Karen K. Caldwell

This case involved criminal charges against Bryan Coffman and others for mail fraud, wire fraud, and securities fraud under the Securities Exchange Act, stemming from alleged misrepresentations in soliciting investors for an oil and gas drilling business with operations involving Canadian sales offices and investors. The defendant moved to dismiss certain counts, arguing that the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. barred prosecution because the scheme occurred abroad and the statutes lack extraterritorial reach. The court denied the motion as to the mail and wire fraud counts, reasoning that those statutes focus on the use of U.S. mail and interstate wires rather than the location of the fraudulent scheme or victims. As to the securities fraud count, the court denied the motion without prejudice as premature, permitting the defendant to renew it after the government's case-in-chief to allow further factual development on whether the transactions qualified as domestic.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves loans totaling over $2 million made by Fifth Third Bank to Robert Waxman and Vandalay Racing, LLC, which were guaranteed by Robert Waxman, Debra Waxman, and Vandalay. Fifth Third sued for breach after the loans went into default, and the bank moved for partial summary judgment. The court granted the motion, awarding the bank specific judgment amounts against the defendants jointly and severally plus daily interest, because the defendants had admitted signing the loan and guaranty documents, failing to make required payments, and defaulting, with no genuine disputes of material fact or counterclaims raised. The court rejected the defendants' mitigation defense, finding no evidence that the bank's actions to protect collateral were unreasonable or inconsistent with the agreements.

business & regulatory

In Sparkman v. Thompson, plaintiffs Phillip Sparkman and Ralph Dyer, Knott County employees who supported Thompson's opponent in the 2006 election for Judge Executive, alleged that Thompson terminated Sparkman and issued warnings and laid off Dyer due to their political activities, violating their First Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thompson moved for summary judgment, arguing the employment decisions were not politically motivated, while plaintiffs sought partial summary judgment claiming sufficient evidence of retaliation. The court denied both motions, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding whether there was a substantial connection between the plaintiffs' political support and the adverse employment actions, and that neither party had met the burden for summary judgment under the applicable standards for political retaliation claims.

free speechcivil rightslabor & employmentelections

This case was a class action lawsuit brought by owners of oil and gas interests in Kentucky against Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., NiSource Inc., and Columbia Energy Group, alleging breach of contract, fraud, civil conspiracy, and related claims concerning underpayment of royalties, improper deductions for post-production expenses, misrepresentations on royalty statements, and sales of gas below market value under certain predecessor contracts. After providing notice to class members, considering objections, and conducting a fairness hearing, the court approved the settlement agreement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) as fair, reasonable, and adequate. The court also approved the plan of allocation, which distributes settlement funds based on lease type, duration, interest proportion, gas volume produced from 1992 to 2009, and a weighting formula, as well as class counsel's motion for attorney's fees. The complaint was dismissed with prejudice, with the court retaining jurisdiction to administer and enforce the settlement.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

In Bentley v. Thompson, three former Knott County employees sued the county and its Judge-Executive Randy Thompson under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging they were laid off in retaliation for supporting Thompson's opponent in the 2006 election and, in one case, testifying before a grand jury about misappropriation of funds, in violation of their First Amendment rights. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the layoffs were due to budget shortfalls and not political reasons. The court denied the motion, finding that the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence of a causal connection between their protected conduct and the layoffs, including statements from officials and inconsistencies in the defendants' explanations, creating genuine issues of material fact that require a trial.

free speechcivil rightselectionslabor & employment

This case involves minority shareholders suing Goose Creek Energy, Inc., its related holding company, officers, and affiliated entities for self-dealing transactions, mismanagement of coal mining operations, failure to issue stock certificates or pay dividends, and lack of corporate transparency. The court ruled on motions to dismiss, summary judgment, and related procedural motions, granting dismissal of some claims including certain derivative fiduciary duty claims under Kentucky statutes for failure to follow procedural rules such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1, unjust enrichment claims against individual defendants, and other claims against specific parties, while denying dismissal of unjust enrichment claims against the corporate defendants and some accounting and fiduciary claims. The plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was denied. These outcomes rested on clarifying the plaintiffs' stock ownership, identifying which claims applied to which defendants, and distinguishing between direct and derivative claims.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerned a First Amendment challenge by plaintiff McQueary to specific provisions in a Kentucky law (enacted via HB 333 and SB 93) that restricted picketing, demonstrating, and certain expressive activities within 300 feet of funerals or memorial services. The court had previously granted a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the challenged sections, but the Kentucky General Assembly later amended the statute to remove those provisions, leaving only unchallenged rules on disorderly conduct and funeral disruption in effect. The court held that the case was moot due to the legislative changes. It further decided that the plaintiff was not entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, reasoning that the preliminary injunction did not establish prevailing party status in light of the amendments and that other existing laws would likely bar the plaintiff's proposed activities anyway.

free speechcivil rights

In Browning v. Pennerton, a federal prisoner brought Bivens claims against officials at USP-Big Sandy alleging that they violated the Eighth Amendment by deliberately disregarding his warnings that another inmate posed a threat to his safety, resulting in a physical attack, and by providing inadequate medical treatment afterward. The court denied the motion to dismiss the failure-to-protect claims against defendants Batts, Fazenbaker, Pennington, and Edwards, but granted dismissal of the medical claims against those defendants as well as all claims against defendants Hastings and Gourdoze. It also denied the plaintiff's various procedural motions, though the motion to amend the complaint was denied without prejudice. The rulings turned on whether the complaint sufficiently alleged deliberate indifference to safety and medical needs under the Eighth Amendment and the limits of FTCA liability for constitutional claims.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

The case involved Patricia Miracle suing Wal-Mart for negligence after an overhead receiving dock door struck her on the head while she attempted to enter the back of a store to obtain boxes for her daughter. Miracle had driven to the rear of the store without first seeking permission inside, followed a vendor through the door after it was opened in response to a buzzer, and was injured when an employee began closing it. The court granted Wal-Mart's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint, holding that Miracle was a trespasser rather than a licensee. The core reasoning was that Wal-Mart employees had no knowledge of her presence outside the door, no reason to anticipate her there, and no evidence supported an express or implied invitation to enter the restricted area where customers were not permitted.

torts & liabilityproperty

The case involved Long John Silver’s, Inc. suing three corporate franchisees for breach of franchise agreements and five individual guarantors for breach of related guaranty agreements arising from Long John Silver’s restaurants in Georgia. The court addressed three motions: one guarantor’s challenge to personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff’s request to amend the complaint to add claims against that guarantor, and the remaining guarantors’ motion to dismiss or transfer for improper venue. The court granted the motion to dismiss claims against guarantor Mehboob A. Malik for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding insufficient contacts with Kentucky, denied the motion to amend, and denied the venue motion because a substantial part of the events could have occurred in the Eastern District of Kentucky under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2).

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerns whether a debtor filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy may deduct standardized "Ownership Costs" under the means test for a vehicle that the debtor owns free and clear of any debt or lease payments. The district court granted rehearing and affirmed the bankruptcy court's order permitting the deduction. The court interpreted the Bankruptcy Code's reference to "applicable monthly expense amounts specified under the ... Local Standards" to mean the fixed amounts listed in the IRS tables, rather than conditioning the deduction on an actual loan or lease obligation, because the statute separately excludes debt payments from the means-test calculation. The ruling noted that the means test creates only a presumption of abuse and that trustees may still challenge petitions based on bad faith or the totality of the circumstances.

procedurefederal power

In Baker v. Astrue, plaintiff Linda L. Baker sought Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income, alleging onset of disability in 2004 due to back, leg, and foot impairments, arthritis, headaches, anxiety, depression, and related limitations on sitting, standing, concentration, and interacting with others. The ALJ denied benefits after determining that Baker's impairments did not meet or equal a listed impairment, that her residual functional capacity allowed light work with restrictions, and that she could perform jobs existing in significant numbers. The district court granted summary judgment to the Commissioner, holding that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence, that treating and examining source opinions were properly weighed under the regulations, and that inconsistencies in the medical record and daily activities justified rejecting claims of total disability. The court found no error in the ALJ's evaluation of GAF scores, treatment notes from Comp Care and Pineville Hospital, or the vocational expert testimony.

federal powerhealthcare

In Cloud v. Beckstrom, Petitioner James E. Cloud, convicted of first-degree robbery in Kentucky state court after pleading guilty to a twenty-year sentence, filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Cloud claimed his attorney gave incorrect advice on parole eligibility and failed to communicate a more favorable plea offer, asserting he would have gone to trial or accepted the better deal but for these errors. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommended disposition, overruling Cloud's objections and denying the petition with prejudice. The court reasoned that even assuming deficient performance, Cloud suffered no prejudice under Strickland v. Washington because Kentucky law on first-degree robbery liability made his proposed defense unlikely to succeed at trial and because the alternative plea offer had already expired by the relevant date. The court also denied a certificate of appealability.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, Verizon Wireless challenged the Frankfort/Franklin County Planning Commission's denial of its application to build a 307-foot cell tower on leased property in a rural residential zone. The Commission denied the permit citing local zoning rules on visual impact to neighbors and the preference against towers in residential areas. Verizon sued under the federal Telecommunications Act, arguing the denial was neither issued in writing nor supported by substantial evidence as required by 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). The court granted summary judgment to Verizon on the federal claim, finding the Commission's stated reasons insufficient under the statutory standard, and ordered the Commission to approve the application and issue the necessary permits. The court dismissed the related state-law claims without prejudice.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case involved Russell B. Hill's pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his 2002 state convictions for murder, first-degree burglary, and first-degree wanton endangerment arising from a 2001 shooting. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, denied the petition, and overruled Hill's objections. Although Hill did not dispute the timeliness calculation, the court held that the petition was filed well after the one-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) had run, even after tolling during his state collateral attack, and rejected his constitutional challenges to the limitations period under the First Amendment and Suspension Clause. The core reasoning was that the procedural deadline is a valid limit on habeas relief and does not suspend the writ or abridge petition rights, consistent with Supreme Court precedent.

criminal lawfederal powerprocedure

The case involved Crystal Hibbard's application for Social Security Disability Benefits, which alleged disability from a combination of physical and mental impairments including back pain, scoliosis, anxiety, and carpal tunnel syndrome, with an amended onset date in 2004. The court denied Hibbard's motion for summary judgment and granted the Commissioner's motion, thereby upholding the ALJ's denial of benefits. The court found that the ALJ's conclusion of no severe impairment was supported by substantial evidence, including medical records that did not document work-related functional limitations, the absence of mental health treatment, and the plaintiff's reported ability to perform daily activities such as cooking, shopping, and caring for personal needs.

healthcarefederal power

The case involves a minor plaintiff with severe disabilities who was involuntarily committed to a state-run facility for individuals with mental retardation, which was later managed by a private corporation under contract with Kentucky; the plaintiff alleged repeated physical abuse by staff and other residents and brought federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Medicaid Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, along with numerous state-law claims. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the constitutional claims, finding insufficient allegations of state action by the private defendants to support § 1983 liability. It also dismissed the Medicaid Act claim but denied dismissal of the Rehabilitation Act claim against all defendants and the state-law claims against the corporate defendant, while dismissing some state claims against individual defendants. The court retained supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims because they formed part of the same case or controversy as the surviving federal claim. The decision rested on the standards for motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and analysis of state-action doctrine under the Sixth Circuit's precedents.

civil rightshealthcareproceduretorts & liability

The case concerned Kentucky's anti-price gouging statute (KRS § 367.372 et seq.), which the Governor activated via executive order after Hurricane Katrina to prohibit sales of gasoline and other goods at grossly inflated prices during the declared emergency; the state Attorney General sued Marathon Petroleum in state court for alleged violations during that period. Marathon filed this federal action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing the Kentucky Act was preempted by federal law and otherwise unconstitutional, and later moved to amend its complaint. The district court granted the Attorney General's motion to dismiss, holding that Younger abstention required it to refrain from interfering with the parallel state-court enforcement proceeding. The court also denied leave to file an amended complaint as futile on the same abstention grounds and denied the remaining procedural motions.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this product liability action, the plaintiffs alleged that a 1994 Toyota pickup truck was defective because a dust seal on the steering column deteriorated and allowed carbon monoxide to enter the passenger compartment, causing the deaths of Joshua Early and Timothy Mullins. The plaintiffs sought to introduce expert testimony from Jay Nogan on design defects and inadequate warnings related to the seal. The court granted Toyota's motion to exclude Nogan's testimony after a Daubert hearing. The ruling was based on findings that Nogan lacked sufficient qualifications in the relevant areas and that his opinions were unreliable because they were not supported by scientific testing, peer review, or established methodology, and failed to account for alternative causes.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In this case, Black Mountain Energy Corporation sought a declaratory judgment that the Kentucky Perpetuities Act of 1960, which extinguishes old possibilities of reverter unless preserved by filing notice, is unconstitutional under the Contracts Clause and Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The dispute arose from a 1932 deed conveying property to a school board with a reversionary interest to the grantor if the land ceased to be used for school purposes; Black Mountain acquired that interest but no preservation notice was filed. The court denied the request, holding that the Act did not substantially impair contractual obligations in a manner violating the Constitution and that the five-year grace period provided adequate notice to satisfy due process requirements, relying on Supreme Court precedent regarding similar statutes.

property