Laurie McKinnon

This case involved Kevin and Heidi Cuatt's attempt to enforce a $362,000 Florida court judgment against Xena Benedetto and Christian Benedetto in Montana by filing a notice of foreign judgment. Benedetto moved to vacate the filing for lack of notice, stay enforcement pending Florida appeals, and disqualify the Cuatts' attorney due to an alleged conflict from a prior unrelated representation by the attorney's law firm. The district court denied all motions, finding actual notice had been received and statutory requirements under § 25-9-504, MCA, were met, no security or compliance with appellate rules for a stay was shown, and no relevant confidential information from the prior matter existed. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Benedetto's claims of insufficient notice were contradicted by her own acknowledgments, the attorney disqualification was properly denied under professional conduct rules as the matters were unrelated, and the district court correctly applied settled law on enforcement and stays.

procedure

The plaintiffs, Ronald Allen Trow and Rodney Owen Skurdal, filed a declaratory judgment action against the State of Montana and Yellowstone County alleging that a justice of the peace violated their rights by refusing to allow Skurdal, a non-attorney, to represent Trow in Trow's pending criminal case. The district court dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiffs were collaterally estopped from relitigating the representation issue. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the prior decision in Skurdal v. Walker had already determined that Skurdal could not represent Trow because he was not licensed to practice law and that all elements of collateral estoppel were met.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a child custody dispute between Jonathan Edward Allen (Father) and Petronella Gerline Allen (Mother) over their daughter R.A.A., who had lived in Montana before being taken to the Netherlands in 2023. Father filed an emergency motion for temporary custody and a petition for a permanent parenting plan in Montana district court after foreign courts in the Netherlands had addressed related custody and Hague Convention issues. The district court denied the motion and dismissed the petition without prejudice, concluding it lacked jurisdiction because Montana was no longer the child's home state under the UCCJEA as she had not resided there for more than two years. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined it had no child custody jurisdiction and that Montana must recognize and enforce valid foreign judgments on the matter.

family law

The case Kalarchik v. State involved plaintiffs challenging Montana state policies, including Senate Bill 458 and related administrative rules and MVD policies, that restricted amendments to sex designations on birth certificates and driver's licenses except in limited circumstances such as clerical errors. The district court granted a preliminary injunction after finding the policies likely violated Montana's equal protection clause, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed. The court first determined that the plaintiffs had standing to bring the challenge on behalf of themselves and similarly situated individuals. It then held that the district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in concluding that the four preliminary injunction factors were met, primarily based on the equal protection claim, while avoiding a full merits decision on other constitutional issues.

civil rightsprocedure

In State v. Trombley, the defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss a felony Bail Jumping charge under § 45-7-308, MCA, after he failed to appear at a scheduled hearing despite being released on conditions. Trombley argued that the statute was unconstitutionally vague due to the undefined term "lawful excuse" and that the State's information failed to allege facts establishing probable cause by negating any lawful excuse. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the denial, holding that the statute is not vague as applied to Trombley's conduct of failing to appear and that "lawful excuse" functions as an affirmative defense that the defendant must raise, rather than an element the State must disprove in the charging documents. The court reasoned that the information sufficiently alleged the elements of the offense and provided adequate notice, and that the State is not required to negate exceptions or defenses in an information or affidavit.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves post-dissolution disputes between former spouses Guy Nevin and Tanya Saueressig over child support arrearages for their daughter S.N. and enforcement of a property settlement agreement regarding student loan obligations. The District Court found Nevin in contempt and ordered him to pay $72,800 in child support under the original parenting plan while denying his motion to hold Saueressig in contempt for failing to remove him from the loan. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court reversed the child support order, concluding that equitable estoppel applied because S.N. had primarily resided with Nevin since late 2019 and Saueressig had acquiesced in the nonpayment, and affirmed the denial of contempt against Saueressig on the grounds that she had generally complied with the agreement and no blatant abuse of discretion occurred.

family lawproperty

This case involved Adam Haggag's appeal of a permanent order of protection issued by the Montana District Court that barred him from contact with his minor children A.H. and J.H. until they turn 18, following the dissolution of his marriage to Shanay Darrah and prior temporary protection orders and parenting plans from North Dakota and Montana courts. The District Court had found that Haggag failed to comply with conditions such as mental health evaluations and parenting classes, violated prior orders through unauthorized communications, and posed a risk to the children's safety based on evidence of abusive conduct and minimization of his actions. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the order, holding that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the history of violence, credibility of witnesses, and need to protect the children under applicable statutes. The Court noted that parenting plan proceedings would be the appropriate forum for any future efforts to reestablish contact if Haggag demonstrates it serves the children's best interests.

family law

The case involved David Warwood's petition for an order of protection against Dennis Scott Florer in Montana's Eighteenth Judicial District Court, based on allegations of verbal abuse and threats during a dispute over a work-for-rent arrangement at a cabin. The district court held a hearing where Warwood and a witness testified about Florer's abusive conduct and an incident involving a possible handgun, leading the court to issue a permanent order of protection after observing Florer's agitated behavior in court. Florer appealed, arguing abuse of discretion, improper reliance on witness testimony, and violations of his rights, but failed to provide the trial record or transcripts. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the order, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that a permanent order was necessary based on the evidence and Florer's courtroom conduct.

family lawprocedure

The case involved Stephen Joseph Johnson, who was convicted of criminal mischief, burglary, and bail jumping after allegedly stealing a vehicle, crashing it while fleeing, and later hiding in a witness's home. Johnson appealed, claiming the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation right by permitting an 86-year-old eyewitness to testify via live two-way videoconferencing from Washington due to his caregiving responsibilities for his wife and young children. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the remote testimony was justified by important public policy considerations, including the witness's family obligations and the distance involved, and that the testimony's reliability was preserved through oath, cross-examination, and jury observation of demeanor. The court applied and clarified the test from Maryland v. Craig, noting that the defendant's own delays in the proceedings contributed to the need for remote testimony and that no showing of unavailability was required.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Darrin William Matt's conviction for felony assault on a peace officer after he kicked a detention officer while being restrained in a chair at a tribal detention facility following an incident of self-harm. The district court sentenced him to 24 years in prison, citing among other factors that Matt had wasted time by proceeding to trial despite clear video evidence. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding that the district court's comments improperly punished Matt for exercising his constitutional right to a trial rather than pleading guilty. The court reasoned that while a lack of remorse or other factors could be considered, the sentencing remarks crossed into penalizing the exercise of procedural rights, requiring resentencing without that improper consideration. The court declined to address other claims as moot due to the remand.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether Wesley Thomas Cooper, convicted in North Dakota of misdemeanor Sexual Assault, had a duty to register as a sex offender in Montana under the Sexual and Violent Offender Registration Act based on the DOJ's determination that the offense was reasonably equivalent to a Montana sexual offense. The Supreme Court of Montana reversed the district court's denial of Cooper's writ of prohibition, holding that the proper procedure for the DOJ to impose registration is to file and serve an action in district court rather than requiring the individual to petition for removal. The court further reasoned that Montana courts may not rely on allegations in charging documents that were neither admitted by the defendant nor proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and that North Dakota's Sexual Assault statute, which lacks an age element, is not reasonably equivalent to the Montana provision that triggers registration only when the victim is under 16 and the offender is at least three years older.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Joshua McKnight, who was charged with felony criminal possession of dangerous drugs after methamphetamine was found in his clothing following a vehicle crash investigation. After McKnight failed to return to court following a lunch recess during his jury trial, the district court proceeded with the trial in his absence under Montana statute § 46-16-122(3)(b), which permits continuation when a defendant is voluntarily absent, resulting in a guilty verdict. On appeal, McKnight argued that resuming the trial without him was error and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not moving to suppress the drug evidence. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly applied the statute allowing trial to proceed and that the ineffective assistance claim was non-record-based and thus not reviewable on direct appeal, requiring instead a postconviction proceeding to develop the necessary facts.

criminal lawprocedure

Mary K. Embleton filed a petition for injunctive relief in the Eighth Judicial District Court against Cascade County and its commissioners, claiming harm from an alleged $54 increase in her solid waste district assessments and requesting an expedited hearing. The District Court denied the request without holding a hearing, found the claims without merit, and dismissed the case. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, noting the County's concession that a final judgment without a hearing was premature under Davis v. Westphal. The matter was remanded to the District Court to conduct a hearing before any dismissal. The opinion was issued as a non-precedential memorandum opinion under the court's internal rules.

procedure

The case involved Kaylea L. Mullendore's appeal from convictions for negligent homicide, criminal endangerment, and driving with a suspended license after a car accident in which her vehicle, driven at high speed following a rear-end collision, collided with another car, killing her five-year-old son and paralyzing her six-year-old daughter. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence, rejection of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, admission of certain officer testimony, denial of a mistrial motion, and order of restitution for the victim's father's lost wages. The court reasoned that the evidence supported a finding of negligence based on the driver's actions after the initial impact, that counsel's performance was not deficient, that evidentiary rulings were within discretion, and that restitution was authorized under the statute because lost wages would be recoverable in a related wrongful death civil action.

criminal lawtorts & liability

In State v. J. Pettit, the defendant appealed the District Court's revocation of his suspended sentence for felony sexual assault after he admitted to being terminated from sex offender treatment, which the State had alleged as a non-compliance violation along with others that were later withdrawn. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the revocation, holding that the admitted violation alone justified the revocation and that the District Court did not err by considering evidence of Pettit's other conduct involving minors and supervision failures during the dispositional phase. The Court reasoned that the revocation petition provided adequate notice of the allegations, Pettit had the opportunity to present witnesses and cross-examine the probation officer, and the sentencing court may consider relevant information about the defendant's character and history even if it relates to withdrawn allegations, so long as it is not based on misinformation. The resulting commitment to the Department of Corrections was within the original sentence parameters.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Davisson, the Montana Supreme Court reviewed the conviction of Jay Dee Davisson for one count of sexual intercourse without consent involving a 15-year-old victim who was severely intoxicated. Davisson challenged the trial court's jury instruction defining "knowingly," which contained an error, and argued that his counsel was ineffective for stipulating to it. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that Davisson failed to show prejudice from the erroneous instruction because substantial evidence, including his admission to the acts and video footage of the victim's condition, supported the jury's finding of incapacity. The same lack of prejudice defeated the ineffective assistance claim under the Strickland standard.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Davisson, the Montana Supreme Court reviewed the conviction of Jay Dee Davisson for one count of sexual intercourse without consent involving a 15-year-old victim who was severely intoxicated. Davisson challenged the trial court's jury instruction defining "knowingly," which contained an error, and argued that his counsel was ineffective for stipulating to it. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that Davisson failed to show prejudice from the erroneous instruction because substantial evidence, including his admission to the acts and video footage of the victim's condition, supported the jury's finding of incapacity. The same lack of prejudice defeated the ineffective assistance claim under the Strickland standard.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Pein, the defendant entered a guilty plea to one felony drug possession charge under a plea agreement that incorporated by reference a separate deferred prosecution agreement for two additional charges involving drug distribution and forfeiture. After the defendant's deferred sentence on the first charge was later revoked, the State reinstated prosecution on the deferred counts, leading to convictions following a jury trial. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court addressed whether a deferred prosecution agreement under the pretrial diversion statute could be incorporated into a plea agreement. The court held that the two statutory schemes are distinct and that such incorporation is not permitted, reversing the convictions on the reinstated counts. The decision rested on the plain language and procedural requirements of the relevant statutes governing plea agreements and pretrial diversion.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a dispute over a parenting plan for two children, L.M.A.R. and N.R.R., where the natural parents, Jesse Rehbein and Danielle Buck, appealed a district court order that adopted the grandparents' second amended parenting plan granting the grandparents a third-party parental interest. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. The court found a change in circumstances due to the parents' noncompliance with the prior plan's requirements, such as maintaining sobriety and addressing safety concerns. It held that amending the plan was in the children's best interests under Section 40-4-212, MCA, after considering relevant statutory factors including the children's therapists' input and the children's own statements, and noted that the parents did not challenge the district court's factual findings.

family law

This case involves a dispute between neighboring property owners, the Schuberts and the Toepps, over easements created during the subdivision of land in Yellowstone County, Montana, including an access easement and issues with a gate installed by the Schuberts that encroaches on the Toepps' property. The parties reached a Memorandum of Understanding through mediation, but disagreed on its terms regarding the gate and the scope of the easement. The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed the district court's rulings that the easement is limited to ingress and egress and that the Toepps are entitled to attorney fees for enforcing the agreement, but reversed the finding that the MOU implied the gate could remain, holding that it must be removed as an unlawful encroachment.

propertyprocedure