In Silving v. Wells Fargo Bank, plaintiffs challenged a trustee sale of their Arizona home by U.S. Bank after it was offered at auction, filing an eleven-count complaint in state court asserting only Arizona-law claims related to the foreclosure process. Defendants removed the case to federal district court on diversity jurisdiction grounds, and plaintiffs moved to remand, arguing for Burford abstention due to state-law issues of first impression and invoking the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The court denied the motion to remand and request for fees, holding that removal was proper, abstention was inappropriate because Arizona lacks a complex regulatory scheme for trustee sales comparable to Burford, and Rooker-Feldman did not apply absent a prior state-court judgment. The opinion further addressed motions to dismiss various claims but focused its remand analysis on the absence of exceptional circumstances warranting abstention or dismissal.
This case stems from a 2005 single-vehicle rollover accident in Arizona in which two passengers were ejected, resulting in one death and one severe injury; the plaintiffs brought strict product liability, negligence, and wrongful death claims against TRW Vehicle Safety Systems, Inc., alleging defects in the vehicle's seatbelts. After an earlier related suit against other defendants and a related entity was dismissed, the defendant moved for summary judgment on grounds including claim preclusion, lack of admissible expert testimony, superseding cause, and its status as a component supplier, along with motions to exclude experts and to strike the plaintiffs' statement of facts. The court denied all motions, holding that claim preclusion and duplicative litigation doctrines did not apply because the prior action involved different parties and produced no final judgment on the merits against this defendant, that genuine disputes of material fact existed on defect and causation issues precluding summary judgment, and that the controverting statement of facts substantially complied with local rules. Expert admissibility challenges were deferred to trial via motions in limine.
This case concerns environmental groups' challenge to the Bureau of Land Management's decision to allow resumption of uranium mining operations at the Arizona 1 mine near Grand Canyon National Park without requiring a new plan of operations or updated environmental reviews. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, the General Mining Law, and the National Environmental Policy Act, claiming that the 1988 plan of operations had become ineffective after mining ceased in 1992 and that supplemental environmental analysis was required. The court granted the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment in part and denied them in part, holding that the 1988 plan remained effective under BLM regulations, that no new plan or supplemental NEPA review for the mine itself was required, and that BLM's interpretation of its own rules was reasonable and entitled to deference. The court further found that certain ancillary actions, such as a gravel permit, did not trigger additional NEPA obligations for the mine. BLM was directed to document its finding of no significant cumulative environmental impact in a format consistent with a categorical exclusion.
In this case, plaintiff James Surowiec sued escrow agent Scott Romley and Capital Title Agency, Inc., alleging that they failed to disclose prior to closing that his Scottsdale condominium remained encumbered by junior liens held by investors in the development, which prevented him from selling the property and caused financial losses; the amended complaint asserted claims including breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court granted in part defendants' motion for summary judgment, denying it as to compensatory damages but granting it as to punitive damages, denied plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment, and granted in part plaintiff's motions for sanctions. The court reasoned that the evidence, viewed favorably to the plaintiff, provided a reasonable basis for a jury to find more than $100,000 in compensatory damages with sufficient certainty based on the purchase price, comparable sales, and current appraised value, but found no evidence of an evil mind or malice to support punitive damages; it further found that Capital's discovery abuses, including failure to preserve evidence and late production, warranted reimbursement of expenses and attorneys' fees under Rule 37 and the court's inherent powers.
This case involves an appeal from a bankruptcy court judgment in a dispute between Gorilla Companies LLC and the sellers of event management companies (the Corwins and Holdings, LLC) regarding payments under an asset purchase agreement, including a seller note with an earnout based on EBITDA calculations. The bankruptcy court ruled for Gorilla on claims including fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment, awarding over $4.7 million in damages and nearly $1.8 million in attorneys' fees. On appeal, the district court affirmed the judgment in part and reversed in part, reversing the fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims due to lack of evidence of justifiable reliance on the sellers' estimated EBITDA figures, reversing the breach of contract and related claims along with associated damages and fees, and affirming the unjust enrichment claim plus certain adjustments to the EBITDA calculation. The court reviewed factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo, remanding for further proceedings on fees.
This case concerns the U.S. Department of the Interior's 2010 decision to take a 54-acre parcel of land in Glendale, Arizona, into trust for the Tohono O’odham Nation under the Gila Bend Indian Reservation Lands Replacement Act, enabling the Nation to develop a casino on the property. Plaintiffs, including the Gila River Indian Community and local governments, challenged the decision as violating the Administrative Procedure Act, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, and constitutional provisions such as the Tenth Amendment and Indian Commerce Clause. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the Trust Decision satisfied the statutory requirements of the Gila Bend Act and was not arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise unlawful. The court reasoned that the land acquisition aligned with the Act's purpose of replacing flooded reservation lands and promoting tribal economic self-sufficiency, that IGRA's settlement-of-a-land-claim exception applied, and that Congress's actions fell within its authority under the Indian Commerce Clause without infringing state powers.
