The case involved the Town of Seabrook appealing a decision by the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services granting NextEra Energy Seabrook tax exemptions under RSA 72:12-a for various facilities at the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant claimed to control air or water pollution. The court reviewed the statutory requirements that facilities must perform treatment to reduce pollution and affirmed exemptions for some listed items while reversing others that did not qualify as treatment facilities. It rejected the town's arguments for a public hearing, application of res judicata or collateral estoppel from prior exemptions, and use of an adjudicative process, finding the DES proceeding non-adversarial and noting material changes since earlier applications.
The case concerned whether defendant Steven Forest was entitled to 1,154 days of pretrial confinement credit under RSA 651-A:23 toward his sentences for conspiracy to commit burglary and accomplice liability for burglary. Forest had been arrested on new burglary charges while on parole from a prior drug conviction and was held simultaneously on parole violation warrants; he argued that because his parole had not yet been revoked, the entire period of incarceration should count as pretrial confinement on the burglary charges. The Superior Court denied the credit, and the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the time was properly credited against Forest's underlying sentence pursuant to RSA 651-A:19 and that awarding it again on the new charges would constitute impermissible double credit. The court reasoned that RSA 651-A:23 applies only when a defendant is not under a sentence of confinement, and here the incarceration was allocated to the prior sentence; it also noted that Forest had waived his right to a prompt parole revocation hearing. The sentences on the burglary charges were imposed consecutive to any parole setback.
This case involved a declaratory judgment action over coverage under an automobile insurance policy issued by Liberty Mutual to Rebecca Rivera's parents. Rivera was injured when her passenger grabbed the steering wheel, causing a crash; the passenger was convicted of assault, and his own insurer denied coverage. The trial court ruled that the policy's liability coverage was excluded because the passenger used the vehicle without a reasonable belief he was entitled to do so, but that uninsured motorist coverage applied despite an owned-vehicle exclusion in the policy. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed, holding that state law (RSA 264:15, I) requires uninsured motorist coverage for a lawful operator of the insured vehicle regardless of policy exclusions to the contrary. The court rejected arguments that the exclusion could be harmonized with the statutes or that out-of-state precedents supported denial of coverage.
The case involved petitioner David Fischer, who was arrested on second-degree assault and related misdemeanor charges and challenged superior court bail orders setting $50,000 cash bail (convertible to personal recognizance upon SCCC approval of residence) with conditions including supervision, GPS monitoring, and house arrest by Strafford County Community Corrections (SCCC), an executive-branch agency. Fischer appealed, arguing that the orders unconstitutionally delegated judicial authority to SCCC to decide his release on personal recognizance bail, violating separation of powers. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the orders, holding that SCCC's limited discretion to assess its capacity to supervise proposed residences did not constitute decision-making on bail itself, as the court retained ultimate authority and merely structured alternative consequences based on SCCC's input. The court reasoned that this arrangement reflected cooperative accommodation between branches rather than an improper delegation, noting that SCCC's role was akin to making recommendations within its expertise.
This case involves consolidated appeals from decisions of the New Hampshire Personnel Appeals Board regarding the terminations of two employees at the Sununu Youth Services Center following an incident in which they participated in the physical restraint of a juvenile resident. Timothy Alexander, a permanent Youth Counselor III, was dismissed for using excessive force by pushing the resident from behind without warning, leading to a takedown; the board upheld his termination, and the court affirmed that decision after reviewing the record and finding it neither unjust nor unreasonable under the applicable standard. William Harris, a probationary Youth Counselor I, was dismissed for failing to report the incident, complete an incident report, and be truthful during the investigation; the board reinstated him after finding the penalty too severe, but the court reversed that ruling on certiorari review because the board lacked authority to interfere with the appointing authority's discretion once it determined the dismissal was not arbitrary, illegal, capricious, or in bad faith.
The case involved Say Pease IV, LLC and Say Pease, LLC challenging an assessment of New Hampshire's real estate transfer tax by the Department of Revenue Administration on a transfer of a 47.5% interest in a real estate holding company (TIG) made to satisfy a lender's requirement that all entities be single-purpose bankruptcy-remote entities before approving a $10.5 million mortgage. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the superior court's reversal of the DRA's assessment, holding that the transfer was not taxable. The court reasoned through statutory interpretation that the transfer did not constitute a "contractual transfer" under RSA 78-B:1-a, II because it lacked the required bargained-for exchange, and alternatively that it qualified for exemption as a "noncontractual transfer" under RSA 78-B:1-a, III and RSA 78-B:2, IX.