the non-punitive nomenclature of "surcharge" and "fee."

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned the application of New York Judiciary Law § 487, which makes an attorney guilty of a misdemeanor and liable for treble damages if guilty of deceit or collusion with intent to deceive the court or a party. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified questions asking whether liability under the statute requires a successful deceit and whether litigation defense costs can be proximate damages even if the trial court was never misled by false allegations in a complaint about a party's partnership status. The New York Court of Appeals answered both questions affirmatively, holding that the statute focuses on the attorney's intent to deceive rather than actual success, based on its origins in 13th-century English law and its codification in the state's penal law, and that commencing an action on a material misrepresentation necessarily causes the opposing party to incur defense costs.

criminal lawprocedure

In Moran v. Erk, the plaintiffs (sellers) sued the defendants (buyers) for breach of a real estate contract after the buyers' attorney disapproved the deal within the three-day attorney approval period specified in the contract rider, leading to the house eventually selling for less. The lower courts ruled for the sellers, finding bad faith by the buyers in instructing disapproval. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the contract was void upon timely disapproval and that an attorney approval contingency allows disapproval for any reason or none, without an implied good-faith limitation. The core reasoning was that the contract language created no vested rights before approval, and imposing a good-faith duty would conflict with attorney-client confidentiality and the plain meaning of the contingency clause.

property

The case involved a religious corporation's application for an exemption from New York City water and sewer charges for a large building used for worship and religious instruction, which contained two caretaker apartments and undisclosed guest rooms. The Department of Environmental Protection denied the exemption on the grounds that the property was not used exclusively as a place of public worship under the 1887 water exemption statute and related sewer provisions, as only one caretaker dwelling is permitted without a separate meter for non-exempt portions. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the denial, holding that the statute requires exclusive use for the qualifying purpose and that the additional residences rendered the building ineligible absent separate metering.

religious libertypropertytaxes

This case involved a worker injured when struck by a truck backing up at a highway tree-trimming site; the utility NYSEG had obtained a state DOT work permit allowing the project and had hired an independent contractor (the worker's employer) to perform the work. The plaintiff sued NYSEG for negligence, arguing it was vicariously liable because the permit incorporated federal OSHA and state Industrial Code safety rules requiring backup alarms or spotters on vehicles. The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of the claims against NYSEG, holding that the permit conditions did not impose a nondelegable duty on the utility. The court reasoned that utilities must obtain such permits to perform required maintenance and routinely use contractors, so extending vicarious liability would unreasonably expand their exposure without policy justification.

torts & liabilitylabor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case involved a dispute among former partners in a New York law firm that converted from a professional corporation to a registered limited liability partnership. Plaintiff Louis Ederer, who had acquired a 30% equity interest, sought an accounting of his interests in the PC and LLP as well as damages for alleged breaches of oral and written agreements regarding compensation, equity dilution, loans, and payments upon withdrawal. The Court of Appeals held that Partnership Law § 26(b) does not protect individual general partners from personal liability for the partnership's or other partners' obligations to one another, as opposed to liabilities to third parties. The decision rested on the statutory text, legislative history of the limited liability partnership provisions, and the distinction between internal partner obligations and external creditor claims.

business & regulatory