James Jeremiah Shea

The case involved a challenge by the Transparent Election Initiative and Jeff Mangan to the Montana Attorney General's revised ballot statement for constitutional initiative CI-135, which would amend the state constitution to limit the powers of artificial persons such as corporations, nonprofits, and unions by prohibiting them from spending money to influence elections and imposing penalties like revocation of legal status for violations. The petitioners argued that the Attorney General's statement violated Montana law by being inaccurate, argumentative, or prejudicial, and they sought court approval of their own version instead. The Supreme Court held that the Attorney General had authority to revise the statement after determining the original proposal was noncompliant, but it found one sentence in his version improper and ordered it removed. The court then certified the amended statement to the Secretary of State, reasoning that the revised language otherwise provided a true and impartial explanation as required by statute while respecting the Attorney General's discretion in drafting.

electionsfree speechbusiness & regulatory

This case concerns a post-dissolution child custody dispute in which Clark Ryan Ramsey appealed the Montana District Court's refusal to relinquish jurisdiction over parenting plan matters to a Virginia court under the UCCJEA. After the Montana court had entered a final parenting plan granting primary custody to Whitney Lynn Soderholm in Virginia, Ramsey filed a motion in Montana to surrender jurisdiction, claiming the court no longer had authority or that Montana was an inconvenient forum; he had also initiated related proceedings in Virginia alleging abuse. The District Court denied the motion, concluding it retained jurisdiction because Ramsey resided in Montana and the forum was not inconvenient given its familiarity with the case. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, determining that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in retaining jurisdiction as no pending Virginia proceeding required relinquishment and the relevant statutory factors supported Montana's continued role.

family lawprocedure

The case involved Michael Todd Smith, who was convicted in Montana district court of five counts of sexual abuse of children based on possession of child pornography found on laptops seized from his home during a 2015 search. Smith appealed the convictions, arguing primarily that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated by a multi-year pre-arrest delay, along with challenges to the denial of a motion to compel and the admission of certain trial exhibits. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's rulings and the convictions in full, concluding after applying the four-factor balancing test from State v. Ariegwe that the delay did not violate Smith's speedy trial rights, that the district court did not abuse its discretion on the evidentiary and discovery issues, and that sufficient evidence supported the jury's verdict. A partial dissent would have reversed on speedy trial grounds due to the length of the delay and unrebutted prejudice.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved James “Buck” MacLaurin Jr. suing Fischer Law for legal malpractice, alleging that advice in 2020 to convey his property interest to a trust caused him to lose his right of survivorship in jointly owned property after Mary MacLaurin's death. The district court dismissed the claim, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that a 1987 life estate deed to Mary had already severed the joint tenancy by destroying the necessary unities of ownership, meaning the 2020 conveyance did not cause the loss of survivorship rights. Therefore, Buck failed to plead a viable malpractice claim as the lawyer's actions were not the cause of any damage.

propertytorts & liability

In State v. Steffens, the defendant was convicted of felony sexual assault for subjecting his young niece to sexual contact on multiple occasions between 2009 and 2013 when she was under fourteen years old. Steffens appealed, seeking plain error review of jury instructions on mental state, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to those instructions, and arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove sexual contact or the requisite intent. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the instructions were not plainly erroneous, that counsel's performance did not prejudice the outcome, and that the victim's testimony describing repeated touching of private areas during a secretive game was sufficient for a jury to infer the defendant's intent to gratify sexual desire. The court emphasized that credibility determinations and inferences from conduct are within the jury's province and that settled precedent supported the sufficiency of the evidence.

criminal law

In Heaven v. Weber, Matthew Heaven appealed a district court order denying his motions to disqualify Judge Molly Owen, declaring him a vexatious litigant, and enjoining him from filing further pleadings without leave of court in an underlying civil action against the Webers for breach of contract, fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the disqualification motions, concluding that the judge correctly applied the Montana Code of Judicial Conduct and that no objective basis for bias existed. It also determined that the district court had transmitted an adequate record on appeal. However, the court reversed the vexatious litigant designation and pre-filing order, holding that the district court abused its discretion by failing to provide Heaven notice and an opportunity to be heard and by not making sufficient findings under the four-factor test for such restrictions, and remanded for further proceedings on that issue.

procedurecivil rights

This case involves three beneficiaries of the Estate of Ian Elliot appealing the district court's denial of their motion to intervene in derivative litigation against Joseph Womack concerning Starfire, L.P., along with the denial of their motions for a new trial or relief from judgment and the dismissal of the case. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's orders in a memorandum opinion. The court applied an abuse of discretion standard of review and rejected the appellants' request for de novo review, holding that their due process and intervention arguments lacked merit because they repeated claims already decided in prior appeals, including Elliot IV where settlements by the special administrator were approved as reasonable. The court noted this was the twelfth appeal related to the Elliot estates and Starfire matters, and found that the appellants had waived or failed to preserve many issues.

family lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved a petition by Transparent Election Initiative and Jeff Mangan seeking a declaratory judgment that the Montana Attorney General erred in rejecting Ballot Issue 9 (BI-9) as legally insufficient. BI-9 proposed amending the Montana Constitution to limit the powers of artificial persons, such as corporations, by prohibiting them from expending money to influence elections and defining related terms and penalties. The Attorney General had determined that BI-9 violated the separate-vote requirement of Article XIV, Section 11, of the Montana Constitution, similar to a prior rejected initiative. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that BI-9 constituted a single coherent amendment focused on restricting political spending power by artificial persons and did not require voters to approve multiple distinct changes at once. Dissenting opinions argued that the measure included additional limitations on corporate powers beyond political spending, necessitating separate votes.

electionsfree speechbusiness & regulatory

The case involved Amber Rose D'Hooge, who slipped and fell at an auto repair shop insured by Cincinnati Insurance Company, after which Cincinnati initially accepted liability and paid some medical bills and lost wages but later contested the claim during settlement negotiations. D'Hooge sued Cincinnati asserting claims including promissory estoppel, breach of contract, spoliation, and equitable estoppel, along with several others. The Montana Supreme Court held that the pre-2023 version of § 33-18-242, MCA, does not limit third-party claimants to only statutory or common law bad faith claims against insurers, reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Cincinnati on spoliation and equitable estoppel, affirmed the denial of D'Hooge's partial summary judgment motion and the dismissal of her promissory estoppel, breach of contract, and insufficiently pled claims such as unjust enrichment, and remanded for further proceedings.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Bobby Lowry appealing sanctions imposed by the Montana State Electrical Board for unlicensed electrical work. The Board entered default against Lowry after he failed to comply with discovery requests and imposed a $5,000 civil penalty, which the Board later adopted in its final order following an adjudication meeting. Lowry sought judicial review, claiming the Board erred by denying his request for an interpreter due to his hearing impairment. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the petition, concluding that Lowry had not shown any prejudice to his substantial rights from the lack of an interpreter.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatorycivil rightsprocedure

In State v. Cole, the defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for felony DUI (fourth or subsequent offense), challenging the district court's imposition of the $5,000 mandatory minimum fine under § 61-8-731(1)(a)(iii), MCA (2019), after the court found he lacked the ability to pay and suspended $4,900 of it contingent on probation compliance. The district court had conducted an inquiry into Cole's finances, including his Social Security income and housing situation, before crediting $100 for jail time and ordering $0 payment in the final judgment. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the sentence was legal because the court had statutory authority to impose the fine and suspend the unpaid portion based on ability to pay, consistent with sentencing statutes and without violating excessive fines protections. The majority rejected facial unconstitutionality claims, distinguishing from prior precedent and upholding the mandatory minimum through this procedural approach.

criminal law

In this case, Amanda Walton appealed her convictions in Montana state court for sexual abuse of children by accountability, incest by accountability, incest, and endangering the welfare of children, based on allegations that she participated in or abetted her husband's sexual abuse of her son and daughter and exposed the children to methamphetamine. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that evidence of Walton's prior bad acts was properly admitted under Rules 404(b) and 403 to show lack of mistake, lack of accident, and a plan relevant to whether her participation was voluntary. The court also upheld the admission of testimony from a blind expert witness on the dynamics of child sexual abuse and delayed disclosure, ruling that the general testimony educated the jury without vouching for the victims' credibility and did not require a Daubert analysis on plain error review.

criminal lawprocedure

Rex Allen sued his former public defender Lisa Kauffman for legal malpractice and alleged state constitutional violations stemming from her representation in a 2016 felony partner or family member assault case, where a 2012 Georgia conviction was used to enhance the charge to felony level; Allen later had the conviction reduced to misdemeanor after the Georgia offense was deemed an improper predicate. The district court dismissed the complaint as time-barred under the three-year statute of limitations in § 27-2-206, MCA. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that Allen had discovered the alleged negligence by the time of his 2017 guilty plea and that harm for purposes of a criminal malpractice claim requires successful prior challenge to or exoneration of the underlying conviction.

criminal lawproceduretorts & liability

This case involved brothers Allen and John Munro, along with Allen's wife Linda, where Allen and Linda sued John for breach of contract and fraud after he failed to repay a loan. A jury awarded them damages, the judgment was affirmed on appeal, and John later sought to vacate it under Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) citing a third party's fraud conviction and usurious interest. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of the motions, reasoning that the matter had been fully litigated, the issues were previously addressed or waived, and Rule 60(b)(6) requires extraordinary circumstances not present here.

proceduretorts & liabilityfamily law

In State v. Lally, the defendant had pled guilty to two counts of felony theft and received suspended sentences that were later revoked in 2024, leading to a dispute over the amount of elapsed time credit to be applied to his new sentences. The district court credited him with 616 days based on the parties' agreement at the revocation hearing, but Lally argued on appeal that he was entitled to 102 additional days. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that Lally waived any objection by failing to raise the issue and explicitly agreeing to the calculation during the hearing. The court rejected application of the Lenihan exception for unlawful sentences, citing recent precedents that treated similar elapsed-time claims as waivable issues rather than illegal sentences. The case was decided by memorandum opinion under the court's internal rules for settled questions of law.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Padilla-Canales, an undocumented immigrant defendant appealed his forty-year prison sentence for mitigated deliberate homicide after pleading guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, claiming the district court rendered his plea involuntary by failing to advise him of potential immigration consequences at the change-of-plea hearing. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's sentencing order. The court declined to exercise plain error review over the unpreserved claim, reasoning that the defendant had received an earlier immigration advisement in justice court, the district court had confirmed his understanding of the proceedings after addressing language concerns with counsel, and the overall record did not show he was unaware that his guilty plea would likely result in deportation.

criminal lawprocedureimmigration

This case involved Isaac Trimble's appeal of a district court order affirming a justice court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence from a traffic stop that led to his DUI conviction. Trimble had been stopped for speeding, after which the officer observed an odor of alcohol, bloodshot and watery eyes, and other behaviors that prompted field sobriety tests and arrest. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' rulings, holding that the officer had particularized suspicion to expand the stop into a DUI investigation based on specific observations including the alcohol odor from the vehicle, the driver's eyes, apparent confusion, and delayed slowing near a marked patrol vehicle. The court explained that such facts, considered together under the totality of the circumstances, supported reasonable inferences of impairment without needing a checklist of factors. Trimble had pled guilty to an amended DUI per se charge while reserving the right to appeal the suppression issue.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a petition by Montanans for Nonpartisan Courts seeking a declaratory judgment that Ballot Issue 6 (BI-6), which would amend the Montana Constitution to require nonpartisan judicial elections for all courts and prohibit appointments for judges on new courts, was legally sufficient under state law. The Attorney General had rejected the initiative as legally insufficient, finding it violated the separate-vote requirement of Article XIV, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution by combining multiple distinct amendments into one ballot measure. The Supreme Court of Montana exercised original jurisdiction to review that determination and affirmed the Attorney General's decision. The Court reasoned that BI-6 contained two substantive changes—preserving nonpartisan elections for existing judicial positions and barring appointments for new courts—that were not closely related, which would prevent voters from expressing separate preferences on each and risked logrolling, contrary to the purposes of the separate-vote provision.

electionsprocedure

In MNC v. Knudsen, the Montana Supreme Court addressed a petition by Montanans for Nonpartisan Courts challenging the Attorney General's revised ballot statement for Constitutional Initiative 132, which would amend Article VII of the Montana Constitution to add a section stating that judicial elections shall remain nonpartisan. The petitioner claimed the Attorney General's statement violated § 13-27-212, MCA, by being argumentative, misleading, and prejudicial, particularly through its use of the word "mandates" and its definition of nonpartisan elections, while the Attorney General maintained that the initiative would alter the constitutional status quo since the constitution is currently silent on the issue. The Court considered whether the revised statement complied with statutory requirements and whether the petitioners' proposed alternative was compliant, ultimately determining that the Attorney General's version did not meet the standards and altering the statement accordingly based on its assessment of accuracy and neutrality. A dissent argued that the Attorney General's statement was adequate and should be upheld.

elections

This case involves the dissolution of the common-law marriage between Bridget J. Kelly and Joseph S. Camp III after extensive proceedings that included a 2018 bench trial and Final Decree distributing the marital estate and ordering support payments. Joseph appealed the district court's denial of his motion to set aside the Final Decree and for a new trial, claiming error under Montana statutes §§ 40-4-253 and -254 because the parties had not exchanged final disclosure statements. The Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that Joseph had never previously raised the disclosure issue despite participating in multiple proceedings and appeals, and thus could not challenge the decree on that basis. The court also awarded Bridget attorney fees and costs on appeal under M. R. App. P. 19(5) due to the lack of merit and remanded to determine the amount.

family lawprocedure