Robert J. Branson petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his life sentence for the class A felony of first-degree child molestation, claiming an insufficient factual basis supported his Alford guilty plea under the version of the statute in effect at the time of the offense. The Supreme Court of Missouri denied habeas relief, holding that Branson had waived the claim by failing to raise it in his Rule 24.035 postconviction motion and that the claim did not qualify for any exception to the procedural default rule. The court reasoned that Branson knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty to the class A felony while facing a potential life sentence, creating no jurisdictional defect or manifest injustice that would permit habeas review of the procedurally defaulted sentencing claim.
In this case, Brian K. Heathcock was convicted in Warren County of first-degree tampering with a vehicle, felony resisting arrest, and tampering with a victim after he took his girlfriend's car and led police on a chase. He had previously pleaded guilty in Montgomery County to first-degree tampering based on the same vehicle but an earlier incident of driving it. Heathcock appealed, claiming the Warren County tampering charge violated double jeopardy protections under the Fifth Amendment and Missouri law because it involved the same offense. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the convictions, holding that the two tampering charges arose from distinct acts separated by time and location rather than a single continuous offense. The court reasoned that double jeopardy prohibits multiple punishments only for the same act, and separate instances of unlawful operation qualify as different crimes even under the same statute.
In this case, a fourth-grade student sued a school bus company after being struck by an unidentified hit-and-run driver while crossing the street after being dropped off at the wrong corner due to the substitute driver's lack of an updated route sheet. The jury found the company negligent in failing to provide proper route information and awarded $1.3 million in damages. The Missouri Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the criminal act of the third-party driver constituted an intervening and superseding event that broke the chain of proximate causation from any actions or omissions by the bus company.
This case involved an appeal by Joplin Regional Stockyards (JRS) from a circuit court order reviving a 2013 judgment based on a 2005 workers' compensation settlement with employee Joe David Hudson. The settlement provided an $80,000 lump-sum payment for certain disability and past medical issues, with future medical expenses left open. Hudson sought to revive the judgment in 2022, claiming it remained unsatisfied, while JRS argued it had been paid and moved for relief from the judgment. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that JRS had standing to appeal and reversed the revival order, finding the judgment satisfied because the lump sum had been fully paid and any future medical determinations fall under the exclusive authority of the Division of Workers' Compensation rather than circuit court enforcement of the partial settlement judgment.
The case concerns a motion by the St. Louis County Prosecuting Attorney under Missouri statute § 547.031 to vacate Marcellus Williams' 2001 first-degree murder conviction and death sentence, based on claims of actual innocence and constitutional errors including ineffective assistance of counsel and racial bias in jury selection. After reviewing the motion, the circuit court denied relief, and the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed that judgment on appeal. The court held that there was no clear and convincing evidence of actual innocence or constitutional error undermining the original trial judgment, noting that all such claims had been rejected in prior state and federal proceedings over more than two decades and that the prosecutor had abandoned key innocence arguments. The court also overruled a related motion to stay Williams' execution as moot.
In State of Missouri v. Marcellus Williams, the Missouri Supreme Court addressed Williams' motion to withdraw a June 2024 warrant of execution setting a September 2024 date for his first-degree murder conviction and death sentence. The court overruled the motion, holding that the pending § 547.031 motion filed by the St. Louis County prosecutor to vacate the conviction—based on prior DNA testing claims of actual innocence and ineffective assistance—did not automatically require staying the execution. The core reasoning was that Rule 30.30(c) authorizes the warrant once postconviction remedies are exhausted, the prosecutor's action is not a defendant-filed postconviction motion under Rule 29.15, and Williams failed to demonstrate the equitable factors for injunctive relief; the court had previously rejected the same DNA and related claims in habeas proceedings.
This case involved a petition by Missouri's Attorney General for a writ of prohibition against circuit court judges who granted a criminal defendant's motion for a change of judge. After the defendant and prosecutor had stipulated to a change of venue and change of judge under Rule 32.02, the circuit court later sustained the defendant's second motion for a change of judge following the retirement of the assigned judge. The Supreme Court of Missouri issued a permanent writ of prohibition, holding that the circuit court lacked authority to grant the additional change of judge. The court's reasoning centered on Rule 32.02 and Rule 32.08, which bar parties who stipulate to a change of venue or judge from obtaining further changes except in narrow circumstances under Rules 32.09(c) or 32.10, which the defendant did not invoke or demonstrate. As a result, the case was ordered to remain assigned to the prior judge.
The case involved a dispute over whether Missouri Governor Michael Parson could rescind a prior executive order that had stayed the execution of death-row inmate Marcellus Williams and appointed a board of inquiry under § 552.070. Williams sued for declaratory judgment, claiming the rescission violated due process, statutory rights to a board review, and separation of powers. The circuit court denied the governor's motion for judgment on the pleadings, prompting the governor to seek a writ of prohibition. The Missouri Supreme Court made the writ permanent, holding that the state constitution grants the governor exclusive authority over clemency decisions and that Williams had no protected liberty interest or statutory entitlement to the board-of-inquiry process. The court reasoned that § 552.070 imposes no procedural requirements on the governor and that precedents like Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard confirm clemency remains a matter of executive discretion without due-process constraints.
David Steele sued Johnson Controls, Inc. (JCI) alleging retaliation and discrimination under § 287.780 for filing a workers' compensation claim, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. After JCI failed to respond to the properly served petition, the circuit court entered a default judgment awarding Steele $300,000 in compensatory damages and $600,000 in punitive damages. JCI moved to set aside the judgment under Rules 75.01, 74.05(d), and 74.06(b)(1), claiming its registered agent's misrouting of the documents constituted good cause, but provided only limited affidavits and no additional evidence at the hearing. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed, holding that JCI failed to prove good cause for its default as required by Rule 74.05(d), that the cited alternate rules did not apply, and that claims of error in the punitive damages award were not reviewable on appeal from the default judgment.
This case involved 2,625 St. Louis County commercial property owners who filed ratio discrimination claims against the county assessor, alleging their 2017 property assessments were set at a higher percentage of fair market value than other similar properties, even though they did not allege intentional bias. The taxpayers appealed their assessments through the board of equalization and State Tax Commission, and some received reduced valuations, but they argued the original assessor values should still be used to show discrimination. The Missouri Supreme Court held that the circuit court erred in reversing the STC, vacated that judgment, and reinstated the STC's order denying the claims. The court reasoned that the STC's decision was supported by substantial evidence because the taxpayers' reliance on the adjusted FMV figures from the BOE and STC effectively meant their properties were assessed at the statutory 32% rate, with no gross excess shown, and that the STC did not abuse its discretion in limiting discovery. The court also addressed the proper method for evaluating such claims using the assessor's original valuations rather than post-appeal adjustments.
In this case, Tyler Technologies sought a writ of prohibition from the Missouri Supreme Court to prevent a circuit court from proceeding on Counts IV and VI of a class-action negligence suit brought by property owners against Tyler, Jackson County officials, and others over the 2023 real property assessment process. The plaintiffs claimed Tyler breached a duty of care in performing its contract with the County by failing to ensure timely assessment notices and required physical inspections, leading to allegedly illegal assessments. The Supreme Court made its preliminary writ permanent, ordering the circuit court to dismiss those counts with prejudice. The core reasoning was that the plaintiffs failed to allege facts establishing Tyler owed them any duty of care, as the rule of privity barred tort liability for a contractor's performance of contractual duties owed solely to the County, and no statutory or common-law duty to the plaintiffs was shown.
The City of Harrisonville sued the Missouri Department of Natural Resources after the agency withheld certain correspondence under exemptions in the state's Sunshine Law, claiming the documents related to personnel matters; the Fund Board intervened in support of nondisclosure. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the agencies, finding the records were properly closed under sections 610.021(3) and (13). On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court dismissed the case without reaching the merits because the City's appellate brief violated multiple requirements of Rule 84.04, which substantially impeded review. The court emphasized that a proper point relied on must identify the challenged ruling, state legal reasons for reversal, and explain why those reasons apply in context.
The case concerned whether Walmart Starco LLC was exempt from Missouri use tax on information technology equipment it purchased and then resold to other Walmart subsidiaries after adding software or hardware, testing, and repackaging. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the Administrative Hearing Commission's decision that Starco qualified for the resale exemption under sections 144.018.1 and 144.615(6). The court reasoned that Starco's transactions involved transferring ownership for consideration, satisfying the definition of a sale, and that the equipment was held solely for resale in the regular course of business. Director's argument regarding Starco's status as a disregarded entity was not considered because it was not raised before the Commission.
The case involved the State of Missouri appealing a circuit court order that dismissed with prejudice charges of second-degree murder, first-degree robbery, and armed criminal action against Semaj Harris, which stemmed from a 2018 shooting incident and arose after the parties' deferred prosecution agreement and Harris's guilty plea to a related stealing charge. The Supreme Court of Missouri dismissed the appeal, concluding it lacked jurisdiction because the order did not adjudicate all seven counts in the indictment and thus was not a final, appealable judgment. The court reasoned that the State's right to appeal in criminal cases is purely statutory under § 547.200, which permits only specific types of interlocutory appeals not applicable here, and declined to treat the improper appeal as a writ petition given the absence of exceptional circumstances.
The case concerned a joint application by Missouri-American Water Company and a developer, DCM Land, LLC, seeking variances from the company's approved tariff rules on funding water main extensions for a new subdivision, which would have shifted more costs to the company. The Missouri Public Service Commission granted the variances, but the Office of Public Counsel appealed. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the Commission's order, holding that the Commission lacked authority to approve variances because the specific tariff rule (Rule 23) contained no explicit exceptions clause permitting departures. The court relied on precedent requiring such language in the relevant rule itself for the Commission to have power to grant exceptions, and remanded for entry of an order consistent with the opinion.
In State of Missouri v. Lindsay Michelle Forbes, the defendant was convicted by a jury of the class B felony of financial exploitation of an elderly person by undue influence under Missouri statute. Forbes appealed, challenging the jury instruction and other trial rulings, but the Supreme Court of Missouri dismissed the appeal after determining that the notice of appeal was filed more than 10 days after the circuit court orally rendered final judgment and sentence on February 10, 2020. The court held that the timely filing requirement is jurisdictional, so the late notice deprived it of authority to consider the merits, and it further ruled that subsequent circuit court actions purporting to resentence Forbes were void because the court had exhausted its jurisdiction after the original judgment. The case was remanded with directions to vacate the later judgment and enter a written judgment consistent with the February 10 sentence.
In this case, Jarrad Ryan Vandergrift was convicted by a jury of three counts of first-degree child molestation and three counts of first-degree statutory sodomy, after which the circuit court orally pronounced sentence and imposed consecutive terms totaling 135 years. Vandergrift filed a notice of appeal shortly after the oral sentencing, but questions arose regarding the timeliness of the appeal and appellate jurisdiction because a formal written judgment was not entered until nearly eight months later. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that final judgment occurs upon the oral rendition of sentence in the defendant's presence, triggering the right to appeal under § 547.070, and that the appeal was timely, preserving jurisdiction despite the delayed written judgment. The Court further determined that Vandergrift's challenges to the denial of his new trial motion and to the admission of expert testimony on delayed disclosure by child victims lacked merit. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the convictions.
In State of Missouri v. Randy G. Teter, an inmate at a state correctional center was convicted of first-degree kidnapping and committing violence against a Department of Corrections employee after attacking a staff member and holding her hostage. Teter, who represented himself at trial following a Faretta hearing, appealed on grounds that the circuit court failed to ensure his waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary and that his sentence should have run concurrently with a prior sentence under an earlier plea agreement. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the convictions, finding no plain error in the proceedings. The court determined that the record as a whole, including Teter's prior self-representation experience and the circuit court's colloquy on rights and punishments, established that his waiver was valid. It also rejected the sentencing claim as unsupported by the record.
The consolidated cases involve two tier I sex offenders, Brock Smith and Gary Nelson Ford, who each pleaded guilty to sex offenses in Missouri and petitioned for removal from the state sex offender registry after meeting the time and compliance requirements under the tiered system in § 589.401. The circuit courts denied both petitions, and the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed those judgments. The Court held that § 589.400.1(7) of the Missouri Sex Offender Registration Act independently requires lifetime registration for any person who has ever been obligated to register under the federal SORNA, even if the offender would otherwise qualify for removal as a tier I registrant under state law. This conclusion rests on the plain language of the statute making MO-SORA applicable to those with federal registration duties, without regard to the 2018 tiered removal provisions.
This case arose when M.O. sought insurance coverage from GEICO for bodily injury after contracting HPV during consensual sexual activity in M.B.'s insured vehicle; GEICO denied the claim, and M.B. and M.O. then entered a secret agreement under § 537.065 allowing recovery only from insurers. They arbitrated a $5.2 million award without full notice to GEICO, filed suit to confirm it, and GEICO moved to intervene within the statutory 30-day period after learning of the agreement. The trial court confirmed the award while the intervention motion was pending, then granted intervention afterward, and denied GEICO's subsequent motions to vacate. The Missouri Supreme Court vacated the confirmation judgment and remanded, ruling that the plain language of § 537.065.2 grants the insurer an absolute right to intervene in the pending action before any judgment may be entered.