Richard B. Teitelman

Janet Delana sued a Missouri gun shop and its employees after they sold a firearm to her adult daughter, who had severe mental illness; the mother had warned the store against the sale, but two days later the daughter bought a gun and ammunition and used it to fatally shoot her father. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act preempted the negligence claim and that Missouri law does not recognize a negligent-entrustment claim against firearm sellers. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed in part, ruling that the PLCAA expressly preserves negligent-entrustment actions and that Missouri common law (following Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390) permits such a claim against a seller who knowingly supplies a dangerous item to an unfit person. The court affirmed dismissal of the ordinary negligence claim and the individual liability claims against the corporate principals, then remanded the case for further proceedings on the negligent-entrustment theory.

gunsfederal powertorts & liability

The Missouri Supreme Court disciplinary proceeding against attorney Joel B. Eisenstein arose from his representation of a husband in a divorce case, in which the husband had unauthorized access to his wife's personal email account and provided Eisenstein with her payroll documents and opposing counsel's confidential list of direct-examination questions. Eisenstein reviewed the materials, used some of the payroll information in settlement discussions, and presented the examination outline to opposing counsel at trial without prior disclosure; he also sent opposing counsel a threatening email afterward. The Court found that these actions violated Rules 4-8.4(c), 4-8.4(d), 4-3.4(a), and 4-4.4(a) by using evidence obtained through improper means and failing to promptly notify opposing counsel. Although the disciplinary hearing panel had recommended an indefinite suspension with no reinstatement eligibility for 12 months, the Court imposed an indefinite suspension with no reinstatement eligibility for six months, citing Eisenstein's prior disciplinary record and the nature of the misconduct.

family lawprocedure

William David Hill appealed a circuit court judgment upholding the denial of his 2013 application for a concealed carry permit under section 571.101, which the Jefferson County sheriff rejected solely because of Hill’s 1973 guilty plea to felony forgery. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the denial. The Court held that the 1975 statutory restoration of “all rights and privileges of citizenship” upon completion of probation did not erase the historical fact of the guilty plea, which section 571.101.2(3) expressly disqualifies, and that the 2014 amendment to article I, section 23 of the Missouri Constitution did not apply retroactively. It further concluded that the statute created no unconstitutional retrospective disability because it imposes regulatory duties on sheriffs rather than new legal obligations on applicants.

gunscriminal lawcivil rights

William David Hill appealed the denial of his 2013 application for a concealed carry permit by the Jefferson County sheriff, who cited Hill’s 1973 guilty plea to felony forgery (a crime punishable by more than one year in prison) under section 571.101.2(3). The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment upholding the denial. The court held that the 1975 statutory restoration of “all rights and privileges of citizenship” upon completion of probation did not negate the historical fact of the guilty plea or conviction for purposes of the permit statute. It further ruled that a 2014 amendment to article I, section 23 of the Missouri Constitution applied only prospectively and that section 571.101 imposed no unconstitutional retrospective disability on Hill.

gunscriminal lawcivil rights

John Strake sued the Robinwood West Community Improvement District under Missouri’s Sunshine Law, alleging it unlawfully withheld public records—including a settlement agreement from a personal injury case—despite a written request for disclosure. The trial court ordered the district to release the documents but denied Strake’s request for civil penalties and attorney fees, finding that the district had not “knowingly” or “purposefully” violated the law because it relied on counsel’s advice to honor the agreement’s confidentiality clause. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed that portion of the judgment. It held that the district’s counsel had explicitly recognized the Sunshine Law’s requirement that settlement agreements are open records, yet still advised withholding them to avoid potential breach-of-contract liability; this demonstrated awareness of the legal obligation and a deliberate choice to disregard it. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the penalty and fee issues.

procedurecivil rights

The case involved John McNeal, a prisoner, appealing the circuit court’s dismissal of his petition for dissolution of marriage. McNeal argued that sections 491.230 and 544.275 were unconstitutional because they failed to guarantee prisoners an unconditional right to appear in court for civil matters, and he sought direct review by the Missouri Supreme Court on that basis. The Court held that it lacked exclusive appellate jurisdiction under article V, section 3 of the Missouri Constitution because McNeal did not present a real and substantial challenge to the facial or as-applied validity of the statutes themselves. Instead, his claims centered on the trial court’s alleged failure to implement statutory alternatives to personal appearance, such as video proceedings under section 544.275 or other accommodations referenced in prior precedent like Call v. Heard. The appeal was therefore transferred to the Court of Appeals, Western District.

family lawprocedurecivil rights

In State of Missouri v. Anwar Randle, the defendant was convicted of first-degree trespass, second-degree assault, and armed criminal action after he and two companions broke into a home and he struck an occupant with a vodka bottle during a confrontation. Randle appealed, claiming the trial court wrongly refused his request for a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of third-degree assault. The Missouri Supreme Court vacated the assault and armed criminal action convictions and remanded the case, holding that the trial court erred by denying the instruction. The court reasoned that third-degree assault is a "nested" lesser-included offense of second-degree assault, differing only by the required mental state (reckless versus knowing), and that section 556.046 requires such an instruction when there is any evidentiary basis for it, including the jury's right to disbelieve the state's evidence of the greater offense. The court further noted that a "knowing" mental state legally establishes recklessness under section 562.021.4.

criminal lawprocedure

Brandon Roberts was convicted of second-degree domestic assault and witness tampering after an altercation in which he injured his partner A.A. with a shower rod and hammer, and after he allegedly tried to dissuade her from testifying. The Supreme Court of Missouri vacated both convictions, holding that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of third-degree domestic assault. The court reasoned that the two offenses are separated by only one element—whether Roberts acted “knowingly” or “recklessly”—making third-degree assault a “nested” lesser-included offense on which the jury must be instructed whenever the evidence could support acquittal of the greater offense, which the jury is always free to do by disbelieving part of the State’s proof. The court separately concluded that the assault and witness-tampering charges were properly joined because they arose from connected transactions, and that severance was not required given the simple, distinct elements of each offense.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute over whether the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission retained authority to decide an employer’s obligation to pay for specific future medical treatment under an approved workers’ compensation settlement. ISP Minerals settled Michael Alcorn’s claim for a work-related lung condition by paying a lump sum for permanent partial disability and agreeing to leave future related pulmonary medical care “open,” including authorized monitoring by a named physician; when the employer refused to cover certain prescribed inhalers, Alcorn sought a commission hearing, and the employer responded with a writ petition claiming the settlement had stripped the commission of jurisdiction. The Missouri Supreme Court quashed the writ, holding that the commission retains statutory jurisdiction under chapter 287 to determine liability for future medical care when a settlement leaves that issue open. The court reasoned that the workers’ compensation statutes give the commission exclusive authority over such disputes, and channeling the matter to circuit court via judgment enforcement or separate contract actions would be inconsistent with that framework and leave the issue unresolved.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved a medical negligence lawsuit brought by Douglas Stewart against Dr. Krikor Partamian and Phoenix Urology, alleging that the defendants failed to timely drain a diagnosed prostate abscess, causing it to rupture on May 17, 2009, and resulting in severe, permanent injuries including coma, loss of urethra function, incontinence, and reproductive impairment. A jury awarded Stewart $4.3 million in damages, and the defendants appealed the judgment on grounds including improper admission of deposition testimony, excessiveness of the verdict due to passion or prejudice, and the unconstitutionality of a Missouri statute barring remittitur in medical negligence cases. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the judgment in full. It held that the defendants waived any objection to the challenged testimony by failing to raise it at trial, failed to demonstrate that the verdict was excessive under applicable standards, and therefore could not establish the threshold showing needed to raise a viable constitutional challenge to the remittitur prohibition.

healthcaretorts & liabilityprocedure

Gary Coleman was convicted after a bench trial of second-degree robbery for entering a Missouri bank, handing a teller a plastic bag, saying “Put the money in this bag,” telling an approaching assistant manager to “stop where you are and don’t move any farther,” taking $1,472, and leaving; he admitted the acts to police. On appeal he contended the evidence was insufficient to prove he “forcibly stole” property because he neither used nor threatened the immediate use of physical force. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a demand for money inside a bank is an implicit threat of force when viewed objectively and in context, and that Coleman’s additional conduct—keeping one hand out of sight and ordering the manager not to approach—supplied further evidence from which a fact-finder could conclude he threatened the immediate use of physical force to accomplish the theft.

criminal law

The case involved Michael Amick’s convictions for second-degree murder and second-degree arson after a jury trial in which he was sentenced to life in prison and seven years. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the convictions and remanded the case because the trial court violated section 494.485 by recalling and substituting a discharged alternate juror for a principal juror after the jury had already deliberated for more than five hours. The statute requires that alternate jurors be discharged once the jury retires to consider its verdict and expressly bars any substitution thereafter, ensuring that the same twelve jurors participate throughout deliberations to protect the right to a unanimous verdict. The court held that this statutory violation constituted reversible error, regardless of the alternate’s assurances that she had not discussed the case.

criminal lawprocedure

Robert Mammen, convicted of driving while intoxicated as a chronic offender under Missouri law, was sentenced to ten years in prison along with a long-term substance abuse treatment program. After successfully completing the program, he petitioned the Supreme Court of Missouri for a writ of mandamus to compel his immediate release on probation, arguing that section 217.362.3 required it regardless of other statutes. The Court denied the petition, holding that Mammen was ineligible for probation until he served the two-year minimum imprisonment mandated for chronic offenders by section 577.023.6(4). The opinion reasoned that section 217.362 does not override or exempt chronic offenders from that minimum term, so the circuit court’s scheduled release date of June 24, 2015, was proper.

criminal lawprocedure

James Dean Hodges, convicted as a chronic offender for driving while intoxicated, was sentenced to five years in prison and placed in a long-term substance abuse treatment program under section 217.362. After successfully completing the program before serving two years, he sought a writ of mandamus for immediate probation release, claiming the statute required it. The Missouri Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that section 577.023.6(4) mandates a minimum of two years' imprisonment for chronic offenders before any probation or parole eligibility, and that section 217.362.3 does not override this requirement or create an exception. The court found the statutes consistent rather than conflicting, as the treatment program's probationary release provisions accommodate the two-year minimum, and the circuit court's scheduled June 2015 release date satisfied both.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, several Missouri landowners sued Bohr Farms and Cargill Pork, alleging temporary nuisance from offensive odors and emissions from a large hog concentrated animal feeding operation (CAFO), along with related negligence and conspiracy claims; the plaintiffs sought only damages for loss of use and enjoyment of their property and did not claim diminution in rental value or medical costs. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the defendants, ruling that section 537.296—which limits recoverable damages in agricultural nuisance cases to economic losses such as property value diminution or documented medical expenses—was constitutional and barred the plaintiffs’ requested relief. On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute validly supplants common-law nuisance remedies for crop and animal production operations by restricting recovery to the specified economic damages and does not effect a private or public taking, violate equal protection or due process, or infringe other constitutional provisions. The Court further found no error in the dismissal of the negligence and conspiracy claims.

business & regulatoryenvironmentpropertytorts & liability

This case involved an appeal from a circuit court's sua sponte dismissal, with prejudice, of a petition to dissolve a same-sex marriage on grounds that Missouri's constitutional and statutory bans on such marriages deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case, holding that the circuit court possessed subject matter jurisdiction. The court reasoned that article V, section 14 of the Missouri Constitution grants circuit courts original jurisdiction over all civil cases and matters, a petition for dissolution qualifies as such a matter, and neither the marriage ban in article I, section 33 nor related statutes limits that broad jurisdictional grant; any lack of authority to grant relief would not eliminate jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.

family lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved residents and the Labadie Environmental Organization challenging Franklin County’s zoning amendments that permitted a coal-ash landfill next to Ameren Missouri’s Labadie power plant. The circuit court dismissed the claim that the county commission failed to hold a legally sufficient public hearing under section 64.875 and upheld the amendments on the merits. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed, holding that the petition stated a viable claim because the commission allegedly barred discussion of Ameren’s specific site during the hearing, denying the public a fair opportunity to be heard on the actual proposal. Because a proper hearing must be established first, the Court found it unnecessary to address whether the amendments promote public health, safety, and welfare and remanded the case.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

Several individuals and the Labadie Environmental Organization sued the Franklin County Commission and Ameren Missouri, challenging zoning amendments that permitted a coal-ash landfill next to Ameren’s Labadie power plant. The plaintiffs claimed the commission violated state law by failing to hold a proper public hearing under section 64.875—specifically by barring discussion of Ameren’s proposed site—and that the amendments did not promote public health, safety, and welfare. The circuit court dismissed the hearing claim and upheld the amendments on the merits. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plaintiffs’ allegations, if true, showed the hearing denied the public a fair opportunity to address the actual subject of the amendments, making the hearing legally insufficient. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings on that issue before addressing the amendments’ substantive validity.

environmentbusiness & regulatorypropertyprocedure

Peter Hansen was convicted of two counts of felony child abuse for knowingly inflicting cruel and inhuman punishment on his 14-year-old son by repeatedly confining him in a small bathroom and by severely restricting his food intake as discipline. Hansen appealed, claiming the evidence was insufficient to prove the acts met the statutory standard or that he acted knowingly. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the evidence showed Hansen limited the boy to minimal rations such as a cup of grain or rice and vegetables daily—sometimes withholding all food—for periods of days to weeks, resulting in growth impairment well below the fifth percentile, and confined him for up to two weeks at a time in a four-by-five-foot bathroom that was kept cold, without light, and with only brief daily exercise. The Court reasoned that these facts supported findings of knowing infliction of cruel and inhuman punishment under the statute, as the deprivations went beyond ordinary discipline and caused measurable harm.

criminal lawfamily law

Mumtaz Lalani challenged a tax assessment after the Director of Revenue determined he owed Missouri’s 10% tax on the first sale of tobacco products (other than cigarettes) under section 149.160. Lalani had bought the products from a licensed wholesaler and resold them to Missouri retailers without reporting or paying the tax, prompting an audit and a lien for back taxes, penalties, and interest. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the Administrative Hearing Commission’s decision upholding the assessment. The court held that the plain language of sections 149.160.1 and 149.011(5) imposes the tax on the person making the first sale to a retailer, which Lalani did; that the statutes are not unconstitutionally vague; and that a prior ambiguous communication from a revenue employee did not estop the Director from collecting a tax required by statute.

taxesbusiness & regulatory