Jose Alberto Cabranes

This case involved the Joint Industry Board of Electrical Industry suing employer Whiffen Electric Co. and its principal Joseph Romanowicz to recover delinquent contributions to ERISA employee benefit plans, including a 401(k) plan, plus claims that Romanowicz breached fiduciary duties and was personally liable on dishonored checks under New York’s Uniform Commercial Code. The district court entered a default judgment against Whiffen for unpaid amounts, interest, and fees but dismissed all claims against Romanowicz. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that Romanowicz was not an ERISA fiduciary because he lacked discretionary authority or control over plan assets, that no hearing was required before dismissal on the pleadings, and that the UCC did not impose personal liability on the checks given the parties’ prior course of dealing.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involved Brandan R. Freeman, who was convicted of receiving child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) and appealed his sentence, challenging a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4) for possessing images depicting sadistic or masochistic conduct. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's imposition of the enhancement. The court reasoned that the district court's findings—that the images depicted sexual activity involving minors and that the activity would have caused the minors pain—were sufficient to support the enhancement, consistent with its prior holding in United States v. Delmarle.

criminal law

In this securities fraud case, the plaintiffs alleged that Arthur Andersen provided misleading advice and prepared false private placement memoranda recommending investments in Colonial Realty limited partnerships that formed part of a Ponzi scheme, causing over $1.4 million in losses, and that the firm failed to disclose its relationships with the partnerships. The plaintiffs asserted claims under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, and Connecticut common law. On the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court applied the standards requiring acceptance of the complaint's allegations as true and considered the one-year/three-year limitations period for federal claims filed after November 1990, along with state-law limitation periods and equitable tolling doctrines. The court also evaluated pleading requirements under Rule 9(b) and declined to consider new factual assertions raised only in opposition briefs.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this case, plaintiff Irwin Schiff, who had been convicted of tax evasion and placed on probation with a condition to comply with tax laws, sued a federal district judge, an assistant U.S. attorney, a probation officer, and an IRS agent for monetary damages, alleging improper conduct in connection with the revocation of his probation. The defendants moved for dismissal or summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment to all defendants, holding that the judge was protected by absolute judicial immunity for actions taken in his judicial capacity during the probation revocation proceedings, while the other officials were entitled to qualified immunity because the finding of a probation violation established that they had not violated any clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. The court applied established standards for immunity under Supreme Court precedent and found no genuine issues of material fact that would overcome these defenses.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves shareholders of Amity Bankcorp, Inc. suing the company and its directors to block a proposed stock purchase agreement with a third party, alleging that proxy statements contained material misrepresentations in violation of section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that public filings and statements artificially inflated the stock price in violation of sections 10(b) and 20(a). The plaintiffs also brought related state-law claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation. The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint. The court held that the applicable one-year statute of limitations for the federal securities claims is triggered by inquiry notice, not actual notice, and evaluated whether the claims were timely based on when a reasonable investor would have discovered the alleged violations.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerns motions regarding legal representation for defendant High Sheriffs and Special Deputy Sheriffs in actions brought before the Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations, after the state Attorney General withdrew as their counsel due to a conflict of interest. The court addressed whether the Attorney General could partially remain in the case for official-capacity claims and whether he was obligated to pay for substitute private counsel for the defendants. The court vacated its prior orders permitting partial representation, holding that all remaining claims for money damages could proceed only against the defendants in their individual capacities under the Eleventh Amendment and state sovereign immunity doctrines, rendering official-capacity representation moot. It further concluded that piecemeal withdrawal would be inappropriate and that any request for the Attorney General to fund new counsel should be litigated in state court, except for specific defendants where supplemental jurisdiction over novel state-law issues was declined.

labor & employmentprocedurefederal power

This case concerns plaintiff Samantha Champagne's motion for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of Connecticut's stalking statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-181d, following her arrest for allegedly stalking a bus driver after their personal relationship ended. The plaintiff alleges that the arrest and potential enforcement of the law violate her constitutional rights to freedom of association, travel, and due process under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The court reviews detailed findings of fact about the plaintiff's repeated appearances at the driver's bus stops, threatening gestures, and the circumstances leading to her arrest by Hartford police. In its reasoning, the court considers whether the plaintiff's activities constitute protected intimate associations or intrastate travel rights that would render the stalking law unconstitutional as applied.

criminal lawcivil rightsfree speech

In Field v. Kirton, a Connecticut attorney sued a New York Assistant Attorney General under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and related state tort claims, alleging that the defendant maliciously forwarded pleadings from a New York consumer fraud action (in which the plaintiff was identified as counsel for the defendants) to Connecticut grievance authorities, triggering an attorney discipline investigation. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the entire action. It held that the complaint failed to state a colorable federal claim under § 1983, that absolute and qualified immunity barred the claims against the prosecutor, and that supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims should be declined; the court further noted that the plaintiff offered no evidentiary support beyond conclusory allegations to justify further discovery. The ruling rested on the complaint, undisputed facts from the record, and the absence of any genuine issue of material fact.

civil rightsproceduretorts & liability

This case arose from the bankruptcy of Colonial Realty Company and its partners, who had sold limited partnership interests through an alleged Ponzi scheme in the 1980s; the trustee sued two law firms and two accounting firms for professional services allegedly connected to the scheme, asserting claims including fraud, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and RICO violations. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of standing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The court granted the motions, holding that the trustee lacked standing under Bankruptcy Code section 541 because he stands in the shoes of the debtors and the claims belonged to the creditors rather than the debtors themselves. The core reasoning was that a trustee has no standing to sue third parties on behalf of creditors, and the debtors could not have asserted these claims due to the nature of the alleged damages.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned the validity of Home Depot's substance abuse policy, which mandated urinalysis drug testing for any employee involved in a work-related accident causing at least $200 in property damage or other defined serious incidents, and the automatic termination of employees with less than two years of service who tested positive. Plaintiff Jeffrey Doyon, terminated after a forklift incident led to a positive marijuana test despite no other evidence of impairment, challenged the policy under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-51x. The court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment by examining whether involvement in a serious accident alone satisfied the statute's requirement of reasonable suspicion of drug or alcohol use. It concluded that the law demands individualized suspicion based on specific facts about the employee, not statistical correlations between accidents and drug use or blanket post-accident testing, consistent with Fourth Amendment standards and legislative intent limiting exceptions to narrow safety-sensitive roles.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case involves Brian Paul Chesna, a sheet metal worker at a defense contractor, challenging the Department of Defense's revocation of his security clearance on multiple constitutional grounds after administrative hearings upheld the decision. Chesna alleged violations of privacy through compelled medical disclosures and polygraphs, unconstitutional discrimination against blue-collar hourly employees, deprivation of property and liberty interests in his employment and profession, irrational decision-making despite his work record, and Fifth and Sixth Amendment violations from the Department's felony policy allowing clearance revocation based on conduct constituting a felony without a trial or hearing. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court ruled for the Department, finding no genuine issues of material fact, insufficient evidence to support the discrimination or other claims, and that the provided administrative proceedings satisfied due process.

civil rightsfederal powercriminal lawprocedure

The case involved a union health welfare fund, its members, and a hospital challenging whether Connecticut's Uncompensated Care Pool Act—which created a pool funded by assessments and a sales tax on hospital revenues to reimburse facilities for care provided to indigent and uninsured patients—was preempted by ERISA and the NLRA. The plaintiffs, including a class of fund beneficiaries, argued that the assessments could not lawfully be charged to or paid by the ERISA plan, leading the fund to escrow payments and prompting the hospital to apply funds to the assessments first per state requirements. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court examined whether the Act relates to ERISA plans or conflicts with federal statutes such as Medicare cost-shifting prohibitions, while also referencing a consent order that adjusted payment and escrow procedures for signatory hospitals during the litigation.

labor & employmenthealthcarefederal powertaxes

This case involved Louis Atherton's petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 challenging his 1990 federal conviction on two counts of cocaine distribution and the resulting sentence. After losing his direct appeal and certiorari petition, Atherton claimed ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel for failing to introduce defense transcripts of key tape recordings and for stipulating to exclude evidence of the government's main witness's prior DWI convictions; he also argued that the $25,000 fine should not be enforced because the oral sentence made it contingent on his ability to pay, which he lost after foreclosure. The court denied the ineffective assistance claims but granted relief on the fine, amending the sentence to vacate any remaining amount due. The reasoning on the fine was that the oral pronouncement at sentencing controlled over any conflicting written judgment under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36, and the explicit condition of ability to pay was no longer met.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a plaintiff suing a debt collection company under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and parallel Connecticut state law, alleging violations through attempts to collect a 1982 medical debt after the six-year statute of limitations had run, use of envelopes with a bold blue stripe and the word "TRANSMITTAL," and collection activity from an unlicensed California office while listing a Connecticut address. Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 standards, requiring no genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, while viewing facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and rejecting mere speculation or conclusory allegations. Core reasoning addressed whether the collector's letters falsely represented the debt's legal status under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, involved unfair practices under § 1692f, or violated communication rules under § 1692c, in light of the collector having ceased efforts after receiving notice of the dispute.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves a civil RICO action brought by the Sun City Taxpayers' Association against Citizens Utilities Company, alleging that the utility engaged in mail and wire fraud by submitting false accounting information to the Arizona Corporation Commission to obtain higher utility rates for its subsidiaries. The plaintiff sought treble damages under RICO based on the claimed pattern of racketeering activity. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that the Filed Rate Doctrine barred the claims because they would require the court to second-guess rates already approved by the regulatory agency. The opinion also addressed but did not fully resolve issues of organizational standing and the sufficiency of fraud pleadings under Rule 9(b).

business & regulatorycriminal lawprocedure

The case involved a plaintiff's First Amendment challenge to the confidentiality provisions of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-51Í governing investigations by Connecticut's Judicial Review Council into alleged judicial misconduct. After the statute was amended in response to an earlier ruling in the case, the court initially dismissed the action as moot but later granted reconsideration upon the plaintiff's filing of a new complaint. On reconsideration, the court dismissed the case on the merits with prejudice, holding that the amended statute's limits on disclosure—confined to the fact of a pending investigation or information gained through it, and lasting only until a probable cause determination—are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest and thus constitutional. The court rejected arguments that the probable cause standard was inadequate or that recent Supreme Court precedents rendered the restrictions invalid. The plaintiff was permitted to disclose any information known independently of the JRC process.

free speechcivil rights

This case involves a former medical secretary suing her hospital employer and supervisor under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) for her termination and subsequent refusal to rehire, along with claims under the federal and state constitutions, a state whistleblower statute, and various common-law tort and contract theories. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the ADEA count without prejudice, holding that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust required administrative remedies with the EEOC or state agency and that the claim was untimely. The court also dismissed the First Amendment and related state constitutional and statutory claims under Rule 12(b)(6), reasoning that the private hospital defendants were not state actors and that the plaintiff's internal workplace complaints did not involve matters of public concern. With the federal claims eliminated, the court dismissed the remaining supplemental state-law claims for lack of jurisdiction.

labor & employmentcivil rightsfree speechprocedure

The case involved two Special Deputy Sheriffs who alleged that their supervisors retaliated against them for participating in union organizing activities, including threats of termination, harassment, false accusations, denial of medical care, forced payment of dues used for political purposes, and wrongful discharge, partly for filing a workers' compensation claim. The plaintiffs brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to free speech, assembly, equal protection, and due process, along with parallel claims under the Connecticut Constitution, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-51q (free speech), § 46a-71 (employment discrimination), § 31-290a (workers' compensation retaliation), and related conspiracy and tort claims. The defendants moved for summary judgment on all counts. The court addressed whether the plaintiffs' at-will employment status barred due process claims, whether administrative remedies before the state Labor Board had to be exhausted before pursuing federal and state court actions, and the viability of the remaining constitutional, statutory, and common-law claims in light of the alleged facts and supplemental jurisdiction principles.

labor & employmentcivil rightsfree speechprocedure

The plaintiff, Kay Samuels, sued members of a narcotics task force and local police under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that officers violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by mistakenly entering and searching her apartment while executing a valid warrant for a neighboring unit, using force and causing damage. The state defendants moved for summary judgment, contending that any error was mere negligence that did not rise to a constitutional violation and that they were protected by qualified immunity. The court granted the motion, ruling that the officers' mistaken execution of the warrant did not violate clearly established law under Maryland v. Garrison and that their conduct was at most negligent, entitling them to immunity from damages liability. The decision disposed of the entire action against all defendants.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

The case concerns an inmate at a Connecticut correctional facility who filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against prison officials, alleging deliberate indifference to his safety that allowed a sexual assault by another inmate in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. On the defendants' motion to dismiss, the court addressed claims of Eleventh Amendment immunity for official-capacity suits, lack of personal involvement by supervisors, failure to allege deliberate indifference, improper service of process, and qualified immunity. The court granted dismissal of monetary claims against defendants in their official capacities and against the unnamed John Doe defendant, as well as claims against two officers for insufficient service, but denied dismissal of claims for injunctive relief and monetary relief against defendants in their individual capacities, finding the complaint stated viable allegations of deliberate indifference and that qualified immunity could not be resolved without further facts.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure